The Eastern question is the so-called oral designation of a number of international contradictions that arose in the late 18th - early 20th centuries. It was directly related to the attempts of the Balkan peoples to free themselves from the Ottoman yoke. The situation was aggravated by the impending collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Many great powers, including Russia, Great Britain, Prussia, Austria-Hungary, sought to fight for the division of Turkish possessions.

Background

The Eastern question initially arose due to the fact that the Ottoman Turks, who settled in Europe, formed a rather powerful European state. As a result, the situation on the Balkan Peninsula has changed dramatically, a confrontation has emerged between Christians and Muslims.

As a result, it was the Ottoman state that became one of the key factors in international European political life. On the one hand, they were afraid of her, on the other, they were looking for an ally in her face.

France was one of the first to establish diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire.

In 1528, the first alliance between France and the Ottoman Empire was concluded, which was based on mutual hostility to the Austrian Empire, which at that time was personified by Charles V.

Over time, religious components were added to the political ones. King Francis I of France wanted one of the churches in Jerusalem to be returned to Christians. The Sultan was against it, but promised to support all Christian churches that would be founded in Turkey.

From 1535, free visits to the Holy Places were allowed for the French and all other foreigners under the auspices of France. Thus, for a long time, France remained the only Western European country in the Turkish world.

Decline of the Ottoman Empire

The decline in the Ottoman Empire began in the 17th century. The Turkish army was defeated by the Poles and Austrians near Vienna in 1683. So, the advance of the Turks to Europe was stopped.

Leaders of the national liberation movement in the Balkans took advantage of the weakened empire. They were Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs, Montenegrins, Vlachs, mostly Orthodox.

At the same time, in the 17th century, the economic and political positions of Great Britain and France, which dreamed of maintaining their own influence, while trying to interfere with the territorial claims of other powers, were increasingly strengthening in the Ottoman Empire. First of all, Russia and Austria-Hungary.

The main enemy of the Ottoman Empire

In the middle of the 18th century, the main enemy of the Ottoman Empire changed. Russia is replacing Austria-Hungary. The situation in the Black Sea region changed radically after the victory in the war of 1768-1774.

As a result, the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi treaty was concluded, which officially confirmed the first intervention of Russia in the affairs of Turkey.

At the same time, Catherine II had a plan for the final expulsion of all Turks from Europe and the restoration of the Greek Empire, on the throne of which she predicted her grandson Konstantin Pavlovich. At the same time, the Ottoman government hoped to take revenge for the defeat in the Russian-Turkish war. Great Britain and France continued to play an important role in the Eastern question, it was on their support that the Turks were counting.

As a result, in 1787, Turkey began another war against Russia. In 1788, the British and French, through diplomatic tricks, forced Sweden to join the war on their side, which attacked Russia. But within the coalition, it all ended in failure. First, Sweden withdrew from the war, and then Turkey agreed to another peace treaty that pushed its border to the Dniester. The government of the Ottoman Empire renounced its claims to Georgia.

Aggravation of the situation

As a result, it was decided that the existence of the Turkish Empire would ultimately prove to be more beneficial for Russia. At the same time, Russia's sole protectorate over Turkish Christians was not supported by other European states. For example, in 1815 at a congress in Vienna, Emperor Alexander I believed that the Eastern question deserves the attention of all world powers. Soon after this, a Greek uprising broke out, followed by the terrible barbarism of the Turks, all this forced Russia, along with other powers, to intervene in this war.

After that, relations between Russia and Turkey remained tense. Noting the reasons for the aggravation of the Eastern question, it is necessary to emphasize that the Russian rulers regularly studied the likelihood of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. So, in 1829, Nicholas I ordered to study the position of Turkey in the event of collapse.

In particular, it was proposed to justify five secondary states instead of Turkey. Kingdom of Macedonia, Serbia, Epirus, Kingdom of Greece and the Principality of Dacia. Now it should be clear to you what are the reasons for the aggravation of the Eastern question.

Expulsion of Turks from Europe

The plan for the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, conceived by Catherine II, was also attempted by Nicholas I. But as a result, he abandoned this idea, deciding on the contrary to support and protect its existence.

For example, after the successful uprising of the Egyptian pasha Megmet Ali, after which Turkey was almost completely crushed, Russia in 1833 concluded a defensive alliance, sending its fleet to the sultan's aid.

Feud in the East

The enmity continued not only with the Ottoman Empire, but also between the Christians themselves. In the east, the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches competed. They competed for various perks, privileges for visiting the Holy Places.

By 1740, France managed to achieve certain privileges for the Latin Church at the expense of the Orthodox. The followers of the Greek religion obtained from the sultan the restoration of ancient rights.

Understanding the reasons for the Eastern question, one must turn to 1850, when French envoys sought the return of certain Holy places located in Jerusalem to the French government. Russia was categorically against it. As a result, a whole coalition of European states came out against Russia in the Eastern question.

Turkey was in no hurry to adopt a decree favorable for Russia. As a result, in 1853, relations deteriorated again, and the solution of the Eastern question was again postponed. Soon after, relations with European states went wrong, all this led to the Crimean War, which ended only in 1856.

The essence of the Eastern question was the struggle for influence in the Middle East and the Balkan Peninsula. For several decades, he remained one of the key in Russia's foreign policy, she confirmed this over and over again. Russia's policy in the Eastern question was the need to establish its influence in this region; many European powers opposed it. All this resulted in the Crimean War, in which each of the participants pursued their own selfish interests. Now you have figured out what the Eastern question was.

Massacre in Syria

In 1860, the European powers again had to intervene in the situation in the Ottoman Empire, after a terrible massacre against Christians in Syria. The French army went east.

Regular uprisings soon began. First in Herzegovina in 1875, and then in Serbia in 1876. Russia in Herzegovina immediately declared the need to alleviate the suffering of Christians and finally put an end to the bloodshed.

In 1877 a new war broke out, Russian troops reached Constantinople, Romania, Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria gained independence. At the same time, the Turkish government insisted on the observance of the principles of religious freedom. At the same time, the Russian military-political leadership continued to develop plans for the landing on the Bosphorus at the end of the 19th century.

The situation at the beginning of the 20th century

By the beginning of the 20th century, the decay of Turkey continued to progress. This was largely facilitated by the reign of the reactionary Abdul-Hamid. Italy, Austria and the Balkan states took advantage of the crisis in Turkey to seize their territories from her.

As a result, in 1908, Bosnia and Herzegovina was ceded to Austria, the Tripoli region was annexed to Italy, in 1912 four secondary Balkan countries began a war with Turkey.

The situation was aggravated by the genocide of the Greek and Armenian people in 1915-1917. At the same time, the allies in the Entente made it clear to Russia that in the event of a triumph, the Black Sea straits and Constantinople could retreat to Russia. In 1918, Turkey surrendered in the First World War. But the situation in the region changed dramatically again, which was facilitated by the fall of the monarchy in Russia, the national-bourgeois revolution in Turkey.

In the war of 1919-1922, the Kemalists won under the leadership of Ataturk, at the Lausan Conference new borders of Turkey and the countries of the former Entente were approved. Ataturk himself became the first president of the Turkish Republic, the founder of the modern Turkish state in a familiar form.

The results of the Eastern question were the establishment of borders in Europe close to modern ones. We also managed to resolve many issues related to, for example, population exchange. Ultimately, this led to the final legal elimination of the very concept of the Eastern Question in modern international relations.

The Eastern question is a question about the fate of Turkey, about the fate of the peoples enslaved by it and fighting for their national independence in the Balkans, Africa and Asia, as well as about the attitude to these fate of the European powers and about the international contradictions that arose in this process.

By the end of the 16th century, the Turkish Empire reached its greatest power based on territorial conquest and feudal plunder of the enslaved peoples. However, already at the beginning of the 17th century, the process of Turkey losing its conquered lands and the fall of its power began.

The reasons for this process lay in the growth of the economic influence of large landowners-feudal lords in connection with the development of commodity-money relations in Turkey; this led to a weakening of the military power of the Turkish state, to feudal fragmentation and to increased exploitation of the working masses of the enslaved peoples.

The emergence of capitalism, which began in the middle of the 18th century in Turkey, only accelerated this process. The peoples enslaved by Turkey began to form into nations and began to fight for their national liberation; the intolerable exploitation of the laboring masses of the Turkish Empire delayed the capitalist development of the peoples subject to Turkey and intensified their striving for national liberation.

Economic stagnation and degradation, the inability to overcome feudal fragmentation and create a centralized state, the national liberation struggle of the peoples subject to Turkey, the aggravation of internal social contradictions led the Turkish Empire to disintegration and weakening of its international positions.

The increasing weakening of Turkey whetted the predatory appetites of the major European powers. Turkey was a profitable market and a source of raw materials; in addition, it was of great strategic importance, being located at the junction of the routes between Europe, Asia and Africa. Therefore, each of the "great" European powers strove to snatch for themselves more from the legacy of the "sick person" (as they began to call Turkey since 1839).

The struggle of the Western European powers for economic and political dominance in the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire began in the 17th century and continued in the 18th and 19th centuries.

By the end of the third quarter of the 19th century, a new struggle began between the European powers, which was called the "Eastern crisis".

The Eastern crisis arose as a result of an armed uprising of the Slavic population of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1875-1876) against the Turkish oppressors. This uprising, which was of an antifeudal nature, was a progressive national liberation struggle of the Slavic people against the backward and savage Turkish feudalism.

What was the position of the main European powers during the Eastern crisis?

Germany hoped to use the eastern crisis to weaken Russia and gain freedom of action against France. Defeated by Prussia in 1871, it quickly recovered and revanchist sentiments grew in it. Bourgeois Junker Germany was anxiously looking at the revival of the might of France and making plans for its new defeat. For Germany, this was possible only on the condition that no European power intervened in a new Franco-German war on the side of France; in this respect, she most of all could fear the unfavorable interference of Russia. The German Reich Chancellor Bismarck hoped to weaken Russia by drawing her into the war with Turkey; at the same time, Bismarck sought to push Russia in the Balkans against Austria-Hungary and thus finally bind Russia, deprive her of the opportunity to support France.

In Austria-Hungary, the military-clerical German party, led by Emperor Franz Joseph, hoped to use the Bosno-Herzegovinian uprising to seize Bosnia and Herzegovina, which Germany secretly encouraged it to do. The seizure was conceived in the form of an amicable deal with the Russian Tsar, since Austria-Hungary at that time did not consider it possible for itself to fight with Russia. At the beginning of the Eastern crisis, the Austro-Hungarian government circles even believed that it was necessary to extinguish the uprising and thus liquidate the crisis.

Russia, weakened by the Crimean War and not yet fully recovered from its consequences, at the beginning of the Eastern crisis was forced to limit itself, caring only about preserving its positions in the Balkans and maintaining its prestige among the Balkan Slavs. The tsarist government tried to help the rebels, but did not want to get involved in any actions that could involve Russia in the war. This led to the fact that the Russian government was ready to take the initiative to help the rebels, but only in agreement with other powers.

The British government, headed by Prime Minister Disraeli, sought to take advantage of Russia's difficult position to weaken it even further. Disraeli understood that only weakness forced the Russian government to limit itself in its predatory goals in relation to Turkey and that the tsarist government viewed such a limitation as a temporary measure.

To deprive Russia of the opportunity to pursue an active policy in the Balkans, Disraeli adopted a plan to push Russia into a war with Turkey, and, if possible, with Austria-Hungary. In Disraeli's opinion, such a war would weaken all its participants, which would give England freedom of action to implement aggressive plans in Turkey, would eliminate any threat to England from Russia in Central Asia, where Russia was already approaching the borders of India, and in the Balkans, where England feared the capture of the Black Sea straits by Russia. Disraeli began to unleash a war between Russia and Turkey under the hypocritical slogan of non-interference in Balkan affairs.

Such was the international balance of power of the European powers at the beginning of the Eastern crisis.

The first steps of the European powers still gave hope for a peaceful settlement of the Eastern crisis. On December 30, 1875, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Andrássy, at the initiative of Russia and in accordance with the project agreed with it, handed a note to all major European powers. Its essence was to eliminate the uprising with the help of modest administrative reforms for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The powers agreed with the proposals of the note and through their ambassadors began to press Turkey to carry out the requirements proposed by the note. In February 1876, Sultan Abdul-Aziz agreed to the requirements of the note. It would seem that the eastern crisis, having barely begun, ends.

But then British diplomacy entered the scene. The peaceful resolution of the eastern crisis did not suit her.

The closest obstacle on the way to deepening the crisis was Sultan Abdul-Aziz himself and his Russophile cabinet headed by Mahmud Nedim Pasha. As a result of a palace coup organized by the British ambassador to Turkey Elliot, Murad V was elevated to the sultan throne.

Meanwhile, the heroic struggle between the Bosniacs and Herzegovinians hastened the open action of Serbia and Montenegro. At the end of June 1876, Serbia declared war on Turkey. The successful struggle of 13-14 thousand Bosno-Herzegovinian rebels against the 35,000-strong Turkish army showed hopes for a successful outcome of the Serbo-Turkish war. In order to be ready to meet any outcome of this war and not to be drawn into it itself, the Russian government decided to come to an agreement with Austria-Hungary in advance on all possible cases.

On this basis, the Reichstadt Agreement was born, concluded on July 8, 1876 between Alexander II and the Russian Chancellor Gorchakov - on the one hand, Franz Joseph and Andrássy - on the other.

The first option, designed to defeat Serbia, provided only for the implementation of reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, outlined by Andrássy's note. The second option, calculated on the victory of Serbia, envisaged an increase in the territory of Serbia and Montenegro and some annexations for Austria-Hungary at the expense of Bosnia and Herzegovina; According to this option, Russia received Batumi, and the part of Bessarabia that had been torn away after the Crimean War was returned to it. The third version of the agreement, calculated for the complete collapse of Turkey and its displacement from Europe, provided, in addition to measures for the second option, also the creation of an autonomous or independent Bulgaria, some strengthening of Greece and, presumably, the declaration of Constantinople as a free city.

Meanwhile, hopes for a successful outcome for Serbia did not materialize. The Serbian army suffered a series of setbacks, and already on August 26, the Serbian prince Milan asked the powers for mediation in order to end the war. The Powers agreed and asked Turkey to inform them on what conditions peace could be granted to Serbia; England officially took part in this, but unofficially, she prompted Turkey to present Serbia with completely unacceptable conditions for concluding peace.

In response, the powers instructed England to obtain a month-long truce from Turkey. Disraeli could not openly refuse to fulfill this order. Gladstone, who led the opposition against Disraeli's policy in England, developed a hypocritical campaign in England against the tyranny and savage Turkish atrocities prevailing in Turkey and was able to amass political capital on this basis - to turn public opinion in England against Disraeli. To calm the minds and reconcile the public of England with Turkey, Disraeli came up with a new move: he decided to make Turkey at least fictitiously constitutional.

At the behest of the British ambassador, a new palace coup was organized, Murad V was overthrown and a new sultan, Abdul-Hamid, was installed in his place, who was a supporter of England and formally did not object to the proclamation of the constitution.

Following this, Disraeli, who had already received the title of lord and was called Beaconsfield, following the instructions of the powers, officially proposed to Turkey to conclude peace with Serbia on the basis of the situation that existed before the war; at the same time, British diplomats gave the new sultan a secret "friendly advice" to put an end to Serbia.

Abdul-Hamid followed this advice. At Djunisch, the poorly trained Serbian army was defeated. She was threatened with death.

In this situation, the tsarist government could not but act in favor of Serbia, without risking forever losing its influence in the Balkans. On October 31, Russia presented Turkey with an ultimatum demand to declare an armistice with Serbia within 48 hours. The Sultan was not prepared by his English prompters for such a move, he was confused and on November 2 accepted the demand for an ultimatum.

Beaconsfield rattled his weapon, delivered a warlike speech. All this sounded menacing, but in essence England was not ready for a land war. The Russian government understood this and did not back down. Moreover, Alexander II, incited by a militant court party, headed by his brother Nikolai Nikolaevich and son Alexander Alexandrovich, on November 13 gave the order to mobilize twenty infantry and seven cavalry divisions. After that, Russia, without losing its prestige, could no longer abandon its demands on Turkey, even if the latter did not fulfill them.

In order to surely involve Russia in the war with Turkey, Beaconsfield proposed to gather ambassadors of the six powers in Constantinople and once again try to negotiate a "peaceful" settlement of the eastern crisis, peace between Serbia and Turkey, and reforms for the Balkan Slavs.

The conference of ambassadors worked out the conditions for ending the Eastern crisis, and on December 23, it was supposed to present these conditions to the Sultan.

However, on December 23, a representative of the Sultan's government, under the thunder of cannon salutes, announced at the conference that the Sultan had granted all his citizens a constitution and that in this connection all the conditions worked out by the conference were becoming redundant.

This statement by the Sultan's minister, inspired by British diplomats, clearly provoked Russia to go to war with Turkey. For the majority in the Russian government it was becoming clearer and clearer that war was indispensable. By that time, a new agreement was concluded with Austria-Hungary in Budapest, now in the event of a war between Russia and Turkey. This agreement was less profitable for Russia than the Reichstadt one. Russia was forced to agree to the occupation of almost all of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary and promised not to create a strong Slavic state in the Balkans. In return, tsarism received only the "friendly" and unreliable neutrality of Austria-Hungary.

Although Turkey made peace with Serbia on February 28, 1877, the war with Montenegro continued. The threat of defeat hung over her. This circumstance, together with the failure of the Constantinople Conference, pushed tsarist Russia to war with Turkey; however, the disadvantage of the Budapest Convention was so obvious that hesitation arose in the tsarist government; there were even opinions about the need to make concessions to Turkey and demobilize the army.

In the end, it was decided: not to demobilize the army and make another attempt to negotiate with the Western European powers for a joint impact on Turkey.

As a result of this attempt, the so-called "London" proposals were born, demanding from Turkey even more curtailed reforms for the Slavic peoples than before.

On April 11, these proposals, at the instigation of Beaconsfield, were rejected, and on April 24, 1877, Russia declared war on Turkey.

So, the British government managed to achieve its immediate goal in using the eastern crisis: to drag Russia into a war with Turkey. Germany also achieved its immediate goal, forcing Austria-Hungary to take a direct part in resolving the Eastern question; in the future there was a possible collision of Austria-Hungary with Russia in the Balkans.

It would be completely wrong to attribute the entire success of British and German foreign policy in fueling the Eastern crisis to Beaconsfield and Bismarck alone. They, of course, played an important role, but the main reason for the success of England and Germany was the economic and political backwardness of Tsarist Russia.

History of Russia XVIII-XIX centuries Milov Leonid Vasilievich

§ 4. Eastern question

§ 4. Eastern question

Ottoman Empire and European Powers. At the beginning of the 19th century, the Eastern question did not play a significant role in Russian foreign policy. The Greek project of Catherine II, which envisaged the expulsion of the Turks from Europe and the creation of a Christian empire in the Balkans, the head of which the empress saw her grandson Constantine, was abandoned. Under Paul I, the Russian and Ottoman empires united to fight revolutionary France. The Bosphorus and Dardanelles were open to Russian warships, and FF Ushakov's squadron successfully operated in the Mediterranean. The Ionian Islands were under the protectorate of Russia, their port cities served as a base for Russian warships. For Alexander I and his "young friends" the Eastern question was the subject of serious discussion in the Secret Committee. The result of this discussion was the decision to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, to abandon the plans for its partition. This contradicted the Catherine's tradition, but was fully justified in the new international conditions. The joint actions of the governments of the Russian and Ottoman empires ensured relative stability in the Black Sea region, the Balkans and the Caucasus, which was important against the general background of European upheavals. It is characteristic that the opponents of the balanced course in the Eastern question were FV Rostopchin, who were nominated under Paul I, who proposed detailed projects for the division of the Ottoman Empire, and the reputed leader N. M. Karamzin, who considered the collapse of the Ottoman Empire "beneficial for reason and humanity."

At the beginning of the XIX century. for the Western European powers, the Eastern question was reduced to the problem of the "sick man" of Europe, which the Ottoman Empire was considered to be. From day to day, her death was expected, and it was about the division of the Turkish inheritance. England, Napoleonic France and the Austrian Empire were especially active in the Eastern question. The interests of these states were in direct and acute contradiction, but on one thing they were united, seeking to weaken the growing influence of Russia on affairs in the Ottoman Empire and in the region as a whole. For Russia, the Eastern question consisted of the following aspects: the final political and economic establishment in the Northern Black Sea region, which was mainly achieved under Catherine II; recognition of her rights as the patroness of the Christian and Slavic peoples of the Ottoman Empire and, above all, the Balkan Peninsula; favorable regime of the Black Sea straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, which ensured its trade and military interests. In a broad sense, the Eastern Question also concerned Russian policy in the Transcaucasus.

Accession of Georgia to Russia. The cautious approach of Alexander I to the Eastern question to a certain extent was due to the fact that from the first steps of his rule he had to solve a long-standing problem: the annexation of Georgia to Russia. The Russian protectorate over Eastern Georgia, proclaimed in 1783, was largely formal in nature. Severely affected by the Persian invasion in 1795, Eastern Georgia, which made up the Kartli-Kakhetian kingdom, was interested in Russian patronage and military protection. At the request of Tsar George XII, Russian troops were in Georgia, an embassy was sent to St. Petersburg, which was supposed to seek that the Kartli-Kakhetian kingdom "was considered belonging to the Russian state." At the beginning of 1801, Paul I issued a Manifesto on the annexation of Eastern Georgia to Russia on special rights. After some hesitation caused by disagreements in the Permanent Council and in the Secret Committee, Alexander I confirmed his father's decision and on September 12, 1801 signed a Manifesto to the Georgian people, which liquidated the Kartli-Kakhetian kingdom and annexed Eastern Georgia to Russia. The Bagration dynasty was removed from power, and a Supreme Government was created in Tiflis, made up of Russian military and civilians.

P. D. Tsitsianov and his Caucasian policy. General P.D. Tsitsianov, a Georgian by birth, was appointed the chief administrator of Georgia in 1802. Tsitsianov's dream was to liberate the peoples of Transcaucasia from the Ottoman and Persian threats and to unite them into a federation under the auspices of Russia. Acting energetically and purposefully, in a short time he achieved the consent of the rulers of the Eastern Transcaucasia to annex the territories under their control to Russia. Derbent, Talysh, Cuban, Dagestan rulers agreed to the patronage of the Russian tsar. Tsitsianov undertook a successful campaign against the Ganja Khanate in 1804. He began negotiations with the Imeretian king, which later culminated in the incorporation of Imeretia into the Russian Empire. In 1803, the ruler of Megrelia passed under the protectorate of Russia.

Tsitsianov's successful actions aroused the discontent of Persia. The Shah demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia and Azerbaijan, which was ignored. In 1804, Persia began a war against Russia. Tsitsianov, despite the lack of forces, conducted active offensive operations - the Karabakh, Sheki and Shirvan khanates were annexed to Russia. When Tsitsianov accepted the surrender of the Baku khan, he was treacherously killed, which did not affect the course of the Persian campaign. In 1812, the Persian Crown Prince Abbas Mirza was utterly defeated by General P.S.Kotlyarevsky at Aslanduz. The Persians had to cleanse the entire Transcaucasia and negotiate. In October 1813, the Gulistan Peace Treaty was signed, according to which Persia recognized Russian acquisitions in the Transcaucasus. Russia received the exclusive right to keep warships in the Caspian Sea. The peace treaty created a completely new international legal position, which meant the approval of the Russian border along the Kura and Araks and the entry of the peoples of Transcaucasia into the Russian Empire.

Russian-Turkish War 1806-1812 Tsitsianov's active actions in Transcaucasia were perceived with caution in Constantinople, where French influence noticeably increased. Napoleon was ready to promise the Sultan the return of Crimea and some Transcaucasian territories under his rule. Russia considered it necessary to agree to the proposal of the Turkish government on the early renewal of the union agreement. In September 1805, a new treaty of alliance and mutual assistance was concluded between the two empires. Of great importance were the articles of the treaty on the regime of the Black Sea straits, which during the hostilities Turkey undertook to keep open to the Russian navy, while at the same time not allowing the warships of other states to enter the Black Sea. The agreement did not last long. In 1806, incited by Napoleonic diplomacy, the sultan replaced the pro-Russian rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia, to which Russia was ready to respond by introducing its troops into these principalities. The Sultan's government declared war on Russia.

The war, started by the Turks with the expectation of weakening Russia after Austerlitz, was fought with varying success. In 1807, having won a victory at Arpachai, Russian troops repulsed the attempt of the Turks to invade Georgia. The Black Sea Fleet forced the Turkish fortress of Anapa to surrender. In 1811 Kotlyarevsky took the Turkish fortress of Akhalkalaki by storm. On the Danube, military operations took on a protracted nature until, in 1811, MI Kutuzov was appointed commander of the Danube army. He defeated the Turkish forces at Ruschuk and Slobodzeya and forced Porto to conclude peace. This was the first tremendous service provided by Kutuzov to Russia in 1812. Under the terms of the Bucharest Peace, Russia received the rights of the guarantor of Serbia's autonomy, which strengthened its position in the Balkans. In addition, she received naval bases on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus and a part of Moldova between the Dniester and Prut rivers retreated to her.

Greek question. The system of European equilibrium, established at the Vienna Congress, did not extend to the Ottoman Empire, which inevitably led to the aggravation of the Eastern question. The sacred union meant the unity of the European Christian monarchs against the infidels, their expulsion from Europe. In reality, the European powers waged a fierce struggle for influence in Constantinople, using the growth of the liberation movement of the Balkan peoples as a means of pressure on the Sultan's government. Russia widely used its opportunities to provide patronage to the Sultan's Christian subjects - the Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians. The Greek question became especially acute. With the knowledge of the Russian authorities in Odessa, Moldavia, Wallachia, Greece and Bulgaria, Greek patriots were preparing an uprising, the goal of which was the independence of Greece. In their struggle, they enjoyed wide support from the advanced European public, which viewed Greece as the cradle of European civilization. Alexander I showed hesitation. Based on the principle of legitimism, he did not approve of the idea of \u200b\u200bGreek independence, but did not find support either in Russian society, or even in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where I. Kapodistria, the future first president of independent Greece, played a prominent role. In addition, the king was impressed by the idea of \u200b\u200bthe triumph of the cross over the crescent, the expansion of the sphere of influence of European Christian civilization. He spoke about his doubts at the Verona Congress: “Nothing, without a doubt, seemed more in line with the public opinion of the country than the religious war with Turkey, but in the unrest of the Peloponnese, I saw signs of revolution. And he abstained. "

In 1821, the Greek national liberation revolution began, led by the general of the Russian service, the aristocrat Alexander Ypsilanti. Alexander I condemned the Greek Revolution as a revolt against the legitimate monarch and insisted on a negotiated settlement of the Greek question. Instead of independence, he offered the Greeks autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. The rebels, who had hoped for direct help from the European public, rejected the plan. The Ottoman authorities did not accept him either. The forces were clearly unequal, the Ypsilanti detachment was defeated, the Ottoman government closed the straits for the Russian merchant fleet, and moved troops to the Russian border. To settle the Greek question, at the beginning of 1825 a conference of the great powers convened in St. Petersburg, where Britain and Austria rejected the Russian program of joint action. After the Sultan refused to mediate the conference participants, Alexander I decided to concentrate troops on the Turkish border. Thus, he crossed out the policy of legitimism and went on to openly support the Greek national liberation movement. Russian society welcomed the emperor's determination. A firm course in the Greek and, more broadly, the Eastern question was defended by such influential dignitaries as V.P. Kochubei, M.S. Vorontsov, A.I. Chernyshov, and PD Kiselev. They were concerned about the possible weakening of Russian influence among the Christian and Slavic population of the Balkan Peninsula. A. P. Ermolov asserted: “Foreign offices, especially English, they put us guilty of patience and inaction before all peoples in a disadvantageous way. The end result is that in the Greeks who are committed to us, we will leave our just bitterness to us. "

A.P. Ermolov in the Caucasus. The name of A.P. Yermolov is associated with a sharp increase in the military-political presence of Russia in the North Caucasus, a territory that was ethnically diverse and whose peoples were at various levels of socio-economic and political development. There were relatively stable state formations - Avar and Kazikumyk khanates, shamkhalstvo Tarkovskoe, patriarchal "free societies" dominated in the mountainous regions, the prosperity of which largely depended on successful forays on the lowland neighbors engaged in agriculture.

In the second half of the 18th century. The northern Ciscaucasia, which was the object of peasant and Cossack colonization, was separated from the mountainous regions by the Caucasian line, which stretched from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea and ran along the banks of the Kuban and Terek rivers. A postal road was laid along this line, which was considered almost safe. In 1817, the Caucasian cordon line was moved from the Terek to the Sunzha, which aroused the discontent of the mountain peoples, because thereby they were cut off from the Kumyk plain, where cattle were driven to winter pastures. For the Russian authorities, the inclusion of the Caucasian peoples in the orbit of imperial influence was a natural consequence of Russia's successful establishment in the Transcaucasus. Militarily and economically, the authorities were interested in eliminating the threats that the raiding system of the highlanders concealed. The support that the highlanders received from the Ottoman Empire justified Russia's military intervention in the affairs of the North Caucasus.

General A.P. Ermolov, appointed in 1816 to the post of chief commander of the civilian unit in Georgia and the Caucasus and at the same time the commander of the Separate Corps, considered it his main task to ensure the security of the Transcaucasus and to include the territory of mountainous Dagestan, Chechnya and the North-West Caucasus into the Russian Empire. From Tsitsianov's policy, which combined threats and monetary promises, he went on to abruptly suppress the raiding system, for which he widely used deforestation and the destruction of rebellious auls. Ermolov felt himself to be the “proconsul of the Caucasus” and was not shy about using military force. It was under him that the military-economic and political blockade of mountainous regions was carried out, he considered a demonstration of force and military expeditions to be the best means of pressure on mountain peoples. On the initiative of Ermolov, the fortresses of Groznaya, Vnezapnaya, Burnaya were built, which became strongholds for the Russian troops.

Ermolov's military expeditions led to opposition from the mountaineers of Chechnya and Kabarda. Ermolov's policy provoked a rebuff from "free societies", the ideological basis of whose rallying was Muridism, a kind of Islam adapted to the concepts of mountain peoples. The teaching of Muridism demanded from every faithful constant spiritual improvement and blind obedience to the mentor, the student, whose murid he became. The role of the mentor was exceptionally great, he combined spiritual and secular power in his person. Muridism imposed on its followers the obligation to wage a "holy war", ghazavat, against the infidels before their conversion to Islam or complete extermination. Appeals to ghazavat, addressed to all mountain peoples that professed Islam, were a powerful stimulus for resistance to Yermolov's actions and at the same time helped to overcome the disunity of the peoples inhabiting the North Caucasus.

One of the first ideologues of Muridism, Mohammed Yaragsky, preached the transfer of strict religious and moral norms and prohibitions to the field of social and legal relations. The consequence of this was the inevitable clash of Muridism, based on Sharia, a body of Muslim law, relatively new for the Caucasian peoples, with adat, the norms of customary law, which for centuries determined the life of "free societies". The secular rulers were wary of the fanatical preaching of the Muslim clergy, which often led to civil strife and bloody massacres. For a number of the peoples of the Caucasus who professed Islam, Muridism remained alien.

In the 1820s. the opposition of previously scattered "free societies" to the straightforward and shortsighted actions of Yermolov grew into an organized military-political resistance, the ideology of which was muridism. We can say that under Yermolov the events began, which were called by contemporaries the Caucasian War. In reality, these were actions of separate military detachments, devoid of a general plan, which either sought to suppress the attacks of the mountaineers, or undertook expeditions deep into the mountainous regions, without representing the enemy forces and not pursuing any political goals. Military operations in the Caucasus have become protracted.