Crimean War 1853−1856 (or Eastern War) is a conflict between the Russian Empire and coalitions of countries, the cause of which was the desire of a number of countries to gain a foothold in the Balkan Peninsula and the Black Sea, as well as to reduce the influence of the Russian Empire in this region.

In contact with

Basic information

Participants in the conflict

Almost all leading European countries became participants in the conflict. Against the Russian Empire, on whose side there was only Greece (until 1854) and the vassal Megrelian principality, a coalition consisting of:

• Ottoman Empire;
• French Empire;
• British Empire;
• Kingdom of Sardinia.

Support for the coalition troops was also provided by: the North Caucasus Imamate (until 1955), the Abkhazian Principality (some of the Abkhazians sided with the Russian Empire and waged a guerrilla war against the coalition troops), and the Circassians.

It should also be noted, that the Austrian Empire, Prussia and Sweden showed friendly neutrality to the coalition countries.

Thus, the Russian Empire could not find allies in Europe.

Numerical aspect ratio

The numerical ratio (ground forces and navy) at the time of the outbreak of hostilities was approximately as follows:

• Russian Empire and allies (Bulgarian Legion, Greek Legion and foreign voluntary formations) - 755 thousand people;
• coalition forces - about 700 thousand people.

From a logistical and technical point of view, the army of the Russian Empire was significantly inferior to the armed forces of the coalition, although none of the officials and generals wanted to accept this fact . Moreover, the command staff, in terms of its preparedness was also inferior to the command staff of the combined enemy forces.

Geography of combat operations

Over the course of four years, fighting took place:

• in the Caucasus;
• on the territory of the Danube principalities (Balkans);
• in Crimea;
• on the Black, Azov, Baltic, White and Barents seas;
• in Kamchatka and the Kuril Islands.

This geography is explained, first of all, by the fact that the opponents actively used the navy against each other (a map of military operations is presented below).

Brief history of the Crimean War of 1853−1856

Political situation on the eve of the war

The political situation on the eve of the war was extremely acute. The main reason for this exacerbation was, first of all, the obvious weakening of the Ottoman Empire and the strengthening of the positions of the Russian Empire in the Balkans and the Black Sea. It was at this time that Greece gained independence (1830), Turkey lost its Janissary corps (1826) and fleet (1827, Battle of Navarino), Algeria ceded to France (1830), Egypt also renounced its historical vassalage (1831).

At the same time, the Russian Empire received the right to freely use the Black Sea straits, achieved autonomy for Serbia and a protectorate over the Danube principalities. Having supported the Ottoman Empire in the war with Egypt, the Russian Empire extracted from Turkey a promise to close the straits to any ships other than Russian ones in the event of any military threat (the secret protocol was in force until 1941).

Naturally, such a strengthening of the Russian Empire instilled a certain fear in the European powers. In particular, Great Britain did everything, so that the London Convention on the Straits would come into force, which would prevent their closure and open up the possibility for France and England to intervene in the event of a Russian-Turkish conflict. Also, the government of the British Empire achieved “most favored nation treatment” in trade from Turkey. In fact, this meant the complete subordination of the Turkish economy.

At this time, Britain did not want to further weaken the Ottomans, since this eastern empire had become a huge market in which English goods could be sold. Britain was also concerned about the strengthening of Russia in the Caucasus and the Balkans, its advance into Central Asia, and that is why it interfered with Russian foreign policy in every possible way.

France was not particularly interested in affairs in the Balkans, but many in the Empire, especially the new Emperor Napoleon III, thirsted for revenge (after the events of 1812-1814).

Austria, despite the agreements and general work in the Holy Alliance, did not want Russia to strengthen in the Balkans and did not want the formation of new states there, independent of the Ottomans.

Thus, each of the strong European states had its own reasons for starting (or heating up) the conflict, and also pursued its own goals, strictly determined by geopolitics, the solution of which was possible only if Russia was weakened, involved in a military conflict with several opponents at once.

Causes of the Crimean War and the reason for the outbreak of hostilities

So, the reasons for the war are quite clear:

• Great Britain’s desire to preserve the weak and controlled Ottoman Empire and through it to control the operation of the Black Sea straits;
• the desire of Austria-Hungary to prevent a split in the Balkans (which would lead to unrest within the multinational Austria-Hungary) and the strengthening of Russia’s positions there;
• the desire of France (or, more precisely, Napoleon III) to distract the French from internal problems and strengthen their rather shaky power.

It is clear that the main desire of all European states was to weaken the Russian Empire. The so-called Palmerston Plan (the leader of British diplomacy) provided for the actual separation of part of the lands from Russia: Finland, the Åland Islands, the Baltic states, Crimea and the Caucasus. According to this plan, the Danube principalities were to go to Austria. The Kingdom of Poland was to be restored, which would serve as a barrier between Prussia and Russia.

Naturally, the Russian Empire also had certain goals. Under Nicholas I, all officials and all the generals wanted to strengthen Russia’s position in the Black Sea and the Balkans. The establishment of a favorable regime for the Black Sea straits was also a priority.

The reason for the war was the conflict around the Church of the Nativity of Christ located in Bethlehem, the keys to which were administered by Orthodox monks. Formally, this gave them the right to “speak” on behalf of Christians all over the world and dispose of the greatest Christian shrines at their own discretion.

The Emperor of France, Napoleon III, demanded that the Turkish Sultan hand over the keys to the hands of Vatican representatives. This offended Nicholas I, who protested and sent His Serene Highness Prince A.S. Menshikov to the Ottoman Empire. Menshikov was unable to achieve a positive solution to the issue. Most likely, this was due to the fact that the leading European powers had already entered into a conspiracy against Russia and in every possible way pushed the Sultan to war, promising him support.

In response to the provocative actions of the Ottomans and European ambassadors, the Russian Empire breaks off diplomatic relations with Turkey and sends troops into the Danube principalities. Nicholas I, understanding the complexity of the situation, was ready to make concessions and sign the so-called Vienna Note, which ordered the withdrawal of troops from the southern borders and the liberation of Wallachia and Moldova, but when Turkey tried to dictate the terms, the conflict became inevitable. After the Emperor of Russia refused to sign the note with the amendments made by the Turkish Sultan, the Ottoman ruler declared the start of war with the Russian Empire. In October 1853 (when Russia was not yet completely ready for hostilities), the war began.

Progress of the Crimean War: fighting

The entire war can be divided into two large stages:

• October 1953 - April 1954 - this is directly a Russian-Turkish company; theater of military operations - the Caucasus and the Danube principalities;
• April 1854 - February 1956 - military operations against the coalition (Crimean, Azov, Baltic, White Sea and Kinburn companies).

The main events of the first stage can be considered the defeat of the Turkish fleet in Sinop Bay by P. S. Nakhimov (November 18 (30), 1853).

The second stage of the war was much more eventful.

It can be said that failures in the Crimean direction led to the fact that the new Russian emperor, Alexander I. I. (Nicholas I died in 1855) decided to begin peace negotiations.

It cannot be said that Russian troops suffered defeats because of their commanders-in-chief. In the Danube direction, the troops were commanded by the talented Prince M. D. Gorchakov, in the Caucasus - N. N. Muravyov, the Black Sea Fleet was led by Vice Admiral P. S. Nakhimov (who also later led the defense of Sevastopol and died in 1855), the defense of Petropavlovsk was led by V. S. Zavoiko, but even the enthusiasm and tactical genius of these officers did not help in the war, which was fought according to the new rules.

Treaty of Paris

The diplomatic mission was headed by Prince A.F. Orlov. After long negotiations in Paris 18 (30).03. In 1856, a peace treaty was signed between the Russian Empire, on the one hand, and the Ottoman Empire, coalition forces, Austria and Prussia, on the other. The terms of the peace treaty were as follows:

Results of the Crimean War 1853−1856

Reasons for defeat in the war

Even before the conclusion of the Paris Peace The reasons for the defeat in the war were obvious to the emperor and leading politicians of the empire:

• foreign policy isolation of the empire;
• superior enemy forces;
• backwardness of the Russian Empire in socio-economic and military-technical terms.

Foreign policy and domestic political consequences of defeat

The foreign policy and domestic political results of the war were also disastrous, although somewhat softened by the efforts of Russian diplomats. It was obvious that

• the international authority of the Russian Empire fell (for the first time since 1812);
• the geopolitical situation and balance of power in Europe have changed;
• Russia's influence in the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East has weakened;
• the security of the country's southern borders has been violated;
• positions in the Black Sea and Baltic have been weakened;
• The country's financial system is upset.

Significance of the Crimean War

But, despite the severity of the political situation inside and outside the country after the defeat in the Crimean War, it was precisely this that became the catalyst that led to the reforms of the 60s of the 19th century, including the abolition of serfdom in Russia.

The European powers were more interested in the struggle for national interests rather than the ideas of monarchy. Emperor Nicholas continued to view Russia as a guarantor of the preservation of the previous order in Europe. Unlike Peter the Great, he underestimated the significance of technical and economic changes in Europe. Nicholas I was more afraid of revolutionary movements there than of the growth of the industrial power of the West. In the end, the desire of the Russian monarch to ensure that the countries of the Old World lived in accordance with his political convictions began to be perceived by Europeans as a threat to their security. Some saw in the policy of the Russian Tsar the desire of Russia to subjugate Europe. Such sentiments were skillfully fueled by the foreign press, primarily the French.

For many years, she persistently created the image of Russia as a powerful and terrible enemy of Europe, a kind of “evil empire” where savagery, tyranny and cruelty reign. Thus, the ideas of a just war against Russia as a potential aggressor were prepared in the minds of Europeans long before the Crimean campaign. For this, the fruits of the minds of Russian intellectuals were also used. For example, on the eve of the Crimean War, articles by F.I. were readily published in France. Tyutchev about the benefits of uniting the Slavs under the auspices of Russia, about the possible appearance of a Russian autocrat in Rome as the head of the church, etc. These materials, which expressed the personal opinion of the author, were announced by the publishers as the secret doctrine of St. Petersburg diplomacy. After the revolution of 1848 in France, Napoleon Bonaparte's nephew, Napoleon III, came to power and was then proclaimed emperor. The establishment on the throne in Paris of a monarch who was not alien to the idea of ​​revenge and who wanted to revise the Vienna agreements, sharply worsened Franco-Russian relations. The desire of Nicholas I to preserve the principles of the Holy Alliance and the Viennese balance of power in Europe was most clearly manifested during the attempt of the rebel Hungarians to secede from the Austrian Empire (1848). Saving the Habsburg monarchy, Nicholas I, at the request of the Austrians, sent troops into Hungary to suppress the uprising. He prevented the collapse of the Austrian Empire by maintaining it as a counterweight to Prussia, and then prevented Berlin from creating a union of German states. By sending his fleet to Danish waters, the Russian emperor stopped the aggression of the Prussian army against Denmark. He also sided with Austria, which forced Prussia to abandon its attempt to achieve hegemony in Germany. Thus, Nicholas managed to turn wide sections of Europeans (Poles, Hungarians, French, Germans, etc.) against himself and his country. Then the Russian emperor decided to strengthen his position in the Balkans and the Middle East by putting hard pressure on Turkey.

The reason for the intervention was a dispute over holy places in Palestine, where the Sultan gave some advantages to Catholics, while infringing on the rights of Orthodox Christians. Thus, the keys to the Bethlehem Temple were transferred from the Greeks to the Catholics, whose interests were represented by Napoleon III. Emperor Nicholas stood up for his fellow believers. He demanded from the Ottoman Empire a special right for the Russian Tsar to be the patron of all its Orthodox subjects. Having received a refusal, Nicholas sent troops into Moldavia and Wallachia, which were under the nominal authority of the Sultan, “on bail” until his demands were met. In response, Turkey, counting on the help of European powers, declared war on Russia on October 4, 1853. In St. Petersburg they hoped for the support of Austria and Prussia, as well as the neutral position of England, believing that Napoleonic France would not dare to intervene in the conflict. Nicholas counted on monarchical solidarity and international isolation of Bonaparte's nephew. However, European monarchs were more concerned not with who sat on the French throne, but with Russian activity in the Balkans and the Middle East. At the same time, Nicholas I's ambitious claims to the role of an international arbiter did not correspond to Russia's economic capabilities. At that time, England and France sharply moved forward, wanting to redistribute spheres of influence and oust Russia into the category of secondary powers. Such claims had a significant material and technical basis. By the middle of the 19th century, Russia's industrial lag (especially in mechanical engineering and metallurgy) from Western countries, primarily England and France, only increased. So, at the beginning of the 19th century. Russian cast iron production reached 10 million poods and was approximately equal to English production. After 50 years, it grew 1.5 times, and the English one - 14 times, amounting to 15 and 140 million poods, respectively. According to this indicator, the country dropped from 1st to 2nd place in the world to eighth. The gap was also observed in other industries. In general, in terms of industrial production, Russia by the middle of the 19th century. was inferior to France by 7.2 times, to Great Britain - by 18 times. The Crimean War can be divided into two major stages. In the first, from 1853 to the beginning of 1854, Russia fought only with Turkey. It was a classic Russian-Turkish war with the already traditional Danube, Caucasian and Black Sea theaters of military operations. The second stage began in 1854, when England, France, and then Sardinia took the side of Turkey.

This turn of events radically changed the course of the war. Now Russia had to fight a powerful coalition of states that together exceeded it by almost twice the population and more than three times the national income. In addition, England and France surpassed Russia in the scale and quality of weapons, primarily in the field of naval forces, small arms and means of communication. In this regard, the Crimean War opened a new era of wars of the industrial era, when the importance of military equipment and the military-economic potential of states increased sharply. Taking into account the unsuccessful experience of Napoleon's Russian campaign, England and France imposed on Russia a new version of the war, which they had tested in the fight against the countries of Asia and Africa. This option was usually used against states and territories with an unusual climate, weak infrastructure and vast spaces that seriously hampered progress inland. The characteristic features of such a war were the seizure of coastal territory and the creation there of a base for further actions. Such a war presupposed the presence of a strong fleet, which both European powers possessed in sufficient quantities. Strategically, this option had the goal of cutting off Russia from the coast and driving it deep into the mainland, making it dependent on the owners of coastal zones. If we consider how much effort the Russian state spent in the struggle for access to the seas, then we must recognize the exceptional significance of the Crimean War for the fate of the country.

The entry of the leading powers of Europe into the war significantly expanded the geography of the conflict. The Anglo-French squadrons (their core consisted of steam-powered ships) carried out a grandiose military attack on the coastal zones of Russia (on the Black, Azov, Baltic, White Seas and the Pacific Ocean) at that time. In addition to capturing coastal areas, such a spread of aggression was intended to disorient the Russian command regarding the location of the main attack. With the entry of England and France into the war, the Danube and Caucasus theaters of military operations were supplemented by the Northwestern (the area of ​​the Baltic, White and Barents seas), the Azov-Black Sea (the Crimean peninsula and the Azov-Black Sea coast) and the Pacific (the coast of the Russian Far East). The geography of the attacks testified to the desire of the warlike leaders of the Allies, if successful, to tear away from Russia the mouth of the Danube, Crimea, the Caucasus, the Baltic states, and Finland (in particular, this was envisaged by the plan of the English Prime Minister G. Palmerston). This war demonstrated that Russia has no serious allies on the European continent. So, unexpectedly for St. Petersburg, Austria showed hostility, demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova and Wallachia. Due to the danger of expanding the conflict, the Danube Army left these principalities. Prussia and Sweden took a neutral but hostile position. As a result, the Russian Empire found itself alone, in the face of a powerful hostile coalition. In particular, this forced Nicholas I to abandon the grandiose plan of landing troops in Constantinople and move on to the defense of his own lands. In addition, the position of European countries forced the Russian leadership to withdraw a significant part of the troops from the theater of war and keep them on the western border, primarily in Poland, in order to prevent the expansion of aggression with the possible involvement of Austria and Prussia in the conflict. Nikolaev's foreign policy, which set global goals in Europe and the Middle East without taking into account international realities, was a fiasco.

Danube and Black Sea theaters of military operations (1853-1854)

Having declared war on Russia, Turkey advanced a 150,000-strong army under the command of Omer Pasha against the Danube Army under the command of General Mikhail Gorchakov (82 thousand people). Gorchakov acted passively, choosing defensive tactics. The Turkish command, using its numerical advantage, took offensive actions on the left bank of the Danube. Having crossed at Turtukai with a 14,000-strong detachment, Omer Pasha moved to Oltenitsa, where the first major clash of this war took place.

Battle of Oltenica (1853). On October 23, 1853, the troops of Omer Pasha were met by a vanguard detachment under the command of General Soimonov (6 thousand people) from the 4th Corps of General Dannenberg. Despite the lack of strength, Soimonov resolutely attacked Omer Pasha's detachment. The Russians had almost turned the tide of the battle in their favor, but unexpectedly received an order to retreat from General Dannenberg (who was not present on the battlefield). The corps commander considered it impossible to hold Oltenica under fire from Turkish batteries from the right bank. In turn, the Turks not only did not pursue the Russians, but also retreated back across the Danube. The Russians lost about 1 thousand people in the battle near Oltenica, the Turks - 2 thousand people. The unsuccessful outcome of the first battle of the campaign had an adverse effect on the morale of the Russian troops.

Battle of Chetati (1853). The Turkish command made a new major attempt to attack on the left bank of the Danube in December on the right flank of Gorchakov’s troops, near Vidin. There, an 18,000-strong Turkish detachment crossed to the left bank. On December 25, 1853, he was attacked near the village of Chetati by the Tobolsk infantry regiment under the command of Colonel Baumgarten (2.5 thousand people). At the critical moment of the battle, when the Tobolsk regiment had already lost half of its strength and shot all the shells, General Bellegarde’s detachment (2.5 thousand people) arrived in time to help it. An unexpected counterattack by fresh forces decided the matter. The Turks retreated, losing 3 thousand people. The damage to the Russians amounted to about 2 thousand people. After the battle at Cetati, the Turks made attempts at the beginning of 1854 to attack the Russians at Zhurzhi (January 22) and Calarasi (February 20), but were again repulsed. In turn, the Russians, with successful searches to the right bank of the Danube, managed to destroy the Turkish river flotillas in Ruschuk, Nikopol and Silistria.

. Meanwhile, a battle took place in Sinop Bay, which became the most striking event of this unfortunate war for Russia. On November 18, 1853, the Black Sea squadron under the command of Vice Admiral Nakhimov (6 battleships, 2 frigates) destroyed the Turkish squadron under the command of Osman Pasha (7 frigates and 9 other ships) in Sinop Bay. The Turkish squadron was heading to the Caucasus coast for a large landing. Along the way, she took refuge from bad weather in Sinop Bay. Here it was blocked by the Russian fleet on November 16. However, the Turks and their English instructors did not allow the thought of a Russian attack on the bay protected by coastal batteries. Nevertheless, Nakhimov decided to attack the Turkish fleet. The Russian ships entered the bay so quickly that the coastal artillery did not have time to inflict significant damage on them. This maneuver also turned out to be unexpected for the Turkish ships, which did not have time to take the correct position. As a result, the coastal artillery could not fire accurately at the beginning of the battle for fear of hitting its own. Undoubtedly, Nakhimov took risks. But this was not the risk of a reckless adventurer, but of an experienced naval commander, confident in the training and courage of his crews. Ultimately, the decisive role in the battle was played by the skill of the Russian sailors and the skillful interaction of their ships. At critical moments of the battle, they always bravely went to help each other. Of great importance in this battle was the superiority of the Russian fleet in artillery (720 guns against 510 guns on the Turkish squadron and 38 guns on coastal batteries). Of particular note is the effect of the first-time bomb cannons that fire explosive spherical bombs. They had enormous destructive power and quickly caused significant damage and fires on the wooden ships of the Turks. During the four-hour battle, Russian artillery fired 18 thousand shells, which completely destroyed the Turkish fleet and most of the coastal batteries. Only the steamship Taif, under the command of the English adviser Slade, managed to escape from the bay. In fact, Nakhimov won a victory not only over the fleet, but also over the fortress. Turkish losses amounted to over 3 thousand people. 200 people were captured (including the wounded Osman Pasha).

The Russians lost 37 people. killed and 235 wounded."The extermination of the Turkish fleet in Sinop by the squadron under my command cannot but leave a glorious page in the history of the Black Sea Fleet... I express my sincere gratitude... to the gentlemen commanders of ships and frigates for the composure and precise ordering of their ships according to this disposition during heavy enemy fire... I express gratitude to the officers for their undaunted and precise performance of their duty, I thank the teams who fought like lions,” these were the words of the Nakhimov order dated November 23, 1853. After this, the Russian fleet gained dominance in the Black Sea. The defeat of the Turks at Sinop thwarted their plans to land troops on the Caucasus coast and deprived Turkey of the opportunity to conduct active military operations in the Black Sea. This accelerated the entry of England and France into the war. The Battle of Sinop is one of the most striking victories of the Russian fleet. It was also the last major naval battle of the sailing ship era. The victory in this battle demonstrated the powerlessness of the wooden fleet in the face of new, more powerful artillery weapons. The effectiveness of Russian bomb guns accelerated the creation of armored ships in Europe.

Siege of Silistria (1854). In the spring, the Russian army began active operations beyond the Danube. In March, she moved to the right side near Brailov and settled in Northern Dobruja. The main part of the Danube Army, the general leadership of which was now carried out by Field Marshal Paskevich, was concentrated near Silistria. This fortress was defended by a 12,000-strong garrison. The siege began on May 4. The assault on the fortress on May 17 ended in failure due to the lack of forces brought into the battle (only 3 battalions were sent to attack). After this, the siege work began. On May 28, 72-year-old Paskevich was shell-shocked by a cannonball under the walls of Silistria and left for Iasi. It was not possible to achieve a complete blockade of the fortress. The garrison could receive help from outside. By June it had grown to 20 thousand people. On June 9, 1854, a new assault was planned. However, due to the hostile position of Austria, Paskevich gave the order to lift the siege and retreat beyond the Danube. Russian losses during the siege amounted to 2.2 thousand people.

Battle of Zhurzhi (1854). After the Russians lifted the siege of Silistria, the army of Omer Pasha (30 thousand people) crossed in the Ruschuk area to the left bank of the Danube and moved to Bucharest. Near Zhurzhi she was stopped by Soimonov's detachment (9 thousand people). In a fierce battle near Zhurzha on June 26, he forced the Turks to retreat across the river again. The damage to the Russians amounted to over 1 thousand people. The Turks lost about 5 thousand people in this battle. The victory at Zhurzhi was the last success of Russian troops in the Danube theater of military operations. In May - June, Anglo-French troops (70 thousand people) landed in the Varna area to help the Turks. Already in July, 3 French divisions moved to Dobruja, but an outbreak of cholera forced them to return. Disease caused the heaviest damage to the allies in the Balkans. Their army was melting before our eyes not from bullets and grapeshot, but from cholera and fever. Without taking part in the battles, the Allies lost 10 thousand people from the epidemic. At the same time, the Russians, under pressure from Austria, began evacuating their units from the Danube principalities and in September finally retreated across the Prut River to their territory. Military operations in the Danube theater ended. The main goal of the Allies in the Balkans was achieved, and they moved on to a new stage of military operations. Now the main target of their onslaught has become the Crimean Peninsula.

Azov-Black Sea theater of military operations (1854-1856)

The main events of the war unfolded on the Crimean Peninsula (from which this war got its name), or more precisely on its southwestern coast, where the main Russian naval base on the Black Sea was located - the port of Sevastopol. With the loss of Crimea and Sevastopol, Russia lost the opportunity to control the Black Sea and pursue an active policy in the Balkans. The Allies were attracted not only by the strategic advantages of this peninsula. When choosing the location of the main attack, the allied command counted on the support of the Muslim population of Crimea. It was supposed to become a significant help for the allied troops located far from their native lands (after the Crimean War, 180 thousand Crimean Tatars emigrated to Turkey). To mislead the Russian command, the allied squadron carried out a powerful bombardment of Odessa back in April, causing significant damage to coastal batteries. In the summer of 1854, the allied fleet began active operations in the Baltic Sea. For disorientation, the foreign press was actively used, from which the Russian leadership drew information about the plans of its opponents. It should be noted that the Crimean campaign demonstrated the increased role of the press in the war. The Russian command assumed that the Allies would deliver the main blow to the southwestern borders of the empire, in particular Odessa.

To protect the southwestern borders, large forces of 180 thousand people were concentrated in Bessarabia. Another 32 thousand were located between Nikolaev and Odessa. In Crimea, the total number of troops barely reached 50 thousand people. Thus, in the area of ​​the proposed attack, the Allies had a numerical advantage. They had even greater superiority in the naval forces. Thus, in terms of the number of warships, the allied squadron exceeded the Black Sea Fleet three times, and in terms of steam ships - 11 times. Taking advantage of significant superiority at sea, the allied fleet began its largest landing operation in September. 300 transport ships with a 60,000-strong landing party, under the cover of 89 warships, sailed to the western coast of Crimea. This landing operation demonstrated the arrogance of the Western Allies. The plan for the trip was not fully thought out. Thus, there was no reconnaissance, and the command determined the landing site after the ships went to sea. And the very timing of the campaign (September) testified to the Allies’ confidence in finishing Sevastopol in a matter of weeks. However, the rash actions of the allies were compensated by the behavior of the Russian command. The commander of the Russian army in Crimea, Admiral Prince Alexander Menshikov, did not make the slightest attempt to prevent the landing. While a small detachment of allied troops (3 thousand people) occupied Yevpatoria and was looking for a convenient place for a landing, Menshikov with an army of 33 thousand was waiting for further events in positions near the Alma River. The passivity of the Russian command allowed the allies, despite bad weather conditions and the weakened condition of the soldiers after the sea motion, to carry out a landing from September 1 to 6.

Battle of the Alma River (1854). Having landed, the allied army under the general leadership of Marshal Saint-Arnaud (55 thousand people) moved along the coast to the south, to Sevastopol. The fleet was on a parallel course, ready to support its troops with fire from the sea. The first battle of the Allies with the army of Prince Menshikov took place on the Alma River. On September 8, 1854, Menshikov was preparing to stop the Allied army on the steep and steep left bank of the river. Hoping to take advantage of his strong natural position, he did little to strengthen it. The inaccessibility of the left flank facing the sea, where there was only one path along the cliff, was especially overestimated. This place was practically abandoned by troops, also due to fear of shelling from the sea. The French division of General Bosquet took full advantage of this situation, which successfully crossed this section and rose to the heights of the left bank. The Allied ships supported their own with fire from the sea. Meanwhile, in other sectors, especially on the right flank, there was a hot frontal battle. In it, the Russians, despite heavy losses from rifle fire, tried to push back the troops who had forded the river with bayonet counterattacks. Here the Allied onslaught was temporarily delayed. But the appearance of Bosquet's division from the left flank created a threat to bypass Menshikov's army, which was forced to retreat.

A certain role in the defeat of the Russians was played by the lack of interaction between their right and left flanks, which were commanded by generals Gorchakov and Kiryakov, respectively. In the battle on Alma, the superiority of the Allies was manifested not only in numbers, but also in the level of weapons. Thus, their rifled guns were significantly superior to Russian smoothbore guns in range, accuracy and frequency of fire. The longest firing range from a smoothbore gun was 300 steps, and from a rifled gun - 1,200 steps. As a result, allied infantry could hit Russian soldiers with rifle fire while being out of range of their shots. Moreover, rifled guns had twice the range of Russian cannons that fired buckshot. This made artillery preparation for an infantry attack ineffective. Having not yet approached the enemy within the range of an aimed shot, the artillerymen were already in the zone of rifle fire and suffered heavy losses. In the battle on Alma, the Allied riflemen without much difficulty shot down the artillery servants in the Russian batteries. The Russians lost over 5 thousand people in battle, the allies ~ over 3 thousand people. The Allies' lack of cavalry prevented them from organizing an active pursuit of Menshikov's army. He retreated to Bakhchisarai, leaving the road to Sevastopol unprotected. This victory allowed the allies to gain a foothold in Crimea and opened the way for them to Sevastopol. The battle on Alma demonstrated the effectiveness and firepower of new small arms, in which the previous system of formation in closed columns became suicidal. During the battle on Alma, Russian troops for the first time spontaneously used a new battle formation - a rifle chain.

. On September 14, the allied army occupied Balaklava, and on September 17 approached Sevastopol. The main base of the fleet was well protected from the sea by 14 powerful batteries. But from land, the city was weakly fortified, since, based on the experience of past wars, the opinion was formed that a large landing in the Crimea was impossible. There was a 7,000-strong garrison in the city. It was necessary to create fortifications around the city just before the Allied landing in Crimea. The outstanding military engineer Eduard Ivanovich Totleben played a huge role in this. In a short time, with the help of the defenders and the population of the city, Totleben accomplished what seemed impossible - he created new bastions and other fortifications that surrounded Sevastopol from the land. The effectiveness of Totleben’s actions is evidenced by the entry in the journal of the city’s defense chief, Admiral Vladimir Alekseevich Kornilov, dated September 4, 1854: “They did more in a week than they previously did in a year.” During this period, the skeleton of the fortification system literally grew out of the ground, which turned Sevastopol into a first-class land fortress that managed to withstand an 11-month siege. Admiral Kornilov became the head of the city's defense. “Brothers, the Tsar is counting on you. We are defending Sevastopol. Surrender is out of the question. There will be no retreat. Whoever orders a retreat, stab him. If I order a retreat, stab me too!” were the words of his order. In order to prevent the enemy fleet from breaking through into the Sevastopol Bay, 5 battleships and 2 frigates were sunk at the entrance to it (later a number of more ships were used for this purpose). Some of the guns arrived on land from the ships. 22 battalions were formed from naval crews (24 thousand people in total), which strengthened the garrison to 20 thousand people. When the Allies approached the city, they were greeted by an unfinished, but still strong fortification system with 341 guns (versus 141 in the Allied army). The Allied command did not dare to attack the city on the move and began siege work. With the approach of Menshikov’s army to Sevastopol (September 18), the city garrison grew to 35 thousand people. Communication between Sevastopol and the rest of Russia has been preserved. The Allies used their firepower to capture the city. On October 5, 1854, the 1st bombardment began. The army and navy took part in it. 120 guns fired at the city from land, and 1,340 ship guns fired at the city from the sea. This fiery tornado was supposed to destroy the fortifications and suppress the will of their defenders to resist. However, the beating did not go unpunished. The Russians responded with accurate fire from batteries and naval guns.

The hot artillery duel lasted five hours. Despite the enormous superiority in artillery, the allied fleet was severely damaged and was forced to retreat. And here the Russian bomb guns, which had proven themselves well at Sinop, played an important role. After this, the Allies abandoned the use of the fleet in bombing the city. At the same time, the city's fortifications were not seriously damaged. Such a decisive and skillful rebuff of the Russians came as a complete surprise to the allied command, which had hoped to take the city with little bloodshed. The city's defenders could celebrate a very important moral victory. But their joy was overshadowed by death during the shelling of Admiral Kornilov. The defense of the city was led by Pyotr Stepanovich Nakhimov. The Allies became convinced that it was impossible to quickly cope with the fortress. They abandoned the assault and moved on to a long siege. In turn, the defenders of Sevastopol continued to improve their defense. Thus, in front of the line of bastions, a system of advanced fortifications was erected (Selenga and Volyn redoubts, Kamchatka lunette, etc.). This made it possible to create a zone of continuous rifle and artillery fire in front of the main defensive structures. During the same period, Menshikov's army attacked the allies at Balaklava and Inkerman. Although it was not able to achieve decisive success, the allies, having suffered heavy losses in these battles, ceased active operations until 1855. The allies were forced to winter in the Crimea. Unprepared for the winter campaign, the Allied troops suffered dire needs. But still, they managed to organize supplies for their siege units - first by sea, and then with the help of a laid railway line from Balaklava to Sevastopol.

Having survived the winter, the Allies became more active. In March - May they carried out the 2nd and 3rd bombings. The shelling was especially brutal on Easter (in April). 541 guns fired at the city. They were answered by 466 guns, which lacked ammunition. By that time, the Allied army in Crimea had grown to 170 thousand people. against 110 thousand people. among the Russians (of which 40 thousand people are in Sevastopol). After the Easter Bombardment, the siege troops were led by General Pelissier, a supporter of decisive action. On May 11 and 26, French units captured a number of fortifications in front of the main line of bastions. But they were unable to achieve more due to the courageous resistance of the city’s defenders. During the battles, ground units supported with fire the ships of the Black Sea Fleet that remained afloat (steam frigates “Vladimir”, “Khersones”, etc.). General Mikhail Gorchakov, who led the Russian army in the Crimea after the resignation of Menshikov, considered resistance useless due to the superiority of the allies. However, the new Emperor Alexander II (Nicholas I died on February 18, 1855) demanded that the defense be continued. He believed that the quick surrender of Sevastopol would lead to the loss of the Crimean Peninsula, which would be “too difficult or even impossible” to return to Russia. On June 6, 1855, after the 4th bombardment, the Allies launched a powerful assault on the Ship side. 44 thousand people took part in it. This onslaught was heroically repulsed by 20 thousand Sevastopol residents, led by General Stepan Khrulev. On June 28, while inspecting positions, Admiral Nakhimov was mortally wounded. The man under whom, according to contemporaries, “the fall of Sevastopol seemed unthinkable,” has passed away. The besieged experienced increasing difficulties. They could respond to three shots with only one.

After the victory on the Chernaya River (August 4), the allied forces intensified their attack on Sevastopol. In August they carried out the 5th and 6th bombings, from which the losses of the defenders reached 2-3 thousand people. in a day. On August 27, a new assault began, in which 60 thousand people took part. It was reflected in all places except the key position of the besieged ~ Malakhov Kurgan. It was captured by a surprise attack at lunchtime by the French division of General MacMahon. To ensure secrecy, the allies did not give a special signal for the attack - it began on a synchronized clock (according to some experts, for the first time in military history). The defenders of Malakhov Kurgan made desperate attempts to defend their positions. They fought with everything they could get their hands on: shovels, picks, stones, banners. The 9th, 12th and 15th Russian divisions took part in the frantic battles for Malakhov Kurgan, which lost all the senior officers who personally led the soldiers in counterattacks. In the last of them, the head of the 15th division, General Yuferov, was stabbed to death with bayonets. The French managed to defend the captured positions. The success of the case was decided by the firmness of General MacMahon, who refused to retreat. To General Pelissier’s order to retreat to the starting lines, he responded with the historical phrase: “I am here and I will stay here.” The loss of the Malakhov Kurgan decided the fate of Sevastopol. On the evening of August 27, 1855, by order of General Gorchakov, the residents of Sevastopol left the southern part of the city and crossed the bridge (created by engineer Buchmeyer) to the northern part. At the same time, powder magazines were blown up, shipyards and fortifications were destroyed, and the remains of the fleet were flooded. The battles for Sevastopol are over. The Allies did not achieve his surrender. The Russian armed forces in Crimea survived and were ready for further battles. "Brave comrades! It is sad and difficult to leave Sevastopol to our enemies, but remember what sacrifice we made on the altar of the fatherland in 1812. Moscow is worth Sevastopol! We left it after the immortal battle under Borodin.

The three-hundred-and-forty-nine-day defense of Sevastopol is superior to Borodino!” said the army order dated August 30, 1855. The Allies lost 72 thousand people during the Sevastopol defense (not counting the sick and those who died from diseases). Russians - 102 thousand people. In the glorious The chronicle of this defense includes the names of admirals V.A. Kornilov and P.S. Nakhimov, engineer E.I. Totleben, surgeon N.I. Pirogov, General S.A. Khrulev, captain G.A. Butakov, sailor P.M. .Cats, officer A.V. Melnikov, soldier A. Eliseev and many other heroes, united from that time on by one valiant name - "Sevastopol". The first sisters of mercy in Russia appeared in Sevastopol. Participants in the defense were awarded the medal "For the Defense of Sevastopol". The defense of Sevastopol was the culmination of the Crimean War, and after its fall the parties soon began peace negotiations in Paris.

Battle of Balaclava (1854). During the Sevastopol defense, the Russian army in Crimea gave the allies a number of important battles. The first of these was the battle of Balaklava (a settlement on the coast, east of Sevastopol), where the supply base for British troops in the Crimea was located. When planning an attack on Balaklava, the Russian command saw the main goal not in capturing this base, but in distracting the allies from Sevastopol. Therefore, rather modest forces were allocated for the offensive - parts of the 12th and 16th infantry divisions under the command of General Liprandi (16 thousand people). On October 13, 1854, they attacked the advanced fortifications of the Allied forces. The Russians captured a number of redoubts that were defended by Turkish units. But further onslaught was stopped by a counterattack by the English cavalry. Eager to build on their success, the Guards Cavalry Brigade, led by Lord Cardigan, continued the attack and arrogantly delved into the location of the Russian troops. Here she ran into a Russian battery and came under cannon fire, and was then attacked in the flank by a detachment of lancers under the command of Colonel Eropkin. Having lost most of his brigade, Cardigan retreated. The Russian command was unable to develop this tactical success due to the lack of forces sent to Balaklava. The Russians did not engage in a new battle with additional allied units rushing to help the British. Both sides lost 1 thousand people in this battle. The Balaklava battle forced the Allies to postpone the planned attack on Sevastopol. At the same time, he allowed them to better understand their weak points and strengthen Balaklava, which became the sea gate of the allied siege forces. This battle received wide resonance in Europe due to the high losses among the English guards. A kind of epitaph for Cardigan’s sensational attack were the words of the French General Bosquet: “This is great, but this is not war.”

. Encouraged by the Balaklava affair, Menshikov decided to give the Allies a more serious battle. The Russian commander was also prompted to do this by reports from defectors that the Allies wanted to finish off Sevastopol before winter and were planning an assault on the city in the coming days. Menshikov planned to attack English units in the Inkerman Heights area and push them back to Balaklava. This would allow the French and British troops to be separated, making it easier to defeat them individually. On October 24, 1854, Menshikov’s troops (82 thousand people) gave battle to the Anglo-French army (63 thousand people) in the Inkerman Heights area. The Russians delivered the main blow on their left flank by detachments of generals Soimonov and Pavlov (37 thousand people in total) against the English corps of Lord Raglan (16 thousand people). However, the well-conceived plan was poorly thought out and prepared. The rough terrain, lack of maps, and thick fog led to poor coordination between the attackers. The Russian command actually lost control over the course of the battle. The units were brought into battle in parts, which reduced the force of the blow. The battle with the British broke up into a series of separate fierce battles, in which the Russians suffered heavy damage from rifle fire. By firing from them, the British managed to destroy up to half of some Russian units. General Soimonov was also killed during the attack. In this case, the courage of the attackers was dashed by more effective weapons. Nevertheless, the Russians fought with unrelenting tenacity and eventually began to press the British, knocking them out of most positions.

On the right flank, General Timofeev’s detachment (10 thousand people) pinned down part of the French forces with its attack. However, due to the inaction in the center of General Gorchakov’s detachment (20 thousand people), which was supposed to distract the French troops, they were able to come to the rescue of the British. The outcome of the battle was decided by the attack of the French detachment of General Bosquet (9 thousand people), who managed to push the Russian regiments, who were exhausted and suffered heavy losses, back to their original positions. “The fate of the battle was still wavering when the French who arrived to us attacked the enemy’s left flank,” he wrote London correspondent of the Morning Chronicle - From that moment on, the Russians could no longer hope for success, but, despite this, not the slightest hesitation or disorder was noticeable in their ranks. Struck by the fire of our artillery, they closed their ranks and bravely repelled all the attacks of the allies... Sometimes a terrible battle lasted for five minutes, in which the soldiers fought either with bayonets or rifle butts. It is impossible to believe, without being an eyewitness, that there are troops in the world who can retreat as brilliantly as the Russians... This is the retreat of the Russians Homer would compare it to the retreat of a lion, when, surrounded by hunters, he retreats step by step. Shaking his mane, turning his proud brow towards his enemies, and then again continues on his way, bleeding from the many wounds inflicted on him, but unshakably courageous, undefeated." The Allies lost about 6 thousand people in this battle, the Russians - more than 10 thousand people. Although Menshikov was unable to achieve his intended goal, the Battle of Inkerman played an important role in the fate of Sevastopol. It did not allow the Allies to carry out their planned assault on the fortress and forced them to switch to a winter siege.

Storm of Evpatoria (1855). During the winter campaign of 1855, the most significant event in Crimea was the assault on Yevpatoria by Russian troops of General Stepan Khrulev (19 thousand people). In the city there was a 35,000-strong Turkish corps under the command of Omer Pasha, which threatened the rear communications of the Russian army in Crimea from here. To prevent the offensive actions of the Turks, the Russian command decided to capture Yevpatoria. The lack of allocated forces was planned to be compensated by a surprise attack. However, this was not achieved. The garrison, having learned about the assault, prepared to repel the onslaught. When the Russians launched an attack, they were met with heavy fire, including from the ships of the allied squadron located in the Yevpatoria roadstead. Fearing heavy losses and an unsuccessful outcome of the assault, Khrulev gave the order to stop the attack. Having lost 750 people, the troops returned to their original positions. Despite the failure, the raid on Yevpatoria paralyzed the activity of the Turkish army, which never took active action here. The news of the failure near Evpatoria, apparently, hastened the death of Emperor Nicholas I. On February 18, 1855, he died. Before his death, with his last order, he managed to remove the commander of the Russian troops in Crimea, Prince Menshikov, for the failure of the assault.

Battle of the Chernaya River (1855). On August 4, 1855, on the banks of the Chernaya River (10 km from Sevastopol), a battle took place between the Russian army under the command of General Gorchakov (58 thousand people) and three French and one Sardinian divisions under the command of Generals Pelissier and Lamarmore (about 60 thousand in total). people). For the offensive, which had the goal of helping the besieged Sevastopol, Gorchakov allocated two large detachments led by generals Liprandi and Read. The main battle broke out on the right flank for Fedyukhin Heights. The assault on this well-fortified French position began due to a misunderstanding, which clearly reflected the inconsistency of the actions of the Russian command in this battle. After Liprandi’s detachment went on the offensive on the left flank, Gorchakov and his orderly sent a note to Read “It’s time to start,” meaning to support this attack with fire. Read realized that it was time to start attacking, and moved his 12th division (General Martinau) to storm the Fedyukhin Heights. The division was introduced into battle in parts: the Odessa, then the Azov and Ukrainian regiments. “The swiftness of the Russians was amazing,” a correspondent of one of the British newspapers wrote about this attack. “They did not waste time shooting and rushed forward with extraordinary impetus. French soldiers.. "They assured me that the Russians had never before shown such ardor in battle." Under deadly fire, the attackers managed to cross the river and canal, and then reached the advanced fortifications of the Allies, where a hot battle began. Here, on the Fedyukhin Heights, not only the fate of Sevastopol was at stake, but also the honor of the Russian army.

In this final field battle in the Crimea, the Russians, in a frantic impulse, sought for the last time to defend their dearly purchased right to be called invincible. Despite the heroism of the soldiers, the Russians suffered heavy losses and were repulsed. The units allocated for the attack were insufficient. Read's initiative changed the commander's initial plan. Instead of helping Liprandi's units, which had some success, Gorchakov sent the reserve 5th Division (General Vranken) to support the assault on the Fedyukhin Heights. The same fate awaited this division. Read brought the regiments into battle one by one, and separately they also did not achieve success. In a persistent effort to turn the tide of the battle, Read led the attack himself and was killed. Then Gorchakov again shifted his efforts to the left flank to Liprandi, but the allies managed to pull up large forces there, and the offensive failed. By 10 o'clock in the morning, after a 6-hour battle, the Russians, having lost 8 thousand people, retreated to their original positions. The damage to the Franco-Sardinians is about 2 thousand people. After the battle on Chernaya, the allies were able to allocate the main forces for the assault on Sevastopol. The Battle of Chernaya and other failures in the Crimean War meant the loss for almost a whole century (until the victory at Stalingrad) of the sense of superiority previously won by the Russian soldier over Western Europeans.

Capture of Kerch, Anapa, Kinburn. Sabotage on the Coast (1855). During the siege of Sevastopol, the Allies continued their active attack on the Russian coast. In May 1855, a 16,000-strong Allied landing force under the command of generals Brown and Otmar captured Kerch and plundered the city. Russian forces in the eastern part of Crimea under the command of General Karl Wrangel (about 10 thousand people), stretched along the coast, did not offer any resistance to the paratroopers. This success of the allies cleared the way for them to the Sea of ​​Azov (its transformation into an open sea zone was part of England's plans) and cut off the connection between Crimea and the North Caucasus. After the capture of Kerch, the allied squadron (about 70 ships) entered the Sea of ​​Azov. She fired at Taganrog, Genichevsk, Yeisk and other coastal points. However, local garrisons rejected offers of surrender and repelled attempts to land small troops. As a result of this raid on the Azov coast, significant reserves of grain that were intended for the Crimean army were destroyed. The Allies also landed troops on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, occupying the Anapa fortress abandoned and destroyed by the Russians. The last operation in the Azov-Black Sea theater of military operations was the capture of the Kinburn fortress by General Bazin's 8,000-strong French landing force on October 5, 1855. The fortress was defended by a 1,500-strong garrison led by General Kokhanovich. On the third day of the bombing he capitulated. This operation became famous primarily for the fact that armored ships were used for the first time. Built according to the drawings of Emperor Napoleon III, they easily destroyed the stone Kinburn fortifications with gun fire. At the same time, shells from Kinburn’s defenders, fired from a distance of 1 km or less, crashed against the sides of the battleships without much damage to these floating fortresses. The capture of Kinburn was the last success of the Anglo-French troops in the Crimean War.

The Caucasian theater of military operations was somewhat in the shadow of the events that unfolded in Crimea. Nevertheless, actions in the Caucasus were very important. This was the only theater of war where the Russians could directly attack enemy territory. It was here that the Russian armed forces achieved the greatest successes, which made it possible to develop more acceptable peace conditions. The victories in the Caucasus were largely due to the high fighting qualities of the Russian Caucasian army. She had many years of experience in military operations in the mountains. Its soldiers were constantly in the conditions of a small mountain war, had experienced combat commanders aimed at decisive action. At the beginning of the war, Russian forces in Transcaucasia under the command of General Bebutov (30 thousand people) were more than three times inferior to Turkish troops under the command of Abdi Pasha (100 thousand people). Using their numerical advantage, the Turkish command immediately went on the offensive. The main forces (40 thousand people) moved towards Alexandropol. To the north, on Akhaltsikhe, the Ardagan detachment (18 thousand people) was advancing. The Turkish command hoped to break through to the Caucasus and establish direct contact with the troops of the mountaineers, who had been fighting against Russia for several decades. The implementation of such a plan could lead to the isolation of the small Russian army in Transcaucasia and its destruction.

Battle of Bayardun and Akhaltsikhe (1853). The first serious battle between the Russians and the main forces of the Turks marching towards Alexandropol took place on November 2, 1853 at Bayandur (16 km from Alexandropol). Here stood the vanguard of the Russians, led by Prince Orbeliani (7 thousand people). Despite the significant numerical superiority of the Turks, Orbeliani boldly entered the battle and was able to hold out until Bebutov’s main forces arrived. Having learned that fresh reinforcements were approaching the Russians, Abdi Pasha did not get involved in a more serious battle and retreated to the Arpachay River. Meanwhile, the Ardahan detachment of Turks crossed the Russian border and reached the approaches to Akhaltsikhe. On November 12, 1853, his path was blocked by a half-size detachment under the command of Prince Andronnikov (7 thousand people). After a fierce battle, the Turks suffered a heavy defeat and retreated to Kars. The Turkish offensive in Transcaucasia was stopped.

Battle of Bashkadyklar (1853). After the victory at Akhaltsikhe, Bebutov’s corps (up to 13 thousand people) went on the offensive. The Turkish command tried to stop Bebutov at a powerful defensive line near Bashkadyklar. Despite the triple numerical superiority of the Turks (who were also confident in the inaccessibility of their positions), Bebutov boldly attacked them on November 19, 1853. Having broken through the right flank, the Russians inflicted a heavy defeat on the Turkish army. Having lost 6 thousand people, she retreated in disarray. The Russian damage amounted to 1.5 thousand people. The Russian success at Bashkadiklar stunned the Turkish army and its allies in the North Caucasus. This victory significantly strengthened Russia's position in the Caucasus region. After the Battle of Bashkadyklar, Turkish troops did not show any activity for several months (until the end of May 1854), which allowed the Russians to strengthen the Caucasian direction.

Battle of Nigoeti and Chorokh (1854). In 1854, the strength of the Turkish army in Transcaucasia was increased to 120 thousand people. It was headed by Mustafa Zarif Pasha. Russian forces were brought to only 40 thousand people. Bebutov divided them into three detachments, which covered the Russian border as follows. The central section in the Alexandropol direction was guarded by the main detachment led by Bebutov himself (21 thousand people). On the right, from Akhaltsikhe to the Black Sea, Andronikov’s Akhaltsikhe detachment (14 thousand people) covered the border. On the southern flank, to protect the Erivan direction, a detachment of Baron Wrangel (5 thousand people) was formed. The first to take the blow were units of the Akhaltsikhe detachment on the Batumi section of the border. From here, from the Batum region, Hassan Pasha's detachment (12 thousand people) moved to Kutaisi. On May 28, 1854, his path was blocked near the village of Nigoeti by a detachment of General Eristov (3 thousand people). The Turks were defeated and driven back to Ozugerty. Their losses amounted to 2 thousand people. Among those killed was Hassan Pasha himself, who promised his soldiers to have a hearty dinner in Kutaisi in the evening. Russian damage - 600 people. The defeated units of Hassan Pasha's detachment retreated to Ozugerty, where Selim Pasha's large corps (34 thousand people) was concentrated. Meanwhile, Andronnikov gathered his forces into a fist in the Batumi direction (10 thousand people). Without allowing Selim Pasha to go on the offensive, the commander of the Akhaltsikhe detachment himself attacked the Turks on the Chorokh River and inflicted a severe defeat on them. Selim Pasha's corps retreated, losing 4 thousand people. The Russian damage amounted to 1.5 thousand people. The victories at Nigoeti and Chorokhe secured the right flank of Russian troops in Transcaucasia.

Battle at Chingil Pass (1854). Having failed to break into Russian territory in the area of ​​the Black Sea coast, the Turkish command launched an offensive in the Erivan direction. In July, a 16,000-strong Turkish corps moved from Bayazet to Erivan (now Yerevan). The commander of the Erivan detachment, Baron Wrangel, did not take a defensive position, but himself stepped out to meet the advancing Turks. In the scorching heat of July, the Russians reached the Chingil Pass with a forced march. On July 17, 1854, in a counter battle, they inflicted a severe defeat on the Bayazet Corps. The Russian casualties in this case amounted to 405 people. The Turks lost over 2 thousand people. Wrangel organized an energetic pursuit of the defeated Turkish units and on July 19 captured their base - Bayazet. Most of the Turkish corps fled. Its remnants (2 thousand people) retreated to Van in disarray. The victory at the Chingil Pass secured and strengthened the left flank of Russian troops in Transcaucasia.

Battle of Kyuryuk-dak (1854). Finally, a battle took place on the central sector of the Russian front. On July 24, 1854, Bebutov’s detachment (18 thousand people) fought with the main Turkish army under the command of Mustafa Zarif Pasha (60 thousand people). Relying on numerical superiority, the Turks left their fortified positions at Hadji Vali and attacked Bebutov’s detachment. The stubborn battle lasted from 4 a.m. to noon. Bebutov, taking advantage of the stretched nature of the Turkish troops, managed to defeat them piecemeal (first on the right flank, and then in the center). His victory was facilitated by the skillful actions of the artillerymen and their sudden use of missile weapons (missiles designed by Konstantinov). The losses of the Turks amounted to 10 thousand people, Russians - 3 thousand people. After the defeat at Kuryuk-Dara, the Turkish army retreated to Kars and ceased active operations in the Caucasian theater of military operations. The Russians received a favorable opportunity to attack Kars. So, in the campaign of 1854, the Russians repelled the Turkish onslaught in all directions and continued to maintain the initiative. Turkey's hopes for the Caucasian highlanders also did not materialize. Their main ally in the Eastern Caucasus, Shamil, did not show much activity. In 1854, the only major success of the mountaineers was the capture in the summer of the Georgian town of Tsinandali in the Alazani Valley. But this operation was not so much an attempt to establish cooperation with Turkish troops as a traditional raid with the aim of seizing booty (in particular, princesses Chavchavadze and Orbeliani were captured, for whom the highlanders received a huge ransom). It is likely that Shamil was interested in independence from both Russia and Turkey.

Siege and capture of Kars (1855). At the beginning of 1855, General Nikolai Muravyov, whose name is associated with the greatest success of the Russians in this theater of military operations, was appointed commander of the Russian forces in Transcaucasia. He united the Akhaltsikhe and Alexandropol detachments, creating a united corps of up to 40 thousand people. With these forces, Muravyov moved towards Kars with the goal of capturing this main stronghold in eastern Turkey. Kars was defended by a 30,000-strong garrison, led by the English general William. The siege of Kars began on August 1, 1855. In September, Omer Pasha's expeditionary force (45 thousand people) arrived from Crimea to Batum to help Turkish troops in Transcaucasia. This forced Muravyov to act more actively against Kars. On September 17, the fortress was stormed. But he was not successful. Of the 13 thousand people who went on the attack, the Russians lost half and were forced to retreat. The damage to the Turks amounted to 1.4 thousand people. This failure did not affect Muravyov's determination to continue the siege. Moreover, Omer Pasha launched an operation in Mingrelia in October. He occupied Sukhum, and then got involved in heavy battles with the troops (mostly police) of General Bagration Mukhrani (19 thousand people), who detained the Turks at the turn of the Enguri River, and then stopped them on the Tskheniskali River. Towards the end of October it began to snow. He closed the mountain passes, dashing the garrison's hopes for reinforcements. At the same time, Muravyov continued the siege. Unable to withstand hardships and without waiting for outside help, the garrison of Kars decided not to experience the horrors of winter sitting and capitulated on November 16, 1855. The capture of Kars was a major victory for the Russian troops. This last significant operation of the Crimean War increased Russia's chances of concluding a more honorable peace. For the capture of the fortress, Muravyov was awarded the title of Count of Karsky.

Fighting also took place in the Baltic, White and Barents Seas. In the Baltic Sea, the Allies planned to capture the most important Russian naval bases. In the summer of 1854, an Anglo-French squadron with a landing force under the command of Vice Admirals Napier and Parseval-Duchenne (65 ships, most of them steam) blocked the Baltic Fleet (44 ships) in Sveaborg and Kronstadt. The Allies did not dare to attack these bases, since the approach to them was protected by minefields designed by Academician Jacobi, which were first used in combat. Thus, the technical superiority of the Allies in the Crimean War was by no means total. In a number of cases, the Russians were able to effectively counter them with advanced military equipment (bomb guns, Konstantinov missiles, Jacobi mines, etc.). Fearing the mines at Kronstadt and Sveaborg, the Allies attempted to seize other Russian naval bases in the Baltic. The landings in Ekenes, Gangut, Gamlakarleby and Abo failed. The only success of the Allies was their capture of the small fortress of Bomarsund on the Åland Islands. At the end of July, an 11,000-strong Anglo-French landing force landed on the Åland Islands and blocked Bomarsund. It was defended by a 2,000-strong garrison, which surrendered on August 4, 1854 after a 6-day bombardment that destroyed the fortifications. In the fall of 1854, the Anglo-French squadron, having failed to achieve its goals, left the Baltic Sea. “Never before have the actions of such a huge armada with such powerful forces and means ended with such a ridiculous result,” the London Times wrote about this. In the summer of 1855, the Anglo-French fleet under the command of Admirals Dundas and Pinault limited themselves to blockading the coast and shelling Sveaborg and other cities.

On the White Sea, several English ships tried to capture the Solovetsky Monastery, which was defended by monks and a small detachment with 10 cannons. The defenders of Solovki responded with a decisive refusal to the offer to surrender. Then the naval artillery began shelling the monastery. The first shot knocked out the monastery gates. But the attempt to land troops was repulsed by fortress artillery fire. Fearing losses, the British paratroopers returned to the ships. After shooting for two more days, the British ships set off for Arkhangelsk. But the attack on him was also repelled by the fire of Russian cannons. Then the British sailed to the Barents Sea. Joining French ships there, they mercilessly fired incendiary cannonballs at the defenseless fishing village of Kola, destroying 110 of the 120 houses there. This was the end of the actions of the British and French in the White and Barents Seas.

Pacific Theater of Operations (1854-1856)

Particularly worth noting is Russia’s first baptism of fire in the Pacific Ocean, where the Russians, with small forces, inflicted a severe defeat on the enemy and worthily defended the Far Eastern borders of their homeland. Here the garrison of Petropavlovsk (now the city of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky), led by the military governor Vasily Stepanovich Zavoiko (over 1 thousand people), distinguished itself. It had seven batteries with 67 guns, as well as the ships Aurora and Dvina. On August 18, 1854, an Anglo-French squadron (7 ships with 212 guns and 2.6 thousand crew and troops) under the command of Rear Admirals Price and Fevrier de Pointe approached Petropavlovsk. The Allies sought to capture this main Russian stronghold in the Far East and profit from the property of the Russian-American company here. Despite the obvious inequality of forces, primarily in artillery, Zavoiko decided to defend himself to the last extreme. The ships "Aurora" and "Dvina", turned by the city's defenders into floating batteries, blocked the entrance to the Peter and Paul harbor. On August 20, the Allies, having a triple superiority in cannons, suppressed one coastal battery with fire and landed troops (600 people) ashore. But the surviving Russian artillerymen continued to fire at the broken battery and detained the attackers. The artillerymen were supported by fire from guns from the Aurora, and soon a detachment of 230 people arrived at the battlefield, and with a bold counterattack they dropped the troops into the sea. For 6 hours, the allied squadron fired along the coast, trying to suppress the remaining Russian batteries, but itself received heavy damage in an artillery duel and was forced to retreat from the coast. After 4 days, the Allies landed a new landing force (970 people). captured the heights dominating the city, but his further advance was stopped by a counterattack by the defenders of Petropavlovsk. 360 Russian soldiers, scattered in a chain, attacked the paratroopers and fought them hand-to-hand. Unable to withstand the decisive onslaught, the allies fled to their ships. Their losses amounted to 450 people. The Russians lost 96 people. On August 27, the Anglo-French squadron left the Petropavlovsk area. In April 1855, Zavoiko set out with his small flotilla from Petropavlovsk to defend the mouth of the Amur and in De Castri Bay won a decisive victory over a superior British squadron. Its commander, Admiral Price, shot himself in despair. “All the waters of the Pacific Ocean are not enough to wash away the shame of the British flag!” one of the English historians wrote about this. Having checked the fortress of Russia's Far Eastern borders, the allies stopped active hostilities in this region. The heroic defense of Petropavlovsk and De Castri Bay became the first bright page in the annals of the Russian armed forces in the Pacific.

Parisian world

By winter, fighting on all fronts had subsided. Thanks to the resilience and courage of the Russian soldiers, the offensive impulse of the coalition fizzled out. The Allies failed to oust Russia from the shores of the Black Sea and the Pacific Ocean. “We,” wrote the London Times, “have found a resistance superior to anything hitherto known in history.” But Russia could not defeat the powerful coalition alone. It did not have sufficient military-industrial potential for a protracted war. The production of gunpowder and lead did not even half satisfy the needs of the army. The stocks of weapons (cannons, rifles) accumulated in the arsenals were also coming to an end. The Allied weapons were superior to the Russian ones, which led to huge losses in the Russian army. The lack of a railway network did not allow for the mobile movement of troops. The advantage of the steam fleet over the sailing fleet made it possible for the French and British to dominate the sea. In this war, 153 thousand Russian soldiers died (of which 51 thousand people were killed and died from wounds, the rest died from disease). About the same number of allies (French, British, Sardinians, Turks) died. Almost the same percentage of their losses were due to disease (primarily cholera). The Crimean War was the bloodiest conflict of the 19th century after 1815. So the Allies’ agreement to negotiate was largely due to heavy losses. PARISIAN WORLD (03/18/1856). At the end of 1855, Austria demanded that St. Petersburg conclude a truce on the terms of the allies, otherwise threatening war. Sweden also joined the alliance between England and France. The entry of these countries into the war could cause an attack on Poland and Finland, which threatened Russia with more serious complications. All this pushed Alexander II to peace negotiations, which took place in Paris, where representatives of seven powers (Russia, France, Austria, England, Prussia, Sardinia and Turkey) gathered. The main terms of the agreement were as follows: navigation on the Black Sea and Danube is open to all merchant ships; the entrance to the Black Sea, the Bosporus and the Dardanelles is closed to warships, with the exception of those light warships that each power maintains at the mouth of the Danube to ensure free navigation on it. Russia and Turkey, by mutual agreement, maintain an equal number of ships in the Black Sea.

According to the Treaty of Paris (1856), Sevastopol was returned to Russia in exchange for Kars, and the lands at the mouth of the Danube were transferred to the Principality of Moldova. Russia was prohibited from having a navy in the Black Sea. Russia also promised not to fortify the Åland Islands. Christians in Turkey are compared in rights with Muslims, and the Danube principalities come under the general protectorate of Europe. The Paris peace, although not beneficial for Russia, was still honorable for her in view of such numerous and strong opponents. However, its disadvantageous side - the limitation of Russia's naval forces on the Black Sea - was eliminated during the life of Alexander II with a statement on October 19, 1870.

Results of the Crimean War and reforms in the army

Russia's defeat in the Crimean War ushered in the era of the Anglo-French redivision of the world. Having knocked the Russian Empire out of world politics and secured their rear in Europe, the Western powers actively used the advantage they had gained to achieve world domination. The path to the successes of England and France in Hong Kong or Senegal lay through the destroyed bastions of Sevastopol. Soon after the Crimean War, England and France attacked China. Having achieved a more impressive victory over him, they turned this country into a semi-colony. By 1914, the countries they captured or controlled accounted for 2/3 of the world's territory. The war clearly demonstrated to the Russian government that economic backwardness leads to political and military vulnerability. Further lag behind Europe threatened with even more serious consequences. Under Alexander II, the reform of the country begins. The military reform of the 60s and 70s occupied an important place in the system of transformations. It is associated with the name of Minister of War Dmitry Alekseevich Milyutin. This was the largest military reform since the time of Peter, which led to dramatic changes in the armed forces. It affected various areas: organization and recruitment of the army, its administration and armament, training of officers, training of troops, etc. In 1862-1864. The local military administration was reorganized. Its essence boiled down to weakening excessive centralism in the management of the armed forces, in which military units were subordinated directly to the center. For decentralization, a military-district control system was introduced.

The country's territory was divided into 15 military districts with their own commanders. Their power extended to all troops and military institutions of the district. Another important area of ​​reform was changing the officer training system. Instead of cadet corps, military gymnasiums (with a 7-year training period) and military schools (with a 2-year training period) were created. Military gymnasiums were secondary educational institutions, similar in curriculum to real gymnasiums. Military schools accepted young men with secondary education (as a rule, these were graduates of military gymnasiums). Junker schools were also created. To enter they were required to have a general education of four classes. After the reform, all persons promoted to officers not from schools were required to take exams according to the program of cadet schools.

All this increased the educational level of Russian officers. Mass rearmament of the army begins. There is a transition from smooth-bore shotguns to rifled rifles.

Field artillery is also being re-equipped with rifled guns loaded from the breech. The creation of steel tools begins. Russian scientists A.V. Gadolin, N.V. Maievsky, V.S. Baranovsky achieved great success in artillery. The sailing fleet is being replaced by a steam one. The creation of armored ships begins. The country is actively building railways, including strategic ones. Improvements in technology required major changes in troop training. The tactics of loose formation and rifle chains are gaining an increasing advantage over closed columns. This required increased independence and maneuverability of the infantryman on the battlefield. The importance of preparing a fighter for individual actions in battle is increasing. The role of sapper and trench work is increasing, which involves the ability to dig in and build shelters for protection from enemy fire. To train troops in methods of modern warfare, a number of new regulations, manuals, and teaching aids are being published. The crowning achievement of the military reform was the transition in 1874 to universal conscription. Before this, a recruiting system was in effect. When it was introduced by Peter I, military service covered all segments of the population (excluding officials and the clergy). But from the second half of the 18th century. it limited itself only to the tax-paying classes. Gradually, among them, buying off the army from rich people began to be an official practice. In addition to social injustice, this system also suffered from material costs. Maintaining a huge professional army (its number has increased 5 times since the time of Peter) was expensive and not always effective. In peacetime, it outnumbered the troops of the European powers. But during the war, the Russian army did not have trained reserves. This problem was clearly manifested in the Crimean campaign, when additionally it was possible to recruit mostly illiterate militias. Now young people who had reached the age of 21 were required to report to the recruiting station. The government calculated the required number of recruits and, in accordance with it, determined the number of places that conscripts were drawn by lot. The rest were enlisted in the militia. There were benefits for conscription. Thus, the only sons or breadwinners of the family were exempted from the army. Representatives of the peoples of the North, Central Asia, and some peoples of the Caucasus and Siberia were not drafted. The service life was reduced to 6 years; for another 9 years, those who served remained in the reserve and were subject to conscription in case of war. As a result, the country received a significant number of trained reserves. Military service lost class restrictions and became a national affair.

"From Ancient Rus' to the Russian Empire." Shishkin Sergey Petrovich, Ufa.

The spirit in the troops is beyond description. During the times of ancient Greece there was not so much heroism. I was not able to be in action even once, but I thank God that I saw these people and live in this glorious time.

Lev Tolstoy

The wars of the Russian and Ottoman empires were a common phenomenon in international politics in the 18th-19th centuries. In 1853, the Russian Empire of Nicholas 1 entered into another war, which went down in history as the Crimean War of 1853-1856, and ended in the defeat of Russia. In addition, this war showed the strong resistance of the leading countries of Western Europe (France and Great Britain) to the strengthening of Russia's role in Eastern Europe, in particular in the Balkans. The lost war also showed Russia itself problems in domestic politics, which led to many problems. Despite victories in the initial stage of 1853-1854, as well as the capture of the key Turkish fortress of Kars in 1855, Russia lost the most important battles on the territory of the Crimean Peninsula. This article describes the causes, course, main results and historical significance in a short story about the Crimean War of 1853-1856.

Reasons for the aggravation of the Eastern Question

By the Eastern Question, historians understand a number of controversial issues in Russian-Turkish relations, which at any moment could lead to conflict. The main problems of the Eastern Question, which became the basis for the future war, are as follows:

• The loss of Crimea and the northern Black Sea region to the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 18th century constantly stimulated Turkey to start a war in the hope of regaining the territories. Thus began the wars of 1806-1812 and 1828-1829. However, as a result, Turkey lost Bessarabia and part of the territory in the Caucasus, which further increased the desire for revenge.
• Belonging to the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. Russia demanded that these straits be opened for the Black Sea Fleet, while the Ottoman Empire (under pressure from Western European countries) ignored these Russian demands.
• The presence in the Balkans, as part of the Ottoman Empire, of Slavic Christian peoples who fought for their independence. Russia provided them with support, thereby causing a wave of indignation among the Turks about Russian interference in the internal affairs of another state.

An additional factor that intensified the conflict was the desire of Western European countries (Britain, France, and Austria) not to allow Russia into the Balkans, as well as to block its access to the straits. For this reason, countries were ready to provide support to Turkey in a potential war with Russia.

The reason for the war and its beginning

These problematic issues were brewing throughout the late 1840s and early 1850s. In 1853, the Turkish Sultan transferred the Temple of Bethlehem in Jerusalem (then the territory of the Ottoman Empire) to the management of the Catholic Church. This caused a wave of indignation among the highest Orthodox hierarchy. Nicholas 1 decided to take advantage of this, using the religious conflict as a reason to attack Turkey. Russia demanded that the temple be transferred to the Orthodox Church, and at the same time also open the straits to the Black Sea Fleet. Türkiye refused. In June 1853, Russian troops crossed the border of the Ottoman Empire and entered the territory of the Danube principalities dependent on it.

Nicholas 1 hoped that France was too weak after the revolution of 1848, and Britain could be appeased by transferring Cyprus and Egypt to it in the future. However, the plan did not work; European countries called on the Ottoman Empire to act, promising it financial and military assistance. In October 1853, Türkiye declared war on Russia. Thus began, in short, the Crimean War of 1853-1856. In the history of Western Europe, this war is called the Eastern War.

Progress of the war and main stages

The Crimean War can be divided into 2 stages according to the number of participants in the events of those years. These are the stages:

1. October 1853 – April 1854. During these six months, the war was between the Ottoman Empire and Russia (without direct intervention from other states). There were three fronts: Crimean (Black Sea), Danube and Caucasian.
2. April 1854 - February 1856. British and French troops enter the war, which expands the theater of operations and also marks a turning point in the course of the war. The Allied forces were technically superior to the Russians, which was the reason for the changes during the war.

As for specific battles, the following key battles can be identified: for Sinop, for Odessa, for the Danube, for the Caucasus, for Sevastopol. There were other battles, but the ones listed above are the most basic. Let's look at them in more detail.

Battle of Sinop (November 1853)

The battle took place in the harbor of the city of Sinop in Crimea. The Russian fleet under the command of Nakhimov completely defeated the Turkish fleet of Osman Pasha. This battle was perhaps the last major world battle on sailing ships. This victory significantly raised the morale of the Russian army and inspired hope for an early victory in the war.

Map of the Sinop naval battle November 18, 1853

Bombing of Odessa (April 1854)

At the beginning of April 1854, the Ottoman Empire sent a squadron of the Franco-British fleet through its straits, which quickly headed for the Russian port and shipbuilding cities: Odessa, Ochakov and Nikolaev.

On April 10, 1854, the bombardment of Odessa, the main southern port of the Russian Empire, began. After a rapid and intense bombardment, it was planned to land troops in the northern Black Sea region, which would force the withdrawal of troops from the Danube principalities, as well as weaken the defense of Crimea. However, the city survived several days of shelling. Moreover, the defenders of Odessa were able to deliver precise strikes on the Allied fleet. The plan of the Anglo-French troops failed. The Allies were forced to retreat towards Crimea and begin battles for the peninsula.

Fighting on the Danube (1853-1856)

It was with the entry of Russian troops into this region that the Crimean War of 1853-1856 began. After success in the Battle of Sinop, another success awaited Russia: the troops completely crossed over to the right bank of the Danube, an attack was opened on Silistria and further on Bucharest. However, the entry of England and France into the war complicated the Russian offensive. On June 9, 1854, the siege of Silistria was lifted, and Russian troops returned to the left bank of the Danube. By the way, Austria also entered the war against Russia on this front, which was worried about the rapid advance of the Romanov Empire into Wallachia and Moldavia.

In July 1854, a huge landing of the British and French armies (according to various sources, from 30 to 50 thousand) landed near the city of Varna (modern Bulgaria). The troops were supposed to enter the territory of Bessarabia, displacing Russia from this region. However, a cholera epidemic broke out in the French army, and the British public demanded that the army leadership give priority to the Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea.

Fighting in the Caucasus (1853-1856)

An important battle took place in July 1854 near the village of Kyuryuk-Dara (Western Armenia). The combined Turkish-British forces were defeated. At this stage, the Crimean War was still a success for Russia.

Another important battle in this region took place in June–November 1855. Russian troops decided to attack the eastern part of the Ottoman Empire, the Karsu fortress, so that the Allies would send some troops to this region, thereby slightly weakening the siege of Sevastopol. Russia won the Battle of Kars, but this happened after the news of the fall of Sevastopol, so this battle had little impact on the outcome of the war. Moreover, according to the results of the “peace” signed later, the Kars fortress was returned to the Ottoman Empire. However, as the peace negotiations showed, the capture of Kars still played a role. But more on that later.

Defense of Sevastopol (1854-1855)

The most heroic and tragic event of the Crimean War is, of course, the battle for Sevastopol. In September 1855, French-English troops captured the last point of defense of the city - Malakhov Kurgan. The city survived an 11-month siege, but as a result it was surrendered to the Allied forces (among which the Sardinian kingdom appeared). This defeat was key and served as an impetus for ending the war. From the end of 1855, intensive negotiations began, in which Russia had practically no strong arguments. It was clear that the war was lost.

Other battles in Crimea (1854-1856)

In addition to the siege of Sevastopol, several more battles took place on the territory of Crimea in 1854-1855, which were aimed at “unblocking” Sevastopol:

1. Battle of Alma (September 1854).
2. Battle of Balaklava (October 1854).
3. Battle of Inkerman (November 1854).
4. Attempt to liberate Yevpatoria (February 1855).
5. Battle of the Chernaya River (August 1855).

All these battles ended in unsuccessful attempts to lift the siege of Sevastopol.

"Distant" battles

The main fighting of the war took place near the Crimean Peninsula, which gave the name to the war. There were also battles in the Caucasus, on the territory of modern Moldova, as well as in the Balkans. However, few know that battles between rivals also took place in remote regions of the Russian Empire. Here are some examples:

1. Petropavlovsk defense. The battle, which took place on the territory of the Kamchatka Peninsula between the combined Franco-British troops on one side and the Russian ones on the other. The battle took place in August 1854. This battle was a consequence of Britain's victory over China during the Opium Wars. As a result, Britain wanted to increase its influence in eastern Asia by displacing Russia. In total, the Allied troops launched two assaults, both of which ended in failure. Russia withstood the Petropavlovsk defense.
2. Arctic company. The operation of the British fleet to attempt to blockade or capture Arkhangelsk, carried out in 1854-1855. The main battles took place in the Barents Sea. The British also launched a bombardment of the Solovetsky Fortress, as well as the robbery of Russian merchant ships in the White and Barents Seas.

Results and historical significance of the war

Nicholas 1 died in February 1855. The task of the new emperor, Alexander 2, was to end the war, and with minimal damage to Russia. In February 1856, the Paris Congress began its work. Russia was represented there by Alexey Orlov and Philip Brunnov. Since neither side saw the point in continuing the war, the Paris Peace Treaty was signed on March 6, 1856, as a result of which the Crimean War was ended.

The main terms of the Treaty of Paris were as follows:

1. Russia returned the Karsu fortress to Turkey in exchange for Sevastopol and other captured cities of the Crimean peninsula.
2. Russia was prohibited from having a Black Sea fleet. The Black Sea was declared neutral.
3. The Bosporus and Dardanelles straits were declared closed to the Russian Empire.
4. Part of Russian Bessarabia was transferred to the Principality of Moldova, the Danube ceased to be a border river, so navigation was declared free.
5. On the Åland Islands (an archipelago in the Baltic Sea), Russia was prohibited from building military and/or defensive fortifications.

As for losses, the number of Russian citizens who died in the war is 47.5 thousand people. Britain lost 2.8 thousand, France - 10.2, Ottoman Empire - more than 10 thousand. The Sardinian kingdom lost 12 thousand military personnel. The deaths on the Austrian side are unknown, perhaps because it was not officially at war with Russia.

In general, the war showed the backwardness of Russia compared to European countries, especially in terms of the economy (the completion of the industrial revolution, the construction of railways, the use of steamships). After this defeat, the reforms of Alexander 2 began. In addition, the desire for revenge had been brewing in Russia for a long time, which resulted in another war with Turkey in 1877-1878. But this is a completely different story, and the Crimean War of 1853-1856 was completed and Russia was defeated in it.

To the 160th anniversary of Europe's war against Russia 1853-56.

In domestic historiography, Russia's defeat in the Eastern War was attributed to the defects of the military machine, outdated tactics of closed columns, the helplessness of field smooth-bore artillery, the effectiveness of enemy rifled weapons, the disintegration of the rear, the theft of quartermasters, society's rejection of Nicholas's despotism and the general backwardness of the Russian Empire (1).

To this list we can add the decline in the combat effectiveness of the imperial army and the decline in the “sovereign will” of the high command (2). In 1770 - 1814, the bearers of sovereign power - the court, the guard, the army and navy, the bureaucracy, the clergy and most of the nobility were exponents of “glory and delight” (A.S. Pushkin) and unanimously supported the autocracy, which brought Russia to the borders of the Western , Muslim and Sino-Japanese civilizations. The fighting spirit of the command and soldiers, inspired by both patriotism and the great power idea, soared to gigantic heights in 1812 (3).

The Crimean campaign occurred during the decline of the Russian Empire (1820s - 1917), when, with the exception of the “War for the Slavs” of 1877-78. Three wars were lost - Crimean, Japanese-Russian and World War I. Caution and caution of the high command in 1853-56. in the peripheral Crimea sharply contrasted with the victorious spirit of the Patriotic War of 1812, when a 600,000-strong army of almost all of Europe, led by “the best commander of all times and peoples,” moved towards the heart of Russia.

The assessment of the high command by contemporaries of that time was of the same type. There were no reproaches to the heroes of Russian history - Kornilov, Nakhimov, Istomin, Totleben. However, for other military leaders, black paint was not spared - it was necessary to explain how, after continuous victories since the times of Rumyantsev and Suvorov, the first military defeat of the great empire of the world occurred.

If in 1812-15. The “northern colossus” and the Russian army enjoyed sympathy in the West, then from the 1830s-40s. European liberals, most conservatives and socialists were overwhelmed by general hatred of “Russian-Mongolian barbarism” and “tyranny.” “Knock down the arrogance of predatory Russia!” - this was the main call on the eve of the Crimean War. The information war (including the most influential newspaper in Europe, The Times) rallied public opinion around the “saviors of civilization” - the Sultan, Napoleon III and Queen Victoria for the sake of “destroying forever the center of offensive power [of the Slavs] – Russia” (4).

The Nikolaev era was characterized by the phrase “brilliance on top, rotten below” (P.A. Valuev). Since the second half of the 1820s, radical circles have been talking about regicide, and there have been calls “Down with Nicholas the First!” (5). Revolutionary patriotism forced N.G. Chernyshevsky to be a defeatist during the Crimean War. N.A. Nekrasov called her “cursed”, taking away the breadwinners from the peasants: “the king is fooling - the people are miserable.” A.I. Herzen called the soldiers to defeatism and revolution in order to “take advantage of the storm” and, uniting with the working people of the West and East, sweep away tsarism” (6). S.M. Soloviev wrote that even the generals were afraid of public opinion, not to mention foreign assessments, which the authorities followed with increased attention.

However, the majority of Russian society welcomed the “just war” for the liberation of the Orthodox. “We all felt incredibly cheerful and happy. Russia is a military state” (N.S. Leskov). Slavophiles spoke about the revival of Byzantium and about Nicholas I as the “All-Slavic Tsar,” who was still revered by the people as an earthly god. “Out of a hundred so-called educated people, 99 rejoiced at the thought that we would soon take possession of Constantinople.” “At the beginning of the war... everyone walked boldly, without reasoning, although without patriotic inspiration for the government. We were so confident in our strength that we took the whole thing almost as a joke…” wrote P.A. Granovsky (7).

The military potential of the empire of Nicholas I, which had the largest (almost a million) army in Europe, was impressive. The Russian artillery park was considered one of the best. The infantry, despite the clumsiness of closed columns and outdated weapons (they knew about the unsuitability of “smooth-bore” guns, but only after the start of the Crimean War they began to convert them into fittings, which were often torn apart by rifling when fired), were numerous and capable (unlike the English) of long trips. The combat training of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, the rate of fire and the accuracy of the sailors' guns were better than that of the first naval power in the world - Britain. The Allies feared the numerous Russian cavalry. "Russian Vauban - Totleben" was a genius of fortification. The glory of victories over Napoleon I strengthened the Russian army and was taken into account by opponents. It was believed that one soldier of the “heroic army” (D.V. Davydov) could defeat three (8).

The morale of the troops of Nicholas I as a whole was not inferior to the morale of the armies of Napoleon III and Queen Victoria (9). The North Eurasian “continent of Russia” was difficult to invade, and a full-fledged war on all seas was beyond the capabilities of the allies. The new “Northern War” for Finland and Aland was prevented through diplomacy with the Kingdom of Sweden and Norway, which, however, provided its ports for the Allied squadrons. The United States took Russia into account more than Western Europe. An uprising did not break out in Poland. (Contrary to the hopes of Napoleon III, who was going to transfer the French army there through Germany. With a certain number of deserters, Polish officers and soldiers of the Russian army fought bravely in Crimea). Austria, remembering Russian glory, did not intend to invade Poland or Volyn and go to Kyiv, as the French emperor hoped (10). Serbs and Greeks sympathized with the Russians. Persia was inclined to take an anti-Turkish action on the side of Russia. There were uprisings of the Greeks in Epirus and the Kurds in Asia Minor. The Crimean Tatars, despite the robberies, theft of cattle to the enemy and looting of the Russian dead and wounded, did not rise, and the Shamil highlanders did not make their way through eastern Georgia to the Turks.

The Russian emperor, government and court circles hoped to avoid war. Despite the approach of the English and French fleets (Dardanelles - Sea of ​​Marmara - Bosphorus - Black Sea), the announcement of the "casus belli" was postponed four times by the tsar. But even after the invasion of the Black Sea by squadrons on January 4, 1854, who were going to “rip out the fangs from the bear,” Nicholas I never declared war and the allies had to declare it first: March 27 and 28, 1854. The commander-in-chief was also against the conflict with the West troops and the emperor's governor in the Caucasus, the general of the “lion's courage,” His Serene Highness Prince M.S. Vorontsov (1782-1856). The maid of honor A.F. Tyutcheva, in view of the approaching thunderstorm, wrote: “So, war, despite all efforts to prevent it! Emperor Nicholas looks very concerned, and the heir is extremely sad. Apparently, we are not confident in ourselves, we are afraid of failures, we do not feel sufficiently prepared” (11). Officially, the emperor, as he should, supported the military patriotism of his subjects: “If the insolence of our enemies thinks of touching the borders of Russia, we are ready to meet them, as bequeathed to us by our ancestors; “Aren’t we children, aren’t we descendants of those Russians who brought the glorious year 1812 into the tablets of Russia!” (Manifesto of Nicholas I, February 9, 1854).

Strategy and tactics of the parties.

The Allies' strategic plans were extensive. Although they could not wage war inside Russia, ideas were still put forward to raise an uprising with the help of landings in Finland, Poland and the Caucasus. There were plans to capture Kronstadt, Riga, Odessa and Sevastopol, after which “the Russian Cyclops will throw his clumsy body at random” (12). There were no plans to attack Russian Alaska. The Russian-American Company and the British Hudson's Bay Company considered military action on the North American continent undesirable and spoke out for neutrality in their territories (!). At the initiative of St. Petersburg, the governments of Britain and Russia entered into an agreement recognizing the entire eastern part of the Pacific Ocean as neutral (13).

There were three theaters of military operations in the Black Sea basin: the key naval, the secondary Balkan and the tertiary Caucasian. Before the intervention of the Allies, the most promising would have been the landing of a 16,000-strong landing on the Bosporus according to the plan of Nicholas I and the bombing of Istanbul, but the Russian command was afraid of such boldness. Paskevich was against the landing in the straits and the campaign in the Balkans. The naval authorities did not intend to take the Black Sea Fleet to sea, fearing that a declaration of war by the West would not find the ships there, from where they would not have time to leave for Sevastopol with its huge naval arsenal. From the establishment of a base for the Black Sea Fleet in Sinop harbor, as proposed by V.A. Kornilov on October 1, 1853. refused (14). At the end of October 1853, Nicholas I believed that “if the English and French fleets appear in the Black Sea, then our situation will be more difficult, because we will lose communications with the Caucasus by sea, and some of our forts will have to be abandoned... The anger of the British is beyond all measure... but it would be unwise to compare with them at sea due to their superiority, although our sailors only desire this” (15). So the Russian command abandoned the offensive in two strategic directions and gave the Black Sea to the enemy. In the Baltic, White Sea and Western Pacific Ocean, naval supremacy was given to the enemy without a fight and a strategy of “dumb defense” was adopted. The plan for a campaign in India, developed by engineer Lieutenant General E.A. Egorov in 1855 (16), had no chance of implementation.

Victories over Bonaparte not only raised the authority of Russian power, but also fettered military thought, excluding innovation. The main attention was paid to drill training, which gave gallant bearing, dashing and cohesion - the keys to resistance under fire. The soldiers also recognized the importance of drill and, for the sake of bravado and ringing, when snatching rifle techniques, they loosened bayonets, ramrods and loosened nuts. (The latter was unthinkable in the Caucasian troops). The maneuvers at Krasnoe Selo were colorful and spectacular - sometimes the emperor himself showed how to pull the toe of a boot. However, fist reprisals and beatings with spitzrutens from 250 to 1000 blows, which were tolerated at the end of the 18th century, embittered the soldiers during the decline of the autocracy.

The command and officer corps believed that battles would be decided by bayonet strikes of infantry columns and cavalry masses that swept the enemy from the field. The regiments were not trained to deploy to the front. In the European theater of military operations (unlike the Caucasus), it was believed that a regiment outside rigid battalion or company columns was not combat-ready (17). European journalism explained the use of “sluggish, closed columns” with the desire to correct “gross mistakes of commanders.” Russian skirmishers in loose formation thought more about alignment and intervals than about accuracy and cover in the folds of the terrain (18). The heroic desire to confront the enemy made one forget the innovations of Peter the Great - field fortifications and sudden raids by horse corvolant, which the allies feared. In Russia, irregular Cossack and national formations (including Crimean Tatars) were successfully used for a “small war”. However, in 1854-56. those Crimean Tatars who remained on the side of the Russians or were neutral were not mobilized. Commander Prince A.S. Menshikov, “not expecting an assassination attempt from the Crimean Tatars,” refused to strengthen Sevastopol.

Considering the accuracy of rifle shots from a distance of 1,200 steps to be scanty, the command considered the lethality of rifle fire to be “nonsense of amateurs,” although even mounted shots at huge columns would be effective. The dense columns of heavy infantry were not trained in loose formation (19). Russian shooting (with the exception of the riflemen - 96 people per regiment) was characterized by haste and less integrity than that of the French, British, Sardinians and even the Turks. (When repelling attacks from trenches, “smooth-bore” guns loaded faster and Russian rapid fire was more effective).

The officers had no idea about pistol shooting from horseback. In the Crimean War, the same thing was repeated: columns were sent in lockstep to attack, met with a murderous barrage of fire, lost commanders, retreated, then closed in again and repeated the attacks. Instead of taking cover, the soldiers stood in columns during the most severe bombardments in anticipation of the storming of the bastions; the officers themselves abandoned the scattered formation when attacking towards deadly grapeshot. “Meticulously drilled troops were deployed in columns, which were invented by the generals of the French Revolution to compensate for shortcomings in the training of personnel. Magnificent on the parade ground, they were easy targets on the battlefield. Their tactics involved close bayonet combat with the enemy. Their bayonet enthusiasm greatly amazed the British infantry, who considered themselves unsurpassed in such warfare. But time after time, from skirmish to skirmish, determination and initiative fatally evaporated... Again and again, the Russians not only received resistance, but were broken into pieces and simply swept away (by fire - V.A.) from the battlefield. Outnumbered, the Russians should have won, but a brilliant the command of junior officers and the fighting spirit, courage and firmness of each British soldier decided the outcome of events differently” (20). The French army, formed on the basis of universal conscription, with a well-educated officer corps, was considered the best in Europe (and the world) at that time. The statutory tactics formally repeated Napoleonic models, prescribing attacks with edged weapons in closed columns, accompanied by a loose formation of rangers. (Even according to the French regulations of 1867, out of the 6 companies of the battalion, 4 were formed into company columns, and two into rifle chains. When approaching the enemy, the battalion deployed lines and fired volleys; for a bayonet strike, the battalion again assembled in company columns). The line infantry had smoothbore rifles, although there were also battalions with rifled weapons. The colonial war in Algeria taught us to maneuver deployed lines. The infantry adapted to advance over rough terrain in dense chains and at a quick pace (up to 12 km per hour), shoot accurately over long distances and retreat “rolling”. Swift attacks by the “Panther” shooters could be replaced by staunch defense. The colonial units (Zouaves), recruited from the Parisian mob (“jackals”) had no standards: “The French do not have battle formations defined by regulations, like ours - they build their troops, applying to the terrain, in the order that their commanders think is best for the position they occupy. This rule should develop the military and mental abilities of officers, encouraging them to strain all their moral forces to invent a situation that would provide them with an advantage” (21). A worthy response to the French colonial troops would have been the Caucasian regiments, but they were shackled by the war with the highlanders. There were few plastuns from the Caucasus.

The routine of the English command was no less than the Russian one: it adhered to the clumsy linear tactics of the 18th century. and a thin deployed formation up to 2-3 km long. The battle was fought taking into account repelling attacks from afar with Minie rifles, which loaded as quickly as smooth-bore guns. (The shelves were not entirely fittings). “The British do not have battle formations approved by the regulations. The commander, before an expected meeting of the enemy or before an attack on the field, rides forward under the cover of riflemen, if possible, reconnaissance the area and determines what to do and where to go for which part of his army.” The army was recruited from the “recruited rabble” (A.G. Jomini), which made it difficult to replenish it in 1854-56. Aristocrats entered the caste officer corps by purchasing patents and using connections to advance their careers. (22). Those who bought patent officers were poorly versed in military affairs, did not command well, did not care about the soldiers, but bravely led them into battle. The initiative of the soldiers was suppressed in the same way as in the Russian army. The marks-scars on their backs from the “whip of the nine-tails” remained for life. 40 years of peace had reduced the fighting efficiency of the British - in January 1855, Lord F. J. G. Raglan wrote that his army was suitable for colonial service, but not for field battles (23). “Proud redcoats” with large forged epaulettes and heavy bearskin shakos were ridiculous on campaigns and in battle. At the same time, the command staff was distinguished by perseverance and strict implementation of strict discipline. “An army of lions under the command of donkeys” (F. Engels) rarely retreated and never suffered complete defeat. The English gunners did not shoot accurately. French and English officers, like Russians, also led their units in attacks and often died.

Turkey, after the Tanzimat reforms and with the support of the West, was no longer such a powerless enemy as in 1828-29. The number of regular troops (nizam) increased, the number of irregular troops was huge - 70-100 thousand people. However, the combat effectiveness of the Turkish troops was inferior to the French and English, and in the Crimean military operations they, as a rule, were kept in reserve.

Russian officer corps.

In comparison with the “Catherine’s Eagles” and the heroes of 1812, when Russia was at the apogee of military power, the combat effectiveness of the officers and generals wilted. The prestige of military service and state patriotism evaporated. Most of the brigade and division generals earned their place in parade parades and reviews. In 1841, the Third Section noted the decomposition of the sovereign spirit: “A certain despondency, some reluctance to do business is noticeable among the mass of officers. There is a general passion to criticize all measures and a general fashion to complain about the burden of service, bad treatment and excessive severity. There is no former carelessness, gaiety, daring associated with military rank” (24). The fighting spirit was based on national character and duty: “... Of 10 of our officers perhaps only one, many two, go to the upcoming war with joy, with poetic enthusiasm. A significant portion of officers do not hesitate to express their displeasure out loud. “Why, they say, where? Why should we sacrifice ourselves for others?” Many are thinking about how to dodge this war, how to remain the military commander of some town, hospital, or go somewhere for some kind of reception or to a warehouse” (25). The main thing in a commander is “courage and the ability to take risks” (Clausewitz), however, more literate than the associates of Peter the Great, P.A. Rumyantsev and A.V. Suvorov, the military leaders of the Nicholas Empire, lost these qualities.

He had a solid military education, but did not consider himself commander, but only a “divisional general”, “supreme commander in chief” - Nicholas I, like everyone else, looked back at the victorious war with Bonaparte. Those who were close to him noted that by the middle of the 19th century. his strength, will and determination weakened. When introducing Russian troops into the Danube principalities, the emperor took into account the likelihood of their “reverse movement” (26). The Tsar correctly assessed the strategic weight of the Baltic states, Poland, Bessarabia, Novorossiya and Crimea. He believed that the loss of Crimea would be more dangerous than the loss of Poland, and that displacement from the northern Black Sea region would lead to a decline in influence in the Caucasus. He tried to turn the Crimean War into a new Patriotic War: “we are the same Russians as in 1812”; “we must win or die with honor” (27). The Ruler of Russia could give practical advice on the fortification of Sevastopol and understood the shortcomings of a dense system. At the same time, the autocrat underestimated military science and prioritized discipline and drill reviews. He did not believe that after the defeat in 1815 France would become an ally of England and that Napoleon III would raise his sword against the Russian Empire. The Tsar could not pour spiritual strength into the military, like Peter the Great, A.V. Suvorov and M.I. Kutuzov. He did not realize that many statesmen and generals lost their “wings of victory” during his reign. The defense strategy “adopted at the very top” was implemented by the bosses below. Most of all they feared for St. Petersburg, the Kingdom of Poland, Bessarabia, Odessa and the Caucasus (28).

“Military foundation” of Nicholas I - the elderly “father-commander” I.F. Paskevich (1782-1856), “whose punishment all military leaders feared” (A.M. Zayonchkovsky) was not in Crimea, but had a strong influence on the overall strategy . By this time he had become decrepit, lost his former courage and, nevertheless, considered himself not only an expert m of military affairs, but also a symbol of Russian victories. Preobrazhenets, the former life page of Paul I, was under fire from Izmail (in 1806), Brailov and Varna (in 1809-1810). As a division commander, he fought at Saltanovka, Smolensk, Borodino, Maloyaroslavets and Vyazma (1812), at Dresden, Leipzig, and Paris (1813-14), defeated four times superior Persian forces at Elizavetpol (1826), took Yerevan, Tabriz and in 1828 .received the title of "Count of Erivan". Thanks to the combat effectiveness of the Caucasian troops, having crossed Transcaucasia from Kars and Ardahan to Bayazet and Erzurum, Paskevich received the rank of field marshal general (1829). In his mid-fifties, starting with the Polish War of 1831, the “most serene Prince of Warsaw” and the despotic governor of the Kingdom of Poland began to avoid risks, which was reflected in the campaign against the Hungarian rebels in 1849. He did not consider it possible to fight beyond the Danube.

Contemporaries made the great-grandson of Peter the Great’s associate, Alexander Sergeevich Menshikov (1787-1869), the main culprit for the failures in Crimea. This erudite, who followed scientific innovations, an aristocrat and a polyglot with a library of 30 thousand volumes, participated in the assault on the Turkish fortresses of Turtukay and Rushchuk (1810) and fought with dignity in 1812-14. For the capture of Paris, he was awarded the golden sword “For Bravery.” An excellent memory, brilliant education and “free-thinking” made him a valuable assistant in the eyes of Alexander I. In 1816 he was promoted to major general, and in 1818 he served as quartermaster general of the General Staff. Having become theoretically familiar with maritime affairs, he was appointed in 1827 chief of the Main Naval Staff with the rank of rear admiral. In 1828, at the head of a naval landing, he besieged Anapa from land and sea and took it, for which he received the rank of vice admiral and the Order of St. George, 3rd class. With the same landing, Menshikov led the siege of Varna, but was seriously wounded by a cannonball in both legs. In 1830 he was introduced to the State Council, and in 1831 he became Governor-General of Finland. The second person in the empire, the new “semi-sovereign ruler,” having become the owner of the naval department, was actively involved in administrative affairs. The “most illustrious” one neglected screw ships and underestimated the role of the fleet for Russia. The prince was distinguished by his high efficiency, accuracy, incorruptibility and selflessness.

The mistake of Nicholas I was the appointment as commander-in-chief of the land and naval forces in Crimea as an amateur in naval affairs, a man without the heart of a commander, unsociable, unable to control the masses of troops and “embarrassed” by his rattling voice. During the Sevastopol harvest, His Serene Highness did not consider it necessary to confirm his courage by visiting the bastions. Many accused the prince of atheism (29) and, most likely, this was true. The mercilessly evil witticisms with which the second man of the empire lashed not only the bureaucracy and the military nobility, but also the top of the aristocracy, did not fit into the framework of Christian ethics. Over the course of several decades, the noble dignitary found countless enemies who turned him into a goat about letting go. In memoir literature, he was subjected to scathing criticism and was portrayed exclusively from the black side.

The disparity in assessments fell on the second commander-in-chief in Crimea, Prince Mikhail Dmitrievich Gorchakov (1793-1861). This “true Russian heart” fought in Persia, took part in the battles of Borodino, Lutzen, Bautzen, Dresden and Leipzig. In 1817, Gorchakov was transferred as a colonel to the General Staff. During the Russian-Turkish War of 1828-29. was during the siege of Silistria and the blockade of Shumla. During the Polish War of 1830-31. As chief of staff of the 1st Infantry Corps, he fought near Grokhov, Ostroleka and Warsaw. The state of his soul in 1854 can be judged by the cheerful patriotic song he wrote , which has survived to this day: “He alone is worthy of life, // He who is always ready to die. //Orthodox Russian warrior, //He beats his enemies without counting... //For the Tsar and for Russia we are ready to die, //For the Tsar and for Russia we will put you on the bayonet.” Educated, selfless and intelligent, who did not tolerate gossip and lies, Gorchakov suffered from absent-mindedness and often changed his mind. The prince, like Menshikov, did not have a commanding voice. (When greeting the soldiers, he would sometimes come in from the back rank). But in the fire of battle, the “soldier’s brave soul” gave orders soberly and clearly. By sending reinforcements to Crimea without sanction from above, he showed civic courage. (It is an unfair review that, having fallen under Paskevich’s boot, the boss his headquarters for 22 years, he “came out from under him looking like a squeezed lemon.” Gorchakov felt sorry for the soldiers and they loved “the best quartermaster in the world.” With a chivalrous contempt for death, “not hearing a whistle or a roar, he calmly walked under bullets, as if along a boulevard” (30). Both Menshikov and Gorchakov were distinguished by unconditional courage, unparalleled honesty and incorruptibility.

The naval command was very different for the better from the land command. Duty and loyalty to the Fatherland raised sailors to the heights of heroism - before the Battle of Sinop, all officers, by order of P.S. Nakhimov, put on ceremonial uniforms and orders. The defeat of the Turkish squadron in Sinop, which was going to help the Caucasian highlanders, occurred in the presence of the Allied fleet in the Bosphorus, which did not send a single steamer to prevent the attack of P.S. Nakhimov. Annoyance because inactivity erupted indignation and an outburst of hatred in Europe towards the Russians for the “inhumane savage slaughter of the vandals”, for the “unprecedented in history slaughter of the weak by the strong” for a “disgusting crime” (31). European propaganda shouted that the Cossacks would become the arbiters of the destinies of the world. However, Nakhimov’s brilliant victory does not in any way fit under the rubric of “treacherous Russian atrocity,” even taking into account the superiority of Russian 720 guns (including 72 bombs) against 427 Turkish. (The battles of Chesma, Abukir, Trafalgar and Navarino were won with similar crushing blows). The Turkish naval forces were not insignificant. “With a total fleet strength of about 80 pennants (more than 4 thousand guns), the Turkish Black Sea squadron consisted of more than 30 steamship-frigates with bomb guns... Sailing ships were transferred to the category of auxiliary and transport... Russia on the eve of the war had only 6 steamship-frigates on the Black Sea "(32).

The Sinop victory left Istanbul defenseless and cut off communications and supplies from the Ottoman capital to the weakening Turks in the Caucasus. However, the Russian command did not intensify operations on the Danube and on the Asia Minor coast. Moreover, the Sinop victory resulted in the liberation of the Black Sea from the Russian fleet. In December 1853, the Allies handed a note to the envoy N.D. Kiselev in Paris, and sent a dispatch to Sevastopol threatening that their fleet would escort Turkish transports to Batum and “will not allow the Russian flag to be shown” in the Black Sea waters (33). This is how, since December 1853, the main forces of the Black Sea Fleet were locked in the Sevastopol Bay, dying there on August 27, 1855.

Allied command with few exceptions (commander of the French observation corps (from 1856 - Marshal of France) P.F.J. Bosquet (1810-1861) and division general (from 1856 Marshal of France and “Duke of Malakhovsky" J.J. Pelissier (1794-1864) was no higher than the Russian. The commander of the French army, the “fearless cutthroat” Marshal A. J. L. de Saint-Arnaud (1796-1854), distinguished by military talent, quickness of thought and vast experience, kept his plans secret , cared little about the army, allowed disorder and theft of quartermasters. The founder of the Foreign Legion, commander of the French army in the Crimea F. G. Canrobert (1809-1895) was a poor strategist, feared his emperor and was even more indecisive than Gorchakov. Commander of the English army Lord F. J. G. Raglan (who served as Wellington's private secretary for 45 years) was an “armchair general" and had little understanding of strategy. The French called him a weakling and a weakling. The Allies were cautious in strategy, tried not to take risks in battle, refused to pursue defeated enemy. The level of the officer corps in terms of combat effectiveness and professional literacy was not much higher than the Russian one.

Leaving the Balkan strategic direction.

After the entry of the 80,000-strong Russian corps into Moldavia and Wallachia on June 21, 1853, nothing was done to rouse Christians in Serbia and Bulgaria to a “holy war.” Russian forces under the general command of M.D. Gorchakov, scattered from Kalafat to Galati, adhered to the tactics of cautious waiting. The attack on Turkish positions on October 23 near Oltenica ended in an absurd retreat on the orders of the infantry general, commander of the IV Infantry Corps and participant in the wars with Napoleon P. A. Dannenberg (1792-1872). The attack on enemy batteries was then carried out without detailed reconnaissance on only one side, without artillery support. This fight was called "Dannenberg's stolen victory." Commanding from deep in the rear, he did not know about the turning point in favor of the attackers and lost heart at the sight of the wounded (34).

On December 25, 1853, they managed to repulse the attack of 18 thousand Turks at Chetati, but Adjutant General I.R. Anrep (1798-1860), who bravely went through all the wars of Russia with the Ottomans, Poles and Lezgins since 1828, organized a church parade , which missed the complete defeat of the enemy. On March 20, 1854, the Danube was crossed at Brailov, Galati, Izmail and Isaccea was taken. About the breakthrough for the Balkans following the example of I.I. Diebitsch (1785-1831) was out of the question. The commander of the Western and Southern armies (from Riga to the mouth of the Southern Bug), “infallible” in the eyes of Nicholas I, Field Marshal I.F. Paskevich, fearing a continental war with France and England, as well as the “Austrian threat,” offered to sit out beyond the Prut River.

On May 5, 1854, 65 thousand Russian troops (such a force had never before been assembled against Turkish fortresses) approached Silistria, where a 20 thousand-strong garrison was located, and which in 1810 General N.M. Kamensky (1775-1811) “victoriously spirit" took seven days. The siege was carried out sluggishly, ruining the entire campaign in the Balkans. Paskevich outlined the first siege parallel at a thousand fathoms from the Arab fort of the fortress, and not three hundred, as the specialist, Adjutant General K.A. Schilder believed. The field marshal did not allocate forces to suppress communications between Silistria and Shumla, Varna, Turtukai and other Turkish fortresses, from where reinforcements were coming. During the night chaotic assault on May 16, 1854, one of the earthen forts, the assault battalions were led by generals. When the fort was almost taken, a retreat was suddenly signaled. The Elder Field Marshal fell
ear. He not only did not believe in victory, but was convinced that the Danube campaign was lost. This dampened the mood of the entire officer corps. His chief of staff, M.D. Gorchakov, knowing Paskevich’s instructions, “tried to fight without fighting, to hurry without moving.” On March 16, 1854, he wrote to the emperor that if Austria entered the war, then it was necessary to leave Wallachia without a fight.
“The cowardly sitting on the banks of the Danube” (A.M. Zayonchkovsky) ended on June 1, when Paskevich got out from under Silistria. On the same day, Nicholas I authorized the lifting of the siege, having learned that Austria was allegedly preparing to move against Russia on July 1. The Austrian "cigarette scared the bear." Russia did not raise up either the Slavs or Hungary against the “Austrian Judas” (F.I. Tyutchev). “Indignation for disappointed hopes” (E.V. Tarle) gripped even the soldiers - the stereotype was broken: “Russians never retreat.” Saint-Arnaud could not believe it: “was the arrival of the allied armies in Varna and the Austrian demonstrations sufficient to decide the retreat of the Russians?” (35). The withdrawal of troops not only “struck all Russians and covered them with shame” (K.S. Aksakov), but for the first time since 1814, it undermined Russia’s military glory and was interpreted in Europe as weakness of spirit. Courland governor P.A. Valuev (1814-1890) in the famous note “Russian Duma”
dated August 28, 1855 he wrote: “Why did we start a case without calculating the consequences? Why did we face the war without propeller ships and fittings? Why did they bring a handful of people into the principalities and leave a handful of people in Crimea? Why did they occupy the principalities in order to clear them, crossed the Danube in order to return because of it, besieged Silistria in order to lift the siege? (36).
The Danube campaign revealed the “total incapacity of the commanders” (37) and became the threshold of general failure. In Europe they began to write about Russian strategic and political defeat and the “stupidity of Russian generals.” “Russia... has proven that it is not armed with force, moreover, its weapons are powerless and that instead of exercising its power, it is hastily retreating” (38). If Russian troops had remained in the Danube principalities, it would have been difficult for the Allies to land in the Crimea, and for the Habsburgs to intervene in affairs in the Balkans.

Allied offensive in Crimea.

The defense strategy, concentrating huge armed forces along the western borders of Russia, prevented Austria, Sweden, Prussia from entering the war and an uprising in Poland, but there were few troops in Crimea. In 1853, Paskevich, while maintaining an “offensive appearance,” believed that landings in the Crimea would “hardly do anything serious.” British Admiral D.U.D. Dundas (the same ardent “prayer book” as the Russian general D.E. Osten-Sacken in the Crimea), sending five poorly arranged caravans to the peninsula, anxiously awaited an attack by the Russian sailing fleet - its warships were cluttered beyond measure with ammunition, soldiers and tools (39). The Allies did not know the number of Russian troops in Sevastopol and Crimea and the roads there. Given the insignificance of their cavalry, they were seriously afraid of the Russian cavalry.

After the Sinop victory, the Black Sea Fleet was excluded from reconnaissance and combat operations, although after the declaration of war by England and France, it could have acted at least against ships taking soundings off the Crimean coast. In Sevastopol they missed the exit of the “great armada” from Varna and did not attack the slow-moving transport on the approach to Evpatoria.
Although European newspapers wrote about the future “Crimean expedition,” theorists at the Academy of the General Staff in St. Petersburg considered the landing of an entire army to be absurd and could not imagine how a fleet could be assembled for a huge mass of troops against powerful Russia. The complex transfer of people and cargo thousands of kilometers from Mediterranean bases on sailing (mostly) transport ships (hired from all the ports of Europe and even the USA) to Varna and Crimea came as a surprise to the Russian command, which remembered the failure of Napoleon to cross the English Channel, but ignored the French a landing party of 37,612 people, transported on 103 military and 347 transport ships in May-July 1830 against Algeria, and “forgotten” about the landings of Bonaparte’s 40,000-strong army in Egypt in 1798, and the Anglo-Russian corps in Holland in 1799 , as well as the British in Portugal and Spain in the 1800s.

From the start of the war on October 20, 1853 until the enemy appeared on the Crimean coast, Menshikov did nothing to defend Sevastopol, Evpatoria, Balaklava, Feodosia and Kerch. No observation cordons were set up along the coast, and no obstacles were put in the way of reconnaissance ships off the Crimean coast. Perhaps this was explained by the inaction of the allies since the spring of 1854, when they did not even attack defenseless Kerch, through which Russian troops were supplied in the Caucasus and Crimea. Contrary to the emperor’s order to meet the enemy upon landing, or retreating from the coast, Menshikov, who had been writing since February 1854 about the possibility of private landings in the Crimea, with the onset of the “time of storms” reasonably believed that there would be no landing. It was hard to imagine that the Allies, having missed spring and summer, would dare to invade in the run-up to autumn and winter (40). The commander wrote to Paskevich on May 30, 1854 that the Black Sea Fleet was in excellent condition, “everything has been renewed,” “we will be in a wait-and-see position.”

English warships surrounded the berth at Evpatoria in a large arc and the unloading of troops, artillery and ammunition of the “great armada” took place unhindered, as in the Åland Islands in August 1854. It is indicated that no resistance was given due to the expected artillery fire from the sea. However, in bad weather and waves, the six-day “crazy landing” (N.S. Milosevic) of the “saviors of civilization” could not be accompanied by well-aimed fire from ships. Having 3,600 cavalrymen and field guns, the prince could, using the dark time of day, at least indicate opposition. He could remember that on October 1, 1787, A.V. Suvorov, having lost only 4
50 people, destroyed a 5,000-strong Turkish landing force that appeared under the protection of naval guns at Kinburn. Kamchatka military governor and commander of the Petropavlovsk port, Major General V.S. Zavoiko, having ordered “to drive the enemy away with bayonets and fight to the last drop of blood... as Russian soldiers should,” on August 24, 1854, repelled the landing with cannons, the frigate “Aurora” and 290 privates 900 people, landed from six ships (41). Near Odessa, four 24-pound guns from Ensign Shchegolev’s battery fought off five steamships with a total of 86 guns for 6 hours. In July and May 1855, Taganrog also repulsed landings.
It is not known whether His Serene Highness knew that his dashing great-grandfather, during the “Russian campaign” of Charles XII, constantly disturbed the Swedes with attacks from the flanks and rear, but he did not disturb the allies in any way on the march from Evpatoria to Sevastopol. Menshikov did not attack the night before the battle on the Alma River, which the enemy especially feared. Menshikov decided to detain the enemy on the way to the Russian naval base on a slope above the Alma River - the best position on the west coast.

By September 2, 33,600 people had gathered there. with 84 guns against 55-60 thousand allies with 112 guns. Entering into battle against superior forces, Peter the Great built an entire system of field fortifications. Menshikov poured only two earthen ramparts for two batteries to fire at the ford and bridge on the river. Alma. The prince did not consider it necessary to make shelters for soldiers who “must win with the bayonet.” Additional guns and experienced artillerymen from the ships were not brought from Sevastopol. Instead of a hospital, a dressing station was set up, but there were no stretchers. The gardens and the village of Burliuk on the other side of the Alma were not burned. One of the participants wrote: “they stood on the ground as best they could, fought gloriously, dashingly, in Russian style, i.e. they didn’t know what they were defending and where to go forward and which path to follow back” (42). There was no disposition or main idea of ​​the battle. There was no council of war. The initiative was given to the enemy.

It was more convenient to give a defensive battle at the tops of the slope above the Alma River, forcing the enemy to climb the slope. But the prince agreed to the proposal of Lieutenant Colonel Zalessky of the General Staff to bring the troops down to the shallow river, where on September 8 two lines of company columns stood almost closely. Two thousand riflemen with rifles, as in Napoleonic times, were scattered along the front line, and not gathered into a fist. Instead of “trench fighting” behind earthen fortifications, which could have neutralized rifle fire, Menshikov placed full-length regiments in the open, calmly observing the enemy’s movements through a large telescope (43).
The coastal height at the mouth of the Alma River, due to an oversight, and not because of the threat of shelling from the sea (44), was not occupied by either artillery or infantry, which had some opportunity to hide from mounted fire from ships in the folds of the terrain. (Finnish riflemen of the Russian service fired at the ships from the steep (45). The narrow road and the ascents to the heights were not dug, no blockages were made in the ravines, the ford through the shallow Alma was not damaged (46). The second battalion of the Minsk regiment stood far from the access to the height Menshikov recklessly entrusted the entire left flank to the fanfare general V. Ya. throws hats at the enemy and how he shoots chickens,” threw down the parts handed to him.
Before the battle, a Pole colonel ran across to the French, who reported that the bridge across the river was not mined and gave advice on how to fight the battle (47). Tired allies, with a meager supply of ammunition and food, almost without cavalry and convoys, without many of the most necessary things and maps, unsure of the outcome of the battle in unfamiliar terrain, went on the attack at 8 a.m. on September 8. The bright red uniforms of the British and the blue of the French contrasted with the gray greatcoats of the Russians. The officers led the soldiers forward in full dress uniform, with shiny epaulettes and swords, at the risk of being knocked out first. The opponents amazed each other: “We couldn’t understand how we could lead troops into an attack in a deployed formation,” Menshikov and his adjutant Panaev were puzzled (48).
The meeting with new European tactics turned out to be a complete surprise for the Russian command. Saint-Arnaud uttered a murderous message to the Russian command: “Their tactics are half a century behind.” Reserves, company and battalion columns were “mown down” by Allied rifles from a distance of 600-800 steps (Russian rifle shots became effective from 200 steps). The French fired overhead fire from the rear rows. Menshikov wisely ordered that the generals and officers be dressed in soldiers' greatcoats, but they, being in front on horseback and not withdrawing the battalion columns from the artillery explosions “for fear of disrupting the harmony of the battle order,” died, being an excellent target.

The fate of the battle was decided by Saint-Arnaud, who was on the verge of death from cholera, and by the French experienced practitioner and theorist of military affairs Bosquet, who climbed with his division and cannons along the seaside steep slope and with flanking fire forced Menshikov’s army to retreat. (The French believed that the Russians, mistaking the Zouaves for Turks by their clothing, expected to easily throw them off, but received a strong blow from the “jackals” (49). The battalions of the Minsk and Moscow regiments, several times, with the assistance of an artillery brigade, tried to throw the enemy off the steep slopes with bayonets, but As soon as the columns approached the enemy, he retreated, knocking out servants and horses from the cannons and greeted the missing bullets with laughter. Fearing being cut off, the Mints and Muscovites retreated (50).

Menshikov's behavior in the battle was worthy. The prince, leaving command of the center to Infantry General P.D. Gorchakov, the older brother of M.D. Gorchakov (51), was under fire from 11 o’clock almost until the end of the battle in the most dangerous place of the left flank. An eyewitness to the battle, doctor F. Pflug, wrote that although the persistent resistance of the soldiers and the enemy’s mistakes helped the cause, it was Menshikov who preserved the honor of Russian weapons and the army and was great at critical moments of the battle (52). The prince encouraged the soldiers to hold out until the last possible opportunity, personally led them into the attack and then sent the Weimar hussars, artillery from the reserve and a squadron of the Crimean Tatar Guard into battle. (After the battle, he “thanked” the Moscow Regiment for their “negative courage”).
Saint-Arnaud also did not introduce divisions into battle immediately, but in parts, in close battalion columns. (When the cannonballs began to hit them more often, he deployed battalions to make the depth shallower). He was unable to encircle the Russian left flank and center (53). The British attacked the Russian center at the usual pace and in deployed formation to the music of Scottish bagpipers and under the protection of deadly rifle fire, which was then perceived as future machine gun fire. They half destroyed two Russian regiments of the 16th division, which were in columns to attack. P.D. Gorchakov and the head of the 16th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Kvitsinsky, like ordinary officers, led the battalions of the Vladimir Regiment into counterattacks to the sounds of military marches, which twice knocked the British into the Alma River with bayonets and rifle butts “like a herd from a hill” (as he wrote one of the English), but, having lost all 47 officers and 1269 lower ranks, was unable to build on his success.
The Tarutino, Brest and Bialystok regiments, crowded together in the open, retreated from the fire zone without orders. The Kazan regiment P.D. Gorchakov was unable to launch an attack: “The Kazan ranger regiment all fell apart... I beat the whip, broke a half-saber, lost two horses... They riddled my entire overcoat with bullets - all in vain!” (54).
Menshikov did not dare to send cavalrymen into the rear of the British, who could create alarm there, like Uvarov and Platov at Borodino. Four regiments and two batteries of the 14th artillery brigade were not put into action at all.
Considering that the regiments were completely upset, Menshikov interrupted the battle at 6 pm. The unexpected effectiveness of rifle fire led to chaos: the soldiers, retreating upward from Alma, fired into the air, abandoned weapons, wounded, "backbreaker" backpacks and suffered greatly from shots in the back. (Perhaps then the prince had the idea that the troops were not capable of defending Sevastopol). The retreat was covered by the Suzdal and Volyn regiments, led by the brave, managerial and conscientious Major General, Chief of the 1st Brigade of the 16th Infantry Division A.P. Khrushchev. (From October 1854 to January 1855, he and the regiment were in the most dangerous 4th bastion of Sevastopol).

They did not dare to continue the battle the next day on the tops of the hills. “Scorched earth” tactics were a thing of the past. During the retreat, they hastily filled the wells with lime and manure, but there was no time to destroy all the gardens, orchards and wine cellars. On the river As the troops broke and burned houses, some of the soldiers got drunk and broke barrels of wine. Menshikov blamed the defeat on the cowardice of the troops and the inability of the commanders: “What will I do with such generals?” - he sneered at the failure (55). When visiting the wounded, who on September 11th were lying on the barracks floors with worms in their wounds (the same condition of the wounded was then among the Allies) and, perhaps, remembering 1812, he reproached them: “the spirit is not enough, the spirit is not enough” (56).

If in the Patriotic War of 1812 the intensity of military patriotism made one not doubt victory even after leaving Moscow, then in 1854 the highest ranks physically felt the decline in faith in the power of the Empire and tried to avoid defeat with caution. On the night of September 11-12, the retreating army crossed the Inkerman Bridge at the mouth of the Chernaya River and went three miles southwest of Sevastopol, throwing it into the hands of the enemy, like the White Stone capital in 1812. The base of the Black Sea Fleet was protected only by city barricades, which the prince ordered to build on March 17, 1854, as well as 8 reserve battalions. (It was not noted in the historiography that the best cover for Sevastopol at that time would have been the deployment of troops along the ridge of Sapun Mountain, where, as Osten-Sacken reasonably believed, even weak barriers could inflict huge losses on the attackers. Then this natural “circumvalation line” was occupied allies (The goal of capturing Sapun Mountain was set later, before the Battle of Inkerman on October 24).

Fearing to lose contact with Russia, Menshikov on the night of September 12-13 moved in the opposite direction to the Belbek Valley and again crossed the Chernaya River at Chorgun. (From a bivouac on the Kach River, one could immediately turn towards Bakhchisarai, putting the enemy at risk of a flank attack and thereby insuring access to Perekop). During the march towards Bakhchisarai, the command did not organize mounted reconnaissance and the extended marching columns of the opponents, having “lost” each other, miraculously dispersed in different directions.

The farther from the front, the greater the commotion. After the first revenge of the “French eagle” since 1814, Nicholas I cried over the map of Crimea, fearing its complete occupation (57). He hunched over, lost his rigidity and arrogance. The depressed Paskevich assessed the prospects for the war in the darkest light. Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, retelling Menshikov’s message, wrote to his assistant A.V. Golovin on September 15, 1854: “Don’t say a word to anyone, this is strictly prohibited... The troops fought in the most Stramovsky (so! - V.A.) way, fled , unable to withstand the first onslaught... One can expect the worst” (58).

The metropolitan opinion that turned Alma into a symbol of disaster, like the later Tsushima, was unfair. Perhaps the “hefty” generals were not a match for the heroes of Zorndorf and Borodin, but the troops held their positions for several hours and, having lost 5 generals, 23 staff officers, 170 chief officers and 5541 lower ranks, avoided encirclement. (Enemy losses were of the same order - about 5 thousand). The enemy did not even think about bypassing the right wing of the Russians and pressing them to the sea or immediately breaking into defenseless Sevastopol on the shoulders of those who were retreating. This was a disastrous Allied mistake.

The Allies had no trace of the “strategy of crushing” and “French rage” (“furies”) of Bonaparte’s time. The Russian retreat was assessed by them as a “worthy retreat.” The British and French gave the retreaters a “golden bridge.” Their unimaginable delight at the Russian retreat shows how highly they valued the victory over an opponent twice as weak. Only on September 10 did the attackers gather their strength and go around Sevastopol towards Balaklava. Having recognized Russian fortitude, the allied troops throughout the Crimean War (unlike Western public opinion) did not feel either disdain or hatred for the Russian army.
The Russian command, having become convinced of the inability of the columns to overcome the zone of long-range rifle fire, could not (even if they wanted) abandon closed formations. Adherence to the old stereotypes excluded defensive “trench fighting”, rifle lines and powerful artillery preparation before the attack. Only caution was increased, leading to indecision.

The death of warships in Sevastopol.

In 1854, the organization, tactical art and combat training of the Russian sailing fleet were higher than in foreign fleets. Throughout the summer of 1854, 18 thousand Black Sea residents were eager to measure their strength with the enemy (59). The Black Sea giant ships had more heavy artillery than the French and English ones. The sailors, aware of their strength, said that even against an enemy twice as strong with his screw ships in the wind, “we undertake to leave two enemy ships with each of our ships.” English admiral Charles Napier (1786-1860) spoke about the courage, combat readiness and exemplary fire training of Russian sailors in 1856. Western historians wrote about the same thing (60). Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Adjutant General and de facto commander of all troops in Sevastopol V.I. Kornilov proposed breaking through to Istanbul and “sowing terror” in the Ottoman capital, given the burden of Allied ships with cargo and military supplies (61). When starting an attack on Russia's maritime borders, the French and British empires feared privateers and the landing of Russian troops in their colonies. In Australia, infantry battalions conducted exercises to repel landing forces for several months. However, the Baltic, Black Sea fleets, White Sea and Pacific flotillas took refuge in the harbors.

Nicholas I, A.S. Menshikov and M.D. Gorchakov did not rule out the self-destruction (burning) of the Black Sea Fleet before reinforcements arrived in Sevastopol. The Emperor wrote: “... no matter how painful and difficult it is for me to come to terms with the idea, I am already trying to prepare myself for receiving the news of the capture of Sevastopol and the destruction of the fleet.” “If... we cannot save Sevastopol, I hope that the fleet... you yourself will destroy, when there is clearly no longer any salvation,” the Tsar reported to Menshikov on September 12, 1854 (62).
In Crimea, the failure on Alma led to a mood close to panic: with the enemy’s naval dominance, the Allied army marched to open Sevastopol! If Napoleon in 1805 ordered the fleet to ensure an invasion of England even at the cost of its death, then Menshikov initially crossed out Russian naval power. To Kornilov’s question “What to do with the fleet?” he rudely replied, “Put it in your pocket” (63). Thus, four 120-gun sailing giants, 11 84-gun ships, 7 frigates, 4 corvettes, 12 brigs, 8 schooners, 5 combat and 4 messenger ships, 12 large and 15 small transports were locked in the Sevastopol Bay.
Apart from blocking the Sevastopol raid with sunken ships, forming foot battalions from sailors, building barricades and burning huge reserves of ship timber, the prince did not present any other idea. It was forgotten about the dedication of the Black Sea people who were eager to go into battle, about the best fire and combat training of Russian naval artillerymen, about laying booms (in Kerch, in addition to installing booms, ships and old anchors were sunk), about the use of fire ships and blocking the roadstead by ships connected by chains (as in the mouth of Thames in preparation for Napoleon's Boulogne expedition). They did not think of blocking the entrance to the Chersonesos and Streletskaya bays, and Kamyshevaya and Balaklava bays, where the Allies later built their harbors and bases, were not protected by a single ship.
Victory without screw ships was difficult, but when relying on bases in Kerch, Anapa, Nikolaev or Odessa, actions on enemy communications against sailing transports coming from Varna with ammunition, firewood and food were realistic. This could pull some of the enemy ships away from Sevastopol. The command did not take into account that without the sinking of part of the fleet in the roadstead, the enemy would have been forced to waste energy on its blockade (After blocking the Russian fleet, the British removed 2,400 sailors, 2 thousand marines, 65 officers and about 140 guns from their ships. The French removed 30 guns and about 1 thousand people (64).
The Sevastopol base of the Black Sea Fleet was almost impregnable from the sea - E.I. Totleben believed. Coastal batteries and the fleet could concentrate deadly crossfire on the points of the Sevastopol raid - up to 300 shots simultaneously. The enemy could not indulge in the madness of sending ships into the Northern Bay before capturing Sevastopol. (The Allies did not have the strength for a complete blockade from land). The British believed that the Sevastopol port could become the grave of not one, but several squadrons. A six-hour bombardment from the sea on October 5 (with a tenfold superiority in the number of enemy guns) ended disastrously for the allies: 10 ships were damaged, two seriously, so that they had to be sent to Istanbul. The British lost 44 people. killed and 266 wounded, the French - 217 people. killed and wounded. After October 5, the allied fleet no longer attempted to fire at coastal batteries. Fearing for the steam ships, the enemy placed them outside the range of stone sea forts with hundreds of guns on three-tier batteries. Journalist A.V. Kinglake wrote that October 5 confirmed the glory of the invincibility of coastal batteries and the impossibility of capturing Sevastopol from the sea (65).
At the military council on September 9, Kornilov proposed, waiting for a fair wind (the raid did not allow tacking in the opposite wind), to attack the enemy fleet at Cape Lucullus. In case of failure, there was an opportunity to go into the bay or, having grappled with the ships to board, blow up oneself and part of the enemy fleet. Death would not be meaningless. The military glory of any country has been working for its defense capability for centuries. The exploits in Gangut, Chesma, Sinop, the heroism of the ships “Mercury” and “Azov”, later “Varyag” and “Korean”, “Guardian”, will forever strengthen the fighting spirit of the soldiers. Nakhimov thought about centuries-old naval glory, proposing to engage in mortal combat, boarding or blowing up his ships along with enemy ships. (66).

However, the majority of the council spoke in favor of the “execution” of 7 ships, which took place on September 11. In the heat of the moment, the ships were sunk along with guns (so necessary for defense), provisions, gunpowder, ammunition and officers' property. Novosilsky's admiral ship, the 120-gun giant “Three Saints,” was bombed with bombs for speed. The sailors on their knees saw off the ships as they went into the abyss. On September 12-14, they decided to sink the entire Black Sea Fleet - holes were cut in the underwater part of all the remaining ships, temporarily plugged and caulked. Linear giants were converted into coastal floating batteries (67).
The naval crews on the bastions created a “petrified fleet”, strengthening the city’s defense, but it was possible to remove 10 thousand sailors without sinking the ships. The Russian command did not know about the shortage of allied commands, on whose ships officers and privates from the land artillery were assigned and some of which were taken for siege work. When making the decision to scuttle, it was possible to foresee that the stormy season would drive the allied fleet away from the Crimean coast to Istanbul and Asia Minor, which happened after the hurricane on November 2, 1854. Then 40 transport ships, 500 people were killed, 14 transports with crews were lost at Balaklava and the ship “Prince” with a hospital, half a million pounds sterling and clothing sank, two warships were seriously damaged and four were slightly damaged. 150 transport ships were thrown ashore. The 120-gun ship Henri IV ran aground near Evpatoria, finding itself helpless (but not burned by the Russians) (68).
The complete domination of the Allies at sea predetermined the destruction of Kinburn, Kerch, Anapa, Genichesk, Berdyansk, Mariupol, affected the outcome of hostilities and the final death of the Black Sea Fleet: in February 1855, 5 ships “Twelve Apostles”, “Rostislav”, “Svyatoslav” were sunk ", "Gabriel", and two frigates; On August 27, 1855, new ships “Empress Maria”, “Grand Duke Constantine”, “Paris”, “Yagudiil” and others (a total of 6 battleships), 1 frigate, 1 corvette, 5 brigs, sank to the bottom, and at night from August 29 to August 30, all 10 steamships and one transport ship. The sinking of the fleet fit into the general concept of “deep defense” along all Russian borders.
Following the retreating Menshikov on September 12, the Sevastopol residents shouted “Treasoners!” On September 14-15, Kornilov wrote in his diary: “There will be glory if we resist; if not, then Prince Menshikov can be called a traitor and a scoundrel; however, I don’t believe that he sold.” “We want to fight tooth and nail, it’s unlikely to help matters. The ships and all vessels are ready to be sunk: let them get the ruins..." (69). It is clear how much the accusation of treason stung the prince’s soul if he often later repeated the tortured joke that he allegedly “sold Sevastopol to the British, but they did not agree on the price.” (Only on September 18, feeling safe, Menshikov sent part of the ground forces to Sevastopol). Nicholas I approved Menshikov’s recovery “from a desperate situation” (70) and on October 8, 1854 appointed him commander-in-chief of the naval and ground forces in Crimea.

Russian command in Sevastopol.

After the “Alma” confusion, the determination to defend Sevastopol only grew. V.A. Kornilov, P.S. Nakhimov, V.I. Istomin, E.I. Totleben, like the heroes of the war of 1812, “day and night they were ready for death.” Kornilov, who considered the death of Sevastopol until September 18, raised unprecedented inspiration among the sailors. As before, everyone was in love with Suvorov, the “father of sailors” Nakhimov. Every minute of his stay under fire in a uniform with golden epaulettes strengthened the spirit and defense capability of the city. “He was a powerful physical force of defense... which in his hands could work wonders” (Tarle E.V.). On the day of the bombing, October 5, when the enemy hoped to put an end to “the hydra that spewed fire from thousands of vents.” V.A. Kornilov’s “enthusiastic face” filled everyone with enthusiasm. Even in his dying throes, Kornilov thought about his Motherland: “God bless Russia and the sovereign, save Sevastopol and the fleet,” he said in the last minutes of his life (71). The valor of these Russian heroes is comparable to ancient exploits. (After the death of Kornilov, “anarchy, intrigue and a struggle for power among the command began”).
The Sevastopol garrison, under the leadership of Totleben, carried out gigantic earthworks and gained moral superiority over the enemy, who waged the siege “haphazardly, senselessly and ingloriously” (F. Engels). The Allies, knowing that “serf wars” were a strong point of Russian military affairs, laid the first siege parallel 1000 fathoms from the Totleben line of fire.
“Beat the redheads like dogs, and the French just like that,” the besieged sang and went into battle against the “damned locusts.” Participants in the defense wrote about the prowess of “Nakhimov’s lions” under cannonballs, bullets and bombs: “In one shirt, with George on the chest, in wide canvas pants, with a black tie, the ends of which fall on the chest, in a soldier’s cap, smoky in the smoke of battle, stained with gunpowder from shots and constantly loading guns, drenched in blood and sweat, illuminated by lightning shots in clouds of gunpowder smoke, struggling with death... seem to be unearthly creatures of the Scandinavian sky, for whom bloody slaughter constituted heavenly bliss” (72). The rapid-fire tactics familiar to sailors initially led to an unreasonably high consumption of ammunition when firing at areas (the French joked that the death of each of them cost the Russians 60 thousand francs (73). Only then was it ordered to hit the enemy’s bastions and batteries. Too close , as on ships, the placement of guns showered the shafts between adjacent embrasures with their shots. Like the soldiers, the sailors stood on the bastions in dense masses awaiting the assault, dying under bombs and cannonballs. Only a thousand of them survived by the end of the siege.
Mortally dangerous forays were considered bravery and were chosen by lot. “We can hold out a little longer and we will push the enemy into the Black Sea with bayonets,” the soldiers said (74). The French no longer possessed the former “French rage” and believed that if they entered Sevastopol, they would not stay there as long as the Russians occupied the Northern side (75). During short-term truces, when the wounded and dead were removed, the opponents showed respect for each other. (Military operations were carried out without “frenzy” in 1812).
Among the generals, F.I. Soimonov, P.P. Liprandi, S.A. Khrulev, A.P. stood out. Khrushchev. General K.R. Semyakin brought his two cadet sons to the Fifth Bastion under mortal fire. But in general, the officers looked hopelessly at their superiors: “We don’t have bosses and leaders in whom we would believe and hope... like a stone mountain. The army treats Paskevich somehow from a formal point of view... does not see in him a beloved leader close to itself... (Gorchakov’s) indecisiveness, impetuosity, inconsistency are known to everyone. His marches and counter-marches are feared like a tormenting fire. They can't stand Kotzebue. Buturlin is burning hot... they laugh at Boldyrev. Of the army generals, only one is known, Khrulev...” “The corps commanders are below mediocre. Division chiefs and brigade commanders are good on bastions and completely incompetent in field battles” (76).
The honest and conscientious General D.E. Osten-Sacken (1789-1881), who was ironically dubbed the “starchy general” and a pedant, did everything he could: he monitored the exchange of prisoners, uniforms, food and the regularity of religious services among the soldiers, sent from himself, he was in position, fervently prayed for victory and pointed out faults on the bastions. “Erofeich” fundamentally stood for honesty before conscience and God and was not afraid to defend his convictions before the highest ranks. The chief of staff of the Southern Army and all ground and naval forces in Crimea, P.E. Kotzebue (1801-1884), unfairly accused him of almost cowardice: “Saken is completely demoralized and wants us to start evacuating Sevastopol, but it’s too early. All the leaders on the front lines are demoralized” (77).

The passivity of the generals was amazing. The head of the Sevastopol garrison, Lieutenant General von Moller, whom Menshikov despised, did not leave his apartment and did not give orders. The old and spineless Governor-General Admiral Stanyukovich was an empty place. In contrast to the diligence of the lower ranks, those at the top skimped on their responsibilities.
Peter the Great daily disturbed the rear of the Swedish army near Poltava with small and large attacks and false alarms, but in 1854-55. The sorties were mainly carried out by the Sevastopol garrison, but not by the external army. The commanders did not send hussars and dragoons to the enemy pickets. They didn’t even think about crushing the enemy in September until he looked around. Kamyshevaya and Balaklava bays, where the Allies quickly created their large bases, the command did not occupy and did not try to set fire to the crowded ships there. The monstrous lack of foresight of the Imperial General Staff is evidenced by the absence of maps of the environs of Sevastopol. Topographers arrived only at the end of winter. Despite the fact that “God’s blessing no longer accompanied us, Sevastopol corrected the mistakes of its leaders” (78).

Indecision prevented the attack on the vulnerable Allied base at Balaklava. On October 13, 1854, Lieutenant General P.P. Liprandi (1796-1864) won a private victory with 23 thousand troops near Balaklava. (In 1812 he took part in the battles of Tarutino, Maloyaroslavets, Krasny, in the campaigns of 1813-14 he took part in 17 battles. During the storming of Warsaw in 1831, he was twice the first with a banner in his hand at the head of a regiment to ascend the ramparts of the fortifications and was awarded the Order of St. George, Art. 3. Menshikov dubbed him a “phanariot intriguer”).

From Bessarabia in 1854, Liprandi's 12th Division was sent to the Crimea, where the commander-in-chief asked him (two days before the battle) to “loom” before the enemy. A detachment of infantry and cavalry in three columns knocked out the Turks from four redoubts near the village of Kadykioy and captured 11 cannons, but did not continue their movement to Balaklava.
The deployed formation of Scottish Highlanders (the French called them English Zouaves) did not lose composure and accuracy when repelling the Russian attack. At the end of the battle, Raglan ignorantly threw a brigade of light cavalry (700 people) into a stupid attack, which almost all died “in the valley of death” under the crossfire of artillery and the Zlatoust blades of the hussars, which were used to cut English armor. The unforgivable mistake of the British command was the failure to provide assistance to the dying brigade. An even greater blunder was the abandonment by the Russian army of the Fedyukhinsky Heights, which had to be stormed later in the unfortunate battle on the Chernaya River on August 4, 1855.

Inkerman battle.

Believing that Sevastopol was strong only in fortifications, and not in fighting spirit, Menshikov succumbed to the conviction that the city could be saved if the enemy was thrown back from the left flank. For reasons of secrecy, the competent disposition was compiled by Dannenberg alone (“an armchair utopian,” as his Serene Highness called him). He was an educated and delicate theorist, an experienced tactician, who was fond of replacing soldiers' backpacks with pockets or a new cut for overcoats.
In accordance with the disposition, it was supposed to capture the enemy’s camps, but not throw them into the sea. The second part of the troops under the command of P.D. Gorchakov was ordered to “distract” the enemy, trying to capture one of the shoots on Sapun Mountain. (Lord Raglan ordered the ships in Balaklava to separate pairs in case they received troops if the main blow was delivered by P.D. Gorchakov (79). Dannenberg did not calculate the movement of troops and did not order to inspect the condition of the roads, which were heavily washed out after the rains. From -due to the lack of maps, Colonel of the Guards General Staff Popov drew with his finger on a dusty table a “simple diagram” of where the troops should be led (80).
On October 24, the Battle of Inkerman began. Considering that he was not a tactician and it was not his business to lead troops into battle, Menshikov handed command to Dannenberg. The "Great Foray" began in ominous confusion early in the morning under the cover of thick fog. The commanders, perhaps due to secrecy, were not told the target, the direction of the attacks, or the order of attack. “The whole thing was chaos,” huge columns and artillery were confused on the march. The column of the brave General F.I. Soimonov (18,929 people with 38 guns) and the belated column of P.Ya. Pavlov (15,806 people with 96 guns) mixed up and entered the battle in parts. Soimonov heroically led three regiments into the attack and died, forgetting about his four regiments remaining behind. The crowded battalions on a narrow plateau entered the battle not at once, but in waves. A third of the troops were unable to take part in the battle at all. About 14 thousand fought on both sides. At the same time, the offensive impulse was great - the Uglitsky and Butyrsky regiments, appearing on the battlefield, enthusiastically sang “the national anthem - God save the Tsar!” (81).
As the participants recalled, the Russian infantry had not fought with such ferocity since the time of Izmail under a hail of shrapnel grenades, cannonballs and lead (“the Russians became beasts after bayonet work”). The attackers twice broke into the British camp, but did not break them and did not throw them off Sapun Mountain. The British, not having time to put on their uniforms, in gray dressing gowns, desperately fought back with bayonets, butts, axes, stones and experienced a severe shock: “A terrible disorder began to spread in the ranks of the allied forces.” The British chains, piercing several people at once with long-range shots, retreated, but did not run. They were saved from defeat by the help of Algerian riflemen and Bosquet's "jackals".
Shrapnel and grapeshot fell on the Russian crowded columns, which were aligned in ranks and at the back of the head. Almost all regimental, battalion and company headquarters officers were killed. Dannenberg did everything in his power - monitored the state of communications and sent support to the units. In response to the words - scatter, or take cover behind a hillock, the battalion commanders replied, “The regulations do not allow it!” (82).

Menshikov was on the right flank. When the battle began to take a bad turn, he personally led the Suzdal and Vladimir regiments from the reserve to the site of the attack. Dannenberg joined him. Together with the two grand dukes, they were both under fire for some time. Neither one nor the other insisted on joining the battle to P.D. Gorchakov (22,444 people, of which 7,300 were cavalry), who, being on the left bank of the Chernaya River, did not even indicate an attack from the foot of Sapun Mountain to the rear of the enemy, being deceived by his “multitude” on its peaks (83). (After M.D. Gorchakov arrived in the Crimean Army, he removed his 70-year-old older brother from the army). There were cases of soldiers shielding officers from shrapnel, and cases of them leaving under fire under the pretext of carrying out the wounded.
At 12 noon, Dannenberg, unlike the fighting troops, broke down and ordered a retreat. After the “Inkerman massacre”, under explosions and artillery fire, some companies, due to lack of leadership, left in a crowd, others - beating the beat, as in a parade. Russian bitterness stopped the enemy and the commander of the French army in the Crimea, F.G. Canrobert, did not dare to send fresh forces after the retreating forces. The British wrote: “one cannot believe... that there are troops in the world who can retreat as brilliantly as the Russians. Pursued by all the allied artillery, their battalions retreated slowly, constantly closing ranks and at times rushing with bayonets at the allies. Homer would compare this retreat of the Russians to the retreat of a lion” (84).
Russian losses amounted, according to various sources, from 10 to 12 thousand people. In France, the battle was compared to the fierce battle between the Russians and the French at Preussisch-Eylau in 1807. Bosquet called the battle a “slaughterhouse.” The British assessed it not as a victory, but as “heroism unheard of in British military history,” by which they were saved from certain death. “We are on the verge of a terrible catastrophe,” wrote Lord G.V. Clarendon to K. Stratford-Radcliffe on November 6 (18), 1854. The morale of the British after Inkerman was never fully restored. This battle not only forced the cancellation of the assault on Sevastopol, scheduled for October 25, but turned the tide of the war - the allies, realizing the impossibility of hitting the “Russian peasant army” in the field, decided to throw all their forces into a siege. “The dubious victory increased uncertainty and thoughts that the strength of the army was not capable of supporting another such victory (85). The Inkerman battle and Russophobia in England were poured with a cold shower.
Contrary to the above, Menshikov, while recognizing the dedication of the Russian army, did not see strength in it and looked at it from a “bleak, gloomy point of view.” The sight of the terrible massacre paralyzed this sovereign: “Alone, without blood in his face, of some dark gray color, in heavy thought, with unsteady steps... the Most Serene Prince moved. His head was bowed, his eyes were without life and desire. One heavy and joyless suffering... At times he stopped and then turned back - in a word, without will he moved first to the crossing, then back.” Gloomily approaching the Selenga regiment, he asked: “Why did you shoot your own?” The soldiers answered: “God had mercy!” (86).
Perhaps only the heroes of the past loomed before the commander-in-chief and he said: “I have neither generals, nor officers, nor troops capable of battle.” “I do not dare to attack the enemy with our infantry, which received only two rounds of ammunition a year, and with the cavalry, which after the battle of Poltava did not make a single decent attack” (87). P.D. Gorchakov, who miraculously survived under Alma, looked in his eyes like “an old vanity in a cardinal’s hat,” “Kiryakov is always drunk,” “Moller is stupid.” “Alas, what generals and what staff officers; There is not the slightest idea about military operations and the disposition of troops on the ground, about the use of riflemen and artillery. God forbid, there will be real work in the field!” - the prince lamented (88). If Menshikov was unfair in relation to privates and officers, then he assessed the level of the generals correctly. D.E. Osten-Sacken shared the same opinion: “our generals, with the exception of a few, do not correspond to officers and soldiers.” L.N. Tolstoy gave the same assessment in 1855: “The Russian general, for the most part, is an outdated, tired, exhausted creature ... - people without intelligence, education and energy (89).
“On the Inkerman Heights, the trust of the masses in those who were supposed to lead these masses was undermined. The troops... not trusting their more reasonable direction, stopped expecting success and counted on only failures. This mistrust was bitterly expressed at every opportunity... In each of the jokes one could hear a merciless mockery of all our intentions and plans and some kind of malicious self-condemnation...” (90). If in Sevastopol “everything was in full swing” and everyone hoped to earn the gratitude of Russia in battle, then in Menshikov’s camp in the Belbek Valley “everyone hung their head and seemed to fear the verdict of the Fatherland and their contemporaries.”
Looting and desertion among soldiers increased (91). In January 1855, Den and Popov launched “area curses” at the commander-in-chief, M.D. Gorchakov proposed replacing him, and Field Marshal Paskevich even proposed to judge Menshikov. Nicholas I said that it was “mean” to blame one’s mediocrity on the troops. “The wild sailors” awarded the commander-in-chief the nickname “anathema”, the soldiers - “devil”, V.I. Istomin - “asp”, the officers - “gloomy prince” (92).
The Battle of Inkerman turned out to be significant for the military history of Russia after the Napoleonic wars. Based on the lethargy and lack of will of the Russian command, K. Marx made a painful for national Russian pride, but correct conclusion about the exhaustion of the militarism of the Romanov empire and the end of the “glory of the Russian infantry”: “the mask of Western European civilization fell and the Tatar was revealed... Artificially accelerated growth and enormous efforts, which were done to maintain the appearance of a brilliant civilization, given the semi-barbaric level of the country, apparently already exhausted the nation and caused it something like consumption. The battle of Inkerman means for the Russian infantry the same as the battle of Rocroi for the Spanish infantry” (93). Unlike Nicholas I, who believed it was possible to retreat even from Bessarabia and New Russia all the way to the Dnieper, just to hold Crimea and Sevastopol (94), Menshikov understood that it was impossible to instantly retrain the infantry to new tactics and that the next field battles would lead to new losses.
From November 1854, he, like M.D. Gorchakov, who later replaced him, believed that general battles were no longer possible and that one should take into account the possibility of leaving Sevastopol and Crimea and switching to a maneuver war of attrition of the enemy.

End of the Crimean War.

The year 1855 broke not only the top of the command, but also the Nikolaev great power. After the Battle of Inkerman, Nicholas I walked alone at night along the Palace Embankment. On February 19, 1855, mental anguish intensified pulmonary emphysema and dumped the iron autocrat, who was considered the most powerful sovereign in the world, into the grave. (The soldiers feared that the death of the king would lead to a dishonorable peace that would erase everything that they had done to defend Sevastopol) (95).
Menshikov, having presented the idea of ​​​​bringing Russian trenches closer to enemy positions, was crushed by general condemnation, disappeared for some time on a ship in the bay, then was knocked out of action by a bladder disease, surrendered everything to Osten-Sacken and was dismissed in 1856. Paskevich died in 1856 Still vigorous, the famous “lion” general A.P. Ermolov (1777-1861), unanimously elected on February 16, 1855 in Moscow and St. Petersburg as the head of the militia, agreed to become commander-in-chief, “if the sovereign absolutely desires” this (96) . However, it is unlikely that he could turn the situation around. At the end of 1855 M.D. Gorchakov was replaced by Adjutant General A.N. Leaders and died 5 years after the Crimean War. Society was in apathy, the people's devotion to the new sovereign Alexander II was weaker than the supreme power at the apogee of autocracy in 1770-1814. (97).

Unlike field battles, the valor of the Russian army behind the bastions of Sevastopol was deployed in full force. In the winter of 1855, exhausted by the “winter catastrophe” and almost unable to defend the trenches, the allies, who could not stop Russian communications at Perekop, were surprised at the inaction of the Russian command, which did not even think of “throwing into the sea” the opponents, “died like flies” from cold and disease ( so wrote Lord Raglan). At the beginning of January 1855, only 13 thousand British remained in the ranks and twice as many sick and wounded (98). Even more Turkish soldiers died, turned into draft animals by the French and British. “It is incomprehensible to common sense how the besieger himself held out in Crimea and how he was not trampled into the sea ten times, captured or exterminated to the last soldier” (99). Small forays from Sevastopol did not have a serious effect - they did not have time to fill up the enemy’s trenches, destroy the ramparts and rivet the guns.

The inaction of the command was justified by “conserving forces to hold Crimea.” The attempt of the brave General S.A. Khrulev to take Evpatoria on February 5, 1855 with weak forces ended with the loss of 768 people. (Walking under grapeshot, the dismounted dragoons refused on principle to change the column to a loose formation). In St. Petersburg, after desperate letters from the Crimea, they inadvertently started talking about defeat, which intensified the Allied efforts to capture Sevastopol.
After Menshikov’s departure and before the arrival of M.D. Gorchakov on March 8, the high command was in the hands of Nakhimov and Osten-Sacken, who also gained popularity among soldiers and officers.
About Gorchakov, Nicholas I said on June 19, 1853 that he “may be destined by providence to mark the beginning of the triumph of Russia.” Some hoped that the new commander-in-chief would organize a general offensive, others foreshadowed bad things, since he was a supporter of preserving the manpower of the Russian army and winding down the war. Although M.D. Gorchakov advocated for a “small cavalry war,” the cavalry had already weaned itself off it and he had to be advised to avoid battles and keep the cavalry behind the second line of infantry. The Cossacks also did not show themselves in Crimea. Gorchakov, like Menshikov, did not order to strengthen the Kerch Strait and Kerch was taken in just a few hours.

If Nakhimov supported the steadfastness of the soldiers until the last minute (“What a shame, sir! For six months they teach you to build under fire and repair damage, but you can’t!”), then Gorchakov, despite the fact that in total he had 3,570 officers at his disposal and 157,576 lower ranks, already on March 30 came to the conclusion to leave Sevastopol without waiting for the assault. He believed that if bombarded by siege batteries, the defense of the city would not last even 2-3 days (100). “Now I’m thinking about only one thing: how to leave Sevastopol without suffering exorbitant, maybe more than 20,000 damage... There’s nothing to think about ships and artillery! It's a terrible thought! - he wrote in April 1855. At the same time, Gorchakov did a good job of organizing the supply of troops. On May 1, 1855, regimental music was playing on Vladimirskaya Square, bouquets of white acacia, pies, kulebyaki stood on the tables, and officers raised toasts “To the health of the commander-in-chief” and sang “God Save the Tsar.” In Moscow, they did not appreciate that Gorchakov “spared precious blood”; they called him “the scourge of God, a traitor and a villain.” The French also spoke about the complete inability of the commander-in-chief, who destroys troops unnecessarily” (101).
Rumors about the commander-in-chief's alarming letters spread in St. Petersburg and became known in Europe. At the beginning of May, the Allies, having brought up new reinforcements (including 15 thousand Piedmontese), increased their forces to 170 thousand. Along seven parallels, the besiegers approached almost the city itself. On May 25, 1855, they managed to capture advanced positions - the Kamchatka lunette, the Selenga and Volyn redoubts. The commander of these fortifications, General O.P. Zhabokritsky, was immediately labeled as standard with the word “traitor.” On June 1, Osten-Sacken, together with Totleben, visited the forward positions and called on the soldiers to die or win (“Russians die, but do not run”). The speech caused great enthusiasm (102).

On June 4-5, 1855, the allies fired 72 thousand shells from 548 guns at the city’s fortifications, from where they responded with only 19 thousand. On June 6, Sevastopol heroically repulsed a general assault, after which the head of the troops of the Ship side, General S.A. Khrulev, behind whom the soldiers went through fire and water, said the immortal: “There is no retreat. We have Russia in reserve.” During the assault, the enemy lost 5281 people, the Russians - 4830 people. Although the retreating enemy was not pursued, one Englishman wrote in June 1855: “I cannot believe that any great disaster can break Russia. This is a great people" (103).
On June 28, Nakhimov died. The head of the garrison was the capable military general V.I. Vasilchikov (1820-1878). In 1842-44. he fought bravely in the Caucasus, and has now improved the supply of troops and sanitary matters.
The tragedy of the high command was clearly revealed by the military council on July 29, 1855. All sovereign Russia and the main sovereign, Alexander II, expected and insisted on the activity of the troops. The command in Sevastopol understood that a new offensive would result in inevitable collapse. Everyone remembered the lessons of Alma and Inkerman, when battalion and company columns were swept away by grapeshot and rifle fire. However, everyone also remembered the crushing criticism of Menshikov “for inactivity.” It was unthinkable to accept Osten-Sacken’s sober and honest “terrible measure” - to immediately leave the southern side of Sevastopol without a fight. Only Ushakov and Semyakin dared to speak out against the offensive. All the rest - Kotzebue, Liprandi, Buturlin, Khrulev, Vice Admiral Novosilsky, Bukhmeyer, Kryzhanovsky and others, expressing doubts about success, did not find the strength to resist the insistence of the emperor and, like the doomed, agreed to the madness of the assault on the Fedyukhinsky Heights and Sapun Mountain. Gorchakov, realizing the inevitability of the catastrophe and the inhumanity of throwing soldiers to slaughter, was in the darkest state the day before the battle: “I am going against the enemy because if I had not done this, Sevastopol would still have fallen soon... I am going against the enemy, under the worst circumstances" (104). On the night before the battle on August 4, he fervently prayed on his knees with tears before the image of the Smolensk Mother of God (105).

The tactics of Peter the Great, who did not take into account any sovereign ambitions - to pull the enemy away from the city, as from Poltava, even with false sabotage, was forgotten. The disposition was sent out only the day before the battle and the troops did not have time to familiarize themselves with it. “After the indecisive council there was indecision in battle and complete lack of leadership” (P. Alabin).
The officers again led the soldiers in dense masses towards death in a frontal assault on the Fedyukhinsky Heights. Almost all the main commanders died at the beginning of the battle. The divisions were broken up one by one. The cavalry was displayed only for show. If this had happened at the end of the 18th – beginning of the 19th centuries, the then command, less sensitive to bloody losses, might have prevailed. But Gorchakov, after five hours of battle, refused to continue the battle, although three untouched divisions could still strike at the enemy’s right flank. The Russians lost 3,229 killed and 5,000 wounded; the Allied losses were only 196 killed and 1,551 wounded. However, in the last field battle of the Crimean War, as in the previous ones, the Russian army did not turn into a running crowd and the enemy did not pursue it. Under buckshot and bullets, Gorchakov took command of the retreating units and shouted to the bustling commanders: “Make them walk at a quiet pace!” “The affair on Chernaya will be an eternal shame of our military history,” said Paskevich, not knowing that there would be the bitterness of even greater disasters at Mukden and Tsushima in 1905 and the dishonor of the “great escape” at Gorlitsa in 1915.

Gorchakov and Osten-Sacken began to prepare for the evacuation and ordered in advance the construction of a floating log bridge almost a kilometer long on anchors to the northern side of Sevastopol. Ordinary defenders, not thinking about retreat, believed that the bridge would improve supplies from the northern side and were preparing to fight inside the city (106). On August 14, the bridge was built and government property began to be transported north.
On August 24, the Allies fired 150 thousand shells at Sevastopol, which were responded to by fifty thousand. At 12 noon on August 27, to the beat of drums, “Marseillaise” and shouts of “Long live the Emperor!” 58 thousand French and British, in columns and scattered, stormed the Malakhov Kurgan and the destroyed surrounding fortifications. The defenders fought heroically. All commanders of the 9th, 12th and 15th divisions were killed, 5 generals, 419 officers and 12,488 lower ranks were out of action - 26% of the entire garrison. (The enemy lost 9041 people). By 5 o'clock in the evening Malakhov Kurgan was taken.
Thus, on August 27, 1855, one of the longest sieges in military history ended. Sevastopol, with its barricades, loopholes in forts and houses, dugouts, trenches, a chain of bastions, redoubts and defensive ramparts, with several thousand guns that could not be taken across the bridge, was abandoned. V.I. Vasilchikov, having scheduled the withdrawal of detachments minute by minute and erected a rearguard barrier, withdrew the troops in one night in an exemplary manner (“with incredible success,” according to Gorchakov).

The assault bled the enemy dry and he provided the retreating “golden bridge.” On August 28, the remnants of the Black Sea Fleet were scuttled and the fortifications of Sevastopol were blown up. Major General A.P. Khrushchev with the Volyn, Minsk and Tobolsk regiments covered the retreat. The morale of the garrison was not broken. Gorchakov said that “349 days of defense surpass Borodino” and that with the fall of Sevastopol, “a new war begins, a field war, characteristic of the spirit of the Russian soldier” (107).
The withdrawal of troops caused indignation among the rear power holders: “having given up Sevastopol, they gave away all the glory of Russia, the honor and integrity of our land”, “our troops are uselessly destroying their crazy leaders” “Our enemy... our government system” (108).
The Allies did not have the strength to turn a positional war into a maneuverable one and completely take possession of the peninsula, and the Zouaves’ boast that the Crimea had been conquered, like Algeria, looked like fanfare. The heroic defense of Sevastopol, having exhausted the forces of the besiegers, made it impossible for the allies to continue the war.

conclusions

At the rise of the Russian Empire, Peter the Great won with unlettered generals and officers who grew up in the 17th century. on the idea “God grant that I serve the great sovereign, but do not remove the saber from the scabbard.” At the apogee of glory, when Russia finally established the borders of Orthodox civilization from the Western Bug to the Pacific Ocean (1770-1814), continuous wars under the great motto of A.V. Suvorov “We ​​are Russians, God is with us!” were carried out at the highest intensity of sovereign patriotism and the fighting spirit of soldiers and field marshals. With onslaught and determination, the high command and officer corps defeated not only the Ottomans, Persians, Poles and Swedes, but also Napoleon’s armies.
The “victory syndrome” after the “battle of the giants” in 1812 and the victory parade in Paris in 1814 shackled Russian military thought. In the Eastern War of 1853-56. The strategy and tactics of the most powerful empire in the world became defensive both on land and on all oceans and seas. New fighting techniques were rejected everywhere and at all levels. The military abilities of Emperor Nicholas I and the brave military leaders of the early 19th century - Paskevich, Menshikov, Gorchakov (as well as most of the generals) were not inferior to the qualifications of the enemy command, but in the absence of a liberation idea (as in the “War for the Slavs” of 1877-78. ), they have lost energy, initiative and will.
During the decline of the empire, the supreme bearers of power, in contrast to the officer corps and rank and file, realizing that “God is not with them,” were very sensitive to military threats. Their confidence in the invincibility of the Russian army and navy disappeared and they prematurely agreed to peace negotiations.
The contrast between the failures of the Crimean War and past victories led to devastating criticism of the high command in memoirs and historical literature.
The officer corps and generals such as S.A. Khrulev, F.I. Soimonov, P.P. Liprandi, A.P. Khrushchev and others fulfilled their duty and oath with dignity. Heroes of Russian and world military history - V.A. Kornilov, P.S. Nakhimov, V.I. Istomin, E.I. Totleben raised Sevastopol to the heights of glory with their fearlessness. The rank and file showed the highest courage, endurance and dedication.
Feudal Russia was defeated not by the numbers and quality of weapons, not by the abilities of the enemy command staff, and especially not by the superior morale of the armies of Europe, but by the industrial revolution of capitalist states, which overwhelmed the heroes of Sevastopol with tons of lead and cast iron. (Thanks to naval dominance, the French fleet transferred 309,268 people and 41,974 horses, 50 million kilograms of artillery supplies along with guns, 500 thousand tons of food, 12 thousand tons of clothing and ammunition to the Black Sea from France, Italy and Corsica (109). In a one-on-one war with France or England, and especially with Turkey, defeat of Russia was impossible.
The Peace of Paris in 1856 squeezed Russian influence out of central Europe and crushed Russia's military prestige. However, the bloody sacrifices of 102 thousand dead on the Sevastopol bastions and 26 thousand in field battles were not in vain. They made it possible to exit the struggle on more tolerable terms than after the Japanese and First World Wars.
In 1853-56. The Russian army and its officer corps withstood the defensive war against three empires and one kingdom (with the tacit participation of Austria) more honorably than in 1904-05 and 1914-17. The Allies, fearing the then Russian strength, were cautious and were far from the strategy of “crush.” Defeats in field battles forced the Russian military to move away from combat drills in favor of combat training and became the reason for the large-scale “Milyutin” reforms of the 1860-70s. The Black Sea Fleet was revived and Russia successfully resolved the “Eastern Question” in 1877-78.
The heroic defense of Sevastopol will forever be included in the chronicle of the glory of Russian weapons. “Defend Sevastopol!” - this is how the great testament of V.I. Kornilov remained in history, addressed to his descendants before his death.

-----------------------

1 The latter cannot be accepted without reservations: world history knows examples of victories of backward states: the Mongols over China in the 13th century, serf Russia over France, which embarked on the path of capitalist development in 1814, Vietnam over the United States.

2 Sovereignty is devotion to one’s state (power) and the desire to serve its interests through one’s actions. It differs from love for the native land, native culture, language, Fatherland - patriotism. Artamonov V.A. The rise and fall of sovereign consciousness in the history of Russia // Patriotism - the spiritual core of the peoples of Russia. M., 2006.

3 The sovereign appetites of the Orthodox empire extended in 1808 right up to the Elbe and Venice - Artamonov V.A. The Polish Army and Napoleon’s invasion of Russia // Borodino and the Napoleonic Wars. Battles, battlefields, memorials. M., 2003. P.201.

4 Engels F. Germany and Pan-Slavism.//Marx K., Engels F. Works. M., 1958. T.11.S.203. In England, “resistance to Satan” and the demand for a “people's war” grew into national hysteria by 1853. - Right there. T.10. P.298; Baumgart W. (Utg.) Englische Akten zur Geschichte der Krimkriegs. Munchen, 1994. S.31.

5 Grosul V.Ya. Russian society of the 18th-19th centuries. Traditions and innovations. M., 2003. P.231,235, 255, 258, 261.

6 Sheremet V.I. War and business. Power, money and weapons. Europe and the Middle East in modern times. M., 1996.P.534.

7 Grosul V.Ya. Russian society... P.263, 322; Sheremet V.I. War and business... P.528.

8 Panaev A.A. Prince Alexander Sergeevich Menshikov 1853-1869. St. Petersburg, 1877. P.46.

9 French and Russians in Crimea. Letters from a French officer to his family during the Eastern War of 1853-56. Minsk, 1894. P.110

10 Instructions of Napoleon III 14 February 1855 – Franzosische Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkrieges. Munchen, 1999. Bd.2.S.850-851.

11 Tyutcheva A.F. At the court of two emperors. Memories. Diary 1853-55. M., 1990. P.125.

12 Marx K., Engels F. M., 1958. Op.T.10, p. 2 - 4, 84.

13 Treue W. Der Krimkrieg und seine Bedeutung fur die Entstehung der modernen Flotten. Hereford, 1980.S.117.

14 Likhachev D. Essay on the actions of the Black Sea Fleet in 1853-54. //Military collection. 1902. No. 3. P.47.

15 History of Russian foreign policy. First half of the 19th century (From the Russian war against Napoleon to the Peace of Paris in 1856). M., 1999. P.388.

16 Russian antiquity. 1886. No. 5. P.599-614.

17 Alabin P.V. Four wars... Part 2. P.4-6.

18 Engels F. Armies of Europe // Marx K., Engels F. Works. M., 1958. T.11. pp.478-483,604; Gersevanov M. On the reasons for the tactical superiority of the French in the campaign of 1855 and 1856. St. Petersburg, 1856. P.9.

19 Andriyanov A. Inkerman battle and defense of Sevastopol. Participant sketches. St. Petersburg, 1903. P.2; Shcherbachev G.D. 20 years of youth. (Memories from the reign of Nicholas I). M., 1892. P.125.

20 This is what one of the English participants in the battles thought. Back at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the field of actual fire, the infantry walked at a pace and even in step in “boxes” and dense company columns. – Denikin A.I. The path of the Russian officer. M., 1990. P.90-91.

21 Alabin P. Four wars. Travel notes in 1849, 1853, 1854-56 and 1877-78. M., 1892. T. 3, 633-634,637.

22 Alabin P. Four wars... T.3, P.637; Kholodilin N.I. Marx and Engels on the state of armies and the development of military art in the Crimean War (1853-56). M., 1952. Abstract of Ph.D. diss. P.7-8.

23 Baumgart W. Englisce Akten... S.33; “The command of the British army at the level of non-commissioned officers” - wrote the Times newspaper on January 3, 1855 - Marx K., Engels F. Soch. M., 1958. T.10. P.590.

24 Grosul V.Ya. Russian society...P.239.

25 Alabin P. Four wars... T.2, p.9. The moral maximalism of L.N. Tolstoy was reflected in his overly harsh assessment of the officer corps: “In a military society, the spirit of love for the Fatherland, knightly courage, and military honor arouses ridicule; oppression, debauchery and extortion are respected... Soldiers are spotted, beaten every minute, and the soldier does not respect himself, hates his superiors... How many Russian officers were killed by Russian bullets..." (L.N. Tolstoy. Project on reforming the army // I Can’t Be Silent. M., 1985. pp. 399-406). Publicists in Europe also wrote about “aversion” to service, initiative constrained by regulations, and the “infinitesimal number” of good officers. - Engels F. Armies of Europe... P.478.

26 Vasilchikov V.I. Notes of the chief of staff of the Sevastopol garrison, Prince V.I. Vasilchikov // Russian Archive. 1891. No. 6. P. 168.

27 Bagdasaryan V.E., Tolstoy S.G. The Russian War: a century of historiographical experience in understanding the Crimean campaign. M., 2002. P. 114.

28 Vasilchikov V.I. Notes... P.170, 175.

29 Tarle E.V. Works... Vol.9. P.249-250.

30 Kryzhanovsky N.A. Sevastopol and its defenders in 1855 // Russian antiquity. 1886. No. 5. P.427-428, 431-433.

31 Marx K., Engels F. Soch. M.1958. T.10. P.239.

32 Sheremet V.I. War and business... P.542.

33 Debidur A. Diplomatic history of Europe 1814-1878. Rostov-on-Don 1995. T.2.S.90.

34 Bogdanovich M.I. Eastern War 1853-1856 St. Petersburg, 1877. T.1. P.138.

35 Zayonchkovsky A.M. Eastern War 1853-1856 St. Petersburg, 2002. T.2.Part.2. P.316.

36 Valuev P.A. Russian Duma // Crimean War. M., 1999. P.622.

37 Milosevic N.S. From the notes of a Sevastopol resident. M., 1904. P.10

38 Marx K., Engels F. Op. M., 1977. T.44. P.262.

39 Treue W. Der Krimkrieg... S.57, 61.

40 Baryatinsky V.I. Memoirs of the book. V.I. Baryatinsky (1852-1855). M., 1905. P.14; Dubrovin N.F. Eastern War 1853-1856 Review of events regarding the work of M.I. Bogdanovich. St. Petersburg, 1878. P.76; Collection of manuscripts presented by E.I.V. to the sovereign, the heir to the crown prince, about the defense of Sevastopol by the Sevastopol people. (Reprint St. Petersburg, 1872) M., 1998. P.68.

41 Heroic defense of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky in 1854. A collection of memories, articles, letters and official documents. Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, 1979.

42 Popov M.M. The Southern Army and the Crimean Army under Prince Menshikov // Russian Antiquity 1893. No. 9. P.522.

43 For many years. Notes of an unknown person 1844-1874. St. Petersburg, 1897. P. 102.

44 Chaplinsky G. Memoirs of the Sevastopol defense of G. Chaplinsky // Collection of manuscripts... P.159.

45 Souvenirs d`un Zouave devant Sebastopol. Paris, 1856. R.115.

46 Khrushchev A.P. History of the defense of Sevastopol. St. Petersburg, 1889. pp. 9, 12.

47 Souvenirs d`un Zouave... P.120.

48 Panaev A.A. Prince... P.27.

49 Damas R.P. Souvenirs religieux et militaire de la Crimee. Paris.,1857. P.11.

50 Pavlyuk, Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff. Alma 1854-1904. The battle of September 8, 1854 and the current state of the battlefield. Odessa, 1904. P.18.

51 M.D. Gorchakov’s older brother - Gorchakov “Siberian” (1785-1868) in 1836-51. was the Governor-General of Western Siberia, fought bravely in the Russian wars of the early 19th century, and fought in Abkhazia in 1821 and 1824. and besieged Silistria in 1828-29. Contemporaries, recognizing his personal courage, spoke of him as a negligent, disorganized old man, whom “no one gives a damn about, no one listens to.”

52 “...il a ete veritablement grand dans les moments critiques de la bataille, et s`est a lui seul que la Russie doit la conservatin de cette armee” – Pflug F. Souvenirs de la campagne de Crimee. Journal d`un medecin allemand au service de l`Armee Russe. Traduit de l'Allemand. Paris, 1862. P.44-45.

53 French and Russians in Crimea. Letters from a French officer to his family during the Eastern War of 1853-56. Minsk, 1894. P.64-67.

54 Panaev A.A. Prince... P.39.

55 Panaev A.A. Prince... P.43,54; Khrushchev A.P. History of the defense of Sevastopol. St. Petersburg, 1888. P. 14,15; Shcherbachev G.D. 20 years of youth... P.140; Dubrovin N.F. History of the Crimean War... Vol.2. S.6.

56 Popov M.M. Southern Army... P.522.

57 Notes of V.I. Den //Russian antiquity 1890. No. P.656.

58 Handwritten pencil note of the Grand Duke on the report of A.V. Golovin. – From the GARF collection.

59 Military history of the Fatherland from ancient times to the present day. M., "Mosgorarchiv". 1995. T.1.S.486; Record of Lieutenant A.K. Comstadius // Russian antiquity. 1890. No. 4-6. P.88.

60 Treue W. Der Krimkrieg... S.37,123; Leslie P.I. Letters from retired navy captain-lieutenant P.I. Leslie // Collection of manuscripts... p.314; Bagdasaryan V.E., Tolstoy S.G. Russian war... P.143.

61 Anichkov V.N. Military-historical essays of the Crimean expedition. Description of the siege and defense of Sevastopol. St. Petersburg, 1856. Part 2. P.9-10).

62 Russian antiquity. 1893. No. 9. P. 525; Tarle E.V. Crimean War... T. 9. P. 107.

63 Popov M.M. The Southern Army and the Crimean Army under Prince Menshikov // Russian Antiquity 1893. No. 9. P.523.

64 Likhachev D. Essay on the actions of the Black Sea Fleet in 1853-54. //Military collection. 1902. No. 4. P.105; Treue W. Der Krimkrieg... P.64.

65 Treue W. Der Krimkrieg... S.64-65; Crimean expedition...P.45; Moshnin V.A. Coastal defense from ancient times to the present day. St. Petersburg, 1901.S.282; Dubrovin N.F. History of the Crimean War... T.2 P.72,73; his: Eastern War... P.65,66; Parfenov, captain 2nd rank. Defense of Sevastopol “from the water” during the siege by allied forces in 1854-55. St. Petersburg, 1904. P.9.

66 The opposite happened - so, the corps commander, General Gelfreich, in the presence of his retinue, introducing his son to General Pelissier (after the peace of 1856), inadvertently said: “here is my son, a sailor from the sunken fleet.” (Alabin P. Four wars... Vol. 3, p. 631.

67 Memoirs of the Sevastopol Defense of Georgy Chaplinsky // Collection of manuscripts presented by E.I.V. to the sovereign, the heir to the crown prince, about the defense of Sevastopol by the Sevastopol people. M.1998 (reprint SPb.1872). P.71-72; Dubrovin N.F. Eastern War... P.130; Obezyaninov A.A. Sinop battle. Siege of Sevastopol. From the memories of a Black Sea sailor. Ryazan, 1899. P. 21; Bagdasaryan V.E., Tolstoy S.G. Russian war... P.141.

68 Alabin P. Four wars... T. 3. P. 148, 151,426. Shcherbachev G.D. 20 years of youth... P.166.

69 Tarle E.V. Crimean War... T. 9. P.134-135.

70 Schilder N.K. Notes on the events of 1853-55. //Russian antiquity 1875. No. 8. P.642.

71 Marine collection. 1854. No. 12. P.445.

72 Alabin P. Four wars... T.3. P.464.

73 Damas. P.24.

74 Baryatinsky V.I. Memoirs of the book. V.I. Baryatinsky (1852-55). M., 1905. P.40; Collection of manuscripts... P.35.

75 Crimean expedition... P.68.

76 Alabin P. Four wars... Vol.4. S.4; Kersnovsky A.A. History of the Russian Army. M., 1993. T. 2.S.155.

78 Valuev P.A. Russian Duma in the second half of 1855 // Russian antiquity 1893. No. 9. P.505-507.

79 Dubrovin N.F. History of the Crimean War... T. 2. P. 175, 200.

80 Andriyanov A. Inkerman battle and defense of Sevastopol. Participant sketches. St. Petersburg, 1903. P.15; Dukhonin L.G. Near Sevastopol in 1853-1856. //Russian antiquity. 1885. No. 8. P.267.

81 Pflug F. Souvenirs... P.119.

82 Andriyanov A. Inkerman battle... P. 26.

83 Den V.I. Notes of V.I. Den // Russian antiquity.1890. No. 4-6. P.675-676; Chaplinsky G. Memoirs... // Collection of manuscripts... P.83,97, 102-104.

84 Dubrovin N.F. History of the Crimean War... Vol.2. P.229.

85 Barker A.J. The Vainglorious War 1853-56. L., 1970. P.193; Royle T. Crimea. The Great Crimean War 1854-56. L., 1999.

86 Andriyanov A. Inkerman battle... P.27; Alabin P. Four wars... T.3.S.128.

87 Dubrovin N.F. Eastern War... P.308,314,336, 352.

88 Tarle E.V. Crimean War.. T. 9. P.236.

89 Tolstoy L.N. Project on reforming the army // I can’t remain silent. M., 1985. P.406. 90 From camping memories of the Crimean War. - Russian archive. 1870 No. 11. P.2044-2045.

91 Den V.I. Notes... P.51.

92 Vrochensky M.A. Sevastopol defeat. Kyiv, 1893.P.12.

93 The end of the “invincibility” of the Spanish infantry after the defeat in 1643 at the French fortress on the Belgian border. - Marx K., Engels F. Works. M., 1958. T.10. P.588; F. Engels wrote about “boundless mediocrity... both on the part of the Russians and on the part of the allies.” - Right there. P.565; The decline in the morale of the Russian armed forces (“you are not the heroes”) was noted back in 1837 by M.Yu. Lermontov in the poem “Borodino”.

94 Tatishchev S.S. Emperor Alexander II his life and reign M., 1996. T.1 p.153.

95 Pflug F. Souvenirs... P.129.

96 Aksakova V.S. Diary... pp. 193-194, 198.

97 When Alexander II appeared on the Red Porch in the Kremlin on September 2, 1855, ironic remarks were heard: “What an honor for one man!”; “They shouted hurray in unison, so... it became a pity.” – Aksakova V.S. Diary... P.154-155.

98 Baumgart W. (Utg.) Englische Akten... S.34.

99 Milosevic N.S. From notes... P.16.

100 Tatishchev S.S. T.1.S.169; Dubrovin N.F. Eastern War... P.411,427.

101 Aksakova V.S. Diary... P.161,165,171,185.

102 Pflug F. Souvenirs... P.184,189.

103 Tarle E.V. Crimean War... Vol.9. P.403.

104 Dubrovin N.F. Eastern War... P.497.

105 Krasovsky I.I. From memories of the war of 1853-1856. M., 1874. P.4-5.).

106 Ershov A.I. Sevastopol memoirs of an artillery officer. St. Petersburg, 1891. P.214.

107 Buturlin S.P. A few words about the actions of Russian troops in Crimea in 1854 and 1855.” Odessa, 1867. P.11.

108 Aksakova V.S. Diary... pp. 147-150, 181.

109 Treue W. Der Krimkrieg.... P.82.

Dear visitors!
The site does not allow users to register and comment on articles.
But in order for comments to be visible under articles from previous years, a module responsible for the commenting function has been left. Since the module is saved, you see this message.

The Crimean War of 1853−1856 was a war between the Russian Empire and a coalition consisting of the British, French, Ottoman Empires and the Kingdom of Sardinia. The war was caused by Russia's expansionist plans towards the rapidly weakening Ottoman Empire. Emperor Nicholas I tried to take advantage of the national liberation movement of the Balkan peoples to establish control over the Balkan Peninsula and the strategically important Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. These plans threatened the interests of the leading European powers - Great Britain and France, which were constantly expanding their sphere of influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, and Austria, which was seeking to establish its hegemony in the Balkans.

The reason for the war was the conflict between Russia and France, associated with a dispute between the Orthodox and Catholic churches over the right of guardianship over the holy places in Jerusalem and Bethlehem, which were in Turkish possessions. The growth of French influence at the Sultan's court caused concern in St. Petersburg. In January-February 1853, Nicholas I proposed to Great Britain to negotiate the division of the Ottoman Empire; however, the British government preferred an alliance with France. During his mission to Istanbul in February-May 1853, the Tsar’s special representative, Prince A. S. Menshikov, demanded that the Sultan agree to a Russian protectorate over the entire Orthodox population in his possessions, but he, with the support of Great Britain and France, refused. On July 3, Russian troops crossed the river. Prut and entered the Danube principalities (Moldova and Wallachia); The Turks made a strong protest. On September 14, the combined Anglo-French squadron approached the Dardanelles. On October 4, the Turkish government declared war on Russia.

Russian troops, under the command of Prince M.D. Gorchakov, entered Moldavia and Wallachia, occupied a very scattered position along the Danube in October 1853. The Turkish army (about 150 thousand), commanded by Sardarekrem Omer Pasha, was located partly along the same river, partly in Shumla and Adrianople. There were less than half of the regular troops in it; the rest consisted of the militia, which had almost no military education. Almost all regular troops were armed with rifled or smooth-bore percussion rifles; the artillery is well organized, the troops are trained by European organizers; but the corps of officers was unsatisfactory.

On October 9, Omer Pasha informed Prince Gorchakov that if after 15 days a satisfactory answer was not given about the cleansing of the principalities, the Turks would open military operations; however, even before this period expired, the enemy began to shoot at Russian outposts. On October 23, the Turks opened fire on the Russian steamships Prut and Ordinarets, passing along the Danube past the Isakchi fortress. 10 days after this, Omer Pasha, having gathered 14 thousand people from Turtukai, crossed to the left bank of the Danube, occupied the Oltenice quarantine and began building fortifications here.

On November 4, the battle of Oltenitz followed. General Dannenberg, who commanded the Russian troops, did not complete the job and retreated with the loss of about 1 thousand people; however, the Turks did not take advantage of their success, but burned the quarantine, as well as the bridge on the Arjis River, and retreated again to the right bank of the Danube.

On March 23, 1854, Russian troops began crossing to the right bank of the Danube, near Brailaa, Galati and Izmail, they occupied the fortresses: Machin, Tulcea and Isaccea. Prince Gorchakov, who commanded the troops, did not immediately move to Silistria, which would have been relatively easy to capture, since its fortifications at that time were not yet completely completed. This slowdown in actions that had begun so successfully was due to the orders of Prince Paskevich, who was prone to exaggerated caution.

Only as a result of the energetic demand of Emperor Nicholas Paskevich ordered the troops to go forward; but this offensive was carried out extremely slowly, so that only on May 16 the troops began to approach Silistria. The siege of Silistria began on the night of May 18, and the chief of engineers, the highly talented General Schilder, proposed a plan according to which, subject to the complete investment of the fortress, he undertook to take it over in 2 weeks. But Prince Paskevich proposed another plan, extremely unprofitable, and at the same time did not block Silistria, which, thus, could communicate with Rushchuk and Shumla. The siege was waged against the strong forward fort of Arab Tabia; on the night of May 29 they had already laid a trench 80 fathoms from it. The assault, carried out without any orders by General Selvan, ruined the whole matter. At first the Russians were successful and climbed the rampart, but at this time Selvan was mortally wounded. In the rear of the assaulting troops, the all clear sounded, a difficult retreat began under enemy pressure, and the whole enterprise ended in complete failure.

On June 9, Prince Paskevich carried out an intensive reconnaissance to Silistria with all his might, but, being shell-shocked by a cannonball, surrendered the command to Prince Gorchakov and left for Iasi. He still sent orders from there. Soon after, General Schilder, who was the soul of the siege, received a serious wound and was forced to leave for Calarasi, where he died.

On June 20, the siege work had already moved so close to Arab-Tabiya that an assault was planned at night. The troops were preparing, when suddenly, around midnight, an order came from the field marshal: immediately burn down the siege and move to the left bank of the Danube. The reason for such an order was a letter received by Prince Paskevich from Emperor Nicholas and the hostile measures of Austria. Indeed, the sovereign allowed the siege to be lifted if the siege corps was threatened by an attack by superior forces before the capture of the fortress; but there was no such danger. Thanks to the measures taken, the siege was lifted completely unnoticed by the Turks, who almost did not pursue the Russians.
Now on the left side of the Danube the number of Russian troops reached 120 thousand, with 392 guns; In addition, 11/2 infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade were located in Babadag, under the command of General Ushakov. The forces of the Turkish army extended to 100 thousand people located near Shumla, Varna, Silistria, Rushchuk and Vidin.

After the Russians left Silistria, Omer Pasha decided to go on the offensive. Having concentrated more than 30 thousand people at Rushchuk, on July 7 he began to cross the Danube and, after a battle with a small Russian detachment that stubbornly defended the island of Radoman, captured Zhurzha, losing up to 5 thousand people. Although he then stopped his offensive, Prince Gorchakov also did nothing against the Turks, but, on the contrary, began to gradually clear the principalities. Following him, the special detachment of General Ushakov, who occupied Dobruja, returned to the Empire and settled on the Lower Danube, near Izmail. As the Russians retreated, the Turks slowly advanced, and on August 22 Omer Pasha entered Bucharest.