The Murder of Count Mirbach: In the Traces of the Crime. The assassination of the German ambassador Mirbach and the uprising of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries Killed Mirbach

Many people in Russia know who Count Mirbach was. Or at least you've heard the name. Count Mirbach (Wilhelm von Mirbach-Harff) was the German (then Kaiser's) ambassador to Moscow in the early years of Soviet rule. On July 6, 1918, that is, exactly 100 years ago, he fell victim to an assassination attempt: he was killed by the Left SRs Blumkin and Andreev, after which the Left SR revolt began in the capital and other Russian cities, brutally suppressed by the Bolsheviks.

But what was Count Mirbach "guilty" of? Why exactly did he fall victim to the conspirators? And how is the uprising of the Left SRs connected with this murder?

Count Wilhelm von Mirbach-Harff (such is his full name) came from a very well-born aristocratic family in the Rhineland. Its roots date back to the 13th century. Family castles still stand on the banks of the Rhine and Moselle. Once the Mirbachs were knights, later they made either a military or diplomatic career. Count Mirbach became a diplomat.

In 1908 (he was then 37 years old) he was appointed advisor to the German embassy in St. Petersburg. For almost four years that he stayed here, Mirbach learned Russian pretty well. This, as well as experience and an excellent reputation, became the reason for his appointment to the post of first emergency representative, and then ambassador of Germany to Russia after the Bolsheviks came to power.

As you know, Kaiser's Germany financed the Leninist party, which advocated an end to the war and a separate peace. Cash infusions did not stop after the conclusion of the Brest Peace. On May 16, 1918, Mirbach met with Lenin. His report on this meeting and on Ilyich's requests was preserved in the archives of the German Foreign Ministry. As well as the recommendations for its results: to transfer 40 million Reichsmarks and allocate three million more to the Bolshevik government every month, otherwise it will not stay in power, as a result of which Germany may lose what it received under the treaty in Brest-Litovsk. The German Foreign Ministry immediately responded to the request of the leader of the proletariat: at the beginning of June, the Bolsheviks received money.

Count Mirbach was an extremely unpopular figure in Soviet Russia, because he was associated with the "obscene" Peace of Brest. Moreover, not only the opponents of the Bolsheviks, but also part of the Leninist party - the left communists, which included, for example, Dzerzhinsky, as well as the allies of the Bolsheviks - the Left Social Revolutionaries, opposed the "enslaving" agreement with the "German imperialists". At the Congress of Soviets, which opened at the very beginning of July in Moscow, their delegates chanted: "Down with Mirbach!"

The ambassador became more cautious, although he did not reduce his activity. And she was directed, in particular, to save the royal family. One of the employees of the embassy recalls how at one of the secret meetings Mirbach, who learned about the intention of the Bolsheviks to try Nicholas II, said: "We must not allow the trial. We must secure the release of the royal family and take it to Germany." The Bolsheviks did not want to spoil relations with the representative of the Kaiser and their "financier", but as soon as Mirbach was killed, it was decided to shoot the royal family.

How the murder of Count Mirbach happened is well known. Left SRs Yakov Blumkin and Nikolai Andreev arrived at the German embassy, located in Denezhny lane, under the pretext of clarifying the circumstances of the "case", which was allegedly the nephew of Count Mirbach. Blumkin then headed the Cheka department for combating German espionage, Andreev was a simple photographer. They showed the mandate of the Cheka, signed by Dzerzhinsky and the secretary of the Cheka Ksenofontov, with the seal put by the deputy chairman of the Cheka Aleksandrovich. This is the only reason why the ambassador generally agreed to meet with them.

The conversation was short-lived. At some point, Blumkin pulled out a revolver and fired three shots - at Mirbach and at the embassy staff in the room. And he missed three times. The thrown bomb did not explode at first either. Andreev immediately began to shoot, and, apparently, it was his bullet that mortally wounded Count Mirbach. Throwing the briefcase with the aforementioned mandate, Blumkin and Andreev jumped out the window and rushed to the car. The Germans fired after and wounded Blumkin in the leg.

But he got to the car. Then he hid for about a year and, in the end, made a confession. Blumkin had by that time been sentenced to three years in prison for the murder of the German ambassador, but after his confession he was forgiven. They shot him ten years later for a completely different matter: he secretly met in Istanbul with the disgraced Trotsky and undertook to hand over his letter to his comrades-in-arms who remained in the USSR. As for Andreev, he fled to Ukraine, to Father Makhno, and died in 1919 from typhus.

The Bolsheviks thoroughly investigated the murder of Mirbach. Despite this thoroughness, some questions remained. For example: how is the uprising of the Left Social Revolutionaries generally connected with this murder? Was it really a signal for rebellion? In the documents of the Central Committee of the Party of Left SRs, there are no decisions on the assassination attempt. Sverdlov and Trotsky, for example, believed that the Cheka organized the murder of Mirbach. It is not entirely clear whether the signature of Dzerzhinsky (an ardent opponent of the Brest Peace) was on the mandate? The chairman of the Cheka himself claimed that it was forged. Later, Blumkin seems to have confirmed this. But who exactly forged the signature, he did not say. During interrogation, Dzerzhinsky claimed that he did not know Blumkin closely and rarely saw him.

But we are still more interested in Count Mirbach. His body was transported to Germany and buried in the family cemetery. On the website of the Mirbach family on the Internet, the murdered ambassador is presented as an outstanding representative of the family. In addition to him, on this page there are Countess Maimi Freiin von Mirbach, who during the Nazi dictatorship risked her life to save Jews (in 1982 she was honored in Israel as a righteous woman), and Baron Andreas Baron von Mirbach), officer and diplomat. He was the military attaché of the FRG embassy in Stockholm, which in April 1975 was seized by terrorists of the "Red Army Faction" - the German left-wing radical organization. When one of their demands was not met, they shot and killed Andreas von Mirbach. So he repeated the tragic fate of the first German ambassador to Soviet Russia ...

On July 6, 1918, the ambassador of Kaiser Wilhelm II to Soviet Russia, Count Wilhelm von Mirbach-Harf, was killed in Moscow. For decades, this terrorist act was unambiguously interpreted in the USSR as a provocation by the party of the Left Social Revolutionaries, which since October 1917 was part of the government coalition with the Bolsheviks, which set itself the goal of disrupting the Brest-Litovsk Peace with the Germans and seizing power in the country.

MONEY Lane, 5

The mansion of the German embassy in the RSFSR was located at this address in Moscow. On July 6, 1918, at 2:15 pm, a dark-colored "Packard" stopped near it, from which two people emerged.

They showed the Swiss embassy a certificate of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission and demanded a personal meeting with the German ambassador. The Chekists were escorted through the lobby to the Red Living Room of the mansion and offered to wait a bit. Count Mirbach was warned of a possible attempt on his life and therefore avoided receiving visitors. But, having learned that official representatives of the Cheka had arrived, he decided to go out to them. Mirbach was joined by the Embassy Counselor, Dr. Kurt Riezler, and the military attaché's adjutant, Lieutenant Leonhard Müller, as translators. The conversation lasted over 25 minutes.

The Chekist, who introduced himself as Yakov Blumkin, showed Mirbach papers that allegedly testified to the espionage activities of a "relative of the ambassador" a certain Robert Mirbach. The diplomat noted that he had never met this relative. Then the second officer of the Cheka - Andreev - asked if the count wanted to know about the measures that the Soviet government was going to take. Mirbach nodded. After that, Blumkin drew his revolver and opened fire. He fired three shots: at Mirbach, Riezler and Müller, but did not hit anyone. The ambassador started to run. Andreev threw a bomb, and when it did not explode, he fired at Mirbach and mortally wounded him.

The count fell bleeding on the carpet. Blumkin, on the other hand, raised the bomb that did not work and threw it a second time. There was an explosion, under the cover of which the killers tried to hide. Leaving the Cheka ID, the "Robert Mirbach case" and a briefcase with a spare explosive device on the table, the terrorists jumped out the broken window and ran through the garden to the car. Andreev was in Packard a few seconds later. Blumkin landed extremely unsuccessfully - he broke his leg. With difficulty he began to climb over the fence. From the side of the embassy, the Germans opened fire indiscriminately. The bullet hit Blumkin in the leg, but he also got to the car.

At 15 hours 15 minutes, Count Mirbach died. He was 47 years old┘

TWO POLITICAL LINES

So, the Kaiser's diplomat was killed by Blumkin and Andreev, the Left SRs. But did they only want Mirbach's death?

In the summer of 1918, the position of the German troops on the Western Front of the World War became more and more difficult. That is why the military-political elite of Germany was in dire need of preserving the peace treaty signed by the Bolsheviks in Brest-Litovsk. The Bolsheviks, however, weighed down by the "obscene", "predatory" and "enslaving" peace with the German imperialists, were forced to abide by it, since the fate of the Russian revolution now depended on Berlin.

Count Mirbach became a hostage, on the one hand, of the policy of the forced partnership of the Reich with the Bolsheviks, and on the other hand, of the search for political alternatives to the Lenin government and the support of anti-Soviet forces in Russia. Thus, the ambassador was forced to pursue two mutually exclusive political lines at once, which made possible the provocation of which he became a victim.

Materials from the political archive of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, documents of Kaiser Wilhelm II, Reich Chancellor Gertling, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Kühlmann speak of their high appreciation of the work of the German ambassador to Soviet Russia. The service letters from Count Mirbach sent from Moscow to Berlin, on the whole, testify to his correct understanding of the situation in the host country, although at the same time there is a reassessment of pro-German sentiments.

Count Mirbach's report on his conversation with Lenin on May 16, 1918 is one of the few documents containing the recognition by the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the failure of the Brest policy. However, Mirbach believed that Germany's interests still required its orientation towards the Leninist government, since those forces that might replace the Bolsheviks would seek, with the help of the Entente, to reunite with the territories torn away from Russia by the Brest Peace.

On May 18, 1918, two days after meeting with Lenin, Mirbach in a telegram to Berlin expressed concern about the situation in Russia and emphasized that he estimated that a one-time sum of 40 million marks would be required to keep the Bolsheviks in power. A few days later, on June 3, the German ambassador telegraphed to the Reich Foreign Office that, in addition to a one-time sum of 40 million marks, another 3 million marks would be required every month to support Lenin's government.

State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Kühlmann instructed Mirbach to continue to provide financial assistance to the Bolsheviks. However, neither Kuehlmann nor Mirbach were convinced that with the help of German money that helped bring the Bolsheviks to power in October 1917, Lenin would be able to continue to stay at the helm of government. The German ambassador was convinced that in the summer of 1918 the Bolsheviks were living out their last days. Therefore, Mirbach offered to hedge against the fall of Lenin, having previously formed a pro-German anti-Soviet government in Russia.

Berlin approved this proposal. On June 13, 1918, Mirbach informed his leadership that various political figures were contacting him to find out the possibility of the German government providing assistance to anti-Soviet forces in overthrowing the Bolsheviks. Moreover, these forces consider the revision of the Articles of the Brest Peace by Germany a condition for the overthrow of Lenin.

On June 25, 1918, in his last letter to Kuhlmann, Mirbach wrote that he could not "make a favorable diagnosis for Bolshevism. We are undoubtedly standing at the bedside of a dangerously ill person who is doomed." Proceeding from this, the ambassador proposed to fill "the resulting void with" new "government bodies, which we will keep at the ready and which will be fully and completely in our service."

The change in Germany's position and the intensification of Mirbach's contacts with anti-Bolshevik forces did not go unnoticed. Already in mid-May, representatives of the political parties ousted in October 1917, the so-called "right", noted that "the Germans, whom the Bolsheviks brought to Russia, peace with whom constituted the only basis of their existence, are ready to overthrow the Bolsheviks themselves."

But not only Russian "right-wing" circles and foreign diplomats were aware of the anti-Soviet activities of the German embassy in Russia. The Soviet government also knew about the change in the mood of the Germans. It is no coincidence that at a time when preparations began in Berlin and at the German embassy in Moscow to change the course of German eastern policy, in the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, led by the left communist and enemy of the Brest Peace Felix Dzerzhinsky, a counterintelligence department was created in the most important department of the Cheka for combating counterrevolution. aimed at working against the German diplomatic mission. The 19-year-old Yakov Blumkin headed the "department for combating German espionage", and Nikolai Andreev was the employee (photographer) of this department.

HOW THE ATTENTION WAS PREPARED

Due to his official position, Blumkin had extensive information about the German embassy in Moscow. He managed, under the guise of an electrician, to introduce his employee Yakov Fishman there. As a result, in the hands of Blumkin was the plan of the premises and posts of the internal security of the diplomatic mission. The head of the department for combating counter-revolution of the Cheka Martin Latsis recalled: "Blumkin boasted that his agents give him anything they want, and that in this way he manages to get connections with all persons of German orientation." But in order to kill Mirbach, Blumkin and Andreev had to personally enter the well-guarded embassy building, which was legally considered the territory of Germany, and get a meeting with the ambassador.

As a pretext, Blumkin used the "case" fabricated by him, allegedly of the ambassador's nephew - "Austrian prisoner of war" Robert Mirbach, whom the Chekists accused of espionage. In fact, Robert Mirbach was just a namesake or a very distant relative of the Kaiser's diplomat. The Russified German Robert Mirbach never served in either the Austro-Hungarian or the German armies. He was a Russian citizen, before his arrest he lived in Petrograd and worked at the Smolny Institute in the economic field.

According to Latsis' recollections, "Blumkin showed a great desire to expand the anti-espionage department and more than once submitted projects to the commission." However, the only "case" in which Blumkin was really engaged was the "case of Mirbach-Austrian," and Blumkin "completely went into this business" and sat "over the interrogation of witnesses for whole nights." As a result of Blumkin's zeal, the modest manager of Smolny turned into an Austro-Hungarian officer who allegedly served in the 37th Infantry Regiment of the army of Emperor Franz Joseph, was captured by Russia and was released after the ratification of the Brest Peace Treaty. While awaiting departure to his homeland, he rented a room in one of the Moscow hotels, where he lived until the beginning of June 1918, when the Swedish actress Landstrom, who was staying in the same hotel, unexpectedly killed herself. It is difficult to judge whether this suicide was rigged by the Chekists or not. The Cheka, meanwhile, announced that Landstrom had committed suicide in connection with her counter-revolutionary activities, and arrested all the hotel's inhabitants. Among them, they say, was the "nephew of the German ambassador."

The Cheka immediately reported the arrest of Robert Mirbach to the Danish consulate, which represented the interests of Austria-Hungary in Russia. On June 15, the Danish consulate began negotiations with the Cheka "on the case of the arrested officer of the Austrian army, Count Mirbach." During these negotiations, the Chekists suggested to the consular representative the version that Robert Mirbach was a relative of the German ambassador. On June 17, the Danish consulate handed the security officers the document they had been waiting for: Consulate General, in fact, is a member of a family related to the German ambassador, Count Mirbach, who settled in Austria. "

Obviously, the German embassy decided to consider the unknown Count Robert Mirbach a relative of the German ambassador in the hope that this would alleviate the fate of the unfortunate Austrian officer, and he would be immediately released, especially since the charges against him seemed frivolous.

However, the "nephew case" formed the basis of a dossier against the German embassy and the ambassador personally. The main evidence in the hands of Blumkin was a document allegedly signed by Robert Mirbach: "Obligation. I, the undersigned, a Hungarian citizen, a prisoner of war officer of the Austrian army, Robert Mirbach, undertake to voluntarily, at my personal request, deliver secret information about Germany and The German Embassy in Russia. I confirm everything written here and will voluntarily fulfill it. Count Robert Mirbach. "

Of course, the business executive of the Smolny Institute could not tell the Chekists "secret information about Germany and the German Embassy in Russia": he simply did not know them. The fact that Robert Mirbach's "commitment" is a dubious document is indicated by its appearance: the text is written in Russian in one handwriting (obviously by Blumkin's hand), and the last sentence in Russian and German (with errors) and signatures in Russian and in -German - in a different handwriting.

"The Robert Mirbach case" became a pretext for the Chekists to infiltrate the ambassador of the German Kaiser. Blumkin printed a certificate on the Cheka letterhead: "The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission authorizes its member Yakov Blumkin and the representative of the Revolutionary Tribunal Nikolai Andreev to enter into negotiations with the German Ambassador to the Russian Republic on a case directly related to the Ambassador. Chairman of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission: F. Dzerzhinsky. Secretary: Ksenofontov ".

Andreev and Blumkin left this certificate together with a folder called "the Robert Mirbach case" at the German embassy. After the assassination attempt, these documents became the main evidence.

"IRON FELIX" JUSTIFY

According to the testimony of the Dzerzhinsky Investigative Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, his signature on the certificate was forged, and, therefore, he was not involved in the murder of the German ambassador. However, new data indicate that the left-wing communist and enemy of the Brest Peace, the Polish nobleman Dzerzhinsky, whose homeland Poland was occupied by the Germans, was playing his political game. It was not for nothing that the day after Mirbakh's assassination, Lenin removed Dzerzhinsky from the post of chairman of the Cheka: apparently, Lenin, Sverdlov and Trotsky viewed the events of July 6, 1918 as a joint conspiracy of the Chekists and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

On July 7, 1918, Dzerzhinsky submitted to the Council of People's Commissars an official application for his dismissal from the post of chairman of the Cheka in view of the fact that he is "one of the main witnesses in the case of the murder of the German envoy, Count Mirbach." The question of removing Dzerzhinsky was considered at a special meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). Apparently in order to somewhat reassure the Germans, Lenin gave the decree on the removal of Dzerzhinsky a demonstrative character: it was published not only in newspapers, but also pasted up in Moscow. The Collegium of the Cheka was announced to be dissolved and was subject to reorganization within a week.

Dzerzhinsky's testimony is a very confusing and contradictory document, which is, in fact, an attempt at self-justification. Dzerzhinsky calls the accusation of Kurt Riezler, who said that the chairman of the Cheka "turns a blind eye to conspiracies directed directly against the safety of members of the German embassy," Dzerzhinsky calls "fiction and slander." However, according to Lieutenant Müller, at the beginning of June 1918, cinematographer Vladimir Ginch contacted the embassy, stating that the underground organization Union of Allies, of which he became a member, was preparing to assassinate Count Mirbach. Ritzler reported the information received to the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Karakhan, who, in turn, informed Dzerzhinsky.

When Ginch warned the German embassy for the second time and, about ten days before the assassination attempt, named the date of the impending terrorist attack - between July 5 and 6, 1918 - Dzerzhinsky made personal contact with him. During a meeting at the Metropol, Ginch told Dzerzhinsky that Cheka employees were involved in the case.

On June 28, Ritsler again informed Karakhan (and he told Dzerzhinsky) about the impending assassination attempt and handed over the relevant materials. At the direction of Dzerzhinsky, a search was carried out at the address indicated by the Germans and a British subject, Wyber, "the main organizer of the conspiracy", was arrested. During a search by the Chekists, "six encrypted sheets" were found. After reviewing their content, Dzerzhinsky came to the conclusion that "someone is blackmailing us and the German embassy, and that Count Wyber may be a victim of this blackmail." Dzerzhinsky expressed his doubts to Ritzler and Lieutenant Müller.

Thus, Dzerzhinsky "from about half of June of this year." knew about "the impending attempt on the life of members of the German embassy and the conspiracy against the Soviet regime," but did nothing to suppress them. The chairman of the Cheka stated that he "feared attempts on the life of Count Mirbach by monarchist counter-revolutionaries who wanted to achieve restoration by military force of German militarism, as well as by counter-revolutionaries - Savinkovites and agents of Anglo-French bankers." Meanwhile, Dzerzhinsky's subordinates were completing preparations for a terrorist attack against the ambassador of the German Kaiser.

And here is what the chairman of the Cheka said about his employees, who became Mirbach's murderers: "Who is Andreev, [I] did not know"; "I did not know Blumkin closely and rarely saw him." Yes, Dzerzhinsky really could not have known that a simple photographer Andreyev was working for him, but Dzerzhinsky probably saw quite often with Blumkin as the head of the most important direction of Soviet counterintelligence, the department for combating German espionage.

Dzerzhinsky's testimony is refuted by Blumkin himself, who in April 1919 claimed that all his "work in the Cheka to combat German espionage, apparently due to its importance, took place under the continuous supervision of the chairman of the Commission, comrade Dzerzhinsky and comrade Latsis."

We do not undertake to assert that Blumkin acted on the direct orders of Dzerzhinsky. However, indirect evidence suggests that Felix Edmundovich knew about his intentions.

So, Dzerzhinsky, even before the murder of Count Mirbach, made the decision "to dissolve our counterintelligence and leave Blumkin out of office for now" (he was accused of violating the law and abuse of power). But, despite this, Blumkin was able to receive the investigation file of Robert Mirbach from Latsis on the morning of July 6, issue a certificate for himself and Andreev, call an official car and go to the German embassy.

Consequently, Blumkin, formally removed from office, in fact, with the tacit consent of Dzerzhinsky, continued to prepare a terrorist attack. It is obvious that the chairman of the Cheka actually allowed his subordinates to kill Count Mirbach.

Moreover, as the People's Commissar of Education Anatoly Lunacharsky testified, Lenin in his presence immediately after the assassination attempt on Mirbach gave the following order to arrest the murderers by telephone: "Search, search very carefully, but not find." Later, in the mid-1920s, Blumkin, in a private conversation with his housemate, the People's Commissar's wife Rosanel-Lunacharskaya, in the presence of her cousin Tatyana Sats, argued that Lenin was well aware of the plan to assassinate Mirbakh. True, Blumkin did not speak personally with the Bolshevik leader on this topic. But he discussed it in detail with Dzerzhinsky ...

LENIN LAUGHS

But, paradoxically, it was Lenin who won the most from the assassination of Mirbach, who, with the help of official Berlin, managed to preserve the Brest-Litovsk Peace, and the last obstacle on the way to the one-party dictatorship of the Bolsheviks - the party of the Left Social Revolutionaries - was destroyed.

An employee of the Soviet embassy in Berlin, Solomon, told how the People's Commissar of Trade and Industry Leonid Krasin, who came to Germany shortly after the July events in Moscow to prepare an economic agreement, told him that he “did not suspect such deep and cruel cynicism” in Lenin. Lenin, on July 6, 1918, telling Krasin how he intended to get out of the crisis created by Mirbach's assassination, "with a smile" said that we "would make an internal loan among the comrades of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, and thus observe innocence and acquire capital."

Lenin could be pleased with how events unfolded after Mirbach's assassination and soon "forgave" Dzerzhinsky. The new board of the Cheka was formed with the direct participation of the "iron Felix", and on August 22, 1918, the "avenging sword of the revolution" was again in his hands.

After the assassination of Count Mirbach, the Kaiser had an opportunity to refuse help to Lenin. However, although Germany presented an ultimatum to the Soviet government, Wilhelm II did not have the strength to renew the war against Russia. The emperor spoke out against the severing of relations with Russia and called for "supporting the Bolsheviks under any conditions."

Let me remind you of one well-known fact: Sverdlov, Lenin and Chicherin went to the German embassy to express official condolences on the murder of the ambassador. Trotsky flatly refused to go to the Germans: his formula "no peace, no war" required expression of sympathy for the murdered "imperialist and enemy of the world revolution" Mirbach.

A posh Rolls-Royce from the former tsarist garage was carrying the head of the Soviet state, the head of government and the people's commissar for foreign affairs to Money Lane. Lenin was in excellent spirits: Count Mirbach, who was aware of the dark affairs of the Bolsheviks with the Kaiser Reich, Count Mirbach, who made efforts to save the royal family, Count Mirbach, who was the personification of the humiliation of revolutionary Russia by German imperialism, was no longer alive. Lenin joked: "I already came to an agreement with Radek: I wanted to say" Mitleid ", but I must say" Beileid "- and laughed at his own joke (these are similar words that can be translated into Russian as" sympathy "; however, the first rather means" sympathy, complicity ", in the second -" condolence ").

In the ambassadorial mansion, Lenin delivered a short speech in German. He conveyed to the German side the apology of the government of Soviet Russia about what had happened and, of course, added that "the case will be immediately investigated and the perpetrators will suffer deserved punishment." But these words remained empty promises. So instead of condolences, it really turned out to be complicity ┘

FORGIVEN, AWARDED AND ... SHOT

Meanwhile, Andreev and Blumkin simply disappeared. Soon the first was in Ukraine, where he died of typhus.

Blumkin was in for a different fate. In May 1919, he arrived in Moscow and confessed to the presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which forgave the terrorist. The resolution of the supreme body of Soviet power of May 16, 1919 read: "In view of the voluntary appearance of Ya.G. Blumkin and the detailed explanation given by him of the circumstances of the murder of the German ambassador, Count Mirbach, the Presidium decides to amnesty Ya. G. Blumkin." Yakov Grigorievich was even accepted into the Bolshevik Party. And on the recommendation of ... Dzerzhinsky!

But the appearance of Blumkin in Moscow did not go unnoticed by the German side, which demanded punishment for Mirbach's murderer, and his patrons preferred to temporarily send their ward away from Moscow. Blumkin was sent to the disposal of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. In June 1920, he arrived in northern Iran, where he developed a plan for a coup d'état, he himself took part in it and became a member of the Central Committee of the Iranian Communist Party. The government of Kuchuk Khan was overthrown. New people came to power, offering Blumkin a high military post. The former Left Socialist-Revolutionary did all this enormous work in just four months. Moscow encouraged the enterprising and successful employee, awarding him with a military order and enrolling in the Military Academy of the Red Army.

In 1922, Blumkin was recalled from the academy and sent to Trotsky's secretariat. And already in October 1923, Dzerzhinsky took him to the Foreign Department of the OGPU. Blumkin was in charge of Soviet intelligence in Tibet, Mongolia, the northern regions of China, and the Middle East.

In the late 1920s, Yakov Grigorievich became one of the most famous people in the USSR. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia devoted more than thirty lines to him. Sergei Yesenin dedicated poetry to Blumkin, and Valentin Kataev in the story "Werther has already been written" endowed his hero, Naum the Fearless, with his features and portrait likeness.

However, in 1929, in Istanbul, Blumkin met with his former boss and friend Trotsky, the worst enemy of Stalin, expelled from the USSR, and even undertook to send a letter from the disgraced leader to the Soviet Union. On November 3, 1929, the "case" of the Trotskyist Blumkin was considered at the court session of the OGPU. The verdict is execution.

The reasons for the murder of Count Mirbach should be sought not only in the internal political situation in Russia in 1917-1918, but also in the development of international, in particular Soviet-German, relations. These relations were steadily tightening into the Gordian knot, cut off on July 6, 1918. In 1918, Germany, losing the First World War in the West, won it in the East - the Brest Peace was a proof of this. However, the German military-political elite, with the help of the Brest-Litovsk Peace, supporting the power of the Russian Bolsheviks, inevitably brought the revolution in their country closer. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, being burdened by the "obscene", "predatory" and "enslaving" peace with the German imperialists, were forced to abide by it, since the fate of the Russian revolution now depended on the German Kaiser, his military and diplomats.

Count Mirbach became a hostage, on the one hand, of the policy of the forced partnership of the Reich with the Bolsheviks, and on the other, of Germany's search for political alternatives to the Lenin government and its support of anti-Soviet forces in Russia. An ambivalent policy towards Germany was pursued by the Bolsheviks, on the one hand, who concluded a separate peace in Brest-Litovsk and thereby helped the Kaiser to stay in power and continue the war in the West, and on the other, they kindled a hotbed of world revolution in Germany.

Thus, the German ambassador, often acting at his own peril and risk, was forced to pursue two mutually exclusive political lines at once, which made possible the political provocation of which he became a victim.

The Left SRs launched a terrorist attack against the German ambassador in order to change the mood at the Congress of Soviets and, after Mirbach's assassination, took responsibility for themselves. However, before the massacre of the German ambassador, neither the Central Committee of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party nor the congress of this party adopted a decision on the murder of Mirbach.

Â In the murder of Mirbach, all traces - "tsarist", "money", "Chekist" and "Socialist Revolutionary" are intricately intertwined. “The German government, personally Kaiser Wilhelm II and his all-powerful governor in Soviet Russia, Count Wilhelm von Mirbach, did everything to save and take the tsar and his family to Germany. They constantly put pressure on Lenin and Sverdlov, a big political game was going on, - writes V.I.Sakharov, a researcher at the Institute of World Literature of the Russian Academy of Sciences. “The tragic knot of the history of Russia and Germany has been tightened here, which could only be cut by the death of the Romanovs.”

On May 18, 1918, two days after meeting with Lenin, Mirbach in a telegram to Berlin expressed concern about the situation in Russia and emphasized that he estimated that a one-time sum of 40 million marks would be required to keep Lenin in power; a few days later, on June 3, the German ambassador telegraphed to the Reich Foreign Ministry that, in addition to a one-time sum of 40 million marks, another 3 million marks would be required every month to support Lenin's government.

“Count Mirbach said that he now needs 3 million marks a month for these expenses. However, it should be borne in mind that if circumstances change, this amount may double. The fund that we used for the acquisition in Russia has been exhausted. Therefore, the Secretary of State of the Imperial Treasury must be provided with a new fund, which, taking into account the above circumstances, should amount to at least 40 million, ”reads the note of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs R. von Kühlmann dated June 5, 1918. Already 6 days later - June 11 1918 the imperial treasury allocated 40 million marks "for the requested purposes."

The German ambassador was convinced that in the summer of 1918 the Bolsheviks were living out their last days. Therefore, Mirbach offered to hedge against the fall of the Lenin government and form a pro-German anti-Soviet government in Russia in advance. Berlin approved this proposal. On June 13, 1918, Mirbach reported to Berlin that various Russian politicians had approached him to find out the possibility of the German government providing assistance to the anti-Soviet forces in overthrowing the Bolsheviks. On the eve of his death, in the last telegram sent to Berlin on July 3, 1918, Mirbach warned his government against a break with the Russian bourgeois parties, since this could negatively affect relations with them in the future: the subsequent likely softening of the conditions of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty will not be completely destroyed. "

The intensification of Mirbach's contacts with anti-Bolshevik forces did not go unnoticed. Already in mid-May, representatives of the political forces ousted in October 1917, the so-called right, noted that "the Germans, whom the Bolsheviks brought to Russia, peace with whom constituted the only basis of their existence, are ready to overthrow the Bolsheviks themselves." As an alternative to the Bolsheviks, the Germans even considered the option of a possible restoration of the monarchy, the first step towards which would have been the liberation of the royal family. The cousin of the Russian Empress, the Grand Duke of Hesse, Ernst Ludwig (Ernst Ludwig von Hessen und bei Rhein), after the signing of the Brest Peace, appealed to the Soviet embassy in Berlin with a request to release the royal family and send it to Germany. For this, he promised to prevent the likely offensive of German troops on Moscow and to cancel the indemnity imposed on Soviet Russia by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.

With all the improbability of the assumptions that Nicholas II, even if the Germans had rescued him and his family, would have recognized the Brest-Litovsk Peace, we note that Mirbach, acting at the direction of Berlin, made efforts to save the royal family. The political decision on the fate of Nicholas II and his family, who were shot by the Bolsheviks in Yekaterinburg 11 days after Mirbach's murder, was made in Moscow by Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V.I. Goloshchekin in early July 1918 - after Count Mirbach was killed. Obviously, this decision was also connected with the attempts of the German side to provide assistance to the Russian Tsar and his family. Not only Russian right-wing circles and foreign diplomats were aware of the activities of the German embassy in Russia directed against the Bolsheviks. The Soviet government also knew about the change in the mood of the Germans. It is no coincidence that the time when in Berlin and in the German embassy in Moscow preparations began to change the course of German eastern policy, led by the left communist and enemy of the Brest Peace, F.E.Dzerzhinsky, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (VChK), in the most important department of the Cheka for combating counterrevolution , a counterintelligence department was created to work against the German embassy. The 19-year-old Yakov Blumkin headed the "department for combating German espionage", and Nikolai Andreev was the employee (photographer) of this department: Mirbach's killers were not just left-wing Socialist-Revolutionaries, but the Chekists.

Due to his official position, Blumkin had extensive information about the German embassy in Moscow. He managed, under the guise of an electrician, to introduce his employee Yakov Fishman there. As a result, in the hands of Blumkin was the plan of the premises and posts of the internal security of the embassy. The head of the department for combating counter-revolution of the Cheka Martin Latsis, Blumkin's immediate superior, recalled: "Blumkin boasted that his agents give him anything and that in this way he manages to get connections with all persons of German orientation." But in order to kill Mirbach, Blumkin and Andreev had to personally enter the well-guarded embassy building, which was legally considered the territory of Germany, and get a meeting with the ambassador.

As a pretext for meeting with Count Mirbach, Blumkin used a fabricated "case" of the ambassador's alleged nephew - "Austrian prisoner of war" Robert Mirbach, whom the Chekists accused of espionage. In fact, Robert Mirbach was neither an Austrian prisoner of war, nor a German spy - he was just a namesake or a very distant relative of the German ambassador. The Russified German Robert Mirbach never served in either the Austro-Hungarian or the German armies. He was a Russian citizen, before his arrest he lived in Petrograd and worked at the Smolny Institute in the economic field.

Blumkin printed a certificate on the Cheka's letterhead: “The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission authorizes its member Yakov Blumkin and the representative of the Revolutionary Tribunal Nikolai Andreev to enter into negotiations with the German Ambassador to the Russian Republic on a case directly related to the Ambassador. Chairman of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission: F. Dzerzhinsky. Secretary: Ksenofontov ".

Andreev and Blumkin left this certificate together with a folder entitled "The Robert Mirbach Case" at the German embassy. After the assassination attempt, these documents became the main evidence.

We do not undertake to assert that Blumkin acted on the direct orders of Dzerzhinsky. However, indirect evidence suggests that Dzerzhinsky knew about Blumkin's intentions. Obviously, Dzerzhinsky, accidentally or deliberately, "allowed" his subordinates to kill Count Mirbach and, thereby, provoke the strongest internal political and international crisis, beneficial to Lenin's opponents, who intended to disrupt the Brest-Litovsk Peace.

But paradoxically, it was Lenin who won the most from the assassination of Mirbach, who, with the help of official Berlin, managed to preserve the Brest-Litovsk Peace, and the last obstacle on the way to the one-party dictatorship of the Bolsheviks - the party of the Left Social Revolutionaries - was destroyed.

As the People's Commissar of Education A. V. Lunacharsky testified, Lenin, in his presence immediately after the assassination attempt on Mirbakh, gave the following order to arrest the murderers by telephone: "Search, search very carefully, but ... not find." Lenin could be pleased with the way events unfolded after Mirbach's assassination, and soon "forgiven" Dzerzhinsky. The new collegium of the Cheka was formed with the direct participation of Dzerzhinsky, and on August 22, 1918, the “avenging sword of the revolution” was again in the hands of “Iron Felix”.

The "scapegoat" for the murder of Mirbach was the deputy chairman of the Cheka, a member of the Central Committee of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party V. Aleksandrovich, who stamped the mandate of Blumkin and Andreev and was aware of their intentions to kill the German ambassador. On the night of July 8, 1918, Aleksandrovich was shot.

After the assassination of Count Mirbach, official Berlin had an opportunity to refuse to support the Lenin government. Although Germany presented an ultimatum to the Soviet government, Wilhelm II did not have the strength to renew the war against Russia. Moreover, the Kaiser opposed the severance of relations with Russia and called for "to support the Bolsheviks under any conditions."

How did the terrorist attack take place in Denezhny Lane? On July 6, 1918, at 2:15 pm, the dark Packard of the Cheka, in which Blumkin and Andreev were, stopped at the mansion of the German embassy. Leaving the car, Blumkin ordered the driver not to turn off the engine.

The murderers showed the Cheka's certificate to the Swiss embassy and demanded a personal meeting with Count Mirbach. They were ushered through the lobby to the living room and told to wait. The ambassador, having heard about the impending assassination attempt, avoided meeting with visitors, but, upon learning that official representatives of the Cheka had arrived, he decided to go out to them. Mirbach was joined by Dr. Kurt Riezler and Lieutenant Müller as translators. The conversation lasted over 25 minutes. Blumkin presented the ambassador with papers that allegedly testified to the espionage activities of the "ambassador's relative." Mirbach noted that he had never met this relative and was indifferent to his fate. Then Andreev asked if the count would like to know about the measures that the Soviet government was going to take. The Count nodded. Then Blumkin drew his revolver and opened fire. He fired three shots, but missed three times. Mirbach jumped up from his chair and started to run. Andreev threw a bomb, but it didn’t explode. Then Andreev shot at Mirbach and mortally wounded him. Mirbach, bleeding, fell onto the carpet. Then Blumkin raised an unexploded bomb, and for the second time threw it with force. There was an explosion, under the cover of which the killers tried to hide. Leaving the Cheka ID, the Robert Mirbach Case and a briefcase with a spare explosive device on the table, the terrorists jumped out the window shattered by the explosion and ran through the garden to the car. Andreev was in the car a few seconds later. Blumkin landed extremely unsuccessfully - he broke his leg. With difficulty he began to climb over the fence. From the side of the embassy, the Germans opened fire indiscriminately. The bullet hit Blumkin in the leg, but he also got to the car. The driver pressed the gas pedal and the Chekist "Packard" rushed to Trekhsvyatitelsky lane to the headquarters of the Cheka detachment headed by Popov. In Popov's detachment, Blumkin was shaved off, shaved off his beard, dressed in a Red Army uniform and taken to a nearby infirmary. “If we left the embassy, then an unforeseen, ironic incident is to blame for this,” wrote Blumkin. At 15 hours 15 minutes, Count Mirbach died. He was 47 years old ...

In order to preserve the Brest-Litovsk peace and observe the appearance of diplomatic decency, Sverdlov, Lenin and Chicherin went to the German embassy to express their official condolences over the assassination of the ambassador. Trotsky flatly refused to go to the Germans: his formula “no peace, no war” required expressions of sympathy for the murdered “imperialist and enemy of the world revolution” Mirbach.

A posh Rolls-Royce from the former tsarist garage was taking the head of the Soviet state, the head of government and the people's commissar for foreign affairs to Money Lane. Lenin was in excellent spirits: Count Mirbach, who was aware of the dark affairs of the Bolsheviks with the Kaiser Reich; Count Mirbach, who made efforts to save the royal family; Count Mirbach, who was the personification of the humiliation of revolutionary Russia by German imperialism, was no longer alive. Lenin joked: “I've already reached an agreement with Radek: I wanted to say 'Mitleid', but I must say 'Beileid'” - and laughed at his own joke i ...

The mansion of the German embassy in the RSFSR was located at this address in Moscow. On July 6, 1918, at 2:15 pm, a dark-colored "Packard" stopped near it, from which two people emerged.

At 15 hours 15 minutes, Count Mirbach died. He was 47 years old ...

TWO POLITICAL LINES

So, the Kaiser's diplomat was killed by Blumkin and Andreev, the Left SRs. But did they only want Mirbach's death?

Best of the day

On June 25, 1918, in his last letter to Kuhlmann, Mirbach wrote that he could not "make a favorable diagnosis for Bolshevism. We are undoubtedly standing at the bedside of a dangerously ill person ... who is doomed." Proceeding from this, the ambassador proposed to fill "the resulting void with" new "government bodies, which we will keep at the ready and which will be fully and completely in our service."

HOW THE ATTENTION WAS PREPARED

Andreev and Blumkin left this certificate together with a folder called "the Robert Mirbach case" at the German embassy. After the assassination attempt, these documents became the main evidence.

"IRON FELIX" JUSTIFY

We do not undertake to assert that Blumkin acted on the direct orders of Dzerzhinsky. However, indirect evidence suggests that Felix Edmundovich knew about his intentions.

Moreover, as the People's Commissar of Education Anatoly Lunacharsky testified, Lenin in his presence immediately after the assassination attempt on Mirbakh gave the following order to arrest the murderers by telephone: "Search, search very carefully, but ... not find." Later, in the mid-1920s, Blumkin, in a private conversation with his housemate, the People's Commissar's wife Rosanel-Lunacharskaya, in the presence of her cousin Tatyana Sats, argued that Lenin was well aware of the plan to assassinate Mirbakh. True, Blumkin did not speak personally with the Bolshevik leader on this topic. But he discussed it in detail with Dzerzhinsky ...

LENIN LAUGHS

FORGIVEN, AWARDED AND ... SHOT

Meanwhile, Andreev and Blumkin simply disappeared. Soon the first was in Ukraine, where he died of typhus.

The terrorist act, which went down in history as the assassination of Ambassador Mirbach, took place on July 6, 1918 in the center of Moscow on the territory of the German embassy at 5 Denezhny Lane. Representatives of the Left SR Party Yakov Blumkin and Nikolai Andreev entered the embassy with the Cheka mandate. It was about 3 pm when Ambassador Wilhelm von Mirbach received them. All those present sat down at the table, and with the ambassador there were his adviser and translator. The conversation lasted for about half an hour, and then the Left SRs opened fire. As a result, the German ambassador was mortally wounded, and the terrorists fled.

German Embassy in Moscow where Mirbach was murdered

These are dry historical facts, but behind them are living people and specific political events. So what prompted the Left SRs to shoot at an official representing the German Empire on the territory of the world's first state of workers and peasants? To understand the essence of the issue, you need to have an idea of the party of the Left SRs and their attitude to the Brest Peace, which was ratified by the IV All-Russian Congress of Soviets and Emperor Wilhelm II back in March 1918.

Left SRs

Who are the Left SRs? This is a party that initially represented the left wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, formed during the First World War. After the February Revolution, the left wing acquired the status of the left opposition. This meant that serious political disagreements arose between the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. In particular, the left opposition was categorically against cooperation with the Provisional Government.

Finally, the Left SRs formed as a party at the end of 1917. They took part in the October Revolution and expressed support for the Bolshevik Party at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets. They did not leave the congress along with the rest of the Social Revolutionaries, they voted for its decisions and became part of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. This meant a complete break with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and support for the Bolsheviks. By December 1917, the Left SRs were considered an independent party.

Social Revolutionaries in 1917

Working closely with the Bolsheviks, they entered not only the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, but also the SNK (Council of People's Commissars), that is, they became members of the government. But in February 1918, a black cat ran between the Left SRs and the Bolsheviks. The Brest Peace Treaty became a stumbling block. The Left Social Revolutionaries voted against both its signing and ratification. However, their opinion was ignored. At the same time, representatives of the Left SRs continued to work in various Soviet institutions.

At the V All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the Left SRs had only 30% of the mandates. But, being in the minority, they openly opposed the Bolsheviks. The congress was held from 4 to 10 July 1918. And it was at this time that the leaders of the Left SRs decided to make a split between the Bolsheviks and the Germans in order to annul the Brest Peace in the future. As already mentioned, on July 6, 1918, the German ambassador Mirbach was killed. This crime was committed by the Left SRs. Then they arrested several Bolshevik functionaries and Dzerzhinsky.

These actions were regarded by the Bolshevik Party as an uprising. It was suppressed on the morning of July 7 by the forces of Latvian riflemen, and the deputies from the Left SRs who were at the congress were arrested. But the Bolsheviks did not stop there, and on July 11 they declared the party of the Left SRs outlawed.

There is a point of view that the assassination of Ambassador Mirbach was organized by the Bolsheviks themselves. The latter needed an excuse to destroy a strong opposition party. And this was successfully carried out. After July 1918, a one-party Bolshevik dictatorship was formed in the country, which existed for 72 years.

Timeline of the assassination of Ambassador Mirbach

As we already know, the officers of the Cheka and members of the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party Yakov Blumkin (1900-1929) and Nikolai Andreev (1890-1918) were instructed to carry out the terrorist act. Blumkin was 18 years old at the time of the crime. He worked in the department for the fight against international espionage. Andreev was 10 years older in age. He was listed as a photographer at the Cheka. Both of these people were born in Odessa, that is, they were fellow countrymen.

Blumkin received the order to carry out the terrorist act, and he had already picked up a partner for himself. This couple on the morning of July 6 arrived at one of the apartments on Tverskaya Street, where they received 2 bombs and 2 revolvers. Then the performers got into the car and drove to Arbat, to Denezhny lane.

At 14 hours 15 minutes the car drove up to the German embassy. Blumkin and Andreev got out of it and presented a certificate of the Cheka signed by the chairman of the Cheka Dzerzhinsky and secretary Ksenofontov. The certificate also bore a blue seal, put by the deputy. Chairman of the Cheka Left SR Aleksandrovich. Subsequently, the Bolsheviks claimed that the signatures of Dzerzhinsky and Ksenofontov were forged.

Yakov Blumkin is one of the terrorists

The terrorists demanded a meeting with the ambassador and they were escorted to the aide-de-camp of the military attaché, Leonhart Müller. He checked the identity, made sure that the people were from a serious government organization and reported them to the first adviser of the embassy, Kurt Ritzler. He talked to the newcomers and went to get the ambassador. He soon returned with Count Mirbach.

Five men sat on the chairs: Blumkin, Andreev, Ambassador Mirbach, Adviser to the Ambassador Kurt Ritzler and Leongart Müller as translator. Blumkin began to talk about a certain Count Robert Mirbach, a Hungarian officer. According to the assumption of the Cheka, he was a relative of the ambassador and was supposed to appear before a military tribunal in the coming days. The ambassador replied that he had heard of this man for the first time. And in the course of the further conversation, the representative of the German Empire remained absolutely indifferent to the fate of some Robert Mirbach.

At some point, Andreev, sitting a little further than Blumkin, said that the ambassador might be interested in learning about the measures that would be taken against the arrested Hungarian. Apparently this phrase was a prearranged signal, since after it Blumkin jumped to his feet, grabbed a revolver from his briefcase and fired several shots at all three men sitting opposite, starting directly with the ambassador.

But the bullets did not touch a single person, since Blumkin's hands were apparently shaking with nervous excitement. After the shots were fired, the ambassador jumped up and ran into the next room. But then Andreyev took out his revolver and fired after him. The bullet hit the back of the head and Mirbach fell. Ritzler and Müller fell to the floor, and Andreev threw the bomb, but it did not explode. Then he threw a second bomb. This time there was an explosion, and the terrorists after it rushed to the window.

They jumped out into the street, while Blumkin broke his leg. Andreev helped him up; the criminals got to the car, got into it and drove away. Embassy guards started shooting too late, so their bullets didn't hit anyone. This is how the assassination of Ambassador Mirbach took place, which caused a whole series of serious political events.

The room in the German embassy where the murder of Mirbach was committed

It is noteworthy that the terrorists left a whole bunch of evidence at the crime scene. Embassy officials found the killers' own IDs. The case that was opened against the "relative" of the German ambassador. The briefcase in which revolvers and bombs were carried into the embassy building. Therefore, the identity of the criminals was immediately established. However, strange as it sounds, Blumkin and Andreev could not be detained. Each was sentenced in absentia to 3 years in prison.

One gets the impression that the Bolsheviks did not try hard to catch the killers. And this could only happen if the Bolshevik party itself was involved in this unsightly terrorist act, which violated all diplomatic norms and rules.

Who could benefit from the assassination of Ambassador Mirbach

The fate of the assassins of the German ambassador was different. Andreev fled to Ukraine. There he was a member of several political movements, and then died of typhus. As for Blumkin, he, having changed his last name, first hid in Moscow, and then plunged headlong into the thick of the Civil War. In 1919, Trotsky liked him, and very soon Blumkin was forgiven for the murder of the ambassador. He was shot by the OGPU at the end of 1929 for his connection with Trotsky.

But this is, so to speak, a saying, and now let's figure out who benefited from the assassination of Ambassador Mirbach? This man is considered by many to be the curator of the Bolsheviks. It was he who supplied them with money, thanks to which the October Revolution was accomplished. The Germans bet on the Bolsheviks and got the Brest Peace Treaty, which was extremely beneficial for them.

However, in addition to the Germans, the French and the British were present in Moscow. They began to establish contacts with other political parties and movements. Mirbach could not stand aside and also began to negotiate with the opposition. In addition, he soon realized that the Bolsheviks were unreliable people. They are uncontrollable and are guided only by their own interests, which at any moment may run counter to the interests of Germany.

German Ambassador Mirbach

The Bolsheviks, having learned that Mirbach was changing orientation, decided to eliminate him, which was done on July 6, 1918. But they used the assassination of the ambassador to the maximum benefit for themselves, destroying the party of the Left SRs. However, this is only one of the assumptions, indirectly proving that the death of the German ambassador was beneficial to the Bolsheviks.

In principle, it can be assumed that the death of poor Mirbach was also beneficial to the Left SRs. Thus, it was planned to violate the conditions of the Brest Peace, to introduce disagreements between Germany and the world's first state of workers and peasants. But we must not forget that the treaty has already entered into force, and after the fight they do not wave their fists. Nobody's death could already reverse the decisions of the Brest Peace.

The Left SRs had to take the initiative back in February, March 1918, and not kill the German ambassador in July. Did the leaders of the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party understand this? Probably, they understood, and therefore it is unlikely that they could initiate the murder of a representative of Germany. So the scales are still tipping towards the Bolsheviks.

In July, Lenin and his associates were not at all afraid that Germany would again begin military operations against Russia. The Germans had many problems on the western fronts, as the First World War ended only in November 1918. Indeed, after the assassination of his ambassador, Wilhelm II did not take any drastic measures. He only expressed a desire to send a battalion of German soldiers to Moscow to guard his embassy. But the Bolsheviks refused, and the Germans accepted this refusal.

Therefore, whatever one may say, the assassination of Ambassador Mirbach was beneficial in the first place to the Bolsheviks. They developed the script and put it into practice. And after that, they dealt a decisive blow to their main political opponents - the Left SRs. Mirbach himself, who imagined himself to be a puppeteer, turned out to be just a bargaining chip in the game that the Bolsheviks started, striving for absolute power in the country and the World Revolution.