Thousands of books have been written about this battle, but many facts are still little known to a wide audience. Russian historian and writer, author of more than 40 publications on the history of the Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Prokhorov Valery Zamulin recalls the heroic and victorious battle in the Black Earth region.

The article is based on the material of the program "The Price of Victory" of the radio station "Echo of Moscow". The broadcast was conducted by Vitaly Dymarsky and Dmitry Zakharov. You can read and listen to the original interview in full here.

After the encirclement of the Paulus group and its dismemberment, the success at Stalingrad was deafening. After February 2, a number of offensive operations were carried out. In particular, the Kharkov offensive operation, as a result of which the Soviet troops captured a significant territory. But then the situation changed dramatically. In the Kramatorsk area, a group of tank divisions, some of which were transferred from France, including two SS divisions - Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and Das Reich - the Germans launched a crushing counterattack. That is, the Kharkov offensive operation turned into a defensive one. I must say that this battle came at a high cost to us.

After the German troops occupied Kharkov, Belgorod and adjacent territories, the well-known Kursk salient was formed in the south. Around March 25, 1943, the front line finally stabilized in this sector. Stabilization occurred due to the introduction of two tank corps: the 2nd Guards and the 3rd "Stalingrad", as well as the operational transfer at the request of Zhukov from the Stalingrad of the 21st Army of General Chistyakov and the 64th Army of General Shumilov (hereinafter it is 6 -I and 7th Guards armies). In addition, by the end of March, mud had set in, which, of course, helped our troops to hold the line at that moment, because the equipment was very bogged down and it was simply impossible to continue the offensive.

Thus, given that Operation Citadel began on July 5, then from March 25 to July 5, that is, for three and a half months, preparations were underway for summer operations. The front stabilized, and in fact a certain balance was maintained, balance, without sharp, as they say, movements on both sides.

The Stalingrad operation cost the Germans the 6th Army of Paulus and himself

Germany suffered a colossal defeat at Stalingrad, and most importantly, the first such deafening defeat, so the political leadership had an important task to consolidate its bloc, because Germany's allies began to think that Germany was not so invincible; and what will happen if suddenly another Stalingrad? Therefore, Hitler needed after a rather victorious offensive in Ukraine in March 1943, when Kharkov was recaptured, Belgorod was taken, the territory was captured, another, perhaps small, but impressive victory.

No, it's not small though. If Operation Citadel were successful, which the German command naturally expected, then two fronts would be in the ring - Central and Voronezh.

Many German military leaders took part in the development and implementation of Operation Citadel. In particular, General Manstein, who initially proposed a completely different plan: to cede the Donbass to the advancing Soviet troops so that they go there, and then, with a blow from above, from the north, press them, throw them into the sea (there were the Azov and Black Seas in the lower part).

But Hitler did not accept this plan for two reasons. First, he said that Germany could not make territorial concessions now, after Stalingrad. And, secondly, the Donetsk basin, which the Germans needed not so much from a psychological point of view, but from a raw material point of view, as an energy base. Manstein's plan was rejected, and the forces of the German General Staff concentrated on the development of Operation Citadel to eliminate the Kursk salient.

The fact is that from the Kursk ledge it was convenient to deliver flank strikes to our troops, so the area for the start of the main summer offensive was precisely determined. However, the task formation process and the preparation process took a long time because there were disputes. For example, Model spoke and persuaded Hitler not to start this operation because of the understaffing of both manpower and technical. And, by the way, the second date of the Citadel was set for June 10 (the first date was for May 3-5). And already from June 10, it was moved even further - to July 5.

Here, again, we must return to the myth that only "Tigers" and "Panthers" were involved in the Kursk Bulge. In fact, this was not the case, because these machines began to be produced in a relatively large series precisely in 1943, and Hitler insisted that about 200 Tigers and 200 Panthers be sent to the Kursk direction. However, this entire 400-machine grouping was not involved, because, like any new technology both those and other tanks suffered from "childhood diseases". As Manstein and Guderian noted, the Tigers quite often caught fire in their carburetors, the Panthers had problems with the transmission, and therefore no more than 50 vehicles of both types were actually used in the fighting during the Kursk operation. God forbid, the remaining 150 of each type would have been brought into battle - the consequences could have been much more deplorable.

It is important to understand here that the German command initially planned the Belgorod grouping, that is, Army Group South, which was headed by Manstein, as the main one - it was supposed to solve the main task. The blow of the 9th Army of the Model was, as it were, auxiliary. Manstein had to go 147 kilometers before joining the troops of the Model, so the main forces, including tank and motorized divisions, were concentrated near Belgorod.

The first offensive in May - Manstein saw (reconnaissance reports, photography) how quickly the Red Army, the Voronezh Front, in particular, was strengthening its positions, and understood that his troops would not be able to reach Kursk. With these thoughts, he first arrived at Bogodukhov, at the command post of the 4th Panzer Army near Goth. What for? The fact is that Goth wrote a letter - there was still an attempt to develop the operation "Panther" (as a continuation in case of success of the "Citadel"). So, in particular, Goth opposed this operation. He believed that the main thing was not to rush to Kursk, but to destroy, as he assumed, about 10 tank mechanized corps, which the Russians had already prepared. That is, destroy mobile reserves.

If all this colossus moves on the Army Group "South", then, as they say, it will not show enough. That's it for this it was necessary to plan at least the first stage of the "Citadel". On May 9-11 Goth and Manstein discussed this plan. And it was precisely at this meeting that the tasks of the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force were clearly defined, and the plan for the Prokhorov battle was also developed here.

It was near Prokhorovka that Manstein planned a tank battle, that is, the destruction of these mobile reserves. And after they are defeated, when an assessment of the state of the German troops is carried out, it will be possible to talk about an offensive.

In the area of ​​the Kursk ledge, both in the north and in the south, the Germans concentrated up to 70% of the armored vehicles available to them on the Eastern Front for Operation Citadel. It was assumed that it was these forces that would be able to ram the three most fortified lines of the Soviet defense and destroy, given the qualitative superiority of German armored vehicles at that time over our tanks, mobile reserves. After that, with a favorable set of circumstances, they will also be able to advance in the direction of Kursk.

For the battles near Prokhorovka, the SS corps, partly the 48th corps and part of the forces of the 3rd Panzer Corps, were planned. These three corps were supposed to crush the mobile reserves, which were supposed to approach the Prokhorovka area. Why in the Prokhorovka area? Because the area was favorable there. In other places it was simply impossible to deploy a significant number of tanks. This plan was largely implemented by the enemy. The only thing is that our defense forces did not calculate.

A few more words about the Germans. The fact is that they already had a seam situation in Africa. After the loss of Africa, it automatically followed that the British establish complete control over the Mediterranean Sea. Malta is an unsinkable aircraft carrier from which they hammer Sardinia first, Sicily, and thus prepare the possibility of landing in Italy, which was eventually carried out. That is, the Germans in other areas, too, everything was not thank God. Plus the vacillation of Hungary, Romania and other allies...

The planning of the summer military operations of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht began approximately at the same time: for the Germans - in February, for us - at the end of March, after the stabilization of the front line. The fact is that the holding of the enemy, who was advancing from Kharkov in the Belgorod region, and the organization of the defense were controlled by the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Zhukov. And after the stabilization of the front line, he was here, in the Belgorod region; together with Vasilevsky they discussed further plans. After that, he prepared a note in which he stated the point of view, which was developed jointly with the command of the Voronezh Front. (By the way, Vatutin became commander of the Voronezh Front on March 27, before that he commanded the South-Western Front. He replaced Golikov, who, by decision of the Headquarters, was removed from this post).

So, in early April, a note lay on Stalin's desk, which set out the basic principles for conducting hostilities in the south in the summer of 1943. On April 12, a meeting was held with the participation of Stalin, in which a proposal was approved to switch to a deliberate defense, to prepare troops and a defense in depth in case the enemy goes on the offensive. And the configuration of the front line in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge assumed a high probability of such a transition.

Despite local successes, the Nazi operation "Citadel" failed

Here we should return to the system of engineering structures, because until 1943, before the Battle of Kursk, the creation of such powerful defensive lines by the Red Army was not carried out. After all, the depth of these three defense lines was about 300 kilometers. That is, the Germans had to plow, ram, drill 300 kilometers of fortified areas. And these are not just trenches dug to their full height and fortified with boards, these are anti-tank ditches, gouges, this is the most powerful system of minefields made during the war for the first time; and each, in fact, the settlement in this territory also turned into a mini-fortress.

Neither the German nor our side have ever erected such a strong and saturated defensive line with engineering barriers and fortifications on the Eastern Front. The first three lanes were the most fortified: the main army lane, the second army lane and the third rear army lane - approximately to a depth of 50 kilometers. The fortifications were so powerful that two large, strong enemy groupings could not break through them for two weeks, despite the fact that, in general, the Soviet command did not guess the main direction of the German attack.

The fact is that in May fairly accurate data were received about the enemy’s plans for the summer: periodically they came from illegal agents from England and Germany. The headquarters of the supreme command knew about the plans of the German command, but for some reason it was determined that the Germans would inflict the main blow on the Central Front, on Rokossovsky. Therefore, Rokossovsky was additionally transferred significant artillery forces, an entire artillery corps, which Vatutin did not have. And this miscalculation, of course, influenced how the fighting developed in the south. Vatutin was forced to repulse the attacks of the enemy's main tank grouping with tanks, not having sufficient artillery to fight; in the north there were also tank divisions that were directly involved in the attack on the Central Front, but they dealt with Soviet artillery, and numerous ones at that.

But let's move smoothly to July 5, when, in fact, the event began. The canonical version is Ozerov's film "Liberation": the defector says that the Germans are concentrated here and there, a colossal artillery raid is being carried out, almost all Germans are killed, it is not clear who else is fighting there for a whole month. How was it really?

There really was a defector, and not one - there were several of them both in the north and in the south. In the south, in particular, on July 4, a soldier of the reconnaissance battalion from the 168th Infantry Division went over to our side. According to the plan of the command of the Voronezh and Central Fronts, in order to inflict maximum losses on the enemy prepared for the offensive, it was supposed to carry out two measures: firstly, to conduct a powerful artillery attack, and, secondly, to strike the aircraft of the 2nd, 16th and 17th air armies at the base airfield. Let's say about the air raid - it failed. And moreover, it had unfortunate consequences, since the time was not calculated.

As for the artillery attack, it was partially successful in the zone of the 6th Guards Army: the telephone communication lines were mostly disrupted. There were losses in both manpower and equipment, but insignificant.

Another thing is the 7th Guards Army, which took up defense along the eastern bank of the Donets. The Germans, respectively, on the right. Therefore, in order to launch an offensive, they needed to force the river. They pulled up significant forces and watercraft to certain settlements and sectors of the front, and previously built several crossings, hiding them under water. Soviet intelligence recorded this (engineer intelligence, by the way, worked very well), and artillery strikes were carried out precisely on these areas: on crossings and on settlements where these assault groups of the 3rd tank corps of Routh were concentrated. Therefore, the effectiveness of artillery preparation in the zone of the 7th Guards Army was much higher. Losses from it both in manpower and in technology, not to mention management and so on, were high. Several bridges were destroyed, which slowed down the pace of the offensive, and in some places paralyzed.

Already on July 5, Soviet troops began to split the enemy strike force, that is, they did not allow the 6th Panzer Division, Kempf's army group, to cover the right flank of Hausser's 2nd Panzer Corps. That is, the offensive of the main strike force and the auxiliary along divergent lines began. This forced the enemy to enlist additional forces to cover his flanks from the point of impact. Such a tactic was conceived by the command of the Voronezh Front and perfectly implemented.

Since we are talking about the Soviet command, many will agree that both Vatutin and Rokossovsky are famous people, but the latter has a reputation, perhaps, of a greater commander. Why? Some say that he fought better in the Battle of Kursk. But Vatutin, in general, did a lot, because he still fought with smaller forces, fewer numbers. Judging by the documents that are now open, it can be said with confidence that Nikolai Fedorovich very competently, very sensibly and skillfully planned his defensive operation, given that the main grouping, the most numerous, was advancing against his front (although it was expected from the north). And until the 9th, inclusive, when the situation turned around, when the Germans had already sent strike groups to the flanks to solve tactical problems, the troops of the Voronezh Front fought excellently, and management went, of course, very well. As for the next steps, the decisions of the front commander Vatutin were influenced by a number of subjective factors, including the role of the supreme commander.

Everyone remembers that Rotmistrov's tankers won a great victory on the tank field. However, before that, at the turn of the German attack, at the forefront, was the notorious Katukov, who, in general, took all the bitterness of the first blows upon himself. How did it happen? The fact is that the defense was built as follows: ahead, on the main line, were the troops of the 6th Guards Army, and it was assumed that the Germans, most likely, would strike along the Oboyan highway. And then they were supposed to be stopped by the tankers of the 1st Tank Army of Lieutenant General Mikhail Efimovich Katukov.

On the night of the 6th, they advanced to the second army line and almost in the morning took the main blow. By the middle of the day, Chistyakov's 6th Guards Army was cut into several parts, three divisions were dispersed, we suffered significant losses. And only thanks to the skill, skill and stamina of Mikhail Efimovich Katukov, the defense was held up to the 9th day inclusive.

Commander of the Voronezh Front, General of the Army N. F. Vatutin accepts the report of one of the unit commanders, 1943

It is known that after Stalingrad our army suffered huge losses, including among the officers. I wonder how these losses were replenished in a fairly short period by the summer of 1943? Vatutin received the Voronezh Front in a very deplorable state. A number of divisions numbered two, three, four thousand. Replenishment was due to the call of the local population, which came out of the occupied territory, marching companies, as well as due to the replenishment that arrived from the Central Asian republics.

As for the command staff, its shortage in the spring of 1942 was made up by officers from the academies, from the rear units, and so on. And after the battles near Stalingrad, the situation with the command staff of the tactical level, especially the commanders of battalions and regiments, was catastrophic. As a result, on October 9, the well-known order to abolish the commissars, and a significant part of the political staff was sent to the troops. That is, everything that can be done was done.

The Battle of Kursk is considered by many to be the largest defensive operation of the Great Patriotic War. Is it so? At the first stage, no doubt. No matter how we evaluate the battle in the Chernozem region now, it was after August 23, 1943, when it ended, that our enemy, the German army, was no longer able to conduct a single major strategic offensive operation within the army group. He simply had nothing to do with it. In the south, the situation was as follows: the Voronezh Front was given the task of exhausting the enemy forces and driving out his tanks. During the defensive period, until July 23, they could not do this completely. The Germans sent a significant part of the repair fund to repair bases, which were located not far from the front line. And after the troops of the Voronezh Front went on the offensive on August 3, all these bases were captured. In particular, in Borisovka there was a repair base of the 10th tank brigade. There, the Germans blew up part of the Panthers, up to forty units, we captured part. And at the end of August, Germany was no longer able to replenish all the tank divisions on the Eastern Front. And this task of the second stage of the Battle of Kursk during the counteroffensive - to knock out the tanks - was solved.

Losses Defensive phase:

Participants: Central Front, Voronezh Front, Steppe Front (not all)
Irrevocable - 70 330
Sanitary - 107 517
Operation Kutuzov: Participants: Western Front (left wing), Bryansk Front, Central Front
Irrevocable - 112 529
Sanitary - 317 361
Operation Rumyantsev: Participants: Voronezh Front, Steppe Front
Irrevocable - 71 611
Sanitary - 183 955
General in the battle for the Kursk salient:
Irrevocable - 189 652
Sanitary - 406 743
In the Battle of Kursk in general
~ 254 470 killed, captured, missing
608 833 the wounded, sick
153 thousand small arms
6064 tanks and self-propelled guns
5245 guns and mortars
1626 combat aircraft

According to German sources 103 600 killed and missing on the entire Eastern Front. 433 933 the wounded. According to Soviet sources 500 thousand total losses on the Kursk ledge.

1000 tanks according to German data, 1500 - according to Soviet
less 1696 aircraft

The Great Patriotic War

Invasion of the USSR Karelia arctic Leningrad Rostov Moscow Sevastopol Barvenkovo-Lozovaya Kharkov Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad Rzhev Stalingrad Caucasus Velikiye Luki Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh Voronezh-Kastornoye Kursk Smolensk Donbass Dnieper Right-Bank Ukraine Leningrad-Novgorod Crimea (1944) Belarus Lviv-Sandomierz Iasi-Chisinau Eastern Carpathians the Baltics Courland Romania Bulgaria Debrecen Belgrade Budapest Poland (1944) Western Carpathians East Prussia Lower Silesia Eastern Pomerania Upper Silesia Vein Berlin Prague

The Soviet command decided to conduct a defensive battle, wear down the enemy troops and inflict defeat on them, inflicting counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. To this end, a defense in depth was created on both faces of the Kursk salient. A total of 8 defensive lines were created. The average density of mining in the direction of the expected enemy strikes was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines per kilometer of the front.

In the assessment of the forces of the parties in the sources, there are strong discrepancies associated with the different definitions of the scale of the battle by different historians, as well as the difference in the methods of accounting and classification military equipment. When assessing the forces of the Red Army, the main discrepancy is associated with the inclusion or exclusion from the calculations of the reserve - the Steppe Front (about 500 thousand personnel and 1500 tanks). The following table contains some estimates:

Estimates of the forces of the parties before the Battle of Kursk according to various sources

A source	Personnel (thousand)		Tanks and (sometimes) self-propelled guns		Guns and (sometimes) mortars		Aircraft
	the USSR	Germany	the USSR	Germany	the USSR	Germany	the USSR	Germany
MO RF	1336	over 900	3444	2733	19100	about 10000	2172 2900 (including Po-2 and far)	2050
Krivosheev 2001	1272
Glantz, House	1910	780	5040	2696 or 2928
Mueller Gill.				2540 or 2758
Zett, Frankson	1910	777	5128 +2688 "Stavka reserve" over 8000 in total	2451	31415	7417	3549	1830
KOSAVE	1337	900	3306	2700	20220	10000	2650	2500

The role of intelligence

However, it should be noted that back on April 8, 1943, G.K. Zhukov, relying on the data of the intelligence agencies of the fronts of the Kursk direction, very accurately predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk salient:

... I believe that the enemy will deploy the main offensive operations against these three fronts in order to defeat our troops in this direction and gain freedom of maneuver to bypass Moscow in the shortest direction.
2. Apparently, at the first stage, the enemy, having gathered the maximum of his forces, including up to 13-15 tank divisions, with the support of a large number of aircraft, will strike with his Oryol-Krom group around Kursk from the northeast and the Belgorod-Kharkov group around Kursk from the southeast.

Thus, although the exact text of the Citadel lay on Stalin's desk three days before Hitler signed it, the German plan became apparent to the highest Soviet military command four days before.

Kursk defensive operation

The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation, at 3 a.m. (the German army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow 5 a.m.), artillery and air counter-training was carried out 30-40 minutes before it began.

Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 o'clock in the morning our time, the Germans also inflicted bombing and artillery strikes on the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went on the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern face was inflicted in the direction of Olkhovatka. Having not achieved success, the Germans suffered a blow in the direction of Ponyri, but they were unable to break through the Soviet defenses here either. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which, from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of the tanks, the 9th German Army went on the defensive. On the southern front, the main blows of the Germans were directed to the areas of Korocha and Oboyan.

July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky.

To accomplish the task, the units of the 48th TC on the first day of the offensive (Day "X") needed to break into the defenses of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I. M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I. P. Sivakov) and the 67 Guards Rifle Division (Colonel A. I. Baksov), capture the large village of Cherkasskoye and carry out a breakthrough with armored units in towards the village of Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of the 48th shopping mall determined that the village of Cherkasskoye was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5. And already on July 6, part 48 of shopping mall. were supposed to reach the city of Oboyan.

However, as a result of actions Soviet units and formations, the courage and stamina they showed, as well as the preparation of defensive lines they carried out in advance, the Wehrmacht's plans in this direction were "significantly adjusted" - 48 shopping mall did not reach Oboyan at all.

The factors that determined the unacceptably slow rate of advance of the 48th mk on the first day of the offensive were the good engineering preparation of the terrain by the Soviet units (starting from anti-tank ditches almost throughout the defense and ending with radio-controlled minefields), the fire of divisional artillery, guards mortars and the actions of assault aircraft on the accumulated front engineering obstacles to enemy tanks, competent location of anti-tank strongholds (No. 6 south of Korovin in the lane of the 71st Guards Rifle Division, No. 7 southwest of Cherkassky and No. 8 southeast of Cherkassky in the lane of the 67th Guards Rifle Division), rapid reorganization of the combat formations of battalions of the 196th Guards Rifle Division .sp (Colonel V. I. Bazhanov) in the direction of the enemy’s main attack south of Cherkassky, timely maneuver by the divisional (245 otp, 1440 sap) and army (493 iptap, as well as 27 oiptabr colonel N. D. Chevola) anti-tank reserve, relatively successful counterattacks on the flank of the wedged units 3 TD and 11 TD with the involvement of forces 245 otp ( lieutenant colonel M. K. Akopov, 39 tanks) and 1440 glanders (lieutenant colonel Shapshinsky, 8 SU-76 and 12 SU-122), as well as the not completely suppressed resistance of the remnants of the outposts in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 battalions. 199th guards regiment, captain V.L. Vakhidov) and in the area of ​​workers' barracks southwest of the village. Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of 48 TC (the capture of these starting positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of 11 TD and 332 RD before the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day "X-1", however, the resistance of the combat guard was not completely suppressed by dawn on July 5). All of the above factors affected both the speed of concentration of units in their original positions before the main attack, and their advancement during the offensive itself.

Machine-gun crew firing at the advancing German units

Also, the shortcomings of the German command in planning the operation and the poorly practiced interaction between tank and infantry units affected the pace of the corps' offensive. In particular, the division "Grossdeutschland" (W. Heierlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and 10 brigade attached to it (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 command tanks Pz.V) in the current conditions battles turned out to be clumsy and unbalanced formations. As a result, throughout the first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks were crowded in narrow “corridors” in front of engineering barriers (overcoming the swampy anti-tank ditch south of Cherkassky caused especially great difficulties), came under a combined attack by Soviet aviation (2nd VA) and artillery - from PTOP No. 6 and No. 7, 138 Guards Ap (Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Kirdyanov) and two regiments 33 from Pabr (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially in the officer corps), and could not deploy in accordance with the offensive schedule on tank-accessible terrain at the turn Korovino - Cherkasskoe for a further strike in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkassy. At the same time, infantry units that overcame anti-tank barriers in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own firepower. So, for example, the combat group of the 3rd Battalion of the Fusiliers Regiment, which was at the forefront of the strike of the VG division, at the time of the first attack, found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing huge armored forces, the VG division could not actually bring them into battle for a long time.

The result of the resulting congestion on the advance routes was also the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th tank corps in firing positions, which affected the results of the artillery preparation before the start of the attack.

It should be noted that the commander of the 48th TC became a hostage to a number of erroneous decisions of the higher authorities. Knobelsdorff's lack of an operational reserve had a particularly negative effect - all divisions of the corps were put into battle almost simultaneously on the morning of July 5, after which they were drawn into active hostilities for a long time.

The development of the offensive of 48 mk on the afternoon of July 5 was most facilitated by: active operations of sapper-assault units, aviation support (more than 830 sorties) and an overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles. It is also necessary to note the initiative actions of units 11 TD (I. Mikl) and 911 TD. division of assault guns (overcoming the strip of engineering obstacles and access to the eastern outskirts of Cherkassy by a mechanized group of infantry and sappers with the support of assault guns).

An important factor in the success of the German tank units was the qualitative leap that had taken place by the summer in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles. Already during the first day of the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of the anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units manifested itself in the fight against both the new German tanks Pz.V and Pz.VI, and with modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet Iptap were armed with 45-mm guns, the power of 76-mm Soviet field and American tank guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances two to three times less than the effective range of fire of the latter, heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent not only in combined arms 6 Guards A, but also in the 1st Tank Army of M.E. Katukov, which occupied the second line of defense behind it).

Only after overcoming in the second half of the day the main mass of tanks of anti-tank barriers south of Cherkassky, having repelled a number of counterattacks of the Soviet units, the units of the VG division and 11 TD were able to cling to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting moved into the street phase. At about 21:00 division commander A. I. Baksov ordered the withdrawal of units of the 196th Guards Rifle Regiment to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassky, as well as to the center of the village. During the withdrawal of units of 196 Guards Rifles, minefields were set up. At about 21:20, a battle group of grenadiers of the VG division, with the support of the Panthers of the 10th brigade, broke into the Yarki farm (north of Cherkassky). A little later, the 3rd TD of the Wehrmacht managed to capture the Krasny Pochinok farm (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th TC of the Wehrmacht was the wedging into the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. And at 6 km, which can actually be considered a failure, especially against the background of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating east in parallel with 48th Tank Corps), which was less saturated with armored vehicles, which managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. BUT.

Organized resistance in the village of Cherkasskoe was suppressed around midnight on July 5 . However, the German units were able to establish full control over the village only by the morning of July 6, that is, when, according to the offensive plan, the corps was already supposed to approach Oboyan.

Thus, the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division, not possessing large tank formations (they had only 39 American tanks of various modifications and 20 self-propelled guns from the 245 otp and 1440 sap) for about a day held five enemy divisions (of which three are armored). In the battle on July 5 in the Cherkassky region, the fighters and commanders of the 196th and 199th Guards especially distinguished themselves. rifle regiments 67 guards. divisions. The competent and truly heroic actions of the fighters and commanders of the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division allowed the command of the 6th Guards. And in a timely manner, pull up the army reserves to the place where the units of the 48th TC were wedged in at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division and prevent a general collapse of the defense of the Soviet troops in this sector in the following days of the defensive operation.

As a result of the hostilities described above, the village of Cherkasskoe actually ceased to exist (according to post-war eyewitness accounts: “it was a lunar landscape”).

The heroic defense of the village of Cherkasskoye on July 5 - one of the most successful moments of the Battle of Kursk for the Soviet troops - unfortunately, is one of the undeservedly forgotten episodes of the Great Patriotic War.

July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks.

By the end of the first day of the offensive, 4 TA wedged into the defense of 6 Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the offensive section of 48 shopping malls (near the village of Cherkasskoye) and 12-13 km in the section of 2 shopping malls of the SS (in the area of ​​​​Bykovka - Kozmo-Demyanovka). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenführer P. Hausser) managed to break through the first line of defense of the Soviet troops to the full depth, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I. M. Nekrasov), and approached the front 5-6 km directly to the second the line of defense occupied by the 51st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), engaging in battle with its advanced units.

However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (W. Kempf) - on July 5 did not complete the task of the day, faced with stubborn resistance from units of the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the advancing 4th tank army. As a result, Hausser was forced from July 6 to 8 to use a third of the forces of his corps, namely MD "Dead Head", to cover his right flank against the 375th Rifle Division (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units brilliantly proved themselves in the battles of July 5 .

Nevertheless, the success achieved by the divisions "Leibstandarte" and in particular "Das Reich" forced the command of the Voronezh Front in conditions of not complete clarity of the situation to take hasty retaliatory measures to plug the breakthrough formed in the second line of defense of the front. After the report of the commander of the 6th Guards. And Chistyakov on the state of affairs on the left flank of the army, Vatutin, by his order, transfers the 5th Guards. Stalingrad shopping mall (Major General A. G. Kravchenko, 213 tanks, of which 106 are T-34s and 21 are Churchill Mk.IVs) and 2 Guards. Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 combat-ready tanks, of which 90 are T-34s and 17 are Mk.IV Churchills) under the command of the commander of the 6th Guards. And he approves his proposal to launch counterattacks on the German tanks that broke through the positions of the 51st Guards Rifle Division with the forces of the 5th Guards Rifle Division. Stk and under the base of the entire advancing wedge 2 TC SS with the forces of 2 Guards. TTK (straight through the battle formations of 375 rifle divisions). In particular, on the afternoon of July 6, I. M. Chistyakov puts the commander of the 5th Guards. Stk Major General A. G. Kravchenko tasked with withdrawing from the defensive area he occupied (in which the corps was already ready to meet the enemy, using the tactics of ambushes and anti-tank strongholds) of the main part of the corps (two of the three brigades and a heavy breakthrough tank regiment), and the infliction of a counterattack by these forces on the flank of the Leibstandarte MD. Having received the order, the commander and headquarters of the 5th Guards. Stk, already knowing about the capture with. Luchki tanks of the Das Reich division, and more correctly assessing the situation, tried to challenge the implementation of this order. However, under the threat of arrests and execution, they were forced to proceed with its implementation. The attack of the corps brigades was launched at 15:10.

Sufficient own artillery means of the 5th Guards. Stk did not have, and the order did not leave time to link the actions of the corps with neighbors or aviation. Therefore, the attack of tank brigades was carried out without artillery preparation, without air support, on level ground and with practically open flanks. The blow fell directly on the forehead of MD Das Reich, which regrouped, setting up tanks as an anti-tank barrier and, calling in aviation, inflicted significant fire damage on the brigades of the Stalingrad Corps, forcing them to stop the attack and go on the defensive. After that, pulling up anti-tank artillery and organizing flank maneuvers, between 17 and 19 hours, units of the Das Reich MD managed to reach the communications of the defending tank brigades in the area of ​​the Kalinin farm, which was defended by 1696 zenap (Major Savchenko) and 464 guards artillery that had withdrawn from the village of Luchki .division and 460 guards. mortar battalion of the 6th guards msbr. By 19:00, units of MD "Das Reich" actually managed to surround most of the 5th Guards. Stk between s. Luchki and the Kalinin farm, after which, building on success, the command of the German division of part of the forces, acting in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka, tried to seize the Belenikhino junction. However, thanks to the initiative actions of the commander and battalion commanders of the 20 brigade (lieutenant colonel P.F. Okhrimenko) of the 5th guards, which remained outside the encirclement ring. Stk, who managed to quickly create a tough defense around Belenikhino from various parts of the corps at hand, managed to stop the offensive of MD Das Reich, and even force the German units to return back to x. Kalinin. Being without communication with the headquarters of the corps, on the night of July 7, the encircled units of the 5th Guards. Stk organized a breakthrough, as a result of which part of the forces managed to escape from the encirclement and connected with parts of the 20 brigade. During July 6, units of the 5th Guards. Stk for combat reasons, 119 tanks were irretrievably lost, another 9 tanks were lost for technical or unexplained reasons, and 19 were sent for repair. Not a single tank corps had such significant losses in one day during the entire defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge (losses of the 5th Guards Stk on July 6 exceeded even the losses of the 29th Tank Corps during the attack on July 12 at the Oktyabrsky temporary storage warehouse).

After the encirclement of the 5th Guards. Stk, continuing to develop success in the northern direction, another detachment of the tank regiment md "Das Reich", using the confusion during the withdrawal of Soviet units, managed to reach the third (rear) line of army defense, occupied by units 69A (Lieutenant General V. D. Kryuchenkon) , near the Teterevino farm, and for a short time wedged into the defense of the 285th joint venture of the 183rd rifle division, however, due to a clear lack of strength, having lost several tanks, he was forced to retreat. The exit of German tanks to the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front already on the second day of the offensive was regarded by the Soviet command as an emergency.

Battle of Prokhorovka

Belfry in memory of those who died on the Prokhorovsky field

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The central front involved in the battle in the north of the arc, for July 5-11, 1943, suffered losses of 33,897 people, of which 15,336 were irretrievable, its enemy, the 9th Army of the Model, lost 20,720 people over the same period, which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which participated in the battle on the southern face of the arc, lost on July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrevocable. Including only the Voronezh Front - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed the losses of their front to be 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irretrievable. If, contrary to Soviet documents of the war period, the official numbers are considered correct, then taking into account German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of losses of the Soviet and German parties is 4.95:1 here.

During the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front used up 1079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh - 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.

The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front is in the smaller massing of forces and means in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern face of the Kursk salient. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.

On the southern front, the counteroffensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5, at about 18-00, Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, on August 11, Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railroad, and on August 23 captured Kharkov. The German counterattacks were not successful.

After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as " Watch on the Rhine" () or the operation at Balaton () were also not successful.

Dates of the Battle of Kursk 07/05/1943 - 08/23/1943. The Great Patriotic War has 3 significant events:

• Liberation of Stalingrad;
• Battle of Kursk
• Capture of Berlin.

Here we will talk about the greatest tank battle in modern history.

Battle for Kursk. Situation before the battle

Before the Battle of Kursk, Germany celebrated little success, having managed to recapture the cities of Belgorod and Kharkov. Hitler, seeing a short-term success, decided to develop it. The offensive was planned for the Kursk Bulge. The salient, cut into the depths of German territory, could be surrounded and captured. The operation, approved on May 10-11, was called "Citadel".

Side forces

The advantage was on the side of the Red Army. The number of Soviet troops was 1,200,000 people (versus 900,000 for the enemy), the number of tanks - 3,500 (2,700 for the Germans) units, guns - 20,000 (10,000), aircraft 2,800 (2,500).

The German army was replenished with heavy (medium) tanks "Tiger" ("Panther"), self-propelled guns (ACS) "Ferdinand", aircraft "Foke-Wulf 190". An innovation from the Soviet side was the "St.

Side Plans

The Germans decided to deliver a lightning strike, quickly capture the Kursk salient, and then continue a large-scale offensive. The Soviet side decided at first to defend itself, inflicting counterattacks, and when the enemy was exhausted and exhausted, to go on the offensive.

Defense

It was possible to find out that Battle of Kursk will begin on 05/06/1943. Therefore, at 02:30 and 04:30, the Central Front carried out two half-hour artillery counterattacks. At 5:00, the enemy's guns responded, and then the enemy went on the offensive, exerting strong pressure (2.5 hours) on the right flank in the direction of the village of Olkhovatka.

When the attack was repulsed, the Germans intensified the onslaught on the left flank. They even managed to partially encircle two (15, 81) Soviet divisions, but failed to break through the front (advance 6-8 km). Then the Germans made an attempt to capture the Ponyri station in order to control the Orel-Kursk railway.

170 tanks and self-propelled guns "Ferdinand" broke through the first line of defense on July 6, but the second survived. On July 7, the enemy came close to the station. The 200 mm frontal armor became impenetrable for Soviet guns. Ponyri station was held by anti-tank mines and powerful Soviet air raids.

The tank battle near the village of Prokhorovka (Voronezh Front) lasted 6 days (10-16). Almost 800 Soviet tanks opposed 450 enemy tanks and self-propelled guns. The overall victory was for the Red Army, but more than 300 tanks were lost against 80 of the opponent. Medium tanks The T-34s could hardly withstand the heavy Tigers, and the light T-70 was generally unsuitable in open areas. This is where the losses come from.

Offensive

While the troops of the Voronezh and Central Fronts were repulsing enemy attacks, units of the Western and Bryansk Fronts (July 12) went over to the attack. Within three days (12-14), waging heavy fighting, the Soviet army was able to advance up to 25 kilometers.

The beginning of the combat path of the Ural Volunteer Tank Corps

The defeat of the fascist German army near Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-1943 shook the fascist bloc to its foundations. For the first time since the beginning of the Second World War, Nazi Germany, in all its inevitability, faced the formidable specter of inevitable defeat. Its military power, the morale of the army and the population were thoroughly undermined, and the prestige in the eyes of the allies was seriously shaken. In order to improve Germany's internal political situation and prevent the disintegration of the fascist coalition, the Nazi command decided in the summer of 1943 to conduct a major offensive operation on the central sector of the Soviet-German front. With this offensive, it hoped to defeat the grouping of Soviet troops located on the Kursk salient, seize the strategic initiative again and turn the course of the war in its favor. By the summer of 1943, the situation on the Soviet-German front had already changed in favor of the Soviet Union. By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the overall superiority in forces and means was on the side of the Red Army: in people by 1.1 times, in artillery - by 1.7, in tanks - by 1.4 and in combat aircraft - by 2 times.

The Battle of Kursk occupies the Great Patriotic war special place. It lasted 50 days and nights, from July 5 to August 23, 1943. This battle has no equal in its bitterness and stubbornness of the struggle.

The goal of the Wehrmacht: the general plan of the German command was to encircle and destroy the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts defending in the Kursk region. If successful, it was supposed to expand the front of the offensive and return the strategic initiative. To implement his plans, the enemy concentrated powerful strike groups, which numbered over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2700 tanks and assault guns, about 2050 aircraft. Great hopes were placed on the latest Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, Focke-Wulf-190-A fighter aircraft and Heinkel-129 attack aircraft.

The purpose of the Red Army: the Soviet command decided to first bleed the enemy strike groups in defensive battles, and then go on the counteroffensive.

The battle that began immediately took on a grandiose scope and was of an extremely tense character. Our troops did not flinch. They met the avalanche of enemy tanks and infantry with unprecedented stamina and courage. The offensive of the enemy strike groups was suspended. Only at the cost of huge losses did he manage to penetrate our defenses in some areas. On the Central Front - 10-12 kilometers, on the Voronezh - up to 35 kilometers. Finally buried the Nazi operation "Citadel", the largest in the entire Second world war oncoming tank battle near Prokhorovka. It happened on July 12th. 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns simultaneously participated in it from both sides. This battle was won by the Soviet soldiers. The Nazis, having lost up to 400 tanks during the day of the battle, were forced to abandon the offensive.

On July 12, the second stage of the Battle of Kursk began - the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops. On August 5, Soviet troops liberated the cities of Orel and Belgorod. On the evening of August 5, in honor of this major success, a victorious salute was given in Moscow for the first time in two years of the war. Since that time, artillery salutes have constantly announced glorious victories Soviet weapons. On August 23, Kharkov was liberated.

Thus ended the Battle of the Kursk Fiery Bulge. During it, 30 selected enemy divisions were defeated. The Nazi troops lost about 500,000 men, 1,500 tanks, 3,000 guns and 3,700 aircraft. For courage and heroism, over 100 thousand Soviet soldiers, participants in the Battle of the Fiery Arc, were awarded orders and medals. The Battle of Kursk ended with a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War in favor of the Red Army.

Losses in the Battle of Kursk.

Type of losses	Red Army	Wehrmacht	Ratio
Personnel
Guns and mortars
Tanks and self-propelled guns
Aircraft

UDTK on the Kursk Bulge. Oryol offensive operation

Baptism of fire in the Battle of Kursk was received by the 30th Ural Volunteer Tank Corps, which is part of the 4th Tank Army.

T-34 tanks - 202 units, T-70 - 7, BA-64 armored vehicles - 68,

self-propelled 122-mm guns - 16, 85-mm guns - 12,

installations M-13 - 8, 76-mm guns - 24, 45-mm guns - 32,

37 mm guns - 16, 120 mm mortars - 42, 82 mm mortars - 52.

The army, commanded by Lieutenant General of the Tank Troops Vasily Mikhailovich Badanov, arrived at the Bryansk Front on the eve of the battles that began on July 5, 1943, and during the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops was brought into battle in the Oryol direction. The Ural Volunteer Tank Corps under the command of Lieutenant General Georgy Semenovich Rodin had the task of advancing from the Seredichi region to the south, cutting off the enemy’s communications on the Bolkhov-Khotynets line, reaching the area of ​​the village of Zlyn, and then saddling the Orel-Bryansk railway and highway and cutting off the escape route of the Oryol grouping of the Nazis to the west. And the Urals fulfilled the order.

On July 29, Lieutenant General Rodin set the task of the 197th Sverdlovsk and 243rd Molotov tank brigades: to cross the Nugr River in cooperation with the 30th motorized rifle brigade (MSBR), capture the village of Borilovo and then advance in the direction of the settlement Vishnevsky. The village of Borilovo was located on a high bank and dominated the surrounding area, and from the bell tower of the church it was visible for several kilometers in a circle. All this made it easier for the enemy to conduct a defense and hampered the actions of the advancing corps units. At 20:00 on July 29, after a 30-minute artillery preparation and a volley of guards mortars, two tank motorized rifle brigades began to force the Nugr River. Under the cover of tank fire, the company of Senior Lieutenant A.P. Nikolaev was the first to cross the Nugr River, capturing the southern outskirts of the village of Borilovo. By the morning of July 30, the battalion of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade, supported by tanks, captured the village of Borilovo despite the stubborn resistance of the enemy. All units of the Sverdlovsk brigade of the 30th UDTK were concentrated here. By order of the corps commander at 10:30, the brigade launched an offensive in the direction - height 212.2. The assault was heavy. The 244th Chelyabinsk Tank Brigade, which was previously in the reserve of the 4th Army, graduated from it.

Hero of the Soviet Union Alexander Petrovich Nikolaev, company commander of a motorized rifle battalion of the 197th Guards Sverdlovsk Tank Brigade. From personal archiveON THE.Kirillova.

On July 31, in the liberated Borilovo, the heroically dead tankers and submachine gunners were buried, including commanders of tank battalions: Major Chazov and Captain Ivanov. The mass heroism of the corps soldiers, shown in the battles from July 27 to 29, was highly appreciated. Only in the Sverdlovsk brigade, 55 soldiers, sergeants and officers were awarded government awards for these battles. In the battle for Borilovo, the Sverdlovsk sanitary instructor Anna Alekseevna Kvanskova accomplished a feat. She rescued the wounded and, replacing the artillerymen who were out of action, brought shells to firing positions. A. A. Kvanskova was awarded the Order of the Red Star, and later for her heroism she was awarded the Orders of Glory III and II degrees.

Guards sergeant Anna Alekseevna Kvanskova assists the lieutenantA. A.Lysin, 1944.

Photo by M. Insarov, 1944. TsDOOSO. F.221. OP.3.D.1672

The exceptional courage of the Urals warriors, their readiness to carry out a combat mission without sparing their lives, aroused admiration. But the pain from the losses suffered was mixed with him. It seemed that they were too great in comparison with the achieved results.

A column of German prisoners of war captured in the battles in the Oryol direction, USSR, 1943.

Destroyed German vehicles during the battles on the Kursk Bulge, USSR, 1943.

Battle of Kursk, 1943

Since March 1943, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) has been working on a strategic offensive plan, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center, to crush the enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go on the offensive. However, in mid-April, based on information that the Wehrmacht command was planning to launch an offensive near Kursk, it was decided to bleed the German troops with a powerful defense, and then go on the counteroffensive. Possessing a strategic initiative, the Soviet side deliberately began hostilities not on the offensive, but on the defensive. The development of events showed that this plan was correct.

Since the spring of 1943, Nazi Germany has launched intense preparations for the offensive. The Nazis organized the mass production of new medium and heavy tanks, increased the production of guns, mortars and combat aircraft compared to 1942. Due to the total mobilization, they almost completely made up for the losses incurred in personnel.

The fascist German command decided to carry out a major offensive operation in the summer of 1943 and once again seize the strategic initiative. The idea of ​​the operation was to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops in the Kursk ledge with powerful counter strikes from the Orel and Belgorod regions to Kursk. In the future, the enemy intended to defeat the Soviet troops in the Donbass. For the implementation of the operation near Kursk, called "Citadel", the enemy concentrated huge forces and appointed the most experienced military leaders: 50 divisions, including. 16 tank, Army Group "Center" (commander Field Marshal G. Kluge) and Army Group "South" (commander Field Marshal E. Manstein). In total, over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, and more than 2,000 aircraft were part of the enemy strike groups. An important place in the enemy's plan was given to the use of new military equipment - the Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as new aircraft (Focke-Wulf-190A fighters and Henschel-129 attack aircraft).

The offensive of the German fascist troops against the northern and southern faces of the Kursk ledge, which began on July 5, 1943, was countered by the Soviet command with a strong active defense. The enemy, attacking Kursk from the north, was stopped four days later. He managed to wedge into the defense of the Soviet troops for 10-12 km. The group advancing on Kursk from the south advanced 35 km, but did not reach its goal.

On July 12, the Soviet troops, having exhausted the enemy, launched a counteroffensive. On this day, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place near the Prokhorovka railway station (up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns on both sides). Developing the offensive, the Soviet ground forces, supported from the air by strikes from the forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies, as well as long-range aviation, by August 23 pushed the enemy back 140-150 km to the west, liberated Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov.

The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The balance of forces at the front changed dramatically in favor of the Red Army, which provided it with favorable conditions for deploying a general strategic offensive.

Having revealed the offensive plan of the fascist German command, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to wear out and bleed the enemy strike groups with a deliberate defense, and then complete their complete defeat with a decisive counteroffensive. The defense of the Kursk ledge was assigned to the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts. Both fronts numbered more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (48th, 13th, 70th, 65th, 60th combined arms armies, 2nd tank army, 16th air army, 9th and 19th separate tank corps) under the command of General K.K. Rokossovsky should were to repel the enemy's offensive from the side of Orel. In front of the Voronezh Front (38th, 40th, 6th and 7th Guards, 69th Armies, 1st Tank Army, 2nd Air Army, 35th Guards Rifle Corps, 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps) , commanded by General N.F. Vatutin, the task was to repel the enemy’s offensive from Belgorod. The Steppe Military District was deployed in the rear of the Kursk ledge (since July 9 - the Steppe Front: 4th and 5th Guards, 27th, 47th, 53rd armies, 5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Air Army, 1 rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized, 3 cavalry corps), which was the strategic reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters.

Enemy troops: in the Oryol-Kursk direction - the 9th and 2nd armies of the Army Group "Center" (50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized divisions; commander - Field Marshal G. Kluge), in the Belgorod-Kursk direction - 4th Panzer Army and Operational Group "Kempf" of the Army Group "South" (commander - Field Marshal E. Manstein).

The commander of the central front considered Ponyri and Kursk the most probable direction of action for the main enemy forces, and Maloarkhangelsk and Gnilets as auxiliary ones. Therefore, he decided to concentrate the main forces of the front on the right wing. The decisive massing of forces and means in the direction of the expected enemy strike made it possible to create high densities in the zone of the 13th Army (32 km) - 94 guns and mortars, of which more than 30 anti-tank artillery guns, and about 9 tanks per 1 km of the front.

The commander of the Voronezh Front determined that the enemy offensive could be in the directions of Belgorod, Oboyan; Belgorod, Korocha; Volchansk, Novy Oskol. Therefore, it was decided to concentrate the main forces in the center and on the left wing of the front. In contrast to the Central Front, the armies of the first echelon received wide lines of defense. However, even here, in the zone of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies, the density of anti-tank artillery was 15.6 guns per 1 km of the front, and taking into account the means located in the second echelon of the front, up to 30 guns per 1 km of the front.

On the basis of our reconnaissance data and the testimonies of the prisoners, it was established that the enemy offensive would begin on July 5. Early in the morning of that day on the Voronezh and central fronts, artillery counter-preparation planned in the fronts and armies was carried out. As a result, she managed to delay the enemy's offensive for 1.5 - 2 hours and somewhat weaken his initial blow.

On the morning of July 5, the Oryol grouping of the enemy, under the cover of artillery fire and with the support of aviation, went on the offensive, inflicting the main blow on Olkhovatka, and auxiliary ones on Maloarkhangelsk and Fatezh. Our troops met the enemy with exceptional stamina. The Nazi troops suffered heavy losses. Only after the fifth attack did they manage to break into the front line of defense of the 29th Rifle Corps in the Olkhovat direction.

In the afternoon, the commander of the 13th Army, General N.P. Pukhov, advanced several tank and self-propelled artillery units and mobile barrier detachments to the main strip, and the front commander - howitzer and mortar brigades to the Olkhovatka area. Decisive tank counterattacks, in cooperation with rifle units and artillery, halted the enemy's advance. On this day, fierce battles unfolded in the air. The 16th Air Army supported the fighting operations of the defending troops of the central front. By the end of the day, at the cost of huge losses, the enemy managed to advance 6-8 km in the Olkhovat direction. In other directions, his attacks were not successful.

Having determined the direction of the main efforts of the enemy, the front commander decided on the morning of July 6 to launch a counterattack from the Olkhovatka area to Gnilusha in order to restore the position of the 13th Army. The 17th Guards Rifle Corps of the 13th Army, the 2nd Tank Army of General A. G. Rodin and the 19th Tank Corps were involved in the counterattack. As a result of the counterattack, the enemy was stopped in front of the second line of defense and, having suffered heavy losses, was unable to continue the offensive in all three directions in the following days. After delivering a counterattack, the 2nd Panzer Army and the 19th Panzer Corps went over to the defensive behind the second lane, which strengthened the position of the troops of the Central Front.

On the same day, the enemy launched an offensive in the direction of Oboyan and Korocha; the main blows were taken by the 6th and 7th guards, the 69th army and the 1st tank army.

Having not achieved success in the Olkhovat direction, the enemy on the morning of July 7 launched an attack on Ponyri, where the 307th Rifle Division was defending. During the day, she repelled eight attacks. When enemy units broke into the northwestern outskirts of the Ponyri station, the division commander, General M.A. Enshin, concentrated artillery and mortar fire on them, then, with the forces of the second echelon and the attached tank brigade, launched a counterattack and restored the situation. On July 8 and 9, the enemy continued attacks on Olkhovatka and Ponyri, and on July 10 against the troops of the right flank of the 70th Army, but all his attempts to break through the second line of defense were thwarted.

Having exhausted its reserves, the enemy was forced to abandon the offensive and on July 11 went on the defensive.

German soldiers in front of the Tiger tank, during the Battle of Kursk in June-July 1943

Against the troops of the Voronezh Front, the enemy launched a general offensive also on the morning of July 5, inflicting the main blow with the forces of the 4th Panzer Army on Oboyan, and the auxiliary operational group Kempf on Korocha. The fighting took on a particularly fierce character in the Oboyan direction. The commander of the 6th Guards Army, General I. M. Chistyakov, in the first half of the day put forward part of the anti-tank artillery brigade, two tank and one self-propelled artillery regiments and a tank brigade to the front line of defense. By the end of the day, the troops of this army had inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and stopped his attacks. The main strip of our defense was broken through only in separate sections. In the Korochan direction, the enemy managed to force the Northern Donets south of Belgorod and capture a small bridgehead.

In the current situation, the front commander decided to cover the Oboyan direction. To this end, on the night of July 6, he advanced to the second line of defense the 1st Tank Army of General M.E. Katukov, as well as the 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, operationally subordinate to the 6th Guards Army. In addition, the army was reinforced by front-line artillery.

On the morning of July 6, the enemy resumed the offensive in all directions. On the Oboyan direction, he repeatedly launched attacks from 150 to 400 tanks, but each time he met with powerful fire from infantry, artillery and tanks. Only by the end of the day did he manage to wedge into the second lane of our defense.

In the Korochan direction that day, the enemy managed to complete the breakthrough of the main line of defense, but his further advance was stopped.

Heavy German tanks "Tiger" (Panzerkampfwagen VI "Tiger I") at the line of attack, south of Orel. Battle of Kursk, mid-July 1943

On July 7 and 8, the Nazis, by bringing fresh reserves into battle, again tried to break through to Oboyan, expand the breakthrough towards the flanks and deepen it in the direction of Prokhorovka. Up to 300 enemy tanks rushed to the northeast. However, all enemy attempts were paralyzed by the active actions of the 10th and 2nd tank corps, advanced from the reserves of the Stavka to the Prokhorovka area, as well as the active actions of the 2nd and 17th air armies. On the Korochan direction, enemy attacks were also repulsed. The counterattack inflicted on July 8 by formations of the 40th Army on the left flank of the enemy's 4th Tank Army, and by units of the 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps on its left flank, greatly facilitated the position of our troops in the Oboyan direction.

From July 9 to 11, the enemy brought additional reserves into the battle and at any cost sought to break through along the Belgorod highway to Kursk. To help the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies, the front command promptly put forward part of its artillery. In addition, to cover the Oboyan direction, the 10th Tank Corps was regrouped from the Prokhorovka area and the main aviation forces were aimed, and the 5th Guards Tank Corps was regrouped to strengthen the right flank of the 1st Tank Army. By the joint efforts of the ground forces and aviation, almost all enemy attacks were repulsed. Only on July 9, in the Kochetovka area, enemy tanks managed to break through to the third line of our defense. But two divisions of the 5th Guards Army of the Steppe Front and advanced tank brigades of the 5th Guards Tank Army were advanced against them, which stopped the advance of enemy tanks.

SS Panzer Division "Dead Head" (Totenkopf), Kursk, 1943.

In the offensive of the enemy, a crisis was clearly ripe. Therefore, Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, chairman of the headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and General N. F. Vatutin, commander of the Voronezh Front, decided on the morning of July 12 to launch a counterattack from the Prokhorovka area with the forces of the 5th Guards Army, General A. S. Zhdanov and the 5th Guards Tank Army, General P. A. Rotmistrov, as well as the forces of the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies in the general direction of Yakovlevo with the aim of finally defeating the enemy grouping that had penetrated. From the air, the counterattack was to be provided by the main forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies.

On the morning of July 12, the troops of the Voronezh Front launched a counterattack. The main events unfolded in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka railway station (on the Belgorod-Kursk line, 56 km north of Belgorod), where the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place between the advancing enemy tank group (4th Tank Army, task force "Kempf ") and counterattacking Soviet troops (5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Guards Army). On both sides, up to 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns simultaneously participated in the battle. Aviation support of the enemy's strike force was carried out by the aviation of the "South" army group. Air strikes against the enemy were carried out by the 2nd Air Army, units of the 17th Air Army, and long-range aviation (about 1,300 sorties were made). During the day of the battle, the enemy lost up to 400 tanks and assault guns, over 10 thousand people. Having not reached the intended goal - to capture Kursk from the southeast, the enemy (moved up to a maximum of 35 km on the southern face of the Kursk salient) went on the defensive.

July 12 came a turning point in the Battle of Kursk. By order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. The Hitlerite command was forced to abandon offensive plans and on July 16 began to withdraw its troops to their original position. The troops of the Voronezh, and from July 18 and the Steppe Fronts, proceeded to pursue the enemy, and by the end of July 23, they had mainly reached the line, which they occupied by the beginning of the defensive battle.

Source: I.S. Konev "Notes of the Front Commander, 1943-1945", Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1989

The Orlovsky ledge was defended by the troops of the 2nd Tank and 9th Field Armies, which were part of the Center group. They numbered 27 infantry, 10 tank and motorized divisions. Here the enemy created a strong defense, the tactical zone of which consisted of two lanes with a total depth of 12-15 km. They had a developed system of trenches, communications and a large number of armored firing points. In the operational depth, a number of intermediate defensive lines were prepared. The total depth of its defense on the Oryol bridgehead reached 150 km.

The Oryol grouping of the enemy was instructed by the Headquarters of the Supreme Command to defeat the troops of the left wing Western Front and the main forces of the Bryansk and Central Fronts. The idea of ​​the operation was to cut the enemy grouping into separate parts and destroy it with counter strikes from the north, east and south in the general direction of Orel.

The Western Front (commanded by General V. D. Sokolovsky) received the task of delivering the main blow by the troops of the 11th Guards Army from the area southwest of Kozelsk to Khotynets, preventing the withdrawal of Nazi troops from Orel to the west and, in cooperation with other fronts, destroy them; part of the forces, together with the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front, to surround and destroy the Bolkhov grouping of the enemy; deliver an auxiliary strike with the troops of the 50th Army on Zhizdra.

The Bryansk Front (commanded by General M. M. Popov) was supposed to deliver the main blow by the troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies from the Novosil region to Orel, and the auxiliary one - by the forces of the 61st army to Bolkhov.

The Central Front had the task of eliminating the enemy grouping that had penetrated north of Olkhovatka, subsequently developing a strike on Kromy and, in cooperation with the troops of the Western and Bryansk Fronts, to complete the defeat of the enemy in the Oryol ledge.

The preparation of the operation in the fronts was carried out taking into account the fact that for the first time they had to break through the enemy’s prepared and deeply echeloned defenses and develop tactical success at a high pace. To do this, a decisive massing of forces and means was carried out, the battle formations of troops were echeloned deeper, success development echelons were created in the armies as part of one or two tank corps, the offensive was planned to be carried out day and night.

For example, when overall width offensive zone of the 11th Guards Army 36 km, a decisive massing of forces and means was achieved on the 14-kilometer breakthrough sector, which ensured the growth of operational-tactical densities. The average density of artillery in the area of ​​the army breakthrough reached 185, and in the 8th Guards Rifle Corps - 232 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front. Whereas the offensive lines of divisions in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad fluctuated within 5 km, in the 8th Guards Rifle Regiment they were narrowed to 2 km. New in comparison with the counter-offensive at Stalingrad was the fact that the combat formation of rifle corps, divisions, regiments and battalions was built, as a rule, in two, and sometimes in three echelons. This ensured an increase in the strength of the strike from the depths and the timely development of the emerging success.

Characteristic in the use of artillery was the creation in the armies of artillery groups of destruction and long-range action, groups of guards mortars and anti-aircraft artillery groups. The schedule of artillery preparation in some armies began to provide for a period of sighting and destruction.

There have been changes in the use of tanks. For the first time, regiments of self-propelled artillery were included in the tank groups of direct infantry support (NPP), which were supposed to advance behind the tanks and support their actions with the fire of their guns. At the same time, in some armies, NPP tanks were attached not only to rifle divisions of the first, but also to the second echelon of the corps. Tank corps formed mobile army groups, and tank armies were to be used for the first time as mobile front groups.

The combat operations of our troops were to be supported by more than 3 thousand aircraft of the 1st, 15th and 16th air armies (commanded by Generals M. M. Gromov, N. F. Naumenko, S. I. Rudenko) of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts, and as well as long-range aviation.

The following tasks were assigned to aviation: to cover the troops of the shock groups of the fronts during the preparation and conduct of operations; to suppress the centers of resistance at the forefront and in the nearest depth and disrupt the enemy command and control system for the period of aviation training; with the beginning of the attack, continuously accompany the infantry and tanks; to ensure the introduction of tank formations into battle and their operations in the operational depth; fight against suitable enemy reserves.

The counteroffensive was preceded by a large preparatory work. In all fronts, the initial areas for the offensive were well equipped, troops were regrouped, and large stocks of material and technical equipment were created. A day before the offensive in the fronts, reconnaissance in combat was carried out by advanced battalions, which made it possible to clarify the true outline of the front line of the enemy’s defense, and in some areas to capture the front trench.

On the morning of July 12, after a powerful aviation and artillery preparation, which lasted about three hours, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive. The greatest success was achieved in the direction of the main attack of the Western Front. By the middle of the day, the troops of the 11th Guards Army (commanded by General I. Kh. Bagramyan), thanks to the timely entry into battle of the second echelons of rifle regiments, separate tank brigades, broke through the enemy’s main line of defense and crossed the Fomin River. In order to quickly complete the breakthrough of the enemy tactical zone, in the afternoon of July 12, the 5th Panzer Corps was introduced into the battle in the direction of Bolkhov. On the morning of the second day of the operation, the second echelons of the rifle corps entered the battle, which, together with the tank units, bypassing the strong strongholds of the enemy, with the active support of artillery and aviation, by the middle of July 13, completed the breakthrough of the second line of his defense.

After the completion of the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone, the 5th Tank Corps and the 1st Tank Corps, introduced into the breakthrough to the right, together with the forward detachments of rifle formations, proceeded to pursue the enemy. By the morning of July 15, they reached the Vytebet River and crossed it on the move, and by the end of the next day they cut the Bolkhov-Khotynets road. To delay their advance, the enemy pulled up reserves and launched a series of counterattacks.

In this situation, the commander of the 11th Guards Army regrouped the 36th Guards Rifle Corps from the left flank of the army and advanced here the 25th Tank Corps transferred from the front reserve. Having repelled the enemy's counterattacks, the troops of the 11th Guards Army resumed the offensive and by July 19 advanced to 60 km, expanding the breakthrough to 120 km and covering the left flank of the enemy's Bolkhov grouping from the southwest.

In order to develop the operation, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command reinforced the western front with the 11th Army (commanded by General I. I. Fedyuninsky). After a long march, on July 20, an incomplete army on the move was brought into battle at the junction between the 50th and 11th Guards armies in the direction of Khvostovichi. In five days, she broke the stubborn resistance of the enemy and advanced 15 km.

In order to finally defeat the enemy and develop the offensive, the commander of the Western Front in the middle of the day on July 26 brought into battle in the zone of the 11th Guards Army the 4th Tank Army transferred to him from the Stavka reserve (commander General V. M. Badanov).

Having an operational formation in two echelons, the 4th Panzer Army, after a short artillery preparation with the support of aviation, launched an offensive on Bolkhov, and then struck at Khotynets and Karachev. In five days, she advanced 12 - 20 km. She had to break through the intermediate defensive lines previously occupied by enemy troops. By its actions, the 4th Panzer Army contributed to the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front in the liberation of the city of Bolkhov.

On July 30, the troops of the left wing of the Western Front (11th Guards, 4th Tank, 11th Army and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps), in connection with the preparation of the Smolensk offensive operation, were transferred to the Bryansk Front.

The offensive of the Bryansk Front developed much more slowly than that of the Western Front. The troops of the 61st Army under the command of General P. A. Belov, together with the 20th Tank Corps, broke through the enemy’s defenses and, repelling his counterattacks, liberated Bolkhov on July 29.

The troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies, with the 1st guards tank corps brought into battle in the middle of the second day of the offensive, by the end of July 13, completed the breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defense zone. By July 18, they approached the Oleshnya River, where they met fierce enemy resistance at the rear defensive line.

In order to accelerate the defeat of the Oryol grouping of the enemy, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command transferred the 3rd Guards Tank Army (commander General P.S. Rybalko) from its reserve to the Bryansk Front. On the morning of July 19, with the support of formations of the 1st and 15th air armies and long-range aviation, it went on the offensive from the line of Bogdanovo, Podmaslovo and, repelling strong enemy counterattacks, broke through his defenses on the Oleshnya River by the end of the day. On the night of July 20, the tank army, having regrouped, struck in the direction of Otrada, assisting the Bryansk Front in defeating the enemy's Mtsensk grouping. On the morning of July 21, after a regrouping of forces, the army struck at the Stanovoi Kolodez and captured it on July 26. The next day, she was handed over to the Central Front.

The offensive of the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts forced the enemy to withdraw part of the forces of the Oryol grouping from the Kursk direction and thereby created a favorable situation for the counteroffensive of the troops of the right wing of the Central Front. By July 18, they restored their previous position and continued to advance in the direction of Krom.

By the end of July, the troops of three fronts engulfed the enemy's Oryol grouping from the north, east and south. The fascist German command, in an effort to avert the threat of encirclement, on July 30 began the withdrawal of all its troops from the Oryol bridgehead. The Soviet troops began to pursue. On the morning of August 4, the troops of the left wing of the Bryansk Front broke into Oryol and liberated it by the morning of August 5. On the same day, Belgorod was liberated by the troops of the Steppe Front.

Having mastered Orel, our troops continued the offensive. On August 18, they reached the line Zhizdra, Litizh. As a result of the Oryol operation, 14 enemy divisions were defeated (including 6 tank divisions)

3. Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (August 3 - 23, 1943)

The Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead was defended by the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force. They consisted of 18 divisions, including 4 tank divisions. Here the enemy created 7 defensive lines with a total depth of up to 90 km, as well as 1 bypass around Belgorod and 2 around Kharkov.

The idea of ​​​​the headquarters of the Supreme High Command was to cut the opposing enemy grouping into two parts with powerful blows from the troops of the adjacent wings of the Voronezh and steppe fronts, subsequently deeply cover it in the Kharkov region and destroy it in cooperation with the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front.

The troops of the Voronezh Front delivered the main blow with the forces of two combined arms and two tank armies from the area northeast of Tomarovka to Bogodukhov, Valki, bypassing Kharkov from the west, auxiliary, also by the forces of two combined arms armies, from the Proletarsky area in the direction of Boromlya, in order to cover the main groups from the West.

The steppe front under the command of General I. S. Konev delivered the main blow by the troops of the 53rd and part of the forces of the 69th army from the area northwest of Belgorod to Kharkov from the north, the auxiliary - by the forces of the 7th Guards Army from the area southeast of Belgorod to western direction.

By decision of the commander of the Southwestern Front, General R. Ya. Malinovsky, the 57th Army launched a strike from the Martovaya area to Merefa, covering Kharkov from the southeast.

From the air, the offensive of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts was provided, respectively, by the 2nd and 5th air armies of generals S. A. Krasovsky and S. K. Goryunov. In addition, part of the long-range aviation forces was involved.

The command of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, in order to achieve success in breaking through the enemy's defenses, resolutely massed forces and assets in the directions of their main attacks, which made it possible to create high operational densities. So, in the zone of the 5th Guards Army of the Voronezh Front, they reached 1.5 km per rifle division, 230 guns and mortars and 70 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of the front.

There were characteristic features in planning the use of artillery and tanks. Artillery destruction groups were created not only in the armies, but also in the corps operating in the main directions. Separate tank and mechanized corps were supposed to be used as mobile army groups, and tank armies - as a mobile group of the Voronezh Front, which was new in military art.

Tank armies were planned to be brought into battle in the offensive zone of the 5th Guards Army. They were supposed to act in the directions: 1st Tank Army - Bogodulov, 5th Guards Tank Army - Zolochev, and by the end of the third or fourth day of the operation, go to the Valka, Lyubotin area, thereby cutting off the retreat of the Kharkov enemy group to the west.

Artillery and engineering support for the introduction of tank armies into battle was assigned to the 5th Guards Army.

For aviation support of each tank army, one assault and one fighter aviation division was allocated.

In preparing the operation, it was instructive to misinform the enemy about the true direction of the main attack of our troops. From July 28 to August 6, the 38th Army, operating on the right wing of the Voronezh Front, skillfully imitated the concentration of a large group of troops in the Sumy direction. The fascist German command not only began bombing areas of false concentration of troops, but also kept a significant number of its reserves in this direction.

The peculiarity was that the operation was prepared in a limited time. Nevertheless, the troops of both fronts were able to prepare for the offensive and provide themselves with the necessary material resources.

Hiding behind the wrecked enemy tanks, the fighters are moving forward, the Belgorod direction, August 2, 1943

On August 3, after powerful artillery preparation and air strikes, the troops of the fronts, supported by a barrage of fire, went on the offensive and successfully broke through the first position of the enemy. With the introduction of the second echelons of regiments into battle, the second position was broken through. To build up the efforts of the 5th Guards Army, advanced tank brigades of the corps of the first echelon of tank armies were brought into battle. They, together with rifle divisions, completed the breakthrough of the enemy's main line of defense. Following the advanced brigades, the main forces of the tank armies were brought into battle. By the end of the day, they overcame the second line of enemy defense and advanced 12-26 km deep, thereby separating the enemy's Tomarovsk and Belgorod centers of resistance.

Simultaneously with the tank armies, the following were introduced into the battle: in the zone of the 6th Guards Army - the 5th Guards Tank Corps, and in the zone of the 53rd Army - the 1st Mechanized Corps. They, together with rifle formations, broke the enemy's resistance, completed the breakthrough of the main line of defense, and by the end of the day approached the second defensive line. Having broken through the tactical defense zone and defeated the nearest operational reserves, the main strike force of the Voronezh Front, on the morning of the second day of the operation, proceeded to pursue the enemy.

On August 4, the troops of the 1st Panzer Army from the Tomarovka region began to develop an offensive to the south. Its 6th tank and 3rd mechanized corps, having reinforced tank brigades ahead, advanced 70 km by the middle of the day on August 6. In the afternoon of the next day, the 6th Panzer Corps liberated Bogodukhov.

The 5th Guards Tank Army, bypassing enemy resistance centers from the west, attacked Zolochev and broke into the city on August 6.

By this time, the troops of the 6th Guards Army had captured the enemy's strong defense center Tomarovka, surrounded and destroyed his Borisov grouping. The 4th and 5th Guards Tank Corps played a major role in this. Developing the offensive in a southwestern direction, they bypassed the Borisov group of Germans from the west and east, and on August 7, with a swift blow on the move, they broke into Grayvoron, thereby cutting off the enemy's escape routes to the west and south. This was facilitated by the actions of the auxiliary grouping of the Voronezh Front, which went on the offensive on the morning of August 5 in its direction.

The troops of the Steppe Front, having completed the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone of the enemy on August 4, by the end of the next day took Belgorod by storm, after which they began to develop an offensive against Kharkov. By the end of August 7, the front of the breakthrough of our troops reached 120 km. Tank armies advanced to a depth of up to 100 km, and combined arms armies - up to 60 - 65 km.

Kislov Photos

The troops of the 40th and 27th armies, continuing to develop the offensive, reached the line of Bromlya, Trostyanets, Akhtyrka by August 11. A company of the 12th Guards Tank Brigade, led by Captain I. A. Tereshchuk, broke into Akhtyrka on August 10, where it was surrounded by the enemy. For two days, Soviet tankers, without communication with the brigade, were in besieged tanks, repulsing the fierce attacks of the Nazis, who were trying to capture them alive. In two days of fighting, the company destroyed 6 tanks, 2 self-propelled guns, 5 armored cars and up to 150 enemy soldiers and officers. With two surviving tanks, Captain Tereshchuk fought out of the encirclement and returned to his brigade. For decisive and skillful actions in battle, Captain I. A. Tereshchuk was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

By August 10, the main forces of the 1st Panzer Army had reached the line of the Merchik River. After capturing the city of Zolochev, the 5th Guards Tank Army was reassigned to the Steppe Front and began to regroup in the Bogodukhov area.

Advancing behind the tank armies, the troops of the 6th Guards Army reached the northeast of Krasnokutsk by August 11, and the 5th Guards Army captured Kharkov from the west. The troops of the Steppe Front by this time approached the outer defensive contour of Kharkov from the north, and the 57th Army, transferred to this front on August 8, from the east and southeast.

The fascist German command, fearing the encirclement of the Kharkov grouping, by August 11 concentrated three tank divisions east of Bogodukhov (Reich, Dead Head, Viking) and on the morning of August 12 launched a counterattack on the advancing troops of the 1st Panzer Army in the general direction on Bogodukhov. A tank battle ensued. In the course of it, the enemy pushed the formations of the 1st Panzer Army by 3-4 km, but could not break through to Bogodukhov. On the morning of August 13, the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank, 6th and 5th Guards Armies were brought into battle. The main forces of front-line aviation were also sent here. She conducted reconnaissance and carried out operations to disrupt the railway and road transport of the Nazis, assisted the combined arms and tank armies in repelling the counterattacks of the Nazi troops. By the end of August 17, our troops finally thwarted the enemy's counterattack from the south to Bogodukhov.

Tankers and machine gunners of the 15th Guards Mechanized Brigade advance on the city of Amvrosievka, August 23, 1943

However, the fascist German command did not abandon its plan. On the morning of August 18, it launched a counterattack from the Akhtyrka region with three tank and motorized divisions and broke through the front of the 27th Army. Against this grouping of the enemy, the commander of the Voronezh Front advanced the 4th Guards Army, transferred from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the 3rd mechanized and 6th tank corps of the 1st tank army from the Bogodukhov region, and also used the 4th and 5th separate guards tank corps. By the end of August 19, these forces, by strikes on the enemy's flanks, stopped his advance from the west to Bogodukhov. Then the troops of the right wing of the Voronezh Front struck at the rear of the Akhtyrskaya group of Germans and completely defeated it.

At the same time, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts launched an assault on Kharkov. On the night of August 23, formations of the 69th and 7th Guards armies captured the city.

Soviet soldiers inspect the German heavy tank "Panther" knocked out on the Prokhorovsky bridgehead, Belgorod region. 1943

Photo - A. Morkovkin

The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts defeated 15 enemy divisions, advanced 140 km to the south and south-west, came close to the enemy's Donbass grouping. Soviet troops liberated Kharkov. During the occupation and battles, the Nazis destroyed in the city and region (according to incomplete data) about 300 thousand civilians and prisoners of war, about 160 thousand people were deported to Germany, destroyed 1600 thousand m2 of housing, over 500 industrial enterprises, all cultural and educational , medical and communal institutions.

Thus, the Soviet troops completed the defeat of the entire Belgorod-Kharkov enemy grouping and took an advantageous position to go on a general offensive in order to liberate the Left-Bank Ukraine and Donbass.

4. Main conclusions.

The counteroffensive of the Red Army near Kursk ended for us with an outstanding victory. Irreparable losses were inflicted on the enemy, all his attempts to hold strategic bridgeheads in the Orel and Kharkov regions were thwarted.

The success of the counteroffensive was ensured primarily by the skillful choice of the moment for our troops to go over to the offensive. It began in conditions when the main German strike groups suffered huge losses and a crisis was determined in their offensive. Success was also ensured by the skillful organization of strategic interaction between groups of fronts advancing in the western and southwestern, as well as in other directions. This made it impossible for the fascist German command to carry out regroupings of troops in areas dangerous to it.

The success of the counter-offensive was greatly influenced by the large strategic reserves of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, which had previously been created in the Kursk direction and were used to develop the offensive of the fronts.

For the first time, Soviet troops solved the problem of breaking through a well-prepared, in-depth enemy defense and the subsequent development of operational success. This was achieved thanks to the creation of powerful strike groups in the fronts and armies, the massing of forces and means in the breakthrough areas and the presence of tank formations in the fronts, and large tank (mechanized) formations in the armies.

Before the start of the counteroffensive, reconnaissance in force was carried out more widely than in previous operations, not only by reinforced companies, but also by forward battalions.

In the course of the counteroffensive, the fronts and armies gained experience in repulsing counterattacks by large enemy tank groupings. It was carried out with the close cooperation of all branches of the armed forces and aviation. In order to stop the enemy and crush his advancing troops, the fronts and armies part of the forces went over to a tough defense while delivering a powerful blow to the flank and rear of the enemy's counterstrike grouping. As a result of the increase in the number of military equipment and means of reinforcement, the tactical density of our troops in the counteroffensive near Kursk increased by 2-3 times in comparison with the counteroffensive near Stalingrad.

What was new in the field of offensive combat tactics was the transition of units and formations from one-echelon to deep-echelon battle formations. This turned out to be possible due to the narrowing of their sectors and offensive zones.

In the counter-offensive near Kursk, methods of using military branches and aviation were improved. On a larger scale, tank and mechanized troops were used. The density of NPP tanks increased compared to the counteroffensive near Stalingrad and amounted to 15 - 20 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of the front. However, when breaking through a strong defense in depth of the enemy, such densities turned out to be insufficient. Tank and mechanized corps have become the main means of developing the success of combined arms armies, and tank armies of uniform composition have become the echelon of developing the success of the front. Their use to complete the breakthrough of a pre-prepared positional defense was a necessary measure, often leading to significant losses of tanks, to the weakening of tank formations and formations, but in the specific conditions of the situation it justified itself. For the first time, self-propelled artillery regiments were widely used near Kursk. Experience has shown that they were an effective means of supporting the offensive of tanks and infantry.

There were also peculiarities in the use of artillery: the density of guns and mortars increased significantly in the direction of the main attack; the gap between the end of artillery preparation and the beginning of attack support was eliminated; army artillery groups by number of corps