The siege of Plevna in the Russian-Turkish war lasted. Siege and capture of pleven
Tragedy near Plevna
After the capture of Nikopol, Lieutenant General Kridener had to occupy the undefended Plevna as quickly as possible. The fact is that this city was of strategic importance as a junction of roads leading to Sofia, Lovcha, Tarnovo, Shipka Pass, etc. In addition, on July 5, the forward patrols of the 9th Cavalry Division reported on the movement of large enemy forces towards Plevna. These were the troops of Osman Pasha, urgently transferred from Western Bulgaria. Initially, Osman Pasha had 17 thousand people with 30 field guns.
On July 4, the Chief of Staff of the Army in the Field, General Nepokoichitsky, sent a telegram to Kridener: “... immediately send a Cossack brigade, two regiments of infantry with artillery, to occupy Plevna.” On July 5, General Kridener received a telegram from the commander-in-chief, in which he demanded to immediately occupy Plevna and "cover in Plevna from a possible offensive of troops from Vidin." Finally, on July 6, Nepokoichitsky sent another telegram stating: “If you cannot immediately go to Plevno with all the troops, then immediately send Tutolmin’s Cossack brigade and part of the infantry there.”
The troops of Osman Pasha, making daily 33-kilometer crossings, overcame a 200-kilometer path in 6 days and occupied Plevna, while General Kridener failed to overcome a distance of 40 km in the same time. When the units allocated to them finally approached Plevna, they were met by the fire of Turkish cavalry intelligence. The troops of Osman Pasha had already settled down on the hills surrounding Plevna and had begun to equip positions there. Until July 1877, the city had no fortifications. However, from the north, east and south, Plevna was covered by the dominant heights. Having successfully used them, Osman Pasha erected field fortifications around Plevna.
Turkish General Osman Pasha (1877-1878)
To capture Plevna, Kridener sent a detachment of Lieutenant General Schilder-Schuldner, who only approached the fortifications of the Turks on the evening of July 7. The detachment consisted of 8600 people with 46 field guns. The next day, July 8, Schilder-Schuldner attacked the Turks, but was not successful. In this battle, called "First Plevna", the Russians lost 75 officers and 2326 lower ranks killed and wounded. According to Russian data, the losses of the Turks amounted to less than two thousand people.
The presence of Turkish troops at a distance of only two day's marches from the only crossing over the Danube near Sistovo was very worried about Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. The Turks could threaten the entire Russian army from Plevna, and especially the troops advanced beyond the Balkans, not to mention the headquarters. Therefore, the commander demanded to defeat the troops of Osman Pasha (whose forces were greatly exaggerated) and to capture Plevna.
By mid-July, the Russian command concentrated 26 thousand people near Plevna with 184 field guns.
At the same time, it should be noted that the Russian generals did not guess to surround Plevna. Reinforcements freely approached Osman Pasha, ammunition and food were brought up. By the beginning of the second assault, his forces in Plevna had increased to 22 thousand people with 58 guns. As you can see, the Russian troops did not have a superiority in numbers, and an almost triple superiority in artillery did not play a decisive role, since the then field artillery was powerless against well-made earthen fortifications, even of a field type. In addition, the artillery commanders near Plevna did not dare to send cannons into the first ranks of the attackers and shoot the defenders of the redoubts point-blank, as was the case near Kars.
However, on July 18, Kridener launched a second assault on Plevna. The assault ended in disaster - 168 officers and 7167 lower ranks were killed and wounded, while the losses of the Turks did not exceed 1200 people. During the assault, Kridener gave stupid orders, the artillery as a whole acted sluggishly and spent only 4073 shells in the entire battle.
After the “Second Plevna”, panic began in the Russian rear. In Sistovo, they mistook the approaching Cossack unit for the Turks and were about to surrender to them. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich turned to the Romanian King Charles with a tearful request for help. By the way, the Romanians themselves offered their troops before that, but Chancellor Gorchakov categorically did not agree to the Romanians crossing the Danube for some political reasons known to him alone. Turkish generals had the opportunity to defeat the Russian army and throw its remnants across the Danube. But they also did not like to take risks, and also intrigued against each other. Therefore, despite the absence of a solid front line, only a positional war was going on in the theater for several weeks.
On July 19, 1877, Tsar Alexander II, deeply dejected by the “Second Plevna”, ordered the mobilization of the Guards and Grenadier Corps, the 24th, 26th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions, a total of 110 thousand people with 440 guns. However, they could not arrive before September - October. In addition, it was ordered to move to the front the already mobilized 2nd and 3rd infantry divisions, the 3rd rifle brigade, but these units could not arrive before mid-August. Before the arrival of reinforcements, it was decided to confine ourselves to defense everywhere.
By August 25, significant forces of Russians and Romanians were concentrated near Plevna: 75,500 bayonets, 8,600 sabers and 424 guns, including more than 20 siege guns. The Turkish forces numbered 29,400 bayonets, 1,500 cavalry and 70 field guns. On August 30, the third assault on Plevna took place. The date of the assault was timed to coincide with the name day of the king. Alexander II, the Romanian King Charles and Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich personally arrived to watch the assault.
The generals did not bother to provide massive artillery fire, and there were very few mortars near Plevna, as a result, the enemy fire was not suppressed, and the troops suffered huge losses. The Turks repulsed the assault. The Russians lost two generals killed and wounded, 295 officers and 12,471 lower ranks, their Roman allies lost about three thousand people. Only about 16 thousand against three thousand Turkish losses.
Alexander II and Prince Charles of Romania near Plevna
"Third Plevna" made a stunning impression on the army and the whole country. On September 1, Alexander II convened a military council in the town of Poradim. At the council, the commander-in-chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, suggested immediately leaving back across the Danube. In this he was actually supported by Generals Zotov and Massalsky, while the Minister of War Milyutin and General Levitsky categorically opposed the retreat. After a long deliberation, Alexander II agreed with the opinion of the latter. It was decided to go on the defensive again, before the arrival of new reinforcements.
Despite the successful defense, Osman Pasha was aware of the riskiness of his position in Plevna and asked permission to retreat until he was blocked there. However, he was ordered to remain where he was. From the composition of the garrisons of Western Bulgaria, the Turks urgently formed the army of Shefket Pasha in the Sofia region, as reinforcements to Osman Pasha. On September 8, Shevket Pasha sent the Akhmet-Khivzi division (10 thousand bayonets with 12 guns) to Plevna with a huge food transport. The collection of this transport went unnoticed by the Russians, and when the trains of convoys stretched past the Russian cavalry (6 thousand sabers, 40 guns), its mediocre and timid chief, General Krylov, did not dare to attack them. Encouraged by this, on September 23 Shevket Pasha sent another transport, with which he himself set off, and this time only one cavalry regiment made up the entire guard of the convoy! General Krylov missed both the transport and Shevket Pasha, not only to Plevna, but also back to Sofia. Truly, even an enemy agent in his place could not have done more! Due to Krylov's criminal inaction, Osman Pasha's army received food for two months.
On September 15, General E.I. arrived near Plevna. Totleben, summoned by the tsar's telegram from St. Petersburg. Having traveled around the positions, Totleben categorically spoke out against the new assault on Plevna. Instead, he proposed to tightly block the city, and starve the Turks, i.e. what should have started right away! By the beginning of October, Plevna was completely blocked. By mid-October, there were 170 thousand people of Russian troops against 47 thousand of Osman Pasha.
To unlock Plevna, the Turks created the 35,000th so-called "Sofia Army" under the command of Mehmed Ali. Mehmed-Ali slowly moved towards Plevna, but on November 10-11, his units were driven back near Novagan by the western detachment of General I.V. Gurko (Gurko also had 35 thousand people). Gurko wanted to pursue and finish off Mehmed-Ali, but Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich forbade this. Having burned himself near Plevna, the Grand Duke was now cautious.
By mid-November, ammunition and food began to run out in the encircled Plevna. Then, on the night of November 28, Osman Pasha left the city and went on a breakthrough. The 3rd Grenadier Division, vigorously supported by artillery, stopped the Turks. And in the middle of the day, the main forces of the Russian army approached the battlefield. The wounded Osman Pasha gave the order to surrender. In total, more than 43 thousand people surrendered: 10 pashas, 2128 officers, 41,200 lower ranks. 77 guns were taken. Killed and wounded, the Turks lost about six thousand people. Russian losses in this battle did not exceed 1700 people.
The stubborn resistance of Osman Pasha in Plevna cost the Russian army huge losses in manpower (22.5 thousand killed and wounded!) And a five-month delay in the offensive. This delay, in turn, nullified the possibility of a quick victory in the war, which was created due to the capture of the Shipka Pass by the units of General Gurko on July 18-19.
The main reason for the tragedy near Plevna was the illiteracy, indecision and outright stupidity of such Russian generals as Kridener, Krylov, Zotov, Massalsky and the like. This is especially true for the use of artillery. The stupid generals did not know what to do with a large number of field guns, although they could at least remember how Napoleon concentrated batteries of 200-300 guns at the decisive battlefield and literally swept the enemy with artillery fire.
On the other hand, long-range rapid-fire rifles and effective shrapnel made it almost impossible for infantry to attack the fortifications without first suppressing them with artillery. And field guns are physically unable to reliably suppress even earthen fortifications. To do this, you need mortars or howitzers of 6-8 inches. And there were such mortars in Russia. In the western fortresses of Russia and in the siege park of Brest-Litovsk, about 200 units of 6-inch mortars of the 1867 model were idle. These mortars were quite mobile, it was not difficult to transfer even all of them to Plevna. In addition, on June 1, 1877, 16 units of 8-inch and 36 units of 6-inch mortars of the 1867 model were available in the siege artillery of the Danube Army. - half a pound smooth mortars, hundreds of which were in fortresses and siege parks. Their firing range did not exceed 960 meters, but the half-pound mortars were easily placed in trenches, and the crews transferred them to the battlefield manually (this is a kind of prototype of mortars).
The Turks in Plevna did not have mortars, so Russian 8-inch and 6-inch mortars from closed positions could shoot Turkish fortifications with virtually impunity. After 6 hours of continuous bombardment, the success of the storming troops could be guaranteed. Especially in the event that the 3-pound mountain and 4-pound field guns supported the advancing fire, moving in the advanced formations of infantry on horseback or human traction.
By the way, back in the late 50s of the 19th century, chemical munitions were tested near St. Petersburg on the Volkovo field. Bombs from a half-pood (152-mm) unicorn were equipped with cyanide cacodile. In one of the experiments, such a bomb was detonated in a log house, where there were twelve cats protected from fragments. A few hours later, the site of the explosion was visited by a commission headed by Adjutant General Barantsev. All the cats lay motionless on the floor, their eyes watery, but they were all alive. Disappointed by this fact, Barantsev wrote a resolution stating that it was impossible to use chemical munitions either now or in the future due to the fact that they do not have a lethal effect. It did not occur to the adjutant general that it was not always necessary to kill the enemy. Sometimes it is enough to temporarily incapacitate him or make him run by dropping his weapon. Apparently, the general really had sheep in his family. It is not difficult to imagine the effect of the massive use of chemical shells near Plevna. In the absence of gas masks, even field artillery can force any fortress to surrender.
In addition to all that has been said, the real disaster for the Russian army in this war was the invasion of the titled locust. Before the start of the war, the commander-in-chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, wrote a letter to Alexander II, in which he argued that the tsar's stay in the army was undesirable, and also asked not to send grand dukes there. Alexander II replied to his brother that "the forthcoming campaign is of a religious-national character", and therefore he "cannot remain in St. Petersburg", but promised not to interfere with the orders of the commander-in-chief. The tsar was going to start rewarding distinguished servicemen, visiting the wounded and sick. “I will be a brother of mercy,” Alexander finished the letter. He also refused the second request. They say, due to the special nature of the campaign, the absence of the Grand Dukes in the army can be understood by Russian society as their evasion from fulfilling their patriotic and military duty. “In any case,” Alexander I wrote, “Sasha [Tsesarevich Alexander Alexandrovich, future Tsar Alexander III], as the future Emperor, cannot but participate in the campaign, and at least this way I hope to make a man out of him.”
Alexander II still went to the army. The Tsarevich, Grand Dukes Alexei Alexandrovich, Vladimir Alexandrovich, Sergei Alexandrovich, Konstantin Konstantinovich and others were also there. All of them climbed, if not to command, then to advise. The trouble from the tsar and the grand dukes was not only in incompetent councils. Each of them was accompanied by a large retinue of close associates, lackeys, cooks, their own guards, etc. The ministers of military, internal and foreign affairs were constantly in the army with the emperor, and other ministers regularly visited. The stay of the king in the army cost the treasury one and a half million rubles. And it's not just about money - there were no war operations in the theater railways. The army experienced constant interruptions in supply, there were not enough horses, oxen, fodder, wagons, etc. Terrible roads were clogged with troops and vehicles. Is it necessary to explain what confusion was brought about by thousands of horses and carts serving the king and the grand dukes.
| |
140 years ago, on November 28 (December 10), 1877, the Russian army took Plevna after a long siege. The Turkish army of Osman Pasha was defeated while trying to break out of the encirclement and capitulated. The capture of Plevna by the Russian troops became the key event of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, which predetermined the successful completion of the campaign on the Balkan Peninsula and the defeat of the Turkish Empire.
background
After forcing the Danube at Zimnitsa, the Russian Danube Army advanced its Western Detachment (9th Corps of Lieutenant General N.P. Kridener) to capture Nikopol and Plevna. After the successful assault on Nikopol on July 4 (16), the Russian command did not take any action for two days to capture Plevna, located 40 km from it, although there were no serious enemy forces there. The Russians could actually just enter the enemy's strategic fortress. While the Russian troops were inactive, the army of Osman Pasha advanced from Vidin. She made a forced march, having covered 200 km in 6 days, at dawn on 7 (19) she went to Plevna and took up defense on the outskirts of the city. The Ottomans immediately began to strengthen the defense of the fortress, turning it into a fortified area.
On the morning of July 8 (20) a Russian detachment under the command of Lieutenant General Yu. I. Schilder-Schuldner attacked the fortress. But the Turks repelled the attack. On July 18 (30), the second assault on Plevna took place, which also failed and cost the Russian troops about 7 thousand people. In the meantime, the Ottomans quickly restored the destroyed defenses, erected new ones and turned the nearest approaches to Plevna into a heavily fortified area with over 32 thousand troops defending it with 70 guns. The grouping of Osman Pasha created a threat to the Danube army from the flank. This failure forced the Russian command to suspend offensive operations in the main direction of Constantinople.
The Western detachment had to be increased to an entire army, more than three times - 84 thousand people, 424 guns, including the Romanian troops - 32 thousand people, 108 guns. The supreme leadership of Russia and Romania was also located here - Alexander II, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and Minister of War D. A. Milyutin, the Romanian Prince Karl (he was formally the commander of the Western Detachment). In the middle of the day on August 30 (September 11), the third assault on the Turkish stronghold began. Skobelev's detachment in the 2nd half of the day managed to break through the enemy defenses and open the way to Plevna. But the Russian high command refused to regroup forces to the south and did not support Skobelev's detachment with reserves, which the next day, repelling strong counterattacks by the Turks, was forced to retreat under the onslaught of superior enemy forces to their original position. Thus, the third attack on Plevna, despite the high military prowess, dedication and stamina of Russian and Romanian soldiers and officers, ended in failure. There were errors in management. In particular, the intelligence of the Turkish troops and their defense system was weak, which caused the enemy to be underestimated; strikes were delivered in the same directions, where the enemy was already waiting for an attack and was well prepared; the interaction between the troops advancing on each of them was not organized; artillery preparation was ineffective; the breakthrough of the Skobelev detachment could not be used, etc.
The unsuccessful outcome of the offensive forced the Russian high command to change strategy. On September 1 (13), Tsar Alexander II arrived near Plevna and convened a military council, at which he raised the question of whether the army should remain near Plevna or whether troops should be withdrawn from the fortress. The chief of staff of the Western Detachment, Lieutenant General P. D. Zotov, and the chief of artillery of the army, Lieutenant General Prince N. F. Masalsky, spoke out in favor of the retreat. For the continuation of the struggle for the fortress, Major General K. V. Levitsky, Assistant Chief of Staff of the Danube Army, and Minister of War D. A. Milyutin advocated. Milyutin suggested abandoning direct assaults and breaking the enemy's resistance with a siege. Milyutin noted that the troops, not having large-caliber artillery of mounted fire, could not reliably destroy the defensive structures of the Ottoman army and succeed in an open attack. In the event of a complete blockade, success is guaranteed, since the Turkish garrison does not have enough supplies for a long struggle. Indeed, the enemy was already short of supplies. On September 2 (14), Osman Pasha reported to the high command that shells and food were running out, there were no reinforcements, and the losses had greatly weakened the garrison, forcing him to a dangerous retreat.
Alexander II supported Milyutin. The council members decided not to retreat from Plevna, to strengthen their positions and wait for reinforcements from Russia, after which they planned to start a proper siege of the fortress and force it to surrender. To direct the siege work, the well-known engineer-general E. I. Totleben, who became famous during the defense of Sevastopol, was appointed assistant commander of the detachment of the Romanian prince Charles. Arriving at the theater of operations, Totleben came to the conclusion that the Plevna garrison was provided with food for only two months, and therefore could not withstand a long blockade. General Zotov returned to his former duties as commander of the 4th Corps. All cavalry was subordinated to I. V. Gurko. These changes have improved command and control of troops. The western detachment was again reinforced - the newly arrived Guards Corps (1st, 2nd, 3rd Guards Infantry and 2nd Guards Cavalry Divisions, Guards Rifle Brigade) joined it.
Departure from Plevna. December 1877. Painting by an unknown artist published in the English illustrated magazine The Illustrated London News in February 1878.
Siege
General Totleben skillfully led the siege work. To reduce losses in the troops, he ordered to dig strong trenches, build comfortable dugouts, and bring far-flung hospitals closer to the front. Artillery was to carry out a thorough sighting, and then move on to the methodical destruction of enemy fortifications.
Russian-Romanian troops surrounded Plevna from the north, east and south. In the west and southwest, the enemy had the opportunity to pass. Especially important for the Turkish garrison was the Sofia Highway, through which Osman Pasha's army received the main supplies. For the defense of this communication, the Turks fortified the points of Gorny Dubnyak, Dolny Dubnyak and Telish. To completely block the enemy garrison, it was necessary to cut his communication with Sophia. First, small cavalry detachments of Krylov and Loshkarev were sent here. However, this was not enough. It was necessary to take enemy strongholds on the highway. This task was to be solved by the newly formed detachment under the command of I.V. Gurko.
E. I. TOTLEBEN. Engraving from a photograph (1878)
The Gurko detachment was a very powerful force, the whole army - 50 thousand people with 170 guns. It was based on the guards, who had recently arrived at Plevna. They decided to strike the first blow at Gorny Dubnyak, where 4.5 thousand Turkish garrison sat with 4 guns. Turkish troops occupied good positions on the hills, fortified with two redoubts and trenches. To attack enemy positions, 20 battalions, 6 squadrons and 48 guns were allocated. The troops were to attack simultaneously in three columns - from the north, east and south. At 8 o'clock on 12 (24) October, the Russians attacked the enemy. It was impossible to attack the enemy at the same time. The right column was the first to move forward, the other columns moved late. The guardsmen, participating in the battle for the first time, bravely went on the offensive in close formation and suffered unreasonably large losses. The Turks were able to repel individual attacks by Russian columns. As Gurko noted: “... followed whole line individual attacks. All parts found in the highest degree destructive fire, they could not reach the main redoubt. By 12 o'clock, our troops took the Small Redoubt and surrounded the Big Redoubt, but due to heavy fire, they could not break through further and lay down.
Gurko decided to resume the offensive in the evening. At this time, our soldiers, using dashes and crawls, singly and in small groups accumulated near the redoubt. For movement, the soldiers used the folds of the terrain, ditches, ditches and pits. By 6 p.m., enough troops had accumulated in the ditch to attack. They were in the dead zone, could not fall under enemy fire. When dusk came, our troops stormed the redoubt. During the bayonet battle, the enemy was defeated and capitulated. However, the victory came at a high price. The losses of Russian troops amounted to 3.3 thousand killed and wounded. The Turks lost about 1.5 thousand killed and wounded and 2.3 thousand captured.
The second blow was inflicted on Telish. On October 13 (25), our troops attacked an enemy stronghold, but without success. Then Gurko decided to take the fortification with an "artillery attack". The fortifications of the Turkish garrison and the surrounding area were studied. Artillerymen prepared firing positions, the corresponding engineering training offensive. Artillery preparation was thorough - 6 hours. A strict order of artillery preparation was established: from 12 to 14 hours - a powerful fire strike with all artillery; at 14 and 14 hours 30 minutes - three volleys with all artillery, and then methodical fire; at 1630 hours - three volleys, then methodical fire again; at 18 o'clock - the last three volleys. Ammunition consumption was provided for 100 shells per gun. It was planned that if the enemy did not lay down after such a powerful fire strike, then the troops would storm with three parties. Such careful preparation led to success.
On October 16 (28) the assault on Telish began. The attack involved 4 brigades and 72 guns. The powerful and well-aimed fire of the Russian batteries demoralized the Ottoman troops. After a 3-hour artillery preparation, 5 thousand. The Turkish garrison capitulated. Russian losses did not exceed 50 people. On October 20 (November 1), the enemy surrendered Gorny Dubnyak without a fight. On the same day, the advanced units of the 3rd Grenadier Division, which arrived in Bulgaria, approached the settlement northwest of Plevna - Gorny Metropol, interrupting communications with Vidin. Thus, the blockade of Plevna became complete.
The Turkish command decided to release the army of Osman Pasha. For this, 25 thousand groups began to concentrate in the Orkhaniye region. However, this plan of the enemy was destroyed by the actions of the Gurko detachment. The general began to move towards Orkhanie with the aim of defeating the enemy corps and securing a path to the Trans-Balkan region. The Turkish command, not daring to enter into an open battle with the Russians (the stability of the Turkish troops in open battle was doubtful), withdrew troops from Orkhaniye to the fortifications near Arab-Konak. Our troops, having reached this line, stopped. They completed their main task. The blockade of Plevna was secured and our troops took up a convenient position for the future movement for the Balkans.
The location of the Western Detachment by October 24, 1877 and the completion of the blockade of Plevna. Map source: N. I. Belyaev. Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878
Surrender
By the beginning of November, the number of Russian-Romanian troops near Plevna reached 130 thousand people, 502 field and 58 siege weapons. The troops were divided into six sections: 1st - Romanian General A. Chernat (consisted of Romanian troops), 2nd - Lieutenant General N. P. Kridener, 3rd - Lieutenant General P. D. Zotov, 4 th - Lieutenant General M. D. Skobelev, 5th - Lieutenant General V. V. Kataleya and 6th - Lieutenant General I. S. Ganetsky.
Position Turkish army it got harder and harder. Stocks of ammunition and food came to an end. From 13 (25) October, Turkish soldiers were given 0.5 rations each. The fuel has run out. Thousands of soldiers were sick. October 22 (November 3) the high command in Constantinople allowed to leave Plevna, but it was too late. However, it was no longer possible to stay in the fortress - the supplies ran out, and the demoralized soldiers were afraid of the Russian offensive, leaving their posts for the night, hiding in the city. Osman Pasha on November 19 (December 1) convened a military council. Its members made a unanimous decision to break through from Plevna. The Turkish commander expected to cross to the left bank of the Vid River, strike at the Russian troops in a northwestern direction on Magaletta, and then move, depending on the situation, to Vidin or Sofia.
On the night of November 27-28 (December 9-10), his troops set out from Plevna. Wagon trains followed the troops. Osman Pasha was also forced to take with him about 200 families from among the Turkish inhabitants of Plevna and most of the wounded. The division of Tahir Pasha crossed the river. View and, lining up in deep columns at 7 hours and 30 minutes, attacked the positions of the 3rd Grenadier Division in the 6th sector. Despite all the precautions taken, the crossing of the Turkish army was a complete surprise for the Russian command. 7 companies of the 9th Siberian Grenadier Regiment could not withstand the attacks of 16 Turkish battalions. The Turks drove the Russian grenadiers out of the trenches, capturing 8 guns. By 08:30, the first line of Russian fortifications between Dolny Metropol and Kopana Mogila was broken. Under the pressure of desperately attacking, superior forces, the 9th Siberian Regiment withdrew to the second line of defense. The 10th Little Russian Regiment moved to help him, but he also could not stop the enemy and was overturned. Ottoman troops captured the second line of defense around 9 o'clock.
However, the Turks were already exhausted, they fell under the crossfire and could not develop the offensive. At the beginning of 11 o'clock, the 2nd brigade of the 3rd grenadier division (11th Fanagoria and 12th Astrakhan regiments) approached from the side of the Gorny Metropol. As a result of the ensuing counterattack, the Russian grenadiers recaptured the second line of fortifications occupied by the enemy. The 3rd brigade was supported by the approaching 7th Grenadier Samogitsky and 8th Grenadier Moscow Regiments of the 2nd Division. The Russian reserves arrived in time and brought down on the enemy from three sides. The Turks retreated to the first line. Osman Pasha was waiting for the arrival of the second division from the right bank of the Vid, but its crossing was delayed by convoys. The Turkish troops lost even the appearance of mobility, taking with them carts with civilians and the wounded, having lost even a minimal chance of breaking through from the encirclement of the most combat-ready part of the army. The defeated Turkish troops, having not received reinforcements, could not hold on to the first line. By 12 o'clock in the afternoon the enemy was driven out of the first line of fortifications. As a result of the counterattack, the Russian troops not only repulsed 8 guns captured by the Turks, but also captured 10 enemy ones. Turkish troops lost about 6 thousand killed and wounded in this battle. Russian losses left about 1,700 people.
Unsuccessful attempt to break through the army of Osman Pasha
General Ganetsky, still fearing a new attack by the Turks, did not plan to pursue the enemy. He ordered to occupy advanced fortifications, bring artillery here and wait for a new enemy offensive. However, the situation was radically changed by the initiative of junior commanders. The 1st brigade of the 2nd grenadier division, which occupied the fortified position of the Dolne-Dubnyak detachment, seeing the retreat of the Turks, went forward and began to cover them from the left flank. Following her, the rest of the troops of the 6th sector went on the offensive. Under the pressure of the Russians, the Turks at first slowly and in relative order retreated to Vid, but soon the retreating ran into their carts. Panic began among the civilians following the carts, and it spread to the soldiers. At that moment Osman Pasha was wounded. Lieutenant Colonel Pertev Bey, commander of one of the two regiments covering the baggage train, tried to stop the Russians, but to no avail. His regiment was overturned, and the retreat of the Turkish army turned into a disorderly flight. Soldiers and refugees, guns, wagons and pack animals crowded in a dense mass at the bridges. The grenadiers approached the enemy at 800 paces, firing aimed rifle fire at him.
It was a disaster. In the remaining sectors, Russian troops also went on the offensive and, having captured the fortifications of the northern, eastern and southern fronts, occupied Plevna and reached the heights to the west of it. The 1st and 3rd brigades of the Turkish division of Adil Pasha, covering the retreat of the main forces of Osman Pasha's army, laid down their arms. The wounded Osman Pasha, having lost hope of a successful breakthrough, sent his adjutant Neshed Bey to the Russian command at 13:00 on November 28 (December 10), 1877, announcing his surrender. 10 generals, 2128 officers, more than 41 thousand soldiers surrendered.
Dmitriev-Orenburgsky N. D. The last battle near Plevna on November 28, 1877
Osman Pasha presents a saber to General I. V. Ganetsky
Results
The fall of Plevna was of strategic importance. Turkey lost an entire army, which fettered the further offensive of the Russian troops beyond the Balkans. This made it possible for the Russian command to release more than 100,000 people for an offensive in the Balkans, which on the whole predetermined Turkey's defeat in the war.
The Romanian army also released the main forces and was regrouped. A large group was thrown at Vidin and Belgradchik. On December 10 (22), Romanian troops took Arnar-Palanki, located on the Danube. The main forces of the Romanian army in January 1878 blocked Vidin. On January 12 (24), the Romanians took the outer fortifications of the fortress. Vidin himself capitulated after the armistice.
Skobelev Park in Plevna
Monument to the Heroes of Plevna at the Ilyinsky Gates in Moscow
ctrl Enter
Noticed osh s bku Highlight text and click Ctrl+Enter
After three unsuccessful assaults Plevna, its siege began. Under Plevna, the sovereign summoned an engineer-generalTotleben E.I., on September 15 (27) he arrived in the army. “There will be no fourth assault on Plevna,” said Eduard Ivanovich. Totleben was a recognized authority in the conduct of a serf war, he was supposed to develop a plan for the siege of Plevna.
Russian soldiers were ordered to vigorously dig in. For the complete encirclement of Plevna, it was necessary to capture fortified points Mountain Dubnyak, Dolny Dubnyak and Telish; block the Sofia-Plevna road in order to tightly lock Osman Pasha in the city.
Totleben E.I. ordered General Gurko I.V. seize the Sofia Highway and occupy all the space on the left bank of the Vid River. On the same day, he ordered General Zotov to occupy the Lovchinskoe highway, to fortify south of Brestovets on Ryzhaya Gora, and to other units to arrange a demonstration in the direction of Plevna. And all the other troops of the Western Detachment were ordered to demonstrate that day. Totleben and his staff worked tirelessly, sending orders to the troops and developed dispositions for each unit separately.
Attack by the troops of General Gurko Mountain Dubnyak was carried out successfully, but cost four and a half thousand disabled Russian soldiers and officers. Of course, too high a price ... Totleben and many military leaders again started talking about the need for more thoughtful army actions, the need for careful artillery preparation for an attack, about reconnaissance, finally, as an obligatory prerequisite for an attack. It was necessary to take two more settlements, which stood on the Sofia highway.
Gurko developed a disposition for mastering Telish mainly by artillery fire. Totleben gave the following order to Gurko’s detachment on this report: “I fully share the considerations of Your Excellency, set out in report No. 28 on October 13, regarding the need to capture Telish and at the same time mainly an artillery attack, avoiding an assault if possible ...” In addition, Totleben also ordered the actions other units entrusted to him in order to strengthen the connection between all parts. Totleben attached particular importance to the actions of the 16th division of Skobelev M.D. as the most reliable in all respects.
The sad experience of taking Gorny Dubnyak was too expensive to repeat it: twenty-five thousand selected troops, with the most heroic courage, with the able leadership of the talented General Gurko, were barely able to capture two weak Turkish redoubts, which were defended by small detachments of the Turks. Why resort to such a method of taking fortresses when there is an excellent way - to starve to death and force them to surrender.
Chief of Staff of the Gurko detachment General Naglovsky on the eve of the attack Telisha reported in a report to the command that during the capture of Telish it was planned to fire 100 shells per gun, a total of 7200 shells. Approaching the position, the infantry and batteries must dig in. Alexander II, the commander in chief, a large retinue surveyed Plevna and the Turkish position from the lunette of the Kaluga regiment.
The artillery attack of Telish began, the batteries fired volley after volley, but the Turks almost did not answer them, hiding from the fire in dugouts. But the concentrated volleys of several batteries, directed first at one, then at the other Turkish redoubts, made a strong moral impression on the enemy, and the losses were sensitive, of the order 50-60 people per day.
At 12 o'clock, in accordance with the disposition developed by Totleben and Gurko, Skobelev made a demonstration along Zelenaya Gora towards the Krishinsky Heights. But soon he retreated, and silence fell on all the lines, only from the direction of Telish came the muffled cannonade, which had lasted for two hours.
At four o'clock on October 16, Totleben received a report that Telish had been taken, the garrison completely capitulated along with Izmail-Khaki Pasha and 100 officers. Our losses were the smallest. It remained only to take Dolny Dubnyak in order to complete the complete taxation of Plevna. And now Osman Pasha is so surrounded that any attempt to break through from Plevna or to Plevna is doomed to failure: everywhere he will be met by fortified positions with Russian troops. The breakthrough will cost him dearly if he dares to make it.
Two guard divisions of General Gurko I.V. knocked out the Turks and from the redoubt Dolny Dubnyak, forcing them to retreat to Plevna. After that, Plevna was completely blocked.
Thus began the planned siege of Plevna. Osman Pasha was surrounded. His army was left to its own devices by the military council in Constantinople.
By the end of November 1877, the besieged units found themselves in a critical situation: food supplies were exhausted, epidemics raged, soldiers deserted. The Bulgarians increasingly crossed the front line and obtained important information. On December 9, 1877, a Bulgarian came to the headquarters of the Russian army and said: “The last supplies have been distributed. The Turkish population on carts leaves the city, heading towards the Vit River.
Near Pleven there was a "horseshoe" of enemy defensive structures. This "horseshoe" had six defense sectors (sectors). The total length of the enemy position reached 40 kilometers. It began north of the villages of Opanets, Bukovlyk and the Tuchenitsa River, then turned south along the Tuchenitskaya Hollow, Uchin-Dol, the Zelenite-Gori and Kyshin areas and ended in the west by the bank of the Vit River.
The position on the sixth sector of the siege, on the left bank of the river Vit, was occupied by the grenadier corps; the first brigade of the 5th Infantry Division with two batteries; the 4th Romanian division with all its artillery; 9th Kazan Dragoon; 9th Bug Lancers; 9th Kyiv Hussars and 4th Don Regiments, as well as the 7th Horse Artillery Battery; 2nd Don battery and a regiment of Romanian cavalry.
Early in the morning of December 10, 1877, in the sixth sector, the besiegers were unexpectedly attacked by the Turks, led by Osman Pasha. The Russian outposts retreated. A signal tower soared high into the sky, and drums sounded the alarm throughout the Russian rear positions. Half an hour later the Turks appeared in front of the Russian trenches. With exclamations of "Allah" they rushed to the attack. They were met by the grenadiers of the Siberian regiment. A fierce hand-to-hand fight ensued. The Russian soldiers did not retreat. Having mastered the trenches of the first line, the Turks rushed to the battery of the 3rd grenadier artillery brigade.
Guard Osman Pasha reached the second line of Russian trenches. But here she stumbled upon reinforcements that had come to the aid of the Siberians, at the Little Russian Grenadier Regiment, which immediately rushed into a swift bayonet attack.
The Turkish units sought to break through to the north, to the Danube. The 9th Cavalry Division prepared for battle in case the enemy managed to break through. On the left flank, the Turkish arrows were met Arkhangelsk and Vologda regiments. The Turks again concentrated in the center of the Russian defense. It was there that the Russian reserves were sent.
Russian and Romanian artillery carried out powerful artillery preparation. Then the infantry went over to a decisive attack. At this moment, Osman Pasha was wounded. There was a rumor that he had been killed. The ranks of the enemy trembled. To the sound of the drum, the grenadiers went on the general offensive. In hand-to-hand combat, Private Yegor Zhdanov knocked down the Turkish standard-bearer to the ground, taking away the regimental banner from him.
The Turks rolled back to the Vit River. A traffic jam arose on the bridge, wagons and people fell into the water ... After a while, the enemy raised a white flag. Acting Chief of Staff of the Turkish Army in Plevna Tefik Pasha began negotiations, saying that Osman Pasha was wounded and could not come.
The Turks agreed to unconditional surrender. Surrendered into captivity 10 Turkish generals, 2 thousand. officers and 30 thousand soldiers. The victors captured rich trophies: artillery, ammunition, carts. So ingloriously for the Ottoman army ended the last battle near Plevna, which was destined to become the city of Russian military glory.
The battle for the Bulgarian city of Plevna (Pleven) is the main episode of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. The fortress was located at the intersection of roads necessary for the transfer of troops to the region of Constantinople.
On the eve of the war
The Russian Empire was forced to go to war with Turkey after the failure of negotiations on a peaceful settlement of issues related to the protection of the Christian population in the Balkan Peninsula. Porta (government of the Ottoman Empire ) fought against Serbia and actually ignored the ultimatum of Alexander II to conclude a truce.
The Russian generals decided to launch an offensive along the western coast of the Black Sea in the direction of the capital of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, it was planned to force Porto to sit down at the negotiating table, to achieve guarantees of the rights Slavic peoples peninsula and strengthen positions in the region.
Another Russian-Turkish war could finally decide for St. Petersburg Eastern question, which arose in the second half of the XVIII century with the creation of the Montenegrin fleet.
Russia sought to control the strategically important straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and acquire the status of a Mediterranean power.
This would give her significant military and economic advantages.
In the middle of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire lost its former power and could no longer oppose its northern neighbor on equal terms. The Western powers understood that the Porte without their help was doomed to defeat. In addition, in the 1870s, Russia practically recovered from the consequences of Crimean War 1853-1856, in which she lost to a coalition of Turkey, Great Britain and France.
In order to prevent the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and contain the ambitions of St. Petersburg, the British and French were engaged in the training and rearmament of Turkish troops. At the same time, London and Paris did not support the excessively tough position of the Porte in relation to the Christian population in the Balkans.
In 1877, against the backdrop of Ottoman repression against Christians, Russia managed to achieve the neutrality of the West, which made it possible to declare war on Turkey. However, Great Britain and France closely watched the course of hostilities, fearing a hasty surrender of Turkey and the capture of the straits by Russian troops.
On the approaches to Plevna
Alexander II delayed the moment of entering the war with Turkey, although the plan for this war was prepared in 1876. The emperor rightly believed that the Russian army was not yet ready to wage large-scale battles, at least for a long time.
The armed forces of the empire were in the process of modernization. The troops did not have time to get modern weapons and master advanced combat tactics. unfinished military reform served as one of the reasons for the first failures in the battles for Plevna.
On the eve of the war, the size of the Russian army was estimated at about half a million people against the two hundred thousandth Turkish army. In the autumn of 1876, Russia concentrated an army of over 180 thousand people on the southwestern borders. Romanian and Serbian troops, as well as Bulgarian, Armenian and Georgian militias, were ready to act on the side of the Russian Empire.
Alexander II declared war on Turkey in April 1877. In early July, part of the Russian troops crossed the Danube, which separates Romania and Bulgaria, and entrenched themselves on the outskirts of Plevna. On July 16, the 9th Corps of Lieutenant General Nikolai Kridener captured the Nikopol fortress, 40 km from Plevna.
At that time, the garrison of the city consisted of only three Turkish infantry battalions, which were armed with four guns. On July 19, 17,000 Turkish soldiers under the command of Marshal Osman Pasha marched 200 km and took up defense around the city.
- Artillery battle near Plevna. A battery of siege guns on Velikoknyazheskaya Hill. Artist Nikolay Dmitriev-Orenburgsky
- encyclopedia.mil.ru
The battles for Plevna began on July 18, but the first attacks of the Russian troops bogged down. By August 1877, the Russian army had lost almost 10,000 soldiers. Taking advantage of the pause, the Turks increased the size of the garrison to 32 thousand people with 70 guns and erected new engineering structures.
The Turkish group created a threat to cross the Danube, and the Russian command stopped the offensive in the direction of Constantinople. It was decided to take the city by storm. Near Plevna were concentrated 84 thousand soldiers with 424 guns. The Russians were supported by Romanian troops (32 thousand people with 108 guns) and detachments of Bulgarian militias.
From assault to siege
In August-September, the Russian-Romanian units made several unsuccessful attempts to capture the Turkish fortifications. Historians of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces Russian Federation explain the failures of the advancing forces by disorganization in the control system.
“The detachment was accompanied by Emperor Alexander II, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and Minister of War Dmitry Milyutin, which made it difficult to unify command and control of the troops. The planning and preparation of the allied forces for the offensive were routine, it was planned to deliver strikes in the same directions, the interaction between the troops advancing on each of them was not organized, ”experts say.
The Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation believes that the Russians and Romanians underestimated the enemy and neglected reconnaissance, which would help to identify gaps in the defense of Plevna. In particular, the Turks had almost no fortifications on the western outskirts of the city, but this direction did not become promising.
According to historians, the reason for the three unsuccessful assaults on Plevna and dozens of battles for redoubts was the high density of fire that Turkish infantrymen created. At long range, the Ottomans used American Peabody-Martini rifles, and in close combat, Winchester carbines.
- Capture of the Grivitsky redoubt near Plevna. Artist Nikolay Dmitriev-Orenburgsky
- encyclopedia.mil.ru
On September 13, Alexander II decided to begin a systematic siege of Plevna. The construction of the fortifications was led by General Eduard Totleben, at that time a leading specialist in the field of engineering. He concluded that the city's garrison could not hold out for more than two months if all supply channels were cut.
On November 1, Russian troops completely surrounded Plevna, knocking out the Turks from the villages of Gorny, Dolny Dubnyaki, Telish and Gorny Metropol. On November 12, Osman Pasha was asked to surrender, but he refused. The fortress was held by 44 thousand people, the number of Russian troops was 130 thousand bayonets. The position of the garrison, due to the lack of food and water, worsened every day.
final showdown
The goal of the Russian-Romanian units was to prevent the enemy from breaking through the defensive lines erected by the besieging troops. The only chance for salvation for the Ottomans was the crossing of the Vid River, the subsequent infliction of an unexpected blow and the retreat to Vidin or Sofia, where the Turkish army stood.
On December 1, Osman Pasha decided to withdraw the garrison from Plevna. The operation to break the siege began on the night of 10 December. Under the cover of darkness, the Ottomans crossed to the left bank of the Vid and attacked the 9th Siberian Grenadier Regiment in the early morning.
By 09:00, the Turks were able to break through two lines of fortifications, but at 11:00 the 2nd brigade of the 3rd grenadier division went on the offensive. An hour later, Turkish troops were pushed back to the first line of defense. After that, the 1st brigade of the 2nd grenadier division hit the enemy from the left flank, forcing him to retreat to the river.
Turkish troops came across the carts left after the crossing. Panic broke out in their ranks, and the retreat took on a disorderly character. Grenadiers literally shot the enemy at a distance of 800 steps. Seeing that his troops were doomed to destruction, Osman Pasha decided to surrender.
On December 10, Russian-Romanian units occupied Plevna without hindrance. Ten Turkish generals, 2128 officers, 41,200 soldiers were captured, in addition, the winners became the owners of 77 guns. The fall of the fortress made it possible to free more than 100 thousand people and continue the offensive against Constantinople.
- The captured Osman Pasha is presented to Alexander II on the day of the capture of Plevna. Artist Nikolay Dmitriev-Orenburgsky
- encyclopedia.mil.ru
“This army, with its worthy commander at the head (Osman Pasha), among 40 thousand, surrendered to us unconditionally.<…>I am proud to command such troops and must tell you that I cannot find words to adequately express my respect and admiration for your fighting prowess.<…>Remember that I am not alone, but the whole of Russia, all her sons rejoice and rejoice at your glorious victory over Osman Pasha, ”said Lieutenant General Ivan Ganetsky, commander of the grenadier corps, after the end of the battle.
Historians of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces note that, despite the mistakes made, imperial army achieved success in the application of new methods of action by the infantry, "whose rifle chains combined fire and movement, used self-digging when approaching the enemy." The importance of field fortifications and high efficiency heavy artillery.
The siege of Plevna taught the Russian army command to use more advanced methods of delivering supplies, moving and deploying troops. For example, two "civilian transports" were engaged in the transportation of food and weapons. Also near Plevna, for the first time in the world, analogues of modern field kitchens appeared.
holy memory
The victory at Plevna and successful actions in Transcaucasia, where the army of Marshal Mukhtar Pasha was defeated, created the conditions for the military surrender of the Porte. On January 19, 1878, the Armistice of Adrianople was signed, and on March 3, the Treaty of San Stefano.
As a result of negotiations with the Porte, Serbia, Montenegro and Romania gained independence. Bulgaria turned into an autonomous principality, although during the period of the Berlin Congress, which was convened at the initiative of the Western powers, Sofia's powers in the field of self-government were significantly curtailed.
March 3rd is a national holiday for Bulgarians. The war with the Ottoman Empire in 1877-1878 is called the Liberation War in the historiography of Bulgaria. Monuments to Russian and Romanian soldiers were erected throughout the country.
“In memory of the battles near Plevna, a mausoleum of fallen Russian and Romanian soldiers, the Skobelevsky park-museum, the historical museum “Liberation of Plevna in 1877” were built in the city, near Grivitsa - the mausoleum of Romanian soldiers and about 100 monuments in the vicinity of the fortress, ”the historians of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
In 1887, in Kitai-Gorod, Moscow, a monument-chapel was erected to the Russian grenadiers who died in the battles for Plevna. The memorial was built on the initiative of the Russian Archaeological Society and the officers of the grenadier corps stationed in Moscow.
- Monument-chapel in memory of the Heroes of Plevna in Ilyinsky Square in Moscow
- globallookpress.com
- Konstantin Kokoshkin
The scientific director of the Russian Military Historical Society, Mikhail Myagkov, in an interview with RT, noted that, despite the difficult political relations between Moscow and Sofia, the battle for Plevna and the Shipka Pass remain a symbol of the military brotherhood of Russians, Romanians and Bulgarians.
“Repeatedly Russia and Bulgaria found themselves in different sides barricades, but political strife did not concern the sacred memory of the Russian contribution to the country's independence. We are seeing the same thing now. Unfortunately, there are forces in Bulgaria that demand the dismantling of monuments Soviet soldiers. However, the attitude towards the memorials of the Russian-Turkish war is extremely positive, ”said the historian.
The capture of Plevna by the troops of Alexander II turned the tide of the war against the Ottoman Empire.
The long siege claimed the lives of many soldiers on both sides. This victory allowed the Russian troops to open the road to Constantinople and free them from Turkish oppression. The operation to capture the fortress went down in military history as one of the most successful. The results of the campaign forever changed the geopolitical situation in Europe and the Middle East.
Prerequisites
Up until the middle of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire controlled most of the Balkans and Bulgaria. Turkish oppression extended to almost all South Slavic peoples. The Russian Empire has always acted as the protector of all Slavs, and foreign policy was largely aimed at their liberation. However, following the results of the previous war, Russia lost a fleet in the Black Sea and a number of territories in the south. Allied treaties were also concluded between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain. In the event of a declaration of war by the Russians, the British pledged to provide military assistance to the Turks. This situation ruled out the possibility of expelling the Ottomans from Europe. In return, the Turks promised to respect the rights of Christians and not persecute them on religious grounds.
Oppression of the Slavs
However, the 60s of the 19th century were marked by new persecutions of Christians. Muslims had great privileges before the law. In court, the voice of a Christian against a Muslim had no weight. Also, most of the local government posts were occupied by the Turks. Dissatisfaction with this state of affairs caused mass protests in Bulgaria and the Balkan countries. In the summer of 1975, an uprising begins in Bosnia. And a year later, in April, popular riots engulf Bulgaria. As a result, the Turks savagely suppress the uprising, killing tens of thousands of people. Such atrocities against Christians cause discontent in Europe.
Under the pressure of public opinion, Great Britain abandons its pro-Turkish policy. This unties the hands of the Russian Empire, which is preparing a campaign against the Ottomans.
The beginning of the war
On the twelfth of April, the Capture of Plevna began; in fact, it will be completed in six months. However, there was a long way to go before that. According to the plan of the Russian headquarters, the troops were to attack from two directions. The first group to go through the Romanian territory to the Balkans, and the other to strike from the Caucasus. In both directions there were insurmountable obstacles. prevented a quick strike from the Caucasus, and the "quadrangle" of fortresses from Romania. The situation was also complicated by the possible intervention of the UK. Despite public pressure, the British still continued to support the Turks. Therefore, the war had to be won as soon as possible so that the Ottoman Empire capitulated before reinforcements arrived.
fast advance
The capture of Plevna was carried out by troops under the command of General Skobelev. In early July, the Russians crossed the Danube and reached the road to Sofia. In this campaign they were joined by the Romanian army. Initially, the Turks were going to meet the allies on the banks of the Danube. However, the rapid advance forced Osman Pasha to retreat to the fortresses. In fact, the first capture of Plevna took place on June 26th. An elite detachment under the command of Ivan Gurko entered the city. However, there were only fifty scouts in the unit. Almost simultaneously with the Russian Cossacks, three battalions of Turks entered the city, which forced them out.
Realizing that the capture of Plevna would give the Russians a complete strategic advantage, Osman Pasha decides to occupy the city before the arrival of the main forces. At this time, his army was in the city of Vidin. From there, the Turks were to advance along the Danube in order to prevent the Russians from crossing. However, the danger of encirclement forced the Muslims to abandon the original plan. On July 1, 19 battalions set out from Vidin. In six days they covered more than two hundred kilometers with artillery, baggage, provisions, and so on. At dawn on July 7, the Turks entered the fortress.
The Russians had the opportunity to take the city before Osman Pasha. However, the negligence of some commanders played. Due to the lack of military intelligence, the Russians did not learn in time about the Turkish march on the city. As a result, the capture of the fortress of Plevna by the Turks passed without battles. Russian General Yuri Schilder-Schuldner was only a day late.
But during this time, the Turks had already managed to dig in and take up defense. After some deliberation, the headquarters decides to storm the fortress.
First seizure attempt
Russian troops attacked the city from two sides. General Schilder-Schuldern had no idea about the number of Turks in the city. He led the right column of troops, while the left marched on four kilometers. According to the original plan, both columns were supposed to enter the city at the same time. However, due to an incorrectly drawn map, they only moved away from each other. At about one in the afternoon, the main column approached the city. Suddenly, they were attacked by the advance detachments of the Turks, who had occupied Plevna only a few hours before. A battle ensued, which escalated into an artillery duel.
Schilder-Schuldner had no idea about the actions of the left column, so he ordered to move away from the shelled positions and set up a camp. The left column under the command of Kleinghaus approached the city from the side of Grivitsa. Cossack intelligence was sent. Two hundred soldiers advanced along the river in order to reconnoiter the nearest villages and the fortress itself. However, when they heard the sounds of battle, they retreated to their own.
Offensive
On the night of July 8, a decision was made to storm. The left column was advancing from the side of Grivitsa. The general with most of the soldiers came from the north. The main positions of Osman Pasha were near the village of Opanets. About eight thousand Russians marched against them at a front of up to three kilometers.
Because of the lowlands, Schilder-Schuldner lost the ability to maneuver. His troops had to go on a frontal attack. Artillery preparation began at five o'clock in the morning. The Russian vanguard launched an attack on Bukovlek and drove the Turks out of there in two hours. The road to Plevna was open. The Arkhangelsk regiment went to the enemy's main battery. The fighters were at a distance of a shot from the artillery positions of the Ottomans. Osman Pasha understood that the numerical superiority was on his side, and gave the order to counterattack. Under pressure from the Turks, two regiments withdrew into the ravine. The general requested the support of the left column, but the enemy advanced too quickly. Therefore, Schilder-Schuldner ordered a retreat.
Strike from the other flank
At the same time, Kridener was advancing from the side of Grivitsa. At six o'clock in the morning (when the main troops had already begun artillery preparation), the Caucasian Corps hit the right flank of the Turkish defense. After the unstoppable onslaught of the Cossacks, the Ottomans in a panic began to flee to the fortress. However, by the time they took positions at Grivitsa, Schilder-Schuldner had already retreated. Therefore, the left column also began to retreat to their original positions. The capture of Plevna by Russian troops was stopped with heavy losses for the latter. In many ways, the lack of intelligence and the inept decisions of the general affected.
Preparing a new offensive
After an unsuccessful assault, preparations began for a new attack. Russian troops received significant reinforcements. Cavalry and artillery units arrived. The city was surrounded. Surveillance began on all roads, especially those leading to Lovcha.
For several days, reconnaissance in force was carried out. Constant shootings were heard both day and night. However, it was not possible to find out the number of the Ottoman garrison in the city.
New assault
While the Russians were preparing for the assault, the Turks were rapidly building defenses. Construction took place in conditions of lack of tools and constant shelling. On the eighteenth of July, another assault began. The capture of Plevna by the Russians would mean defeat in the war. Therefore, Osman Pasha ordered his fighters to fight to the death. The attack was preceded by a long artillery preparation. After that, the soldiers rushed into battle from two flanks. Troops under the command of Kridener managed to capture the first lines of defense. Near the redoubt, however, they were met by overwhelming musket fire. After bloody skirmishes, the Russians had to retreat. The left flank was attacked by Skobelev. His fighters also failed to break through the Turkish defense lines. The fight went on all day. By evening, the Turks launched a counteroffensive and drove the Krinder soldiers out of their trenches. The Russians had to retreat again. After this defeat, the government turned to the Romanians for help.
Blockade
After the arrival of the Romanian troops, the blockade and the capture of Plevna became inevitable. Therefore, Osman Pasha decided to break out of the besieged fortress. On the thirty-first of August, his troops made a diversionary maneuver. After that, the main forces left the city and hit the nearest outposts.
After a short battle, they managed to push back the Russians and even capture one battery. However, reinforcements soon arrived. A close fight ensued. The Turks faltered and fled back to the city, leaving almost one and a half thousand of their soldiers on the battlefield.
To complete it was necessary to capture Lovcha. It was through her that the Turks received reinforcements and provisions. The city was also occupied by auxiliary detachments of bashi-bazouks. They did an excellent job with punitive operations against the civilian population, but quickly left their positions at the prospect of meeting with the regular army. Therefore, when the Russians attacked the city on August 22, the Turks fled from there without much resistance.
After the capture of the city, the siege began, and the capture of Plevna was only a matter of time. Reinforcements arrived for the Russians. Osman Pasha also received reserves.
The capture of the Plevna fortress: December 10, 1877
After the complete encirclement of the city, the Turks remained completely cut off from the outside world. Osman Pasha refused to capitulate and continued to strengthen the fortress. By this time, 50 thousand Turks were hiding in the city against 120 thousand Russian and Romanian soldiers. Siege fortifications were built around the city. From time to time Plevna was shelled by artillery. The Turks were running out of provisions and ammunition. The army suffered from disease and hunger.
Osman Pasha decided to break out of the blockade, realizing that the imminent capture of Plevna was inevitable. The breakthrough date was set for December 10th. In the morning, Turkish troops set up scarecrows in the fortifications and began to break out of the city. But the Little Russian and Siberian regiments stood in their way. And the Ottomans came with looted property and a large convoy.
Of course, this complicates maneuverability. After the start of the battle, reinforcements were sent to the breakthrough site. At first, the Turks managed to push back the forward detachments, but after a blow to the flank, they began to retreat into the lowland. After the inclusion of artillery in the battle, the Turks randomly ran and eventually capitulated.
After this victory, General Skobelev ordered that December 10 be celebrated as the Day of Military History. The capture of Plevna is celebrated in Bulgaria in our time. Because as a result of this victory, Christians got rid of Muslim oppression.
