The state and development of society are largely determined by the size and composition of the population. The population is characterized both as an element of the productive forces and as the bearer of production relations. It also has self-reproduction.

Population- this is a naturally historically formed and continuously renewed in the process of production and reproduction of life, a set of people living in a certain territory - in a village, city, district, region, country.

Human Resources- this is the able-bodied part of the population, which, having physical and intellectual capabilities, is able to produce material goods or provide services.

From this definition it follows that labor resources include, on the one hand, people engaged in economic activity (in various industries), and on the other hand, not employed, but who can work. Thus, the labor force consists of actual and potential workers.

The necessary physical and intellectual abilities depend on age: in the early period of a person’s life and at the time of maturity, they are formed and multiplied, and lost by old age. Age acts as a kind of criterion that makes it possible to single out the actual labor resources from the entire population.

The population is all people, regardless of their characteristics, that is, this is the broadest concept for referring to human resources. Often in the same sense in the socio-economic literature, the concept of "population" is used.

At the same time, the population is the source, the “material” from which all other groupings of people are obtained (for example, those that are designated in labor economics as the economically active population, labor resources). Therefore, the study of the size, composition and dynamics of the population (this is the subject of study of the science of demography) is also extremely important for labor economics. Economists consider the population as a source of resources for labor, as a carrier of certain economic relations, and, very importantly, as a consumer who creates demand.

The population of Ukraine is constantly declining (by about 0.4 million annually since 1994). This reduction is caused, on the one hand, by a decrease in the number of births and an increase in the number of deaths (the annual natural decrease in the population has exceeded 300 thousand people in recent years, and on the other hand, by a negative balance of external migration (almost 100 thousand people annually). These two reasons have led to a strong decrease in the population of Ukraine over the past decade An alarming indicator in the dynamics of the population is an increase in the number of people of retirement age and a corresponding decrease in the number of young people, which shows the aging of the population and reduces the source of resources for work.

Migration, social and economic movements of the population are interdependent and interconnected. Together, they determine the size and qualitative characteristics of the population.

In the natural movement of the population, there are types of reproduction: traditional (extensive) and modern (intensive).

Traditional type of reproduction It is characterized by a high unregulated birth rate and high mortality (due to the underdevelopment of medicine, low living standards, wars, epidemics). As a result of the interaction of these factors, the overall population growth rate is low, and the share of young people prevails in the structure. This type is characteristic of the early stages of the development of human society.

Modern type of reproduction due to socio-economic development, rising living standards, advances in medicine, the emancipation and involvement of women in economic activity, and other reasons, as a result of which the birth rate has sharply decreased, life expectancy has significantly increased, the death rate has decreased, and the number of older people in the population structure has increased .

Distinguish three playback modes population: extended, simple, narrowed.

Extended reproduction characterized by a predominance of births over deaths (both in absolute terms and per 1,000 people) and, accordingly, natural population growth.

Simple reproduction means a constant population as a result of approximately the same birth and death rates.

Constricted reproduction, or depopulation, is typical for countries in which death rates exceed birth rates, resulting in an absolute decrease in the number of population, which is what we are seeing now in Ukraine.

Features of the historical development of Ukraine have strongly influenced the dynamics of the entire population, and in particular labor resources. In the 20th century, the life of all generations and almost every person was disturbed and worsened by severe dramatic events (World War I and II and civil wars, industrialization, collectivization, famines, mass repressions, participation in military conflicts (in particular, in Afghanistan), the Chernobyl tragedy, deep crisis of the 1990s). As a result, not only thousands and even millions of young healthy people died or became disabled, but the birth rate sharply decreased, and the sex and age structure of the population was deformed. Therefore, the reproduction of the population and labor resources for work in Ukraine did not occur evenly, but “wave-like”: certain rises are changed by deep falls.

Reproduction of labor resources- This is a process of constant and uninterrupted renewal of the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the economically active population.

Since labor resources are part of the population, the reproduction of labor resources also reflects the state and nature of the reproduction of the population as part of the whole. The dynamics of the total population determines the dynamics of the economically active population, but this dependence is not simple. That is, an increase (decrease) in the population leads to an increase (decrease) in the number of the working population only under other identical conditions, and in real life, under the influence of various reasons, these changes do not occur simultaneously and not on the same scale.

For example, the birth of children increases the population immediately, and the number of labor resources - only after 15-20 years, and then on the condition that these people become economically active. The death rate of disabled people reduces the population, but does not change the resources for labor. With a constant population, labor resources can significantly increase (decrease) due to an increase (decrease) in the labor activity of the population, for example, due to changes in living standards.

In the reproduction of labor resources, as in the reproduction of the entire population, there are types of movement, types and modes.

The natural, migration and economic movement of the population affect the quantitative characteristics of labor resources, while the social movement affects the qualitative ones. Each type of movement is determined by the action of many different causes, and their interaction and interdependence determine the number of economically active population, which is a fundamental indicator for any society or state. Therefore, it is important to analyze the impact on the dynamics of the economically active (labor-active) population of any of these factors separately.

The types of reproduction of labor resources compared with the types of reproduction of the population have different semantic meanings. An extensive type of reproduction is associated with a change in the quality of human resources: an increase in the educational level, qualifications, improved health, mental abilities, etc., which means an increase in labor potential.

In this way, population reproduction has not only demographic, but also economic and social aspects. It determines the formation of labor resources, the development of territories, the state of productive forces, the development of social infrastructure, etc.

The population and labor resources have quantitative and qualitative parameters necessary for the analysis and evaluation of demographic processes, the development of a strategy in the field of labor resources management. To characterize the reproduction of the population, indicators of fertility, mortality and natural increase are used.

The difference between the number of births and deaths with a positive result is called natural population growth.

The average annual population is determined for the middle of the year as the arithmetic average of the population at the beginning and end of the year, or by adding half of its growth to the initial population.

The size and composition of the population in all countries of the world are determined using censuses. The last census in our country took place in 2001. Its main data were published and became the basis for obtaining demographic data in the subsequent period. Censuses provide the most accurate population data.

Population forecasting is very important. Forecast calculations make it possible to identify expected changes in the population, assess the demographic situation that is developing both in individual regions and in the country as a whole, determine the number of labor resources, changes in their educational and vocational level, and trace the impact of other socio-economic and environmental factors on reproductive process.

According to the classification of the International Labor Organization (ILO), the population over a certain minimum age established for accounting for the economically active population (in Ukraine - 16 years) is divided into three categories: employed, unemployed and outside the labor force. Employed and unemployed make up the labor force or population active in a given period. Persons outside the labor force include residual groups who are unemployed, not looking for a job and not ready to work, including those under working age. This group represents the population that is currently economically inactive.

Separation according to the ILO methodology

The population in the Russian Federation is 142 million people.(as of April 2009). Over the past 7 years, Russia has lost 2 million people and moved from seventh to ninth in the world among the largest countries in terms of population.

The current demographic situation in Russia is characterized by depopulation, a decrease in the birth rate and an increase in mortality, an aging population, a reduction in average life expectancy, and problems in the employment of the population. The demographic factor influences the formation of labor potential, largely determines the development and distribution of the country's productive forces.

Population is a complex set of people living within certain areas. It is characterized by a system of such indicators as the size and density of the population, its composition by sex, age, nationality, language and education.

The presence of a certain number of people is one of the important conditions for the material and social life of society. Russia is a relatively sparsely populated country. The population density of the Russian Federation is 8.3 people / km 2, which is 14 times lower than in the European Union, with 79% of the population living in the European part of Russia.

Population dynamics

In 2009, for the first time in 17 years, since 1993, Russia's population stopped declining, stopping at 141.9 million people. In the 1990s even large immigration could not stop this process, the natural population decline was huge (0.96 million people in 2000 alone) due to a sharp jump in mortality (one and a half times) and a sharp drop in the birth rate (one third). But emerging in the early years of the XXI century. a decrease in the size of natural population loss (to 0.249 million people in 2009 due to a partial improvement in mortality and birth rates), coupled with a migration increase that began to grow again, made it possible in 2009 to maintain the population with a possible prospect of its stabilization in the coming years (if judged by the average version of the forecast of the Federal State Statistics Service on the estimated population until 2030).

As can be seen from Table. 12.1, in Russia the birth rate has not so much fallen (it is already close to the pre-reform level and higher than in most European countries), but the mortality rate has greatly increased and continues to remain at a very high level. It is provoked by high stresses that the population continues to experience. According to a survey of the adult population conducted by Rosstat in the summer of 2008 (that is, even before the crisis began), 72% of respondents experienced a feeling of great or very great anxiety about the uncertainty of their situation (although in 1998 this number was 95%), 45% of respondents assessed the level of their material well-being below the poverty line (when at best there is only enough money for basic food and clothing), 44% were afraid of losing their jobs, 27% experienced a feeling of loneliness.

Table 12.1. Demographic indicators of Russia

						2015, medium version of the forecast (in brackets - low and high versions of the forecast)	2025, medium version of the forecast (in brackets - low and high versions of the forecast)
Population, million people (at the end of the year)						141,7 (139,6-142,6)	140.7 (132.6-145,5)
Natural increase/decrease in population. million people						0.348 (-0,688-0.211)	0,639 (-1,181-0.217)
Birth rate, per 1000 people						11,9 (10,9-12,5)
Mortality, per 1000 people						14,4 (15,8-14,0)	13,9 (17,0-13,2)
Migration growth, million people
Life expectancy at birth, years						69,8 (67,9-70,3)	72,4 (68,2-75,0)
Including: men						63,4 (61,8-64,4)	66,7 (62,3-70,7)
						75,7 (74,3-76,2)	77,9 (74,4-79,3)
Average annual population of working age, million people						82,7 (82,2-83,0)	76,7 (74,5-78,2)

Strong socio-economic stresses cause anomie, primarily in the most active part of the population - men (especially in the group from 30 to 50 years old). Anomia is manifested, in particular, in neglect of one's own and other people's life. As a result, the working-age population has a very high mortality rate from external causes and chronic diseases. So, more than 30% of mortality falls on external causes - these are accidental poisonings (mainly with low-quality alcohol), suicides, murders, traffic accidents, etc. The high mortality of the working-age population from cardiovascular diseases (it is 3-4 times higher than in European countries, and it accounts for 55% of the causes of death) is mainly due to the fact that the proportion of those who take care of their health (through diet, refusal to from bad habits, medical prevention) does not exceed 25% of those surveyed by Rosstat.

The Concept of Demographic Policy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025, approved at the end of 2007 by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, states that the goals of demographic policy are to stabilize the population by 2015 at the level of 142-143 million people and create conditions for its growth by 2025 up to 145 million people, as well as improving the quality of life and increasing life expectancy by 2015 to 70 years, by 2025 to 75 years. In fact, the Concept orients the country towards the high version of Rosstat's forecast of the estimated population.

Population aging

If Russia at the end of the 19th century was a country with a young population - with a high proportion of children and a low proportion of the elderly, then after 1959 the proportion of older people in the total population began to increase. But when compared with other countries with low birth rates, it turns out that Russia's population is not the oldest. In 1990, Russia ranked 25th. This is not surprising, since Russia, firstly, is at the stage of the aging process, when the proportion of the middle-aged population practically does not change and aging occurs due to a decrease in the proportion of children, and secondly, due to low life expectancy, not all people live to old age.

The highest share of adolescent children is in the Republics of the North Caucasus, in the national formations of Siberia and the Far East.

The lowest share of the young population is in the North-West of the country.

Urbanization of the population

— growth in the share of the urban population

At the moment, there are 1096 cities in Russia, of which 11 cities are millionaires:

Millionaire cities Russia:

1. Moscow (10,500 thousand people)
2. St. Petersburg (4 581)
3. Novosibirsk (1 398)
4. Yekaterinburg (1 335)
5. Nizhny Novgorod (1 280)
6. Samara (1 135)
7. Kazan (1 130)
8. Omsk (1 129)
9. Chelyabinsk (1,093)
10. Rosnov-on-Don (1,049)
11. Ufa (1,032)

Quantity urban population in Russia is 73% .

79% of the inhabitants live in the European part of Russia.

Russians make up 80% of the country's population.

Cities that changed their name after the 90s:

• St. Petersburg (Leningrad)
• Nizhny Novgorod (Gorky)
• Yekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk)
• Samara (Kuibyshev)

Factors affecting the population

Let's look at the factors that affect the population.

The dynamics of the population of any state consists of the natural and mechanical movement of the population.

Vital movement of the population

Vital movement of the population- this is a change in the population under the influence of natural processes (fertility and mortality), which determine the change of human generations.

fertility

The birth rate in Russia is 12 per thousand, which means 12 people per thousand people (data for 2009) (in 2002, 10 people per 1,000 people.)

In recent years, the situation has improved somewhat, which is associated with the implementation of an active demographic policy by the state. However, the annual natural population decline remains quite high, and the migration population growth has significantly decreased.

Factors affecting fertility:

• standards of living
• national characteristics
• woman's level of education
• state of the country's healthcare system

The highest birth rate is in the republics of the Volga-Vyatka, North Caucasus and Ural economic regions.

The lowest birth rate is in the Northwestern and Central economic regions.

Mortality

Mortality in Russia is 15 people per 1000 people. Mortality among Russian men and women of working age is significantly higher than the European average.

formed in Russia special model of mortality:

• Huge gap in the average life expectancy of men and women (13 years). On average, men live up to 61 years, women up to 74 years.

• Decreased life expectancy

• Changes in the structure of causes of death:

1. Diseases of the digestive system
2. Cancer diseases
3. Territorial factor
4. Poisoning, AIDS, suicide

In Russia, the region with the highest mortality rate is the Pskov region.

Mechanical population movement

Mechanical population movement- movement of people for permanent or temporary residence due to natural, economic, political and other reasons.

Internal movements do not change the population of the country, but change the population of individual areas. Currently, internal migration covers 80% of the total migration turnover.

Internal migration happens:

• permanent (moving to a permanent place of residence)
• seasonal (moving depending on the season)
• pendulum (regular, usually daily, movement of the population from one locality to another to work or study and back)
• And also, a shift work, characteristic of the northern regions of western and eastern Siberia, was formed.

external migration subdivided into:

• Immigration (entry of citizens into the country)
• Emigration (departure of citizens from their country to another country for permanent or long-term residence)

Population and its importance

The population is a complex set of people living within certain territories and operating in existing historical conditions. It affects the territorial organization of the economy, the production specialization of the economy of the regions and the location of the branches of the economic complex.

The population is characterized by a system of interrelated indicators, such as the size and density of the population, its composition by sex and age, nationality, language, marital status, education, membership in social groups, etc. The population of any country performs two important functions: on the one hand, it is the producer of material goods, the creator of the social national product, on the other hand, the consumer of material values. The quantitative and qualitative composition of labor resources, the traditional occupations and skills of the population largely determine the territorial organization of the economy, the industrial specialization of the economy of the regions, and the location of the branches of the economic complex.

Also, the population in a country or a separate region has a significant impact on the economic potential, on the development of the productive forces of society. However, there is no direct relationship between these concepts. Thus, states with a high level of economic development with a smaller population produce ten times more gross national product than states that surpass them in terms of population, but are inferior in technical equipment, labor productivity, and the level of skills of the workforce.

The population of Russia and its trends

The population size and trends in its change are the result of natural and mechanical movement of the population (migration).

The natural movement of the population is a set of processes of fertility, mortality, natural increase or natural decline. The natural movement of the population is ensured by the mode of reproduction - the continuous renewal and change of human generations. The main indicators of population reproduction are: the birth rate (the number of births per year to the average population per year), the death rate (the number of deaths per year to the average annual population), the coefficient of natural increase (the ratio of natural population growth to the average population for a certain period or the difference between birth and death rates).

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the demographic development of the Russian Federation has entered a period of acute crisis that has engulfed all the main demographic processes: mortality, fertility and migration. The current demographic situation has developed against the background of long-term unfavorable trends in demographic development for more than thirty years, starting from the 1960s. a significant part of the population, the continued aging of the Russian population, immigration processes, the increased loss of the working-age population, the unfavorable environmental situation in many regions of the Russian Federation, etc.

According to the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), as of October 1, 2009, the resident population of the Russian Federation amounted to 141,904.0 thousand people. According to the 2002 Population Census, the population of the Russian Federation was 145,166.7 thousand people. There is a natural decline in the population, which is typical for 75 subjects of the Russian Federation. The population is growing very slowly.

Table 1. Vital movement indicators

Vital rates
Number of births, people
Number of deaths, people
Natural population growth, people
Total fertility rate, per 1,000 population
Crude death rate, per 1000 population
General coefficient of natural increase, per 1000 population
Life expectancy at birth, years:
men and women

Negative rates of natural increase are noted in all regions of the European part of Russia. At the same time, positive dynamics persists in the national formations of the North Caucasus, the Volga region, Eastern Siberia and the Far East. This is due to the preservation of the historically established traditions of large families in these republics, as well as the high proportion of the population living in rural areas, where the birth rate remains high.

At present, thanks to the policy of the state, mortality has begun to decrease significantly. An increase in the number of births was observed in 67 subjects of the Russian Federation, a decrease in the number of deaths - in 75 subjects. In the whole country, the excess of the number of deaths over the number of births was 1.2 times (in January-May 2008 - 1.3 times), in 4 constituent entities of the Russian Federation (Tula, Pskov, Tambov and Leningrad regions) it amounted to 2.0 -2.2 times.

The birth rate of boys exceeds the birth rate of girls and amounts to 104 - 107 people. per 100 girls per year. However, by the age of 30, the ratio of the male and female population levels out. This is due to the higher mortality of males (as a result of a large number of accidents, participation in hostilities within the state and abroad). From the age of 40, the predominance of the female population over the male begins (as a result of increased male mortality associated with industrial injuries and drug and alcohol abuse). The greatest excess of women over men falls on the age group over 70, which is largely due to losses during the Second World War. In general, the proportion of men in the age and sex structure of the population does not exceed 47%, which is somewhat lower compared to the developed countries of the world. The decrease in the proportion of men is also explained by the reduction in life expectancy.

There is also an unfavorable trend in the change in the age structure of the population. The proportion of the working-age population in the total number of deaths reaches 30%. The deformed age structure indicates both a reduction in the labor potential now and in the future, and an increase in a kind of burden on the employed population, since the maintenance of people over retirement age falls on the able-bodied population. [cm. 1, p. 67-68]

Mechanical movement of the population - migration processes or the movement of people across the borders of certain territories with a change of residence forever or for a more or less long time. Migrations contribute to the territorial redistribution of the population and labor resources, affect the level of socio-economic development of the regions.

The indicators of the migration process in the Russian Federation are presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Indicators of migration movements in Russia

Arrived in the Russian Federation from the CIS countries and non-CIS countries, people
Arrived in the Russian Federation from the CIS countries, people
Arrived in the Russian Federation from non-CIS countries, people
Departed from the Russian Federation to the CIS countries and non-CIS countries, people
Left the Russian Federation for the CIS countries
Left the Russian Federation for non-CIS countries
Number of families of internally displaced persons and refugees, units
Number of internally displaced persons and refugees, people

According to statistics, over the past 10-12 years, migration processes in Russia are characterized by the following features:

The total number of registered migratory movements, both internal and external, decreased by more than two and a half times - from 6.3 million in 1989 to 2.4 million in 2001;

The share of internal migrations in the total volume of resettlements (which also includes migration exchanges with the CIS countries, the Baltic States and other countries) has increased from 65% to almost 90%;

The composition of migrants is dominated by the population of working age, which accounts for 3/4 of their total number;

The number of those who entered Russia for permanent residence exceeds the number of those who left it, which ensures a mechanical increase in the population (since the beginning of the 1990s, it has amounted to almost 3.5 million people);

The external migration turnover is dominated by the migration exchange (the sum of arrivals and departures) between the Russian Federation and the CIS and Baltic countries, which in the period under review has already exceeded 11 million people;

The main vector of interregional migration in Russia in recent years has been the movement from the north and east of the country to the south and west. The country is clearly divided into two zones - inflow (Central, Volga-Vyatka, Central Black Earth, Ural economic regions; Rostov region, Krasnodar and Stavropol regions of the North Caucasus region; southern regions of Siberia) and outflow of the population (European north, northern regions of Eastern Siberia , Far East). This spatial pattern of migrations, according to experts, will continue in the foreseeable future.

The largest outflow of population is observed from the Far East region. During the 90s, it exceeded 840 thousand people (11% of all residents). More than 300 thousand people (5%) left the Northern economic region during the same period, more than 180 thousand people (2%) left Eastern Siberia.

The Central District has been the main area of ​​attraction for migrants for many years now. Over the past decade, the migration growth here amounted to 1.2 million people (4% of the population living in the region at the beginning of 1991). Population growth due to migrants in the North Caucasus over the same period exceeded 900 thousand people (5.5%), in the Volga region - 800 thousand people (5%), in the Central Black Earth region - 550 thousand people (7%) .

Since the second half of the 1990s, Moscow has become the most prominent center of attraction for migrants from all regions of the country. Only in 1996-2000. migration growth in the capital exceeded 200 thousand people, which accounted for half of the migration growth throughout the Central Federal District.

Intra- and inter-regional migration flows are formed under the influence of various factors. The transition to the market and the change in economic relations have led, in particular, to the loss of the stimulating value of benefits and wage bonuses previously established by the state in the regions of the Far North and equivalent territories, which have been used for many years to attract personnel. The social conditions of people's lives in these regions have also noticeably deteriorated. The decline in production in the primary industries, which had a predominant development in the north of the country, led to a reduction in jobs and an increase in unemployment. All this taken together led to an increase in migration outflow from the northern territories.

The protracted military conflict in Chechnya and the aggravated interethnic relations in the North Caucasus resulted in the loss of the migration attractiveness of this region and a decrease in the influx of migrants from other regions of the country. The coefficient of migration growth has significantly decreased here.

At the same time, the influx of population into the regions of the west and south of Russia can be explained by the fact that, along with economic incentives, non-economic factors such as climate, political stability, ethnic homogeneity, and geographical location are beginning to play an increasingly significant role. Therefore, the data on migration speak much more about the real interregional differences in the quality of life than the statistics of the population's monetary income.

Russia has the closest external migration ties with the CIS countries. They account for over 4/5 of the migration exchange of the Russian Federation with foreign countries. At the same time, the incoming flow of migrants to Russia prevails. More than 2/3 of the migrants who entered Russia were from Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. In the geography of the departure of migrants from Russia, there are three main directions - Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. They account for 4/5 of all those leaving the Russian Federation for neighboring countries for permanent residence.

Emigration from Russia to non-CIS countries over the past decade has decreased from 88 thousand in 1991 to 75 thousand people in 2001 (reaching a maximum in 1993 - 114 thousand people). Among the states that accept Russian citizens for permanent residence, Germany, Israel and the United States stand out, which account for 9/10 of all emigrants. The share of other countries accepting migrants from Russia is gradually growing, primarily Finland and Canada. [cm. 2].

• Long-term population fluctuations in historical societies
• Appendix. Modeling structural and demographic mechanisms

Long-term population fluctuations in historical societies

This article is a revised translation of Turchin, P. 2009. Long-term population cycles in human societies . Pages 1-17 in R. S. Ostfeld and W. H. Schlesinger, editors. The Year in Ecology and Conservation Biology, 2009. Ann. N. Y. Acad. sci. 1162.
Translation Petra Petrova, editor Svetlana Borinskaya.

about the author

Pyotr Valentinovich Turchin- American scientist of Russian origin, specialist in the field of population dynamics and cliodynamics (mathematical modeling and statistical analysis of historical dynamics). He studied at the Faculty of Biology of Moscow State University, received a bachelor's degree in biology from New York University in 1980, in 1985 received a Ph.D. in zoology at Duke University. Managed several major environmental projects. He made an important contribution to the development of mathematical models of "secular" socio-demographic cycles. He is currently a professor in the Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology and an Associate Professor in the Department of Mathematics at the University of Connecticut.

Existing methods for predicting population change are very imperfect: today's trends are usually extrapolated to obtain a forecast. In the 1960s, when the world's population was growing at a rate faster than exponential growth, demographers predicted imminent catastrophe as a result of a "population explosion." Today, the forecast for many European countries, including Russia, is no less sad - only now we are allegedly threatened with extinction. However, a review of historical data shows that the typical pattern observed in human populations does not correspond to either exponential growth, much less permanent decline in population. In reality, phases of growth and decline alternate, and population dynamics usually look like long-term fluctuations with a frequency of 150-300 years (the so-called "secular cycles") against the background of gradual growth.

Until now, such fluctuations have been noted by historians in individual countries or regions, and in most cases, local explanations have been given for each region or period. However, recent studies have shown that such fluctuations are observed in a wide variety of historical societies, for which more or less detailed data on population changes are available. Regular significant drops in numbers (up to 30-50% of the population, and in some cases even more) with subsequent growth act as a typical characteristic of human population dynamics, and political instability, wars, epidemics and famine are subject to certain patterns, which are studied by the author.

The article examines historical and archaeological evidence of periodic population fluctuations for Eurasian societies from the 2nd century BC to the 2nd century BC. to the 19th century AD and a theoretical explanation of this dynamics is proposed, taking into account the presence of feedback. Feedback, acting with a significant time delay, just leads to oscillatory movements in the population. The feedback mechanisms described in the article also operate in modern societies, and we need to learn how to take them into account in order to build realistic long-term demographic forecasts and predict bursts of political instability.

Introduction

Long-term population dynamics are often presented as almost inevitable exponential growth. Over the past 300 years, the world's population has grown from 0.6 billion in 1700 to 1.63 billion in 1900 and reached 6 billion by the year 2000.

In the 1960s, there was even an impression that the world's population was growing at a rate exceeding the rate of exponential growth, in connection with which they predicted the end of the world, expected, for example, on Friday, November 13, 2026. (Von Foerster et al. 1960, Berryman and Valenti 1994). During the 1990s, when the growth rate of the world's population slowed down significantly (largely due to a sharp drop in the birth rate in densely populated developing countries, primarily in China and India), it became clear that the former predictions of a catastrophe (Ehrlich 1968) require revision. At the same time, the decline in the population in most European countries (which is especially noticeable in the countries of Eastern Europe, but would be no less pronounced in Western Europe, if it were not for the masking effect of immigration), has led to the fact that in the press the discussion of this problem has acquired a completely different turnover. The concern now is that the dwindling number of working people will not be able to support the growing number of retirees. Some of the predictions calculated today are as extreme as past doomsday predictions. For example, Russian popular publications regularly predict that by 2050 the country's population will halve.

Many of the reports about possible population changes that appear in the press are sensational and even hysterical, but the main question - how the population of different countries, as well as the entire Earth, will change in the future - is really very important. The size and structure of the population have a tremendous impact on the well-being of society and individuals, and indeed of the entire biosphere as a whole.

However, the current methods for predicting population change are very imperfect. The easiest way to predict population change is to extrapolate from today's trends. These approaches include the exponential model, or the even faster-than-exponential growth model, as in the doomsday scenario. Some more sophisticated approaches take into account possible changes in demographic indicators (fertility, mortality and migration), but proceed from the fact that these processes are determined by external influences, such as climate change, epidemics and natural disasters. It is noteworthy that these most common approaches to population forecasting do not take into account that population density itself can affect the change in demographic indicators.

To predict how the population will change, it is necessary to understand what factors influence these changes. It is impossible to predict the pattern of population changes in the presence of several interacting factors without mathematical models. Models in which the variable depends only on external parameters, that is, there are no feedbacks, are called zero order models. Zero-order dynamics models are always non-equilibrium (that is, the population does not reach a constant (equilibrium) value, around which small fluctuations occur), and depending on the parameters, they assume either an infinite increase in the population size or its decrease to zero. (Turchin 2003a:37).

More complex models take into account the influence of population density on further changes in its size, that is, they take into account the presence of feedback. These models include the so-called logistic model proposed by Verhulst. (Gilyarov 1990). This model has an exponential part that describes rapid growth when population density is low, and slowing population growth when population density increases. The dynamic processes described by the logistic model are characterized by convergence to an equilibrium position, often referred to as medium capacity(the capacity of the medium may increase with the advent of technical innovations, but in some models, for simplicity, it is considered constant). Such models are called first order models, since in them the feedback acts without delay, as a result of which the model is described by one equation with one variable (for example, a logistic model). While the logistic model does a good job of describing population growth, it (as in any first-order model) does not contain factors that could cause population fluctuations. According to this model, upon reaching a population corresponding to the capacity of the environment, the situation stabilizes, and population fluctuations can only be explained by external factors. exogenous reasons.

First-order feedback effects show up quickly. For example, in territorial mammals, as soon as the population reaches a value at which all available territories are occupied, all excess individuals become territoryless "homeless" with low survival and zero chances of reproductive success. Thus, as soon as the population size reaches the value of the environmental capacity, determined by the total number of territories, the population growth rate immediately decreases to zero.

A more complex picture is presented by processes in which the population dynamics depends on the influence of an external factor, the intensity of which, in turn, depends on the size of the studied population. We will call this factor endogenous(“external” in relation to the population under study, but “internal” in relation to the dynamic system that includes the population). In this case, we are dealing with second order feedback. A classic example of population dynamics with second-order feedback in animal ecology is the interaction between predator and prey. When the density of the prey population is high enough to cause an increase in the number of predators, the effect of this on the rate of growth of the prey population does not affect immediately, but with a certain delay. The delay is due to the fact that it takes some time for the predator population to reach a sufficient level to start affecting the prey population. In addition, when there are a lot of predators and a decrease in the number of prey begins, predators continue to reduce the number of prey. Even though prey become scarce and most predators starve, the associated extinction of predators takes some time. As a result, second-order feedback acts on populations with a noticeable delay and tends to cause periodic population fluctuations.

Models that take into account the presence of feedback are well developed in ecology to describe fluctuations in the number of natural animal populations. Demographers studying human populations began to develop models incorporating density dependence in earnest much later than population ecologists. (Lee 1987).

Some demographic cycles have been discussed in the literature, such as periodic fluctuations in the age structure of populations with a period of approximately one generation (about 25 years). Also discussed were cycles characterized by alternation of generations with high and low fertility, the average duration of which is about 50 years. (Easterlin 1980, Wachter and Lee 1989). In population ecology, such fluctuations are often referred to as generation cycles and first-order cycles, respectively. (Turchin 2003a:25).

However, to the best of my knowledge, demographers still do not consider second-order feedback processes that generate fluctuations with a much longer period, while the rise and fall of the population takes 2-3 generations or more. Accordingly, second-order models are practically not used in the construction of forecasts of the dynamics of the number of human populations.

If population fluctuations in historical and prehistoric societies were governed by second-order feedback, then what seemed to be inexplicable, externally induced reversals in population trends may actually be manifestations of feedback acting with a significant time delay. In this case, it will also be necessary to revise the forecasts of future demographic changes to include second-order dynamic processes in them. In what follows, we will review the historical and archaeological evidence for periodic population fluctuations and attempt to provide a theoretical explanation for such fluctuations.

Historical overview of population dynamics in agrarian societies

Even a cursory glance at population changes over the past few millennia is enough to convince us that the growth of the world's population has not been as steadily exponential as it is commonly portrayed (Figure 1). Apparently, there were several periods of rapid growth, punctuated by periods in which growth slowed down. On fig. 1 presents a generalized view of the population dynamics of mankind. But in different countries and regions, population changes may be inconsistent, and in order to understand the components reflected in the overall dynamics of the human population, it is necessary to study population changes within the boundaries of certain countries or provinces.

To determine what time O On a scale, we need to consider the dynamics of human populations; we use data on other mammalian species. It is known from population ecology that second-order cycles are characterized by periods from 6 to 12-15 generations (sometimes longer periods are observed, but for very rare combinations of parameters). In humans, the period during which a generational change occurs can vary depending on both biological (for example, nutritional characteristics and the distribution of mortality by age) and social (for example, the age at which it is customary to marry) characteristics of the population. However, in most historical populations, generations changed over a period that falls into the interval from 20 to 30 years. Taking into account the minimum and maximum values ​​of the duration of one generation (20 and 30 years, respectively), we can conclude that for a person, the periods of cycles of the second order should be in the range from 120 to 450 years, most likely between 200 and 300 years. Such cycles lasting several centuries, we will henceforth refer to as "secular cycles". To identify such cycles, it is necessary to study time intervals lasting many centuries. At the same time, it is necessary to know how the population has changed over periods comparable to the duration of a generation, that is, to have data for every 20-30 years.

Now let's turn to the data on the population in the past. Such data can be extracted from the periodic population censuses conducted by the states of the past to estimate the tax base, as well as from proxy indicators, which will be discussed later.

Western Europe

The first source of data here can serve as a population atlas (McEvedy and Jones 1978). The time used in this atlas O Its resolution (100 years after 1000 AD and 50 years after 1500 AD) is insufficient for statistical analysis of these data, but for some areas where the long-term population history is fairly well known, such as Western Europe, the resulting overall picture is very vivid.

On fig. Figure 3 shows population change curves for only two countries, but for other countries the curves look about the same. First, there is a general increase in the average population. Secondly, against the backdrop of this millennial trend, two secular cycles are observed, peaking around 1300 and 1600. The millennial trend reflects a gradual social evolution that accelerates noticeably after the end of the agrarian period, but here we will focus primarily on pre-industrial societies. Secular fluctuations look like cycles of the second order, but more detailed analysis is needed for final conclusions.

China

Is this pattern of secular fluctuations against the backdrop of a millennial trend seen exclusively in Europe, or is it characteristic of agrarian societies in general? To answer this question, consider the opposite edge of Eurasia. Since the unification in 221 BC. under the Qin Dynasty, the central government conducted detailed population censuses for the sake of collecting taxes. As a result, we have data on Chinese population dynamics over a period of more than two thousand years, although there are significant gaps in it, corresponding to periods of political fragmentation and civil wars.

The interpretation of the obtained data is hindered by several complicating circumstances. In the later stages of dynastic cycles, when power was waning, it was not uncommon for corrupt or negligent officials to manipulate or even outright falsify population data. (Ho 1959). The rates for converting the number of taxed households to the number of inhabitants are often unknown and may well have varied from dynasty to dynasty. The territory controlled by the Chinese state was also constantly changing. Finally, it is often quite difficult to determine whether the number of taxable households declined during troubled times as a result of demographic changes (mortality, emigration) or as a result of the inability of the authorities to control and count the number of subjects.

Therefore, there is some disagreement among experts as to what O exactly what the numbers at our disposal mean (Ho 1959, Durand 1960, Song et al. 1985). However, these disagreements concern, first of all, the absolute values ​​of the population, while in matters relating to relative changes in population density (which, of course, are of greatest interest to us), there is little disagreement. China's population as a whole increased during periods of political stability and declined (sometimes sharply) during periods of social upheaval. As a result, population changes largely reflect China's "dynastic cycles" (Ho 1959, Reinhard et al. 1968, Chu and Lee 1994).

Of all the works known to me, the most detailed description of the demographic history of China is described by Zhao and Xie. (Zhao and Xie 1988). If you look at the entire two thousand year period, the curve of population changes will be clearly non-stationary. In particular, the demographic regime has undergone two dramatic changes (Turchin 2007). Until the 11th century, population peaks reached 50–60 million (Fig. 4a). However, in the XII century, peak values ​​double, reaching 100-120 million (Turchin 2007: Fig. 8.3).

The mechanism underlying these changes in the demographic regime is known. Until the 11th century, the population of China was concentrated in the north, and the southern regions were sparsely populated. During the Zhao Dynasty (Song Empire), the south equaled and then surpassed the north (Reinhard et al. 1968 : figs. 14 and 115). In addition, new, high-yielding varieties of rice were bred during this period. The next change in the demographic regime occurred in the 18th century, when the population began to grow at a very high rate, reaching 400 million in the 19th century, and more than 1 billion in the 20th century.

To leave aside these regime changes, I will consider here primarily the quasi-stationary period from the beginning of the Western Han Dynasty to the end of the Tang Dynasty, from 201 B.C. to 960 AD (For later centuries, see Turchin 2007: section 8.3.1). During these twelve centuries, China's population peaked at least four times, each time reaching values ​​of 50-60 million people (Figure 4a). Each of these peaks was in the last phase of the great unifying dynasties, Eastern and Western Han, Sui and Tang. Between these peaks, China's population fell below 20 million (although some researchers, for the reasons listed above, consider these estimates to be underestimated). The quantitative details of Zhao and Xie's reconstructions remain debatable, but the qualitative picture they paint - population fluctuations associated with dynastic cycles and having a period corresponding to the expected 2-3 centuries - is beyond doubt.

North Vietnam

Another example of similar fluctuations is given by Viktor Lieberman in his book Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in a Global Context, ca. 800-1830" (Lieberman 2003). The picture of population fluctuations in North Vietnam (Fig. 5) is in many ways similar to that observed in Western Europe (Fig. 3): there is an upward millennial trend and secular fluctuations against its background.

Indirect indicators of population dynamics based on archaeological data

Population reconstructions such as those shown in Fig. 1, 3-5, have one significant drawback: their reliability is reduced due to a number of subjective circumstances. To obtain such reconstructions, specialists usually have to bring together many extremely heterogeneous sources of information, among which there are both quantitative and qualitative ones. At the same time, different data are trusted to varying degrees, not always explaining in detail on what grounds. As a result, different specialists get different curves. This does not mean that we should outright reject well-founded judgments of highly professional experts. Thus, the curves of the dynamics of the population of England in the Early Modern period (XVI-XVIII centuries), reconstructed by experts using informal methods, turned out to be very close to the results subsequently obtained using the formal method of genealogical reconstructions. (Wrigley et al. 1997). However, it would be useful to use some other, more objective way to identify population dynamics in historical (and prehistoric) human societies.

Archaeological evidence gives us grounds for such alternative methods. People leave many traces that are measurable. Therefore, the main idea of ​​this approach is to pay special attention to indirect indicators, which can directly correlate with the population of the past. Usually, this approach makes it possible to evaluate not absolute, expressed in the number of individuals per square kilometer, but relative indicators of population dynamics - by what percentage did the population change from one period to another. Such indicators are quite sufficient for the purposes of this review, because here we are interested in relative changes in abundance. In addition, in some cases, absolute estimates can also be obtained.

Population dynamics of villages in the Western Roman Empire

One of the serious problems that often reduce the value of archaeological data is the rough temporal O m resolution. For example, the reconstruction of the history of the population of the Deh Luran plain in western Iran (Dewar 1991) shows at least three significant fluctuations in population density (characterized by a tenfold difference between peaks and declines). However, these data were obtained for s x segments in 200-300 years. This resolution is insufficient for our purposes.

Fortunately, there are also detailed archaeological studies in which the studied temporal s e segments are much shorter (and it is hoped that in the future the number of such examples will increase). The first such study concerns the history of the population of the Roman Empire. This problem has long been the subject of heated scientific debate. (Scheidel 2001). Tamara Lewit summarized both published and unpublished data from reports of archaeological excavations of villages in the western part of the Roman Empire and calculated the proportion of those that were inhabited during the 1st century BC, 1st century AD. and subsequent fifty-year segments up to the 5th century. It turned out that the population coefficient went through two large fluctuations during these five centuries (Fig. 6a).

Theoretical explanations of secular cycles

Numerous historical and archaeological data, such as the examples discussed above, show that long-term population fluctuations can be observed in many different regions of the Earth and historical periods. It seems that such secular cycles are a general pattern of the macrohistorical process, and not a set of individual cases, each of which is explained by a particular cause.

As we have already shown in the review of the data, secular cycles are characterized by ascending and descending phases lasting several generations. Such fluctuations can be described by second-order feedback models. Can we offer a theoretical explanation for the observed pattern of periodically repeating population fluctuations?

Theory of Malthus

In search of such an explanation, it is appropriate to start with the ideas of Thomas Robert Malthus. (Malthus 1798). The foundations of his theory are formulated as follows. A growing population is moving beyond where people can make a living: food prices are rising and real (i.e. expressed in terms of goods consumed, such as kilograms of grain) wages are falling, causing per capita consumption to fall especially among the poorest strata. Economic disasters, often accompanied by famines, epidemics and wars, lead to falling birth rates and rising death rates, causing population growth to decrease (or even become negative), which in turn makes livelihoods more affordable. Factors limiting fertility are weakening, and population growth resumes, sooner or later leading to a new livelihood crisis. Thus, the contradiction between the natural tendency of populations to grow and the restrictions imposed by the availability of food leads to the fact that the population tends to fluctuate regularly.

The theory of Malthus was expanded and developed by David Ricardo in his theories of falling profits and rents. (Ricardo 1817). In the 20th century, these ideas were developed by such neo-Malthusians as Michael (Moses Efimovich) Postan, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie and Wilhelm Abel (Postan 1966, Le Roy Ladurie 1974, Abel 1980).

These ideas face a number of difficulties, both empirical (which will be discussed below) and theoretical. The theoretical difficulties become apparent if we rephrase Malthus's idea in terms of modern population dynamics. Let us assume that scientific and technological progress proceeds more slowly than the population changes in the course of secular cycles (for pre-industrial societies, this seems to be a completely reasonable assumption). Then the capacity of the environment will be determined by the amount of land available for agricultural cultivation, and the level of development of agricultural technologies (expressed as a specific yield per unit area). Approximation of the population to the capacity of the environment will lead to the fact that all available land will be cultivated. Further population growth will immediately (without delay) lead to a decrease in the average level of consumption. Since there is no time delay here, there should not be an excess of the capacity of the environment, and the population should balance at a level corresponding to the capacity of the environment.

In other words, we are dealing here with dynamic processes with first-order feedback, the simplest model of which is the logistic equation, and our assumptions should lead not to cyclic fluctuations, but to stable equilibrium. In the theory of Malthus and the neo-Malthusians, there are no dynamic factors interacting with population density that could provide second-order feedback and periodically repeating population fluctuations.

Structural demographic theory

Although Malthus mentioned wars as one of the consequences of population growth, he did not develop this conclusion further. The neo-Malthusian theories of the 20th century dealt exclusively with demographic and economic indicators. A significant refinement of the Malthusian model was undertaken by the historical sociologist Jack Goldstone. (Goldstone 1991) who took into account the indirect impact of population growth on the structure of society.

Goldstone argued that excessive population growth has a variety of effects on social institutions. First, it leads to runaway inflation, falling real wages, rural disasters, urban immigration, and an increase in the frequency of food riots and low-wage protests (in fact, this is the Malthusian component).

Secondly, and more importantly, rapid population growth leads to an increase in the number of people seeking to occupy an elite position in society. Increasing competition within the elite leads to the emergence of networks of patronage that compete for state resources. As a result, the elites are torn apart by increasing competition and fragmentation.

Thirdly, population growth leads to an increase in the army and bureaucracy and an increase in production costs. The state has no choice but to raise taxes, despite the resistance of both the elites and the people. However, attempts to increase government revenues do not allow to overcome the unwinding government spending. As a result, even if the state manages to raise taxes, it will still face a financial crisis. The gradual intensification of all these tendencies sooner or later leads to the bankruptcy of the state and the resulting loss of control over the army; elites initiate regional and national uprisings, and defiance from above and below leads to uprisings and the fall of the central government (Goldstone 1991).

Goldstone was primarily interested in how population growth causes social and political instability. But it can be shown that instability affects the dynamics of the population according to the feedback principle (Turchin 2007). The most obvious manifestation of this feedback is that if the state weakens or collapses, the population will suffer from increased mortality caused by an increase in crime and banditry, as well as external and internal wars. In addition, troubled times lead to an increase in migration, associated, in particular, with the flow of refugees from war-torn areas. Migration can also be expressed in emigration from the country (which should be added to mortality when calculating the population decline), and in addition, they can contribute to the spread of epidemics. An increase in vagrancy is causing the transfer of infectious diseases between areas that would have remained isolated in better times. Accumulating in cities, vagrants and beggars can cause the population density to exceed the value of the epidemiological threshold (the critical density above which the widespread spread of the disease begins). Finally, political instability leads to lower birth rates because people marry later and have fewer children during turbulent times. People's choice regarding the size of their families can manifest itself not only in a decrease in the birth rate, but also in an increase in the frequency of infanticide.

Components of instability (on the example of US history in the middle of the 19th century)

Political instability can take many forms, from urban riots that kill a few people to civil wars that claim the lives of hundreds of thousands or even millions of people. Such seemingly diverse events are nonetheless interconnected. Thus, in the United States in the 40s and 50s of the 19th century, the number of such incidents as urban riots, clashes between southerners and northerners, and even bloody clashes on religious grounds (persecution against Mormons) began to rise sharply. In 1861, general instability entered a much more serious phase, and civil war broke out between northern and southern states. More details about the application of the structural-demographic theory to the dynamics of instability in the United States are described in the interview of Petr Turchin to the Expert magazine.

City riots

From 1840 to 1860, about a thousand people died in urban riots in the United States.

Conflicts between North and South

Armed clashes between supporters and opponents of slavery in Kansas from 1854 to 1858, called "Bleeding Kansas" (Bleeding Kansas):
November-December 1855 - the war in Wakarusa (Wakarusa War), 1 dead;
May 24-25, 1856 - Massacre in Potawatomie (Pottawatomie Massacre), 5 dead;
August 30, 1856 - Battle of Osawatomie, 5 dead;
May 19, 1858 - Massacre at the Swan Swamp (Marais des Cygnes Massacre), 5 dead.

October 16, 1859 - John Brown's abolitionist attempt to seize the government arsenal in the Virginian town of Harpers Ferry (John Brown's raid on Harpers Ferry), 6 dead.

Prelude to Civil War: Religious Conflicts

1838 - Mormon War in Missouri (Missouri Mormon War): Massacre at Haun's Mill massacre, Battle of Crooked River, 22 dead.

In this way, structural-demographic theory(so called because, according to it, the effects of population growth are filtered by social structures) represents society as a system of interacting parts, including people, elites and the state (Goldstone 1991, Nefedov 1999, Turchin 2003c).

One of the strengths of Goldstone's analysis (Goldstone 1991)- is the use of quantitative historical data and models in tracing the mechanistic relationships between various economic, social and political institutions. However, Goldstone sees the underlying driver of change—population growth—as exogenous variable. His model explains the relationship between population growth and state collapse. In my book "Historical Dynamics" (Turchin 2007) I argue that when building a model in which population dynamics is endogenous process, it is possible to explain not only the relationship between population growth and the collapse of the state, but also the inverse relationship between the collapse of the state and population growth.

A model of population dynamics and internal conflicts in agrarian empires

On the basis of Goldstone's theory, it was possible to develop a mathematical theory of the collapse of the state (Turchin 2007 : chapter 7; Turchin, Korotayev 2006). The model includes three structural variables: 1) population size; 2) the strength of the state (measured as the amount of resources that the state taxes) and 3) the intensity of internal armed conflicts (that is, forms of political instability such as large outbreaks of banditry, peasant riots, local uprisings and civil wars). The model is described in detail in the appendix to this article.

Depending on the value of the parameters, the dynamics predicted by the model is characterized either by a stable equilibrium (to which damped oscillations lead) or by stable limit cycles, such as those shown in Fig. 8. The main parameter that determines the duration of the cycle is the internal rate of population growth. For realistic values ​​of population growth rate, between 1% and 2% per year, we get cycles with a period of about 200 years. In other words, this model predicts a typical pattern of second-order feedback fluctuations with an average period close to that observed in historical data, with the length of the cycle from one state failure to the next determined by the rate of population growth. Below is an empirical test of the predictions of the theory.

Empirical validation of models

The models discussed above and in the Appendix suggest that structural-demographic mechanisms can cause second-order cycles, the duration of which corresponds to actually observed ones. But models do more than just that: they allow specific quantitative predictions to be made that are validated by historical data. One of the impressive predictions of this theory is that the level of political instability should fluctuate with the same period as population density, only it should be shifted in phase so that the peak of instability follows the peak of population density.

In order to empirically test this prediction, we need to compare data on population change and measures of instability. First, we need to identify phases of population growth and decline. Although the quantitative details of the population dynamics of historical societies are rarely known with significant accuracy, there is usually a consensus among historical demographers as to when the qualitative pattern of population growth changes. Secondly, you need to take into account the manifestations of instability (such as peasant riots, separatist uprisings, civil wars, etc.) that occurred during each phase. Instability data are available from a number of synthesis works (such as Sorokin 1937, Tilly 1993 or Stearns 2001). Finally, we compare the manifestations of instability between the two phases. Structural demographic theory predicts that instability should be higher during phases of population decline. Since the available data is rather rough, we will compare the averaged data.

This procedure was applied to all seven complete cycles investigated by Turchin and Nefedov. (Turchin, Nefedov 2008 ; table 1). Empirical data correspond very closely to the predictions of the theory: in all cases, the greatest instability is observed during the phases of decline rather than growth (t-test: P

Table 1. Manifestations of instability by decade during the phases of population growth and decline during secular cycles (according to table 10.2 from: Turchin, Nefedov 2008).

	growth phase		Decline phase
	years	Instability*	years	Instability*
Plantagenets	1151-1315	0,78	1316-1485	2,53
Tudors	1486-1640	0,47	1641-1730	2,44
Capetians	1216-1315	0,80	1316-1450	3,26
Valois	1451-1570	0,75	1571-1660	6,67
Roman Republic	350-130 BC	0,41	130-30 BC	4,40
Early Roman Empire	30 BC - 165	0,61	165-285	3,83
Moscow Rus	1465-1565	0,60	1565-1615	3,80
Mean (±SD)		0.6 (±0.06)		3.8 (±0.5)

* Instability was estimated as an average for all decades in the period under review, while for each decade the instability coefficient took values ​​from 0 to 10, depending on the number of unstable (marked by wars) years.

Using a similar procedure, we can also test the relationship between population fluctuations and the dynamics of political instability during the imperial periods of Chinese history (from the Han Dynasty to the Qing Dynasty). Population data taken from Zhao and Xie (Zhao and Xie 1988), data on instability - from Lee 1931. The check takes into account only those periods when China was united under the rule of one ruling dynasty (Table 2).

Table 2. Manifestations of instability by decade during the phases of population growth and decline during secular cycles.

	growth phase		Decline phase
Conditional name of the secular cycle	years	Instability*	years	Instability*
Western Han	200 BC - 10	1,5	10-40	10,8
Eastern Han	40-180	1,6	180-220	13,4
Sui	550-610	5,1	610-630	10,5
Tan	630-750	1,1	750-770	7,6
Northern Song	960-1120	3,7	1120-1160	10,6
Yuan	1250-1350	6,7	1350-1410	13,5
Min	1410-1620	2,8	1620-1650	13,1
Qing	1650-1850	5,0	1850-1880	10,8
The average		3,4		11,3

* Instability is estimated as the average number of episodes of military activity over decades.

Once again, we see a remarkable agreement between observations and predictions: the level of instability is invariably higher during phases of population decline than during population growth phases.

Note that the phases of secular cycles in this empirical test were defined as periods of growth and decline in numbers, that is, through the positive or negative value of the first derivative of the population density. In this case, the value being checked is not a derivative, but an indicator of the level of instability. This means that instability should peak around the middle of the population decline phase. In other words, the peaks of instability are shifted relative to the peaks of abundance, which, of course, are observed where the growth phase ends and the decline phase begins.

The importance of this phase shift is that it gives us a clue to identify the possible mechanisms causing these oscillations. If two dynamic variables fluctuate with the same period and there is no shift between their peaks, that is, they occur approximately simultaneously, then this situation contradicts the hypothesis that the observed fluctuations are caused by a dynamic interaction between two variables (Turchin 2003b). On the other hand, if the peak of one variable is offset from the peak of the other, this pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that the fluctuations are caused by a dynamic interaction between the two variables. A classic example from ecology is the cycles shown by the Lotka-Volterra model of predator-prey and other similar models, where peaks in the number of predators follow peaks in the number of prey (Turchin 2003a : chapter 4).

The structural-demographic models discussed above and in the Appendix show a similar picture of dynamics. Note, for example, the phase shift between the population size ( N) and instability ( W) in fig. 8. In this model, the instability indicator is positive only during the phase of population decline.

Analysis of several datasets for which more detailed information is available (Early Modern England, China during the Han and Tang Dynasties and the Roman Empire) allows us to apply the so-called regression models for verification. Analysis results (Turchin 2005) show that incorporating instability into the population density change rate model increases the accuracy of the prediction (the proportion of variance explained by the model). Moreover, the population density made it possible to statistically reliably predict the rate of change in the instability indicator. In other words, these results provide yet another piece of evidence in favor of the existence of the mechanisms postulated by the structural-demographic theory.

conclusions

The data presented show that the typical pattern observed in historical human populations does not correspond to either exponential population growth or slight fluctuations around some equilibrium value. Instead, we usually see long-term fluctuations (on the background of a gradually rising level). These "secular cycles" are generally characteristic of agrarian societies in which there is a state, and we observe such cycles wherever we have any detailed quantitative data on population dynamics. Where we do not have such data, we can infer the presence of secular cycles from the empirical observation that the vast majority of agrarian states in history have been subject to repeated waves of instability. (Turchin, Nefedov 2008).

Secular fluctuations do not represent strict, mathematically clear cycles. On the contrary, they seem to be characterized by a period that varies quite widely around the mean. Such a picture would be expected, because human societies are complex dynamic systems, many parts of which are cross-connected with each other by nonlinear feedbacks. It is well known that such dynamical systems tend to be mathematically chaotic or, more strictly speaking, sensitively dependent on initial conditions. (Ruelle 1989). In addition, social systems are open, in the sense that they are subject to external influences such as climate change or the sudden emergence of evolutionarily new pathogens. Finally, people have free will, and their actions and decisions at the micro level of an individual can have macro-level consequences for the whole society.

Sensitive dependency (chaotic), external influences and free will of individuals all together give a very complex dynamics, the future nature of which is very difficult (or maybe impossible) to predict with any degree of accuracy. In addition, the well-known difficulties of self-fulfilling and self-refuting prophecies are manifested here - situations where the prediction made itself affects the predicted events.

Returning to the problem of long-term forecasting of the population of the Earth, I note that the most important conclusion that can be drawn from my review is probably the following. The even curves obtained by employees of various departments, both governmental and subordinate to the UN, and given in many textbooks on ecology, are even curves, similar to the logistic one, where the population of the Earth is neatly leveled off in the region of 10 or 12 billion are completely unsuitable as serious forecasts. The population of the Earth is a dynamic characteristic determined by the ratio of mortality and birth rate. There is no reason to believe that these two quantities will come to an equilibrium level and fully compensate each other.

During the last two crises experienced by the population of the Earth in the 14th and 17th centuries, its numbers decreased significantly, in many regions very sharply. In the XIV century, many regions of Eurasia lost from a third to a half of the population (McNeill 1976). In the 17th century, a smaller number of regions in Eurasia suffered as badly (although in Germany and Central China the population declined by between a third and a half). On the other hand, the population of North America may have been reduced by a factor of ten, although this is still a matter of controversy. Thus, if we build a forecast based on observed historical patterns, the 21st century should also become a period of population decline.

On the other hand, perhaps the most important aspect of recent human history is that social evolution has dramatically accelerated over the past two centuries. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as industrialization (or modernization). Demographic Capacity of the Earth (Cohen 1995) over this period has increased dramatically, and it is very difficult to predict how it will change subsequently. Therefore, it is quite possible to imagine that the trend towards an increase in the capacity of the environment will continue and prevail over the fruits of the sharp population growth that could be manifested with some delay, which was observed in the 20th century. We do not know which of these two opposing tendencies will prevail, but it is clear that they cannot simply cancel each other out completely. Thus, the establishment in the 21st century of some permanent equilibrium level of the population of the Earth is in fact an extremely unlikely outcome.

Although the future development of human social systems (including its demographic component, which is the subject of this article) is very difficult to predict with any accuracy, this does not mean that such dynamics should not be studied at all. The empirically observed patterns of population dynamics, which are reviewed here, lead us to assume the existence of general principles underlying them, and to doubt that history is just a series of random events. If such principles do exist, then an understanding of them could help governments and societies to anticipate the possible consequences of their decisions. There is no reason to believe that the nature of social dynamics discussed in this article is in any sense inevitable. Of particular interest here are such undesirable consequences of prolonged population growth as waves of instability.

Political instability in "failed" or collapsing states is one of the greatest sources of human suffering today. Since the end of the Cold Wars s v O Wars between states accounted for less than 10% of all armed conflicts. Most armed conflicts today take place within one state. These are, for example, civil wars and armed separatist movements. (Harbom, Wallensteen 2007).

I see no reason to believe that humanity will always have to experience periods of state breakdown and civil wars. However, at present, we still know too little about the social mechanisms underlying the waves of instability. We do not have good theories that would allow us to understand how to restructure state systems to avoid civil wars, but we have the hope that such a theory will be developed in the near future. (Turchin 2008). Research in this area can not only give science new empirically testable theories, but also help alleviate the suffering of many people around the world.

Hello readers! We now live in a world where the population is only growing, but just imagine for a second that such a number of people was not always there. I want to tell you about this growth.

The dynamics of the world population is constantly growing; only in separate, in comparison, short historical periods, due to epidemics, natural disasters, the warrior temporarily decreased (for example, about 15 million people died from the plague in the XIV century; from hunger in the XIX century - 25 million people in India and almost how many - in China; after the First World War (1914 - 1918), about 20 million people died from the “Spanish flu”, 60 million people died in two world wars, and even more significant were the indirect losses of mankind from an increase in mortality and a decrease in the birth rate).

Over the millennia, the population has grown extremely slowly, this can be explained by the poor development of production and the very great dependence of man on mother nature in the early stages of history.

The natural environment limited the increase in the number of primitive people, The basis of their life was hunting, fishing and gathering. Until the end of the Paleolithic, according to rough estimates, a person mastered less than 1/3 of the modern ecumene (approximately 40 million km 2), and the average hardly exceeded 8-10 people per 100 km 2.

Many researchers agree on the point of view that by the end of the Paleolithic era (approximately 15 thousand years BC), the population reached approximately 3 million people, and by the end of the Neolithic (2 thousand years BC), the population was approximately 50 million people. 230 million people were on Earth already at the beginning of our era, until the end of the 1st millennium AD. e.- 275 million people, and by 1500 increased to 425 million.

Starting from the XVII century. world population growth rate has apparently increased. The rapid rise of agriculture, the increase in industry, the success of medicine in many Western European countries (XVI - XVIII centuries) affected the population.

Population growth accelerated very rapidly from the second half of the 18th century. At this time, the first (of the statistically recorded) and extremely strong jump in population growth occurred in individual countries of Western Europe. From 1500 to 1900 The world population has almost quadrupled.

For the second half of the XIX century. characterized by a particularly rapid acceleration of population growth, this is due to a decrease in mortality, especially among children.

Throughout history, the dynamics of the world's population is constantly increasing, and this is evidenced by such data. The population has increased 25 times over the last millennium alone, it took almost 600 years for the first doubling of the population, almost 250 years for the second, less than 100 years for the third, and a little more than 40 years for the last.

The number of 1 billion people the population reached approximately in 1820, 2 billion - reached after 107 years (in 1927), 3 billion - reached 53 years ago (in 1959), 4 billion - reached after 15 years (in 1974), 5 billion - reached after 13 years (in 1987).

At the end of 2011, the 7 billionth inhabitant of the planet was born. At the moment, more than 7 billion people live on Earth.

Due to uneven population growth, the share of individual regions in the total world population in the XIX - XX centuries. changed a lot. The rate of population growth accelerated sharply from the middle of the XX century. The population increased by 116.8% between 1959 and 1992...

Average annual growth in 1950 - 1960 became 53.3 million people, in 1960 - 1970. - 66.7 million, in 1970 - 1980. - 70.3 million, in 1980 - 1990. - 86.4 million, in 1991 - 1992. - 92.2 million. This acceleration in the rate of population growth is different from all previous ones.

During this period, the birth rate changed very significantly. Through natural increase, the population of many countries and even regions (Africa) from 1950 to 1992. more than tripled.

Developing countries.

And in developing countries, life expectancy has increased, but remains lower than in countries with developed economies: in - 53 years, in - 61 years, in Latin America - 67 years.

In developing countries, where about 77% of the world population is concentrated, the decrease in mortality by the beginning of the 1990s. was mainly driven by advances in health rather than social and economic change.

The birth rate remains high, especially in rural areas. For example, mortality in Kenya between 1965 and 1969 fell by half, and in the early 1980s. population growth averaged 3.8% per year. Accordingly, Kenya's population has doubled in less than 20 years.

In developing countries, the proportion of the population under 15 is about 37% and only 4% over 65. For comparison, in developed countries, the population under 15 years of age is 22%, and over 65 - 11%.

As a result, there are large numbers of children living in developing countries whose contribution to the economy is minimal and the necessary funds for their education and health care are significant.

And developed countries should keep in mind the ever-increasing number of pensioners.

In our time, there are more than 2 thousand peoples on Earth. The geographical distribution of the population is uneven: according to experts, 70% of humanity lives on 7% of the land.

Forecasts.

In developed countries with low population growth, most couples have no more than two children. The population in some countries is declining. For example, in Germany during the 1980s. the population was declining by 0.1% per year.

The use of contraceptives is encouraged by many developing countries. In the 14 largest developing countries, including India and China, the level of reproduction, measured by the number of children per 1 woman, in the 1970s and 80s. dropped by almost two thirds.

In the 1980s in China, growth was reduced to 1.3%, but the target was not achieved. Most Chinese couples want to have a son to support them in their old age.

Over the next few decades, the general trend remains a rapid increase in the world population, despite falling birth rates. The number of people living on Earth, according to the forecasts of the UN Population Fund, should have exceeded 6.2 billion by 2000, and by 2025 - 8.5 billion.

Then the pace should slow down, and it is expected that by 2120 the world population will be 11.6 billion people. If today's efforts to reduce the birth rate prove ineffective, the figure could reach 14 billion.

Obviously, 95% of the growth will be in the poor countries of Asia, Latin America and Africa, which are not able to feed so many people. In order to stabilize the birth rate, the replacement rate, which in 1990 in developing countries was 4 newborns per woman, must fall to 2.

Promoting the use of contraceptives is not enough for this. It is necessary to carry out economic and social reforms that improve the standard of living of people.

Thus, we found out that the population is always growing, and moreover, the further - the faster ... I mean that our planet is filled with new people faster than in the past (especially at its initial stage of development). And this is happening despite the fact that population growth has almost halved ...

And of course, in this issue, as in many others, there are many opinions, arguments, many forecasts, including overpopulation; but if the population of the Earth slows down its growth more, I think at the expense of developing countries, because growth has already decreased due to developed countries, then it will only benefit everyone ...