Preparation of the concept of a new union treaty. Union treaty almost signed

In the summer of 1990, work began on the preparation of a fundamentally new document, which was to become the basis of the state. The majority of members of the Politburo and the leadership of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR opposed the revision of the foundations of the Union Treaty of 1922. Therefore, Gorbachev began to fight against them with the help of Boris N. Yeltsin, elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, and the leaders of other union republics, who supported his course towards reforming the Soviet Union.

The main idea embodied in the draft of the new treaty was the provision on granting broad rights to the union republics, primarily in the economic sphere (and later even gaining economic sovereignty by them). However, it soon became clear that Gorbachev was not ready to go for that either. Since the end of 1990, the union republics, now enjoying great freedom, decided to act independently: a series of bilateral agreements were concluded between them in the field of the economy.

In the meantime, the situation in Lithuania became aggravated, the Supreme Council of which passed laws one after another, formalizing in practice the sovereignty of the republic. In January 1991, in an ultimatum form, Gorbachev demanded that the Supreme Council of Lithuania restore the full operation of the Constitution of the USSR, and after their refusal, he introduced additional military formations into the republic. This caused clashes between the army and the population in Vilnius, as a result of which 14 people were killed. The tragic events in the capital of Lithuania provoked a violent reaction throughout the country, once again compromising the Union Center.

On March 17, 1991, a referendum was held on the fate of the USSR. Each citizen who had the right to vote received a ballot with the question: "Do you consider it necessary to preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms of a person of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?" 76% of the population of a vast country spoke in favor of maintaining a single state. However, the collapse of the USSR could no longer be stopped.

Simultaneously with the referendum on the preservation of the Union, a second referendum was held - on the establishment of the post of president. The majority of Russians supported the parliament's decision on the need to introduce the post of President of the RSFSR. Following Russia, the posts of presidents were introduced in most of the union republics. The elections were won by representatives of the forces that advocated independence from the center.

In the summer of 1991, the first presidential elections in Russia took place. During the election campaign, the leading "democratic" candidate Yeltsin actively played the "national card", suggesting that Russia's regional leaders take as much sovereignty as they "can eat." This largely ensured his victory in the elections. BN Yeltsin won the election with 57% of the vote. Gorbachev's position weakened even more. Growing economic difficulties required speeding up the development of a new Union Treaty. The allied leadership was now primarily interested in this. In the summer, Gorbachev agreed to all the conditions and demands made by the Union republics. According to the draft of the new treaty, the USSR was supposed to turn into a Union of Sovereign States, which would include both former union and autonomous republics on equal terms. In terms of the form of association, it was more like a confederation. It was also planned to form new federal authorities. The signing of the agreement was scheduled for August 20, 1991.

The process of concluding a union treaty was disrupted by an attempt to introduce a state of emergency. The signing of a new treaty meant the elimination of a number of unified state structures (a single Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KGB, the army leadership). This caused dissatisfaction with the conservative forces in the country's leadership. In the absence of President M. S. Gorbachev, on the night of August 19, the State Committee for the State of Emergency was created, which included Vice President G. Yanaev, Prime Minister V. Pavlov, Defense Minister D. Yazov. The State Emergency Committee declared a state of emergency, suspended the activities of political parties (with the exception of the CPSU), and banned rallies and demonstrations (see Appendix 9). The leadership of the RSFSR condemned the actions of the State Emergency Committee as an attempt at an unconstitutional coup. Muscovites came to the defense of the building of the Supreme Soviet of Russia. On August 21, the conspirators were arrested, MS Gorbachev returned to Moscow. The August putsch changed the balance of power in the country. B. N. Yeltsin became a folk hero who prevented a coup d'état. MS Gorbachev lost influence.

After these events, work on the union treaty was continued under significantly changed political conditions. The leadership of the RSFSR, supported by Ukraine and some other republics, sought to change the status of the renewed Union (instead of a federation - a confederation) and to minimize the powers of the union bodies. By decision of the extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, work on the completion of the union treaty was entrusted to the State Council, consisting of the President of the USSR and the highest officials of the republics, which began to develop a new version of the draft. At meetings of the State Council on September 16, November 14 and 25, 1991, the leaders of the republics spoke in favor of creating a new political union - the Union of Sovereign States (USG). By a resolution of the State Council of November 25, 1991, the President of the USSR and the leaders of 8 republics sent the agreed draft of the union treaty to the Supreme Soviets of the republics, the reorganized Supreme Soviet of the USSR for approval. It was supposed to form authorized delegations of states to finalize the text and sign it in December 1991. By decision of the State Council, the draft union treaty was published in the press.

After the referendum on independence, which took place in Ukraine on December 1, 1991, the controversial concept of “Union without a Center” prevailed in the leading circles, formalized on December 8, 1991 in the form of the “Belovezhskaya Agreement” - “Agreement between the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation (RSFSR) and Ukraine on the creation CIS”, signed by B. N. Yeltsin, L. M. Kravchuk and S. Yu. Shushkevich, without informing M. S. Gorbachev. It was an agreement on the termination of the Union Treaty of 1922 and the liquidation of the USSR. Instead of the USSR, the creation of a commonwealth of independent states was proclaimed.

The liquidation of the USSR automatically meant the liquidation of the bodies of the former Soviet Union. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR was dissolved, the allied ministries were liquidated. In December 1991, MS Gorbachev resigned from the presidency. The Soviet Union ceased to exist.

Having remained unrealized, the draft Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States of November 25, 1991 is of interest to history, as a document in which an attempt is made to organically combine the interests, rights and obligations of the states that form the Union. This is the last - before the termination of the existence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - a legitimate project, which, along with the Union Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms, was to become the new constitutional basis of the Union.

The collapse of the Soviet Union left a very difficult legacy for Russia in the form of an economic crisis, general social discontent and the absence of a real Russian statehood. Thus, it was necessary to act simultaneously in several directions. To succeed, it was necessary to determine both the goals of the transformations and the priorities for their achievement, which made it extremely urgent to develop a specific reform program. In the context of the collapse of the moderate and conservative models of the period of perestroika, it was quite natural for Russia to win the concept of a democratic liberal market state with a focus on Western countries, which was quite radical for Russia. It was this idea that the ruling circles that came to power tried to implement.

In August 1991, a turning point took place in the life of the Soviet country. This was the beginning of the collapse of the USSR. A completely new political situation has been created. From the very beginning of the reforms, from 1989-1990, the leadership of our republic adhered to the line that helped maintain harmony and stability within the republic itself and build new partnership, mutually respectful relations with both the union and federal centers.

The signing of the Union Treaty and, planned after it, changes in the composition of the top leadership of the USSR were perceived by the conservative part of the communist nomenklatura as a threat to personal power, and they attempted a coup d'état.

The first president of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) Mikhail Efimovich Nikolaev tells about that time, about the main events of 1991.

union treaty

Mikhail Efimovich, 20 years have already passed since those memorable events ...

For me, it's not twenty years ago. For me, this is yesterday. And I always remember these days, very tragic days ... Here, the events of those years stand before my eyes, as if it were yesterday ...

Let us recall the events that preceded the putsch. The main event of 1991 was to be the signing of a new Union Treaty. On May 12, the leaders of the autonomous republics met with the President of the USSR Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev. As far as I understand, there was confirmed the earlier decision in principle that the autonomous republics would also sign the new union treaty. Mikhail Efimovich, please tell us how this meeting was prepared, how did it go?

Yes, indeed, during the reform of the state system, the autonomous republics took an active part in the discussion and development of documents. At one time, a law was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, according to which the powers and rights of the autonomous republics were equated with the union republics. The preparation of a new union treaty was in full swing. And suddenly a message comes out in the press that the union treaty will be signed by the union republics and the center, known as the "9 + 1" formula. And nothing was said about autonomous republics. 9 - these are the then union republics, without the Baltic republics, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and plus one - the President of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev.

It was in April. Having received this message, I called the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin. Showing bewilderment and concern, he asked whether the previously adopted agreements that the union treaty would be signed by the autonomous republics on an equal basis with the union ones had been revised? And he asked for his consent so that we, the chairmen of the presidiums of the Supreme Soviets of the Autonomous Republics, would gather with him for consultations. He agreed.

It was before the May holidays. Boris Nikolaevich asked: "Let's go after Victory Day." Well, I informed Mintimer Shaimiev, Murtaza Rakhimov about this, asked them, since they are closer, to inform the leaders of other autonomous republics that I have an agreement to meet with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin for consultation on Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement about "9 + 1 ". They agreed, and we met on May 10 at Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin's.

And before that, on May 7, we, the leaders of the republics, signed our appeal on "9 + 1". They asked Yeltsin what line we should follow, how he felt about this statement, what importance he attached. He said that he was aware of the matter, knew about the statement and offered: “if you have such a great desire, I will arrange a meeting with Mikhail Sergeyevich.” Immediately called him on the turntable. Gorbachev said that today or tomorrow he won't be able to, "let's do it the day after tomorrow." And so on May 12, in the afternoon, we gathered at Mikhail Sergeevich's in the Kremlin.

Opening the meeting, Mikhail Sergeevich emphasized that it was held at the request of the chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of the autonomous republics. Boris Nikolayevich gave me the first floor, as I was the initiator of the meeting. I expressed the opinion of my colleagues, chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of the republics. The bottom line was that at this tense time it is impossible to deviate from previously adopted agreements, this creates artificial pressures, tensions, so we must, I said, find a common language with you. We believe that, as previously agreed, the leaders of the autonomous republics should take part in the preparation and signing of a new union treaty. Moreover, we in Russia, in the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, have already decided that from the RSFSR the signature of BN Yeltsin will be the first, and then the signatures of all the leaders of the autonomous republics. This is a decision already taken by the Supreme Soviet of Russia. Well, he also outlined a number of economic points.

Then my other colleagues came out with support. In the end, it was decided to move away from the formula "union republics + the president of the Soviet Union" and return to the original version. After that, we began to take an active part in the so-called Novoogarevo process (Novo-Ogaryovo is the residence of MS Gorbachev near Moscow - O.S.).

Then, with short breaks in June-July, they continued to work. Almost in July, we completed the preparation of the document, and we all signed it page by page, article by article. There are two controversial articles left. This is about the tax system and customs taxes. Then, by common efforts, a consensus was reached: to instruct Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev to make a decision. They had to agree on these two articles, find an acceptable solution, sign. And we, trusting them, agree with their decision. And then submit the Treaty for signing on 20 August. On this they parted ways.

Did Boris Yeltsin also agree?

Yes, he agreed.

three days of august

How did the August events unfold?

At the very beginning of August, on the 4th, I think, a message came: MS Gorbachev took a vacation and went to rest. And at the same time, a telegram officially came to us in Yakutsk from the Kremlin with the following content: the signing of the Union Treaty is scheduled for August 20 at 2 pm. The composition of the delegation - so many people, be determined. And we decided and flew out on August 18, settled in the hotels "Moscow" and "Russia". On the 19th, early in the morning, at 6 o’clock, Kliment Egorovich Ivanov calls (he was part of the delegation) and says: “Turn on the TV urgently, they are transmitting an important message.” I turned on the TV, at this time the announcer read out the message that the State Emergency Committee was created, his appeal, orders.

Then we promptly all gathered. Taras Gavrilyevich Desyatkin, Sofron Petrovich Danilov, Kliment Egorovich Ivanov... All those who were. We got together and started discussing what to do. Then they instructed me to contact all the chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of the autonomous republics and try to go to the Kremlin, find out the details in order to decide on further actions. I called my colleagues on the turntable, agreed to meet at 9 o'clock in the morning in the lobby of the Moskva Hotel. We met and agreed that we should go to the Kremlin.

They called, they could not find anyone, then they got through to Lukyanov Anatoly Ivanovich, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. And agreed on 11 hours. We had breakfast, I told Kliment Yegorovich: “Go to the White House, find out the situation, consult on our further actions. And then we'll meet at the Moscow Hotel. And we went at the appointed time with our colleagues to the Kremlin. We went to Anatoly Lukyanov and began to ask what was the matter, what was the situation, what caused it, etc.

- Who took part?

All chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of the autonomous republics who came to the signing. He says, yes, Mikhail Sergeyevich really fell ill. “You yourself saw how he worked day and night. Yes, indeed, he was ill, here. You heard about it, you know from the appeal of the State Emergency Committee.” He also said that he himself was taken to Moscow at night. By helicopter. He was resting in Valdai then. “I flew in at night, so I don’t know what the matter is.”

We understood that he did not finish something. We say, let's organize a meeting with the vice-president, chairman of the State Emergency Committee Gennady Yanaev. Lukyanov agreed, called, he appointed at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. When we came to Yanaev, he was in a very difficult condition - spiritual, physical, moral. In general terms, he outlined what was stated in the appeal. At this time the call. B.N. Yeltsin called. I asked Yanaev why his car was not allowed into the Kremlin, that he had sent his appeal. Yanaev says: "I'll figure it out, I'm not in the know, it can't be that your car is not allowed." This ended the conversation.

We, too, without really getting an explanation, left the Kremlin. We understood one thing, that there is no written statement from Gorbachev about resignation. We go out and see that all of Moscow is filled with tanks. All squares, etc. Arrived at the Moscow Hotel. Kliment Yegorovich was waiting for me, he said that he could not reach the White House. There are barricades, barricaded. Well, what to do next? I say: “Let's go to the permanent mission”, it was then in Kolpachny Lane. From there I called the agency and asked to book two seats for the evening flight. And we went to the port of Domodedovo. On the 20th I was already there, in Yakutsk.

You are back on time. I remember that many in Yakutsk were ready to support the GKChP, the regional committee of the Communist Party prepared a project on the creation of a republican GKChP, tried to pass it through the Presidium of the Supreme Council. Or the same Pavel Pavlovich Borodin, chairman of the Yakutsk city executive committee. Only you have taken a firm position - the rule of law of the RSFSR and the republic. What was your confidence, your position based on?

As I said, while in Moscow, I saw with my own eyes the leaders of the putschists, I was convinced that they were lying. It was clear that these were illegal, unconstitutional actions. And we acted in accordance with our own laws, the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Republic. From the very beginning, I knew and supported the position of the leadership of the Russian Federation, President Boris Yeltsin. Remember, we elected him on June 12, 1991 as the first president of the RSFSR. I saw the prospects for the development of the republic as part of the renewed Russian Federation. I believed in it. It was impossible, it was impossible to return, all the more so by forceful unconstitutional means, during the dictates of one party. We turned out to be right.

- Mikhail Efimovich, from today's point of view, how to evaluate these events? What do you think it was?

A sign of weakness, the agony of the existing government. The authorities of the CPSU. In my opinion, it was necessary just to gather people on the square, to come out to the same vice-president, who at that time performed the functions of the supreme power, and tell about his vision of how to continue to live. If they, the Gekacheppists, did not agree with Gorbachev's policy. And at that time it was unthinkable to stop the reforms by force of arms, it was on the verge of stupidity, because the people were in such a tense state then that it was tantamount to adding fuel to the fire. And this is what happened. It is necessary to negotiate with the people in a peaceful way, if you have something to say, if you want to change something, you need to consult with the people, ask: this is our opinion, how do you look at it.

- Was the purpose of the GKChP to disrupt the signing of a new union treaty?

Undoubtedly. They did not want this union treaty to be signed. There was only one goal - to break.

But if the treaty had been signed then... Here, from the point of view of the republic, Yakutia. Was it good for us? How would it affect the development of the republic?

Undoubtedly positive. As I already said, we agreed that the treaty would be signed on an equal footing with the Union and autonomous republics. At that time, very serious questions were about property, about the tax system. That is, basically, economic issues were resolved. And we achieved this.

- And the treaty gave answers to these questions?

Quite right. And on the basis of this agreement, we would still sign agreements with the Russian Federation on the delimitation of property and delimitation of powers.

- The next step...

Yes. We all - both the people and the authorities - were united in one thing: to democratize. Both the state and society. Give more independence to the republics. The Union Treaty was called as follows: "Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States." Do you understand? So, today an attempt is being made to return to the provisions of that draft. For example, the introduction of a single customs tax. Create a single space in trade. So right? Single ruble. These same issues were to be resolved by the failed union treaty, and all other issues of the republic were to be resolved independently. That is, the rights to development were more laid down in this agreement than in the former Soviet Union.

About Mikhail Gorbachev

Who was the key figure in drafting the treaty? Gorbachev?

I would not say that he alone was the main figure. There were individuals who were in no way inferior to him. These are Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev, Islam Abduganievich Karimov. Here they are, these four most prominent figures, played the role of the first violin in drawing up the project, determining the main vectors for the development of the new Union.

- This year Mikhail Gorbachev turned 80 years old. Please tell us about your meetings with him.

My first meeting with Gorbachev took place after I was elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Yakut-Sakha SSR in July 1990. The first meeting lasted 45 minutes. I put three questions before him, they were not in the nature of demands or requests. I wanted to consult, to know his opinion on these issues. He told us about our socio-economic situation, that in order to solve problematic issues we plan to apply with our proposals to the union government.

At that time, he supported much of what I said. During the last two years, 1990-91, while the union government was working, we communicated quite often. I was at the reception, met during the Novoogarevsky process. I must say, nevertheless, that with Mikhail Sergeyevich, according to my observations, it was during these two years that the real things began to diverge from what he stated. I did not feel his superiority over the above-named personalities. After their speeches, objections, he began to hesitate, change his mind. I think this shows the character of a person, his will as a leader. Yet here he was inferior.

And he is a pleasant, intelligent person. He did a lot to democratize the country, the Soviet Union, end the Cold War with the West, changed not only our country, but also the world. historical personality.

- Was his visit to Yakutia planned?

No. Because I invited Boris Nikolayevich more insistently. We are part of the Russian Federation, therefore, first of all, the head of Russia was supposed to come. He addressed the Prime Minister of the USSR Valentin Pavlov with an invitation to discuss and solve socio-economic problems. He respected, if you remember, he came.

- Did you meet with Gorbachev after 1991?

Yes, sure. After a certain time after the resignation from the presidency of the USSR, he was constantly invited to events, meetings, banquets, holidays. Sometimes they sat at the same table. At Moscow State University, at the anniversary of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, for example. We talked, sometimes recalled the August events, and in general, in general, joint work, he remembered me well.

Recorded by Oleg Sidorov.

Reference:

Mikhail Efimovich Nikolaev was born on November 13, 1937 in the Oktemsky nasleg of the Ordzhonikidzevsky district of Yakutia.

In 1961 he graduated from the Omsk Veterinary Institute. From 1969 to 1971 he studied at the Higher Party School under the Central Committee of the CPSU.

After graduating from the institute, he worked as the chief veterinarian of the Zhigansk region. Then he switched to Komsomol work: the first secretary of the Zhigansky district committee of the Komsomol, the head of the department of the Komsomol bodies of the Yakut regional committee of the Komsomol, the first secretary of the Yakutsk city committee of the Komsomol.

After graduation from the Higher Party School - at party work: secretary, since 1973 - first secretary of the Verkhnevilyui district committee of the CPSU. In 1975 he was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Yakutia.

From 1979 to 1985 - Minister of Agriculture of the Republic. In 1985, he was elected secretary of the Yakut regional committee of the CPSU. Deputy of the Supreme Council of Yakutia 9-11 convocations. On December 8, 1989, he was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Yakutia.

On March 4, 1990, he was elected a people's deputy of the Russian Federation and Yakutia, a member of the constitutional commission of the Russian Federation.

From December 20, 1991 - President of Yakutia. On December 28, 1991, he took the oath. At the same time, Yakutia was renamed the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia).

In January 1992, he simultaneously headed the government of the republic.

On December 12, 1993, he was elected to the Federation Council from Yakutia. Member of the International Affairs Committee.

Representative in the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation from the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). Appointed - since January 28, 2002.

On April 25, 2008, at the 221st meeting, the Federation Council confirmed the powers and approved the senator from the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) as Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council.

Since 2011 - State Advisor to the President of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia).

Behind the assessments of the events of 20 years ago related to the State Emergency Committee, the main reason that pushed part of the party and state leadership of the USSR to such radical actions almost disappeared into the shadows. On August 20, 1991, the signing of a specially prepared Union Treaty was scheduled. The new federal state was supposed to be called the Union of Sovereign Soviet Republics, with the former abbreviation - the USSR.

Novoogarevsky process

In the course of Gorbachev's perestroika, the contradictions between the center and the republics grew. It was necessary to urgently develop a draft Union Treaty that would suit all 15 union republics. However, time was lost and the centrifugal tendencies in some of them acquired the character of irreversible.

Meanwhile, in March 1990, at the All-Union referendum, over 76 percent of the population voted for "preserving the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics." And this obvious result allowed Mikhail Gorbachev to sharply intensify the development of the project.

The first meeting to prepare the treaty took place on May 24, 1991, at Novo-Ogarevo, the residence of the President of the USSR near Moscow (hence the name of the process). It was attended by representatives of nine republics - the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the BSSR, Azerbaijan and five Central Asian ones.

After long and sometimes very tense discussions in June, a compromise was reached: the USSR should be transformed into a soft federation. The issues of defense, security, foreign policy, a unified financial policy (issue of the union currency), and general infrastructure remained behind the union center. The majority of economic issues, questions of social and cultural policy were transferred to the jurisdiction of the union republics, citizenship of the union republics was introduced.

It was assumed that the new head of the union government would be the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev. The prepared Union Treaty was considered open for signing by all republics from August 20, 1991.

Russia's position

By August 1991, there was no consensus among Russian President Yeltsin's circle about a new Union Treaty. In general, the position of the Russian leadership on the conclusion of the treaty was extremely ambivalent. On the one hand, Boris Yeltsin advocated the creation of a renewed Union, on the other, since the winter of 1991, negotiations were underway to create a kind of confederation of Russia-Ukraine-Belarus-Kazakhstan "horizontally" without the participation of the Union Center.

Few people know that the first attempt to conclude the "Belovezhskaya agreements" was made back in February 1991. This idea was actively supported by Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk, then head of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine. However, the Belarusian Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich and the head of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev opposed.

Ruslan Khasbulatov, Acting Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, was a consistent supporter of the Union Treaty, although he expressed certain complaints about its text. In an interview with Radio Liberty in August 2001, Ruslan Khasbulatov recalled: “Yeltsin and I argued a lot - should we go to the meeting on August 20? , this will be perceived as our desire to destroy the Union."

The position of the Russian leadership was followed extremely closely in other union republics, primarily in Ukraine.

Anti-union sentiments in the summer of 1991 were strong only in Western Ukraine and partly in Kyiv. The center of Ukraine and the Left Bank actively supported the signing of the treaty and the preservation of the Union - in a referendum, more than 70 percent of Ukrainian citizens voted for it.

The Ukrainian government was most concerned about protecting the republic's consumer market. In November 1990, cards were introduced in Ukraine. Since that time, Ukrainians, along with wages in Soviet rubles, began to receive multi-colored "sheets of coupons", without which it was difficult to buy something in the state trade system.

Some Ukrainian experts retrospectively began to declare that even then Ukraine began to introduce its own currency. To put it mildly, they are lying. Residents of Russian megacities remember the same coupons for almost all consumer goods - from cigarettes to sugar.

The consumer market crisis was common to all. Meanwhile, against the backdrop of the all-Union crisis, many unfortunate economists appeared, stubbornly arguing that "Ukraine feeds the entire Union" and that in a few years an independent Ukraine will certainly become a "second France."

For the sake of objectivity, it must be said that such conversations were then very popular in Russia as well. "The union republics hang like a heavy burden on our economy," was the insistent refrain.

Contrary to the popular cliché, the West was not interested in the collapse of the USSR in the summer of 1991. Another socialist federation, Yugoslavia, was already creeping into a civil war, and it would be too much to get a new hotbed of tension with nuclear weapons.

During a visit to Kyiv in early August 1991, then US President George W. Bush conveyed to the Ukrainian leadership that the United States was not interested in an independent Ukraine.

Why did the Union fail?

After 20 years, the question again arises: did the new Union have a chance?

In the opinion of a direct and active participant in those events, the former President of Tatarstan Mentimer Shaimiev, "be that as it may, the Union had real chances to survive with the granting of broad powers to the union republics."

It must be said that the personal factor played a huge role in disrupting the process of creating a new Union. In the rejection of the confederation, seemingly opposing forces united in the most surprising way. On the one hand, they were the "guardians" of the former USSR from the conservative wing of the party-state leadership (the actions of the putschists were aimed primarily at disrupting the signing of the new Union Treaty). And on the other hand, the pseudo-democratic elites that were actively forming at that time, represented by people from the republican leadership of the CPSU, who wanted full power in their territories - the former Soviet republics. Russia, led by its leader Yeltsin, was no exception in this sense.

After the failure of the State Emergency Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev was still trying to revive the Novoogarevsky process and create at least some kind of formation on the ruins of the USSR.

On December 9, 1991, seven republics (excluding Ukraine and Azerbaijan) were scheduled to sign an agreement on the creation of a confederal Union with the capital in Minsk.

However, on December 8, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus announced in Belovezhskaya Pushcha the dissolution of the USSR and the creation of the CIS.

The majority of the population of the three Slavic republics believed that the Commonwealth would become the new format of the Union, but these hopes did not come true.

twenty years later

None of the former Soviet republics, including the Baltic pioneers of secession from the USSR, oil-producing Azerbaijan and Russia itself, benefited from the collapse of a single state, more precisely, from the destruction of the common economic space.

The Soviet economy had a very high level of cooperation, up to 80 percent of the products were created jointly and then distributed among the republics. The collapse of the all-Union market led to a collapse in production, galloping inflation, and the disappearance of high-tech industries.

The most indicative in this regard are the problems of Ukraine after gaining independence. The Ukrainian aerospace industry, due to the rupture of cooperation ties with Russia and lack of funding, has significantly reduced production volumes, and many extremely promising projects that are in a high degree of readiness have been mothballed.

After 20 years, many of the ideas embodied in the draft Union Treaty are again becoming relevant in the course of the creation of the Eurasian Union. The Customs Union and the Common Economic Space of the EurAsEC are in fact the first stages in the creation of a new Union, primarily of an economic orientation.

Hopefully, the current political elites of the post-Soviet states will have the wisdom not to repeat the mistakes of 20 years ago.

So, on the way to signing the key document, about which the president of the USSR was busy so much, the finish line was envied ...

On August 2, Gorbachev spoke on television. Officially proclaimed: The Union Treaty is open for signing. He said that he sent a corresponding letter to the heads of delegations of all the republics authorized to sign the document with a proposal to start the signing process on August 20. The letter was also sent to the republics "undecided" about the treaty.

It was assumed that Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan would put their signatures under the agreement on August 20. On September 3, it will be the turn of Belarus and Tajikistan (later they expressed their readiness to sign the agreement together with the "priority" - on August 20). The rest of the republics, as planned, will sign later. The whole process took about two months. Why was it impossible to sign, as usual, all at once? It was hoped that if this process was stretched out in time, perhaps, after some time, those republics that at that moment hesitated or were not going to sign the agreement would “ripen” before signing. The main problem was related to Ukraine, which promised to make its final decision on the treaty only in September. It seems that Armenia and Moldova were also “pulled up”. In his speech on television, Gorbachev said bluntly:

- Such an order (that is, extended in time. - O.M.) will enable the Supreme Council of Ukraine to complete the consideration of the draft. During this time, a referendum will be held in Armenia. Moldova will decide on the attitude towards the Union Treaty.

Just in case, ritually, Gorbachev and the other republics mentioned:

- The peoples of Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia will also be able to decide on this vital issue.

By this moment, it was possible to agree that the Russian autonomies - all without exception - would nevertheless sign the agreement as part of the delegation of the RSFSR: Shaimiev was finally persuaded. Yeltsin promised him that Russia would conclude a separate, bilateral treaty with Tatarstan, which would clearly spell out the delimitation of powers between Moscow and Kazan (Shaimiev stubbornly refused to sign the Federative Treaty, which was then being prepared). Such was the price paid to the Tatarstan leader for his “domestic Russian” signature under the Union Treaty.

In order not to put things off indefinitely, work on a bilateral agreement will begin on August 12.

It was planned to complete the signing of the Union Treaty on October 22. On this day, the last ones from the republican queue will put their signatures under it, and after them - the allied delegation headed by Gorbachev. Gorbachev will make a solemn declaration on the creation of the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics. This day will be declared a public holiday of the USSR.

Alas, none of this was destined to come true.

It is planned to create a full-fledged democratic state

The text of the agreement, basically agreed on July 23 and finalized a few days later, was published in Pravda only on August 15, before that it was kept secret. In fact, it contained a lot of good words, which, if they were implemented, in fact, could become the basis of some new, democratic state.

“The states forming the Union,” it was said, in particular, in the treaty, “consider the priority of human rights in accordance with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other generally recognized norms of international law as the most important principle ...

The states that form the Union see the most important condition for the freedom and well-being of the people and every person in the formation of civil society ...

The parties to the treaty recognize democracy based on popular representation and the direct expression of the will of peoples as a common fundamental principle, strive to create a state of law that would serve as a guarantor against any tendencies towards totalitarianism and arbitrariness.

More than twenty years have passed, but few places in the former Soviet Union have implemented these wonderful declarations. Few places recognize human rights as a priority, where democracy is considered a common fundamental principle, where the state is seriously striving to form a civil society.

The treaty referred to the jurisdiction of the Union issues of defense, state security, foreign policy and foreign economic activity (the right to engage in this policy and this activity was also granted to the republics - the Union acted as a coordinator here), the approval and execution of the union budget ... In short, the rights of the Center were significantly truncated, and the rights of the republics, respectively, expanded.

The issue of taxes has long been controversial - whether to adopt a single-channel or two-channel system. Under a two-channel system, taxes are collected by both the republic that is a member of the Union and the Center - each with their own, with a single-channel tax - one. In the end, they settled on a single-channel system: each republic collects money, after which a certain, fixed percentage is transferred to the union budget.

For those states that sign the treaty, the treaty on the formation of the USSR of 1922 is considered invalid. For such states, "there is a most favored nation treatment." For those who do not sign the treaty - as they say, "by default" - that old, Old Testament treaty of 1922 continues to operate (with which, I think, at least one of them would hardly agree), and with them as relations with foreign states are built "on the basis of the legislation of the USSR, mutual obligations and agreements." That is, a rather funny picture turned out: some states ended up in the “new” USSR (Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics), while others, legally, on the basis of the Union Treaty, remained in the “old” USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). In other words, two groups of states, "foreign" in relation to each other, were formed.

In fact, if the Union Treaty had been concluded, of course, there would no longer be any "old" Union.

Friendly conversation before Gorbachev's departure for Foros

Although, as we have seen, Gorbachev prevented the election of Yeltsin as Russian president in every possible way - just as he prevented his election as chairman of the Russian parliament - after this election, despite all the opposition, nevertheless took place, between them again, at least At least outwardly, peace has been established again, or a truce, call it what you will. Yeltsin agreed to sign the Union Treaty, despite the objections of his allies from "Democratic Russia" and just prominent democrats. They, Gorbachev and Yeltsin (the third was Nazarbayev) passed quite amicably last meeting, on July 29, before Gorbachev's fatal departure to rest in Foros. He left on August 4th.

Gorbachev recalls:

“In that conversation, we agreed on something very important, I would say, historically important. In my opinion, even at the suggestion of Yeltsin. About future. We agreed that we are submitting a detailed Union Treaty for signing... Already on the basis of the Treaty, new elections can be held: by adopting an appropriate law. And Yeltsin says: in connection with this, I want to say: let's clearly agree on what we should go to the polls with. You will be on vacation, we will think here.

I believe that you should (this is Yeltsin speaking, I am stating it) withdraw your statements that you will not participate in the presidential elections, on the basis that it is expedient to continue your work in the Union, and mine in Russia. OK, deal. Now for the government. And the government of the new Union should be headed by Nazarbayev (it must be understood that this is also Yeltsin's proposal. - O.M.) He says: I will not go to such a government where I will be a scapegoat. And here there was an understanding that we were talking about a different government ... We ... sat, in my opinion, for 12 hours in that conversation.

Yeltsin also has a story about this conversation in Notes of the President. However, Yeltsin does not mention that he persuaded Gorbachev to “withdraw his statements” about non-participation in the presidential elections: they say it would be advisable for Gorbachev to continue his work in the Union, and he, Yeltsin, in Russia. Yeltsin only writes that he advised Gorbachev to refuse to combine the posts of president and general secretary (by the way, Gorbachev actually resigned the powers of general secretary immediately after the putsch).

The difference in presentation, in general, is significant. It is one thing to refuse to combine posts, and another thing is to go to the future elections of the union president, to continue our work in the future Union, although no one at that moment knew for sure what this Union would be like.

But, one way or another, we talked peacefully and friendly. But back in February, we remember, Yeltsin demanded that Gorbachev resign. Yes, there were other moments when Yeltsin spoke extremely harshly about President Gorbachev, threatening to leave him in the role of the Queen of England.

“Gorbachev and I,” writes Yeltsin, “suddenly clearly felt that our interests had finally coincided. That these roles suit us quite well. Gorbachev kept his seniority, and I kept my independence. It was the perfect solution for both."

The KGB recorded the conversation of the presidents

Here, perhaps, it is necessary to mention some more details concerning this conversation. According to Yeltsin, the July 29 meeting was of a principled nature. Gorbachev was going on vacation to the Crimea, to Foros, he planned to return before August 20, before the first "act" of signing the Union Treaty, so it was necessary to discuss some of the "most acute" issues that remained unresolved.

The conversation began in one of the halls of the residence. For a while, everything went well, but when they touched on completely confidential topics, Yeltsin suddenly fell silent.

What are you, Boris? Gorbachev was surprised.

“It’s hard for me to remember now,” writes Yeltsin, “what feeling I experienced at that moment. But there was an inexplicable feeling that someone was standing behind you, someone was relentlessly peeping behind you. I said then: "Let's go to the balcony, it seems to me that we are being overheard." Gorbachev did not answer too firmly: “Come on,” but he nevertheless followed me.”

It really was something to eavesdrop on. The conversation was about "personnel" issues. Yeltsin began to convince Gorbachev: if he counts on a renewed federation, the republics will enter it only if he replaces at least the most odious part of his entourage. Who will believe in the new Union Treaty if Kryuchkov, who is responsible for the events in Lithuania, remains the chairman of the KGB? Who will believe in him if such a “hawk” from the old, bygone times as Yazov remains the Minister of Defense?

Yeltsin was supported by Nazarbayev, who added that Minister of the Interior Pugo and Chairman of the State Radio and Television Kravchenko should also be replaced.

- And which vice-president from Yanaev? - said the President of Kazakhstan.

It was evident from everything that this conversation was not easy for Gorbachev. So far, of the candidates put forward by Yeltsin and Nazarbayev, he has agreed to "remove" only Kryuchkov and Pugo.

All three unanimously decided that after the signing of the treaty, Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov would also have to be replaced.

- And who do you see in this position? Gorbachev asked.

As already mentioned, Yeltsin proposed to make the third participant in the conversation, Nazarbayev, the prime minister.

Gorbachev was surprised at first, but quickly agreed.

“That was the meeting,” writes Yeltsin, “and I think a lot would have turned out differently if what the three of us had agreed on had been carried out. History could have taken a very different path."

That is, history could have taken a different path if it had been possible to remove Kryuchkov, Yazov, Pugo, Yanaev from their posts quickly enough - perhaps even before August 20th ...

By the way, Alexander Nikolaevich Yakovlev urgently advised Gorbachev to immediately dismiss four future putschists, albeit in a slightly different composition - Pavlov, Yazov, Pugo, Kryuchkov. He advised immediately after that very ominous June meeting of the Supreme Council (its closed part), when they almost openly showed themselves to be conspirators without five minutes. However, at that time Gorbachev did not go for it, in fact prejudging the further dramatic development of events.

The transition of the presidents from the hall to the balcony at that meeting before Gorbachev's departure for Foros did not save them from listening.

“A little time will pass,” Yeltsin continues, “and I will see with my own eyes the transcript of the conversation between the President of the USSR, the President of Russia and the leader of Kazakhstan. After the August coup in the office of Boldin, Gorbachev's chief of staff (an active participant in the coup. - O.M.), investigators from the prosecutor's office found mountains of folders with texts of Yeltsin's conversations in two safes. I have been recorded for several years - morning, afternoon, evening, night, at any time of the day.

This conversation was also recorded.

Maybe this record was the trigger for August 1991.”

What is meant by the words "trigger" ... Let me remind you that the conversation took place on July 29, 1991. Future putschists - the same Kryuchkov, Yazov, Pugo, others - began to prepare their speech much earlier. But if any of them had any other doubts, is it worth it? - having seen their surname among the candidates for an early resignation, they, apparently, cast aside these doubts.

Gorbachev also admits that the "push" to the putsch "was the secret recording of his conversation with Yeltsin and Nazarbayev" before his departure for Foros.

20 years of a treaty that no one signed

On August 20, 1991, the signing of a specially prepared Union Treaty was scheduled.

The new federal state was supposed to be called the Union of Sovereign Soviet Republics, with the former abbreviation - the USSR.

Novoogarevsky process

By the end of 1990, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia (without Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Armenia, Moldova (without Transnistria and Gagauzia) declared their unwillingness to participate in the negotiation process. Meanwhile, in March 1990, at the All-Union referendum held, over 76 percent of the population voted for (“preserving the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics)”. And this obvious result allowed Mikhail Gorbachev to sharply intensify the development of the project.

The majority of economic issues, questions of social and cultural policy were transferred to the jurisdiction of the union republics, citizenship of the union republics was introduced.

Russia's position

By August 1991, there was no consensus among Russian President Yeltsin's circle about a new Union Treaty. In general, the position of the Russian leadership on the conclusion of the treaty was extremely ambivalent. On the one hand, Boris Yeltsin advocated the creation of a renewed Union, on the other hand, since the winter of 1991, negotiations were underway to create a kind of confederation of Russia-Ukraine-Belarus-Kazakhstan (“horizontally)” without the participation of the Union Center.

Few people know that the first attempt to conclude the (Belovezhskaya Accords) was made back in February 1991. This idea was actively supported by Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk, then head of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine. However, the Belarusian Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich and the head of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev opposed.

Ruslan Khasbulatov, Acting Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, was a consistent supporter of the Union Treaty, although he expressed certain complaints about its text. In an interview with Radio Liberty in August 2001, Ruslan Khasbulatov recalled: “Yeltsin and I argued a lot - should we go to a meeting on August 20? And, finally, I convinced Yeltsin by saying that if we don’t even go there, if we don’t form a delegation, it will be perceived as our desire to destroy the Union.”

The position of the Russian leadership was followed extremely closely in other union republics, primarily in Ukraine.

Position of Ukraine

Anti-union sentiments in the summer of 1991 were strong only in Western Ukraine and partly in Kyiv. The center of Ukraine and the Left Bank actively advocated the signing of the treaty and the preservation of the Union - in the referendum, more than 70 percent of Ukrainian citizens voted for it.

The consumer market crisis was common to all. Meanwhile, against the backdrop of the all-Union crisis, many unfortunate economists appeared, stubbornly arguing that “Ukraine feeds the entire Union” and that in a few years an independent Ukraine will definitely become a “second France”.

For the sake of objectivity, it must be said that such conversations were then very popular in Russia as well. “The union republics hang like a heavy burden on our economy,” was the insistent refrain.

Contrary to the popular cliché, the West was not interested in the collapse of the USSR in the summer of 1991.

Another socialist federation, Yugoslavia, was already creeping into a civil war, and it would be too much to get a new hotbed of tension with nuclear weapons.

During a visit to Kyiv in early August 1991, then US President George W. Bush conveyed to the Ukrainian leadership that the United States was not interested in an independent Ukraine.

Why did the Union fail?

After 20 years, the question again arises: did the new Union have a chance?

According to a direct and active participant in those events, the former President of Tatarstan Mentimer Shaimiev, "be that as it may, the Union had real chances to survive with the granting of broad powers to the union republics."

It must be said that the personal factor played a huge role in disrupting the process of creating a new Union.

In the rejection of the confederation, seemingly opposing forces united in the most surprising way. On the one hand, they were the "guardians" of the former USSR from the conservative wing of the party-state leadership (the actions of the putschists were aimed primarily at disrupting the signing of the new Union Treaty).

On the other hand, the pseudo-democratic elites that were actively forming at that time, represented by people from the republican leadership of the CPSU, who wanted full power in their territories - the former Soviet republics. Russia, led by its leader Yeltsin, was no exception in this sense.

After the failure of the State Emergency Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev was still trying to revive the Novoogarevsky process and create at least some kind of formation on the ruins of the USSR.

On December 9, 1991, seven republics (excluding Ukraine and Azerbaijan) were scheduled to sign an agreement on the creation of a confederal Union with the capital in Minsk.

However, on December 8, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus announced in Belovezhskaya Pushcha the dissolution of the USSR and the creation of the CIS. The majority of the population of the three Slavic republics believed that the Commonwealth would become the new format of the Union, but these hopes did not come true.

twenty years later

Hopefully, the current political elites of the post-Soviet states will have the wisdom not to repeat the mistakes of 20 years ago.

Innokenty Adyasov,

member of the Expert and Analytical Council under the Committee on CIS Affairs of the State Duma - especially for RIA Novosti

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