20 Congress CPSU Central Committee. XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

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Municipal Autonomous Secondary Institution

"Secondary school №152"

Examination on discipline: history

XX Congress of the CPSU

Performed:

Markova A.Yu.

Chelyabinsk

Introduction

1. Causes and prerequisites for the cultivation of the Personality of Stalin

2. Alignment of political forces on the eve of the XX Congress of the CPSU

3. The main provisions of the report of N.S. Khrushchev "On the cult of personality and its consequences" at the XX Congress of the CPSU

4. Creation and collapse of the "anti-party" group after the 20th CPSU Congress

Conclusion

Bibliography

idener Dictate Communist Khrushchev

Introduction

Relevance of the research topic. The Congress was and remains the most important event of domestic history. Contactly and even chronologically, he divides her Soviet-Bolshevik era in half.

Of course, major historical events are rarely accomplished in one or a few days. The Congress has become a culminating point of the turning point, which began on March 5, 1953, on the day of the death of the dictator and continued for some time. Of the almost three dozen congresses of the party, the three-quarter-to-five century countries, this congress was separated from not hot discussions, as it was at the first congresses, and not a little in new placed accents in some performances among the boring and solemn vernacle that took almost two weeks.

The main report was the report of Khrushchev at a closed meeting on February 25, 1956, when all the rulings were already adopted and the central bodies of the party were elected. Performed in the forgotten, although it became easily accessible to the text after the publication of 1989, now it is possible to appreciate what this report was with its breakthroughs, exposure, interpretations and defaults and to which frontiers brought our country the most "thaw" 1956

Nevertheless, the historical meaning of the XX Congress and what happened immediately after it, can hardly overestimate.

A sharp acceleration acquired the process of liberation and rehabilitation. Hundreds of thousands of people have been released, a good name was returned to millions. If the process of this, started before the congress, walked, as the opponents of Khrushchev, dosed, was not stated loudly, his influence on the moral recovery of society would be much less.

The purpose of the study is to explore the content, participants and consequences of the XX Congress of the USSR CPSU.

Object of the study - XX Congress CPSU.

The subject of the study is the content and results of the XX Congress of the CPSU.

1. Causes and prerequisitesazobind of a cult of personalityStalin

The XX CPSS Congress was undoubtedly a turning point in the history of the USSR. From this point on, a new stage of development of the Russian statehood begins, which brought ultimately to the indigenous transformations in society and the state, to turn from the totalitarian regime to normal, natural democratic development. After a long year of silence, violence, fear, the subordination of a single ideology, the Company opened openly about all the lawlessness and atrocities, and, probably, one of the noteworthy moments of this process was that the initiative proceeded not only from representatives of the Higher Party Guide, for that period Many of those interested in the "promotion" of the new ideology, or the intelligentsia, which was historically in opposition to totalitarianism, but also from the middle and lower layers of society, which in the overwhelming majority for many years perceived the situation as a natural necessity. Why did such sharp and in many ways have unexpected changes? You can call several reasons why this situation has developed.

first, for the USSR, the main economic tasks were solved, industrialization was fully completed in the thirties, the USSR was published in the fifth place in the world for industrial production, exceeding the level of pre-revolutionary Rossi, significant successes were achieved in agriculture and other sectors of the national economy;

secondly, Stalin managed to create a tough and strong system of personal control and suppression, which ultimately embodied in the most severe repression, which was supported by Stalin in the suppression of any dissent, and in this sense his authority was built primarily at the fear of all society and every person in front of the system; Thirdly, the victory in the Great Patriotic War played a huge role in the elevation of Stalin, since the USSR from the country that was in long political isolation turned into a state that dictated the areas in world politics, which did not take the rules of Western capitalist countries, and these rules were dictated ; Fourthly, it is impossible not to pay attention to the personal qualities of Stalin, which was an excellent leader and the organizer who was able to manage people and subordinate them to himself.

And yet, despite all this, the situation in the country there was a situation when an externally unified system, based on personal power, could not fully manage the state, especially exclusively from the position of force. The enthusiasm of the people who practically put the country on his feet in the twenties and after the war gradually faded, various contradictions began to appear in the society, grew a kind of protest. This protest was most pronounced in the early 50s in the spiritual sphere, literature and artistic work.

In such a situation, starting from the end of the thirties, Stalin tried to maximize his power positions, covering almost all areas of public life and using all possible methods to achieve their goals. From here and mass repressions - a tested method in the struggle for the holding of power, and the ideological dictate, which reached the unprecedented scale under Stalin, and the policy of the Iron Curtain, designed to isolate a huge state from the world community, to protect it from possible influences and trends in the West, to build socialism in "Separately taken country." Today, appreciating such measures, their insolvency becomes understandable, the utopian and impossibility of incarnation, but Stalin needed to preserve the "moral and political unity of society", powerful power in their hands, and therefore he actively walked on such measures.

Most likely, there are also sharp changes in the party leadership after the XIX Congress of the CPSU: Stalin has expanded the number of the Presidium of the Central Committee to 25 people, and the number of candidates for the presidium - up to 11 (15 and 4, respectively, until the XIX Congress), and now "old Guard, the true adherents of Stalin were in the presidium of the Central Committee no more than a third. At first glance, it seems that Stalin, going to such a step, comes very illogical: being an antipode of collective leadership so unheardly expands the composition of the presidium. It is impossible to explain such an act and only by the fact that Stalin consciously prepared the elimination of his closest associates, as witnesses of his backstage "acts", since, firstly, there was no threat of exposure, because These revelations would lead to the self-destruction of the entire Stalin clan; And, secondly, the exposure of the least could come from Molotov and Mikoyan, which Stalin subjected to Ostracism, and, on the contrary, left Malenkov and Beria in the nearest sweater.

Probably, the most correct explanation of the permutations in the party leadership is that Stalin has gave himself a report in the coming change, is that the cult of personality will die with him. Stalin did not see anyone who could replace him and continue the course of personal leadership, skillfully holding the strength and power of sole power, he assigns the role of unable to the major steps in his business, and therefore saw the alternative to his power only in the collective manual. Conducting this idea, Stalin at the same time tried to prevent the possible usurper claims to the power of any of the comrades.

However, there is one most important objective reason for the exposure of the cult of the personality of Stalin, which played a decisive role in the changes in the life of the USSR. The reason is this - the current Soviet system of power. Phenomena Similar XX Congress are laid in the Soviet system as an internal condition of its update. The very existence of this system is a two-way process that combines "insight" and expose with the confrontation of the entire authoritarian system, which extended to the consciousness of the whole society, forming the notorious Soviet two. No wonder and the processes of the 30s were with such inspiration perceived by the majority of the people as a completely fair exposure of the permit of the Leninsky Guard.

The Soviet system of power violated the foundations of human morality and consciousness, when a person does not understand that they are all creative - a great crime and sabot. With such a system, during life, a person becomes the secret judge and the executioner. And after all, the rules of such a game were asked almost from the very beginning: in the 30s, Stalin expressed them to a completely unthinkable paradox, saying that this pest was not at all the one who works badly, but the one who works well.

The Soviet system of power, constantly denying, exposing and removing itself on clean water up to completely anti-Soviet positions, nevertheless, reproduces herself. The system catches criminals, successfully their fruit; The exposure of crimes for this system of power is an integral side of all new and new crimes. After all, it is not for nothing that Stalin himself, after conducting collectivization, subsequently condemned its inflection, and after the repression - the crimes of berries and horses.

It is possible to argue about how the struggle for power would be unfolded in such a situation, but the story was ordered in his own way, and after the death of I.V. Stalin, on March 5, 1953, sharply turned his move into another river, accelerating the course of events.

2. Alignment of political forces on the eve of the XX Congress of the CPSU

On March 6, 1953, a joint meeting of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Using a shock condition under the pretext of the established emergency circumstances, the need for high efficiency The nearest comers from Stalin's comrades were attempted to restore their undivided domination in the leadership of the party and the country. In fact, the meeting was approved by the new composition of the Presidium of the Central Committee, the Bureau of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was eliminated.

The members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU were included: G.M. Malenkov, L.P. Beria, V.M. Molotov, K.E. Voroshilov, N.S. Khrushchev, N.A. Bulgarian, L.M. Kaganovich, A.I. Mikoyan, M.Z. Saburov, MG Primurain. This composition reflects the hierarchy that pretended at that time and practically fully corresponds to the composition that acted until the XIX party congress. Notable is not the fact that the number of presidium members is more than doubled, and above all, the principle of this abbreviation: the Presidium of the Central Committee limited its composition of the number of 10 because it was just so much more and no less remaining "Stalin's associates", including Bulgarine, Pervukhina and Saburov, who have already been a considerable time in the Stalinist apparatus. A new replenishment was not given a single place in the presidium.

One of the main motives for revising the composition of the Presidium was precisely the inevitability of the issue of the cult of the personality of I.V. Stalin, the mode of the Stalinist dictatorship. In the "abbreviated part", the Presidium of the Central Committee received the opportunity to define the fate of the "cult of personality" in his own interests, without fear of exposure of members, not involved in lawlessness, which later happened in practice. Thus, it was the first step towards the exposure of the cult of Stalin's personality.

After Stalin's death, all leadership posts in the party and the country remained behind His closest associates. G.M. Malenkov became Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Molotov - Minister of Foreign Affairs, Beria became the head of the new Ministry of the Interior, Bulgarin was appointed by the USSR Defense Minister, Mikoyan - Minister of Internal and Foreign Trade, Saburov - Minister of Machinery, Pierce - Minister of Power Plants and Electricity . The chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR approved by K.E. Voroshilov, and who held this post N.M. Screcan was appointed Chairman of the WCSPS. In addition, it was recognized as necessary, "To comrade Khrushchev N.S. Concentrated at work in the Central Committee of the CPSU, "therefore he was exempted from the duties of the first secretary of the Moscow Committee of the CPSU. Khrushchev formally remained in the rank of the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, but, being the only one of the secretaries (besides Malenkov), a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, naturally, occupied the dominant place among them. The position of Khrushchev increased even after the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee satisfied the request of Malenkov on the release of him from the duties of the CC secretary in connection with the inappropriateness of the combination of the functions of the Preasmme and the CC secretary. The leadership of the Central Committee and the chairmanship at its meetings was identified at Khrushchev.

In the current situation of relative stability in the manual, the possibility of usurpactor recurrence remained. On the other hand, increasing political importance acquired the question of the attitude of Stalin's personality regime. The real danger in this direction proceeded from L.P. Baryia. He unfolded active political activities, in every way to strengthen his position, actually setting himself out of control of the highest party and state bodies, because he was led by such a strong department as the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

Despotic, the adventuristic figure of Beria tales a serious threat to a new dictatorial regime. Having a "dossier" (right up to the secret recording of telephone conversations) for each member of the leadership, he had all the opportunities to eliminate any competitor. In addition, in his hands there was a powerful power seizure unit. In such a situation, the Presidium of the Central Committee, with the support of the military command, adopted decisive preventive measures and on June 26, 1953 at a meeting of the Presidium of the Sovmina of the USSR, Beria was arrested. Officially, the arrest of Beria was the result of his "criminal anti-party and anti-state actions", with a report on which G.M. Malenkov in the July Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU 1953.

"The Beria Case" for a certain time filled the Vacuum of guilt and responsibility for the repressive arbitrariness, violation of legality, decorated the threat of direct accusations against the rest of Stalin's associates. Nevertheless, the situation in the party and the country required the strengthening and stabilization of the party leadership. The Central Committee had actually two leaders and did not have an official electoral leader. After eliminating Beria, Malenkov had a real opportunity to receive official leadership in the party, but as a mature and enough sober politician, he realized that the part of the crimes of the Personality of the Personality of Stalin would not allow him to gain confidence and the support of the party and the people. Otherwise, this plan looked like a candidate N.S. Khrushchev, whom Stalinist associates considered their own, who was simultaneously sufficiently authority and was not identified with the nearest surroundings of Stalin. Given all this, the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in September 1953 establishes the post of first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and unanimously elects N.S. Khrushchev. Thus, by the fall of 1953, the alignment of political forces in the USSR ended. Stalin's colleagues retained strong positions in the party and managed to create a fairly slender system of senior management, putting a new leader at the head of the party to ensure the further achievement of the goals.

3. The main provisions of the report of N.S.Khrushchev "On the cult of personality and its consequences" at the XX Congress of the CPSU

Few of the delegates of the XX Congress of the CPSU represented that they would be expected in the morning closed meeting on February 25, 1956. For most present in the hall, the report of N.S. Khrushchev became a complete revelation, producing a shock effect on truth.

Probably, it is not necessary to analyze and express the report completely mainly because today, almost everything is known about the crimes of the Stalin era, even more than Khrushchev himself, and for our contemporaries there is hardly something new. And, nevertheless, it is necessary to stop at some of its most important provisions.

Before the report, the delegates of the congress were distributed "Letter to the Congress" V.I. Lenin. Many, of course, knew about his existence, but before that moment it was not published. The concrete consequences of the fact that the party at one time did not implement Leninsky recommendations, primarily in relation to Stalin, were carefully hidden and masked. In the Khrushchev report, these consequences were first promulgated and received the appropriate political assessment. The report, in particular, it was said: "Now we are talking about a matter of great importance for the present, and for the future party, we are talking about how the cult of the personality of Stalin gradually develops, which has become at a certain stage in the source of a number of largest largest and very severe perversions of party principles, party democracy, revolutionary legality. " Khrushchev in this regard leads to the criticism of the Stalinist regime on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist teaching, speaking of violations and departure from the Leninist principles of party discipline and party leadership, which and sees the cause of the development of the cult of Stalin's personality. The rationale for the exposure of the cult of the personality by Lenin principles is the first distinctive feature of the report of N.S. Khrushchev.

Of particular importance was the exposition of the Stalin formula "Enemies of the People". This term, said Khrushchev, immediately freed the need for a good evidence of the ideological inappropriateness of a person or people with whom you lead a controversy: he gave the opportunity for anyone who did not agree with Stalin, who was only suspected of hostile intentions, anyone who There was only silent, subjected to the most cruel repression, with a violation of all the norms of revolutionary legality. This concept of "enemy of the people" was essentially already removed, excluded any ideological struggle or expressing his opinion.

Khrushchev opened the question of the misunderstanding and inadmissibility of repressive reprisals with ideological opponents, and, although the report is mainly the old one (according to the "brief course") assessment of ideological and political struggle in the party and role in it Stalin, it was undoubtedly Bold step and merit of Khrushchev. The report said: "Attention is drawn to the fact that even in the height of a fierce ideological struggle against Trotskyists, Zinovievts, Bukharin residents and others - they did not apply extremely repressive measures. The struggle was conducted on an ideological basis. But in a few years, when socialism was Mostly built in our country, when the exploratory classes were mainly eliminated, when the social structure of the Soviet society has radically changed, the social base for hostile parties, political flows and groups has sharply reduced, when the ideological opponents of the party were politically long distorted, against them Based repression.

As for the responsibility for repression, the role of Stalin in creating a political terror regime is disclosed in the report to a fairly full. However, a direct participation in the political terror of the staff of Stalin and the true scales of the repression were not named. Khrushchev was not ready for confrontation with most members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, especially since he himself belonged to this majority. Yes, it was not part of his task, the main thing was "decisively, once and forever to cultivate the cult of personality," without which the political improved society was impossible.

The debate on the report was decided not to open. At the suggestion of the chairperson at the meeting N.A. Bulgarin Congress adopted a resolution "On the cult of personality and its consequences", published in the press. On March 1, 1956, the text of the report from the note of Khrushchev and the necessary edits were sent to members and candidates for the members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. The Fifth Martha The Presidium of the Central Committee adopted a resolution "On acquaintance with the report of TOV. Khrushcheva N.S. "On the cult of personality and its consequences" at the XX CPSU Congress. " It indicated: "1. Offer Obcomam, Districtcomam and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union republics with the report of Khrushchev of all Communists and Komsomol members, as well as a non-partisan asset workers, employees and collective farmers. 2. The report of Khrushchev sent to party organizations with a vulture "not for printing", removing the strictly secret brochure.

Thus, although the highest party leadership of the USSR and managed to accomplish such a step as the nationary exposure of the cult of the personality, in essentially, the authorities of the authorities for almost two decades, giving the fight against the repressive registry status of the official political phenomenon, all the same these measures were still weak enough and Nessel. This is evidenced by a number of facts, the main of which is the reaction to the report of Khrushchev: the report itself was not published for almost 30 years, "familiarization" was conducted at meetings of party and Komsomol organizations. In part, these facts can be explained by the fact that there were a serious danger of social stress, since there were still many people who retained the loyalty to the Stalinist principles for which his authority was unshakable on the other side, all this could lead to the undermining of the CPSU authoritative as a leader in the international communist and worker Movement.

4. Creation and collapse of the "anti-party" group after the 20th CPSU Congress

After the XX Congress of the CPSU, the former "elite" of the Stalinist environment - Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov occupied a clearly antagonistic position in relation to Khrushchev, often entered confrontation, zealously referring to rapid growth and strengthening his authority in the party and the people.

On the other hand, Khrushchev stood before the inevitability of the gap with the "group Malenkov", since the freedom of action was needed with a support for other, new forces in the leadership of the party, it was necessary to dissociate the continuity of the Stalinist leadership and thereby approve themselves as a new, democratic leader greeted with a person's cult mode. Khrushchev began his offensive before the twentieth congress: he was released from the post of Posmmin Malenkov, and in 1956, ministerial portfolios and Molotov lost, and Kaganovich. The situation for the "oldest associates of Stalin" was created threatening, and therefore they were the first to decide to go to active actions. It must be said that from the very beginning of Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich did not put forward any political platform, their collusion in the soil of discontent "came out due to control" Khrushchev was formed under pressure from circumstances, the community of destinies.

In the implementation of their plans, the "Anti-Partisian Group" assigned the essential role of Bulgarine, since he held the post of pre-UNDAMMIN, was the volatilization, close to prostaline sentiments. Over time, the Bulgarian became actually the center center. At the last moment, the group attracted to his side Voroshilov, who as a politician did not imagine much value, but his voice as a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee could play a significant role; In addition, its internal commitment to Stalinism did not cause any doubts. As for Pervukhina and Saburov, their nomination and activities were also associated with the Stalin's time, and in the conditions when Khrushchev was already focused on the new personally nominated by the personnel in the group Malenkov, they expected to preserve themselves as prominent party and government leaders. In this composition, the "anti-party group" approached the time of the most decisive actions.

In the morning, on June 18, 1956, Bulgarian appointed a meeting of the Presidium of the Council. Under the pretext of discussing the issue of a trip to the anniversary celebrations of the 250th anniversary of Leningrad "Anti-Partisian Group" could be gathering at neutral territory and finally agree on its actions. Khrushchev, having learned about this, replied that this is not necessary, since all issues related to this trip have already been resolved. Nevertheless, at the insistence of most members of the Presidium of the Central Committee meeting gathered.

From the very beginning at the meeting were attended by members of the Presidium of the Central Committee - Khrushchev, Bulgarin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Molotov, First; Candidates for the members of the Presidium - Brezhnev, Furtsev, Schermann, Shipilov, then arrived beetles. Malenkov proposed to remove Khrushchev from presidency and recommended Bulgarin on his place. The sixth voices against the two proposal was made. Then, Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich were made with a statement and sharp criticism to Khrushchev. The group has a significant political force for the exercise of its designs and had the majority of votes in the Presidium of the Central Committee. The main goal was to shift Khrushchev from the post of first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and, by entering the CC Secretariat, to take key positions in the party leadership, ensuring a calm future. Given the instability of the numerical majority of the "Anti-Party Group" in the Presidium, the question of the removal of Khrushchev was necessary to decide on the first day. In this setting, Khrushchev and Mikoyan stated that they would leave the meeting, if all members and candidates for members of the Presidium of the Central Committee are not collected, as well as the Secretaries of the Central Committee.

At the meeting on June 19, the picture acquired a completely opposite character. In the full composition of the Presidium in support of Khrushchev, Kirichenko, Mikoyan, Suslov, Brezhnev, Zhukov, Kozlov, Furtsev, Aristov, Belyaev, Pospelov were performed. The ratio of forces Six against two at the meeting on July 18 was now seven (there was a missing saburov) against four (Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Suslov, Kirichenko), but taking into account the votes of candidates - thirteen against six in favor of Khrushchev.

Considering the situation, the Malenkov Group at a meeting of July 20 did not put the question of the displacement specifically Khrushchev, and it was discussed that in the interests of more complete collegiates to eliminate the post of first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. This proposal was made first of all in order to consolidate Bulgarin as presiding at the Presidium and to approve with its influence in it, but this proposal did not receive a response of most participants in the meeting.

The meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee became known to members of the Central Committee, and on July 21, they turned with a letter to the Presidium. The letter contained a requirement to urgently convene a plenum of the Central Committee and make it a question about the leadership of the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Secretariat, since "it is impossible to hide from the members of the Plenum of the Central Committee the questions important for the entire party and the country." A group of 20 people was instructed to hand this letter to the Presidium of the Central Committee. After a short discussion and congress to Moscow, most members of the Central Committee, it was decided to convene a plenum on June 22.

Taking advantage of the moment, Khrushchev understood that it was necessary to prevent any decisions with the Presidium and postpone all the questions at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, since he personally could not strike in Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich, without fear of no less good controls, but the Central Committee, the composition of which Rightly changed during the XIX-XX Congresses, the question of the personal responsibility of the Malenkov Group could be opened.

The extraordinary plenum of the CPSU Central Committee gathered on June 22. From the very beginning after Suslov's speech, described the behavior of the group's participants as non-party, and Zhukov, who set the question of the direct responsibility of Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov for criminal repression of the 30s-40s, it became clear that the chances of the group on the implementation of conceived plans were very small. Then, Brezhnev and Aristov were performed at the plenum, continuing the topic of the responsibility and guilt of the Malenkov Group. At the end of the meeting, when the political fate of the Group was, in fact, was predetermined, with charges of her address, Khrushchev was accomplished: For the first time, documents were given on the genuine scales of repression and involvement of specific individuals.

From this point on, the Malenkov group occupies a defensive position, because the facts and documents clearly indicate their crimes. At the plenum, all members of the group appeared, stating that it was not about the removal of Khrushchev, but to strengthen the collectivity of the leadership, eliminate the shortcomings in the work of the Presidium and the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee. Under the severity of charges, the "Single Front" of the group crumbled, each began to pour wine on the other, as a result of Saburov, initiative, Voroshilov and Bulgarian were trying to dissociate from Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov.

In the end, the fact of conspiracy was recognized by all participants in the group. Plenum unanimously condemned the group conspiracy and supported Khrushchev as the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Plenum on the same day adopted a resolution on the election of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee consisting of 15 members and 9 candidates. The members of the Presidium were elected:

Aristov, Belyaev, Brezhnev, Bulgarian, Voroshilov, Zhukov, Ignatov, Kirichenko, Kozlov, Kuusinen, Mikoyan, Suslov, Furtsev, Khrushchev, Churchnik; Candidates for members of Kalnberzin, Korothenko, Kosygin, Mazurov, Mzhavanadze, Mukitdinov, First, Pospelov.

Conclusion

Thus, in the process of research, the following basic conclusions were made in the work, the results were summed up.

The 20 CPSU Congress took place in 1956, February 14 - 25. At this congress, those estimates that were previously given by Stalinist politics were revised. Also, the cult of the personality of Stalin was convicted. One of the rapporteurs was Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. The report "On the Cult of Personality and His Consequences" was presented on February 25 at the closed Morning meeting. It was criticized by political repression of the 1930s, as well as 1950, and all the wines for the events of those years were entrusted personally in Stalin.

The report "On the cult of personality and its consequences" made a strongest impression on the listeners. The delegations of France and Italy, as well as the delegation of communist states, were familiar with him. It should be noted that the report was accepted ambiguously.

Citizens of the USSR were able to familiarize themselves with him only in 1989, but due to the fact that rumors about the report made on the last day of the congress still leaked outside the Kremlin Cabinets, a decree was issued on June 30 "On overcoming the cult of personality and its consequences", in which the position of the Central Committee clarified.

20 Congress CPSU and the report of Khrushchev led to a split public opinion. Part of the citizens of the country perceived it as a symbol of the beginning of democratic change. Another part reacted negatively. This could not not be alarmed the ruling top and, as a result, led to the termination of the discussion of the problem of Stalinist repression.

Thus, all necessary tasks were solved in the work, the goals were achieved.

Bibliography

1. Zagladin N.V. History of Russia XX century. Grade 9. - M.: Infra-M, 2009. - 400 s.

2. Kuznetsov I.N. Domestic history: textbook. - M.: Dashkov and K, 2012. - 816 p.

3. Orlov A.S., Georgiev V.A., Georgiev N.G. Russian history. Textbook. - M.: Prospekt, 2015. - 528 p.

4. Spector A.A. Russian history. - M.: Infra-M, 2014. - 449 p.

5. Fedorov V.A., Sailors V.I., Shchetinov Yu.A. History of Russia since ancient times to the present day. Textbook. - M.: Prospekt, 2015. - 536 p.

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...

"I made a proposal to judge Stalin by the Court of Party"

N 1. Of the information of the Leningrad Region of the CPSU

From 12 to 15 March, this year In the districts of Leningrad, the meetings of the party asset on the discussion of the results of the XX Congress of the CPSU took place. Meetings were organized and at a high ideological and political level.

At the meeting of the party asset of the Vasileostrovsky district, Researcher at the Institute of Russian Literature of the Academy of Sciences T. Alekseev I.A., Member of the CPSU since 1920, speaking, said:

Tov. Khrushchev his report did such a turn in our party life, which must support the party.

Tov. Khrushchev pointed out that Stalin's true tragedy is his valid conviction that he did everything in the name of the good of the people.

I believe that the true tragedy is the tragedy of the personality for all the communists and the entire party, the fact that such facts turned out in our Soviet system; Historical facts of one-chisty for a long time is a genuine tragedy for us. There are ordinary members of the party talking about it, the people say about this.

I say a little that the true tragedy of Stalin is the inner conviction that he acted for the benefit of the people. Take any tyrant in Russian and world history. Did he acted against conviction? No, he was convinced that it acts or as an anointed of God, or as a sacred inquisitor. We are believed that the greatest disgrace of the history of peoples was the Inquisition. But the Spanish Inquisition flashes before we have ...

What are our scale? We have a scale much more. And how are we, comrades, we can calmly say that this person deserves condescension for being ideological communist. Yes, when he walked to the revolution, he was a wrestler for the liberation of the people, for the liberation of him from the Iea capitalists, he then walked along with Lenin, but until a certain time, he fought with Trotskyists, he wanted to approve Lenin's views, exposed antlennintsev and t. d. But this man was not the one who should be. What can be compared with the monstrous feudal exploitation, which took place during the domination of Stalin, when his words dispelled with the case?

I reviewed the decisions referred to 1937-1938. Comrades, everything is right, the plenums of the Central Committee of the Party, the congresses all endured solutions for the benefit of the people so that the collective farms were Bolshevik. A quarter of a century passed, and we see collective farms on the verge of poverty in many areas (not counting some leading collective farms).

Comrades, on March 9, I wrote a letter to Comrade Khrushchev, after he heard a message about the cult of the person. In this letter, I made a proposal to be posthumously judged Stalin by the Court of Party, so that all party organizations have a question specifically about Stalin in such aspect, whether he was a state criminal. I think that most of the party, at least a healthy part of it, all honest, not the reborn party members will perform and say: "Yes, he was a criminal against humanity, ideological inspirer of the murders committed by a gang of Beria and his predecessors on the bloody terror."

During the discussion of the resolution TOV. Alekseev made a proposal to posthumously judge Stalin by the Court of Party. A number of communists spoke against this, who rejected this proposal as a politically harmful and leading party from the decision of the next tasks.

At the meeting of the party asset, questions were asked.

If many honest people are posthumously rehabilitated, then why the Central Committee of the CPSU and the XX Congress of the Party did not make a decision on the posthumous condemnation of Stalin, which brought so much harm to our homeland?

From 1937 to 1952, from 1937 to 1952, lived in the vice of the military dictator - Stalin and everyone felt in his soul and indignant. Why TT. Khrushchev, Molotov and others did not organize the salvation of the people, did not choke from the throne of one monster?

How to treat the theoretical heritage of Stalin?

Why did not disclose the role of the Commission of the CPSU Central Committee on the "Leningrad Case", headed by T. Malenkov 9?

Participants in the meetings of district party assets unanimously approved the decisions of the XX CPSU Congress, adopted them to steady execution and outlined them to carry out them.

Secretary of the Leningrad Region Committee CPSU Kozlov 10

RGASPI. F. 556. OP. 14. D. 45. L. 20-26.

signature - autograph F.R. Kozlova.

"Meets with Major State Security, which was tied"

N 2. Of the information of the Kalininsky regional committee of the CPSU

[...] At the collection of an asset of the Proletarian district of Kalinin, a member of the CPSU since 1925, t. Epstein said: "For 20 years, the party was waiting for a response to a number of questions that worried us, the communists. The cult of the person defeated us a big damage. We have in The city also had a lot of people slander. Reports. Tov. Khrushchev must be told not only to the Communists, but also non-partisan. "

The chief engineer of the Kalininsky plant of artificial leather t. Amdur said: "I am a communist since 1928, a leaving from the workers, the pupil of the Komsomol, was turned into an enemy of the people, spy and saboteur ... I am happy that I retained a deep faith in the party. With this I addressed the CPSU Central Committee, when it became possible. The CPSU Central Committee figured out this case, took appropriate measures, and I was released. But when I returned to contented and joyful in September 1955, my joy was overshadowed by me met in Kalinine in the form of Major State Security Alexandrova, who tied me and better than me knew my innocence and pushed there, from where I could get out only thanks to the attention of the Central Committee of the CPSU. I think that the work on the inspection of state security workers should be continued ... "

Many communists in their speeches and in the notes submitted by the speakers and the Presidium assembly contributed proposals to bring Stalin's body from Lenin's Mausoleum, remove his portraits and not call him a friend. Similar statements were expressed and non-partisan. In some enterprises, in collective farms, institutions and schools began spontaneously with portraits of Stalin.

Proposals were also made to rename cities, industrial enterprises, collective farms, MTS and state farms, scientific institutions and educational institutions, which are assigned to the name of Stalin, as well as change the name of the awards in the field of science, technology, production and art. Communists of educational institutions spoke to cancel this year in higher educational institutions of exams on the basics of Marxism-Leninism. Such questions were asked in this regard. Should I continue to study the history of the USSR in schools on old textbooks? How to tell students about the dangers of a cult of personality, are there theoretical mistakes in the textbook of political economy and the work of Stalin "Economic problems of socialism in the USSR"? What are the main questions there were disagreements between Stalin and Tito? How to consider the conclusion of a contract with Germany in 1939? Did he have been concluded? Whether we really won the time to strengthen boundaries, and were they fortified in 1939-1941??

Whose initiative to arrange a parade on Red Square on November 7, 1941? Where are Izov 11 now, and how to evaluate his work in the NKVD bodies? Is the former secretary of the Kalininsky regional committee of the Mikhailov Party 12, or is it correctly accused?

Along with questions about the activities of Stalin and his personal life, several notes were filed with such content: "How to perceive the reports. Khrushchev about the cult of personality in Georgia?" "Are rumors reliable that in Gori affair just do not before strike?" 13

Secretary of the Kalinin Committee of the CPSU
F. Goryachev 14.
RGASPI. F. 556. OP. 14. D. 45. L. 36-39.
Script. Types of machine
signature - autograph F.S. Goryachev.

"I consider it wrong to blame Stalin in despotism"

N 3. From the information of the Dagestan Committee of the CPSU

The meetings of the party asset and the overwhelming majority of speakers approve and recognize the correctness of the measures taken by the Central Committee to combat foreign Marxism-Leninism of the cultural theory of personality.

However, individual communists misunderstand the creatures of the report of Tov. N.S. Khrushchev at the closed meeting of the congress. Chairman of the collective farm named after Lenin Docoupharny district, T. Agabalaev (who had previously worked by the head of the RO MGB) acted at the district assembly of the party asset and said the following: "... I consider it wrong to blame Stalin in despotism, in whims, in the wildness, in the fact that It was confused at the beginning of the war before he did not lead military operations. No one approves these accusations, the people are indignant. ... we know Stalin as a link, theoretics of the party, who wrote a number of works, defeated the antlennaya groupings, and shave it will be completely incorrectly and unacceptable. "

Elements of misunderstanding report Tov. N.S. Khrushchev "On the cult of personality and its consequences" manifests itself from a small part of students. So, when familiarizing with the report of students of the Physical and Mathematics Faculty of the Pedagogical Institute, when reading the place of the report, where rows from the hymn are given: "Stalin raised us - to the loyalty to the people, for the work and on the feats I inspired us" part of the students coplen.

Secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU A. Daniyov 15
RGASPI. F. 556. OP. 14. D. 45. L. 86-88.
Script. Types of machine
signature - autograph A.D. Daniylova.

"Why did the Politburo members silent?"

N 4. From the list of questions asked at meetings of district party assets of the mountains. Molotova (annex to the information of the Molotovsk City Mountain of the CPSU).

1. Will be rehabilitated persons affected in 1937. How it will be organized, or in relation to everyone will need to be excited by the petition. This question is of fundamental importance, it concerns many people, in particular me.

2. Where is the heels now?

3. Where Shatalin is running 16.

4. Is it true that Stalin's wife - Allyluweva expressed dissatisfaction with his despotic attitude towards the people and for it died for a violent death, like many 17.

5. Were at the closed meeting of the congress representatives of fraternal compatines.

6. How to explain the application of Comrade Khrushchev in a conversation with Tito that Stalin will not give offense.

7. How to consider performances, speeches and work of Stalin.

8. Report the role of Malenkov in creating a "Leningrad business".

9. Will Stalin's coffin in Mausoleum be left, and whether this question was resolved at the XX Congress.

10. After the death of the T. Stalin was the decision of the government about the construction of the Pantheon in Moscow, which was expected to put Sarcophages V.I. Lenina and I.V. Stalin. Whether this building is built now, and Stalin's Sarcophag will be placed 18.

11. What measures will be taken to those who planned, as ordinary work, arrests of honest members of the party and blindly carried out these arrests.

12. Where at this time there is 19.

13. Is the death of Kirov with a cult of personality.

14. Lee were the enemies of the people Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Berry, Blucher, Gamarnik.

18. Is it possible to understand that Tov. Stalin was and remains the leader of the international proletariat, and whether his works should be used.

28. Like a fully denying progressive role of Stalin in the course of civil and domestic war.

29. The pre-revolutionary activity of Stalin is properly described correctly in the biography.

30. Was Stalin in Berlin, as shown in the paintings.

31. When literature will be considered and seized, especially the period of the Great Patriotic War, where the cult of the personality of Stalin is highlighted.

32. Will Stalin's portraits be removed, and if they are, how to explain to the workers.

33. Why, during the life of Stalin, the question was not discussed in the Central Committee of the CPSU about the incorrect management of the state from Stalin, did not know the members of the Central Committee, or what was the case, the criticism was pressed.

34. Only six months passed between the July Plenum and the congress, in the transcript of Plenum, we read a positive assessment of Stalin, this TT. Khrushchev, Mikoyan and others. Why in such a short period there were sharp changes. Unless then all this was not known.

49. Why Nobody from the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU did not raise the issue of errors. Stalin at the XIX Congress of the Party. How could all this happen, who and what contributed to this. Why the members of the Politburo were silent, and praised T. Stalin themselves. Incorrectly accuse everyone in blindness, because the cult of personality was over. Maybe you need to explain the reasons deeper, and not only to talk about the investigation.

50. Do members of politburo panties really, and the party powerless was put in place Stalin.

RGASPI. F. 556. OP. 14. D. 45. L. 69-73.
Copy. Typewriting text.

"For what I fought, hungry so that some bunch was embarrassed?"

N 5. From the information of the Tuvinsky regional committee of the CPSU

In general meetings and conversations conducted in areas, about I.V. Stalin had different interpretations. At the party meeting of the collective farm "Stalin's path" of the Sut-Kholsky district, T. Dondar, Urthn-Nazyan, O. Lopsan, Baldan and others in their speeches with indignation spoke about the atrocities that I allowed I.V. Stalin, and expressed a desire to remove it from the mausoleum.

At the same meeting, Communist K. Mong said: "We know the merits of Stalin, we must have yet to hurry to clean his body from the mausoleum. The work must be done gradually, because it can be used by capitalist countries." [...]

In individual meetings and in personal conversations, demagogic, irregular judgments, and sometimes anti-party and anti-Soviet statements took place. So, in a personal conversation with the secretary of the primary partorization of the foodstorn, Tov. Perezheva non-partisan ch. Engineer Shubin, was captive and judged, made hostile, anti-Soviet statements about such a content: "Why did all this announced how they span in the soul. Now you don't even know who you should believe. 20 years sat there, silent, and now they started talking. Life had to say to prevent this. So, the skin was bold. And in general, I remember, until 1928 lived well, and then how they went the five-year plan, life went worse and worse. " He then said that "I had to meet with people who, with Hitler, did not live so badly. I think at night for what I fought, hungry for some kind of bunch of gone? The peasantry brought to the cattle." On the response of the secretary of parlorization, that life will be even better, he replied: "So far, it is on paper," having, apparently, in mind the decisions of the XX party congress. The secretary of the party regulation t. Pereseva turned out to be weak and did not give him a decisive essay and even with a delay reported in the Golomb of the CPSU. T. Pereseva was called to the Bureau of the CPSU City Committee and received the appropriate suggestion for a soft approach to excavation elements.

When familiarizing with the report t. Khrushchev, in the parlorization of the management of culture of Komsomolskaya Korinsky, Gorina and Shorshun asked the question: "Why were we deceived by 25 years, where there were a collective manual, where the cohesion of the party, where were the Politburo members?" Present Communists, incl. Secretary of PARTORGANIZATION T. Stepanchuk, instead of giving the right explanation, reading a report t. Khrushchev, gave "comments", in which such moments added: "When surrounded by Kharkov, 75 Soviet divisions" 21, and about Ordzhonikidze stated: "After all The newspapers wrote that he died from the disease "22, etc. And only if the individual Komsomol members began to ask unhealthy questions like the fact that "why they were deceived 25 years old", etc., Stepanchuk began to correct and give correct explanations. When they caused t. Stepancuk in a hill capacity of the CPSU, he admitted that they were mistaken and in the future he would not allow it.

The non-partisan Saturarm who arrived from the trip, t. Cherkashin, being in the store in line, conducted panic conversations about Moscow that allegedly in Moscow is a great outrage that Lenin's Mausoleum is closed, and from there, in his opinion, Stalin's sarcophagus should be removed. When they called him in the hill of the CPSU and asked where he took all this, calmly stated: "I thought so." He is also given a corresponding explanation.

A student of the 4th course of Pedaging Khuek said that: "I believe Stalin, he is really a genius, and many believe him."

For all these crochetical performances, appropriate clarifications were given.

Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee of April 3, 23, 1956 "On hostile seals at the meeting of the Party Organization of the Teply Engineering Laboratory of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR on the results of the 20th CPSU Congress" and Article March 28 in the "Pravda" "The Communist Party won and defeats the Leninism" discussed in primary organizations. Communists warmly approve of the decision of the CPSU Central Committee, which exposes slanderous, evil provocative statements, the auditory general line of our party.

Secretary of the Tuvinian Commander CPSU
S. Current 24.
RGASPI. F. 556. OP. 14. D. 46. L. 173-179.
Script. Types of machine
signature - autograph S. current.

Notes
1. See: Rehabilitation: As it was. T. II. M., 2003. P. 54.
2. Published: ibid. P. 18.
3. On the cult of personality and its consequences. Report of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSS Tov. Khrushcheva N.S. XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union // News of the CPSU Central Committee. 1989. N 3. P. 149, 160.
4. Transcript Speech by I.S. Sharicikov at the meeting at the Academy of Public Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee on March 23, 1956 and the note D.T. Shepilova in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSUs on this occasion of March 24, 1956. See: RGASPI. F. 17. OP. 171. D. 491. L. 49-66.
5. See: Rehabilitation ... T. II. P. 52-57.
6. Published: ibid. P. 63-65. The complex of documents on the closed party assembly in the heat engineering laboratory of the USSR Academy of Sciences is kept in RGASP (F. 17. OP. 171. D. 490. L. 18-39).
7. Published: True. 1956. July 2.
8. The mentioned letter I.A. Alekseeva N.S. Khrushchev, see: RGASKI. F. 17. OP. 171. D. 493. L. 30-31.
9. See: About the so-called "Leningradsky case" // News of the CPSU Central Committee. 1989. N 2. P. 126-137.
10. Kozlov Frol Romanovich (1908-1965) - in 1953-1957. The first secretary of the Leningrad Region of the CPSU, in 1957-1964. Member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee.
11. Yezhov N.I. (1895-1940) - in 1936-1938. People's Commissar of the USSR, in 1938-1939. People's Commissar of Water Transport of the USSR. In June 1939, he was arrested, in February 1940, he was shot at the sentence of the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. Not rehabilitated.
12. Mikhailov (Caselelenbogen) M.E. (1902-1938) - in 1928-1932. Responsible instructor, Deputy Head, Head of Departments of the Central Committee of the CPP (b). In 1932-1935 Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee of the WCP (b), in 1935-1937. First Secretary of the Kalininsky Regional Committee, in July-November 1937, the first secretary of the Voronezh Regional Committee of the WCP (b). In October 1937 - January 1938, a member of the Central Committee of the CPP (b). In November 1937, Arrested, in August 1938, was shot. Rehabilitated by the decision of the PDA under the CPSU Central Committee of March 13, 1956
13. March 5-10, 1956 in Georgia in defense I.V. Stalin took place mass rallies, demonstrations and strikes. Speeches in Tbilisi were suppressed by troops. Documents about these events: See: Report N.S. Khrushchev about the cult of personality ... pp. 257-265, 426-428.
14. Goryachev F.S. (1905-1996) - First Secretary of the Kalinin Committee in 1955-1959.
15. Daniylov A.D. (1908-1981) - First Secretary of the Dagestan Committee of the CPSU in 1948-1967.
16. Shatalin N.N. (1904-1984) - in 1955-1956. First Secretary of the Primorsky Criton of the CPSU, in 1956-1957. Deputy Minister of State Control of the USSR.
17. Allyluweva N.S. (1901-1932) - wife I.V. Stalin. Committed suicide in November 1932
18. Decision on the removal of the coffin with the body I.V. Stalin from Mausoleum was adopted by the XXII Congress of the CPSU October 30, 1961
19. Poskrebyshev A.N. (1891-1965) - in 1929-1953. Deputy Head, head of the special sector of the Central Committee of the Central Committee, the Secret Department and the Special Sector of the Central Committee of the CPP (b). In 1952-1953 Secretary of the Presidium and the Bureau of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. Since 1953, retired.
20. The XIX Congress of the CPSU took place on October 5-14, 1952.
21. This refers to the Kharkiv Operation in May 1942
22. Ordzhonikidze G.K. (Sergo) (1886-1937) - in 1926-1930. Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the People's Commissar of the USSR, and at the same time, the Deputy Chairman of the SNK and the one hundred USSR. In 1930-1937 Member of the Political Bureau CCP (b). In 1930-1932 Chairman of the ANTH USSR, in 1932-1937. The drugs of the Heavy Industry of the USSR. Committed suicide on February 18, 1937
23. So in the document. The mentioned decision was made on April 5, 1956
24. Current S.K. (1901-1973) - First Secretary of the Tuvinian Commander of the CPSU in 1944-1973.

For a long time, the Khrushchev myth was spinning about the fact that Stalin de To war was not prepared, that in the first days was confused, closed at the cottage, and then he left the military operations ...
It turned out, however, that all this is a lie.
And it's not even in the late exposure of historians, our and foreign, found evidence, refuting the Khrushchev lies.
The country's leadership, the team composition of the Red Army well and long were aware of the trends in the development of the situation in the West and corrected their activities, respectively.
And the testimony of this is found in the most unexpected source - the Children's film of 1942 "Klyatva Timura", the action of which is happening in June 1941
The father of the young heroine of Gaidar history of Zhenya Aleksandova, Colonel of armored troops, sends his daughter from the front a sound letter, in which, in particular, speaks (at 49 minutes):

I swear to you with the honor of the old and gray commander, which is even when you were completely crumb, we already knew this enemy, they were preparing for mortal battle, they were promised to win, and now we will fulfill our word ...

If we consider that my wife is 13 years old, she was in the early 30s. And it turns out that the enemy already knew at least since 1931. And prepared from the same time.
And that's right, everything coincides in the dates - the ascent of Hitler to power in Germany and the steep beginning of industrialization and collectivization in the USSR.

And under the cat, the interesting article of Igor Nevsky "Curve Speech of Nikita Khrushchev", exposing a number of Khrushchev myths about Stalin, with the quotes of our and - which is especially significant - foreign historians.

60 years ago, in February 1956, the 20th Coupss Congress was held, which ended with a private meeting, at first not provided for by the official agenda. According to eyewitnesses, after this meeting, the delegates of the congress were silent and shocked.
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At this meeting, the then Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the CPSU Nikita Khrushchov exposed the cult of the recently deceased leader of the Soviet Union of Joseph Stalin, which for many years before the idol of millions of people not only in our country, but also throughout the world.
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In his speech, Khrushchev told the delegates of the congress that Stalin allegedly brought the party, the state and the people is more harmful than the benefit that Stalin distracted the great communist Lenin's teachings that we almost did not lose the Great Patriotic War with Stalin. This is the debt, then for many years I was breathing, then again gained momentum ...
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However, a lot of professional historians have emerged, including those living abroad, which, based on the facts identified by them, have proven that most of the provisions of the famous Khrushchev speech expressed at the 20th Congress of the Party ... did not have a real basis.
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That is, the speech of Nikita Sergeevich was false from the beginning to the end!
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That's what, for example, says the famous American historian Grover Ferr, a major specialist in the history of Russia of early 20th century:
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"I managed to allocate 61 accusatory assertion. Each of them is investigated by me in the light of historical evidence, and, as it became clear, in the end, in the "closed" report, Khrushchev did not say about Stalin and Beria nothing that would be true. "Stalin's defense" here is not: the burden of evidence lies on the accusatory side. And all the "exposure" approval of the "closed" report as evidence is untenable. "
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Take for example the main antistali accusations that sounded at the congress.
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He was a dictator and did not consult with anyone.
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Nikita Khrushchev said that before the emergence of Stalin in the country, there was no "cult of personality". But, they say, with his arrival in power in 1924, the cult began to flourish. Stalin imagined himself almost the king, who was not advised not that with his people, but even with the ruling communist party.
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"Plenums of the Central Committee almost did not conveyed," Khrushchev was reigning in his report. "It is enough to say that for all the years of the Great Patriotic War, not a single plenum of the Central Committee was actually conducted."
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In fact, the cult of party leaders originated in the Communists before the arrival of Stalin - in the conditions of the dictatorship of one-sole political force, it could not be simple. This is what Igor Pyhaualov wrote about this historian:
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"In 1925, the city of Tsaritsyn became Stalingrad. And here Stalin was late, because Zinovievsk (former Elizavevend), Trotsky (former Gatchina) and Tukhachevsk (former Miass) existed. In 1925, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Central Committee of Alexey Ivanovich Rykov during a trip to Leningrad visited the factory of his name. According to the Volga, the steamers "Alexey Rykov" and "Mikhail Tomsky" went. Etc. etc.".
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I'm not talking about the cult of Lenin, which originated just immediately after the October Revolution and continued until the collapse of the USSR - Ilyich, our propaganda ranked hardly to face "saints". However, it concerned almost all party leaders without exception. The older generation people remember the cults of the same Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko and even the "perestroika" Gorbachev (at the beginning of his rule).
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So Stalin did not stand out here ...
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Round Khrushchev about "Violations of Party Democracy". Congresses and party plenums were going regularly, literally on each important issue of the state of the state. Yes, during the war and the first years after she was taken a break. But there were objective reasons. So, one of the plenums was planned for October 1941, members of the Central Committee arrived in Moscow. However, the event had to be postponed, as was said in a special decree, "created a heavy situation on the fronts and inappropriateness of distraction from the fronts of the leading comrades" - Germans began their offensive to Moscow by that time. Again, I want to quote Poyalov:
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"In general, listen to Khrushchev, so holding congresses and plenums - a panacea from all troubles. As mentioned in one Soviet joke: "In the spring, no matter what weather, we sow wheat, corn, oats, rye. - And in the fall that we will collect? - plentom of agriculture. " As if the crackling on party forums can replace real work. "
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As for the approval that Stalin did not consult with anyone ... It is enough to read the memories of our prominent military, engineers, scientists, designers, party workers of the time to make sure that the Khrushchev's postulate. Stalin was not just consulted with smart people, but also often argued with them (like them with him). And the Stalinist point of view did not always won. Recall at least as in 1944, Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky managed to prove Stalin that the summer offensive of our troops should be started in the center of Belarus, and not south, as the leader believed.
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Marshal showed enviable perseverance, reinforcing him convincing evidence. And Stalin eventually accepted Rokossovsky's point of view, not ashamed to publicly admit to his wrong.
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Kirov killed and repressed the party.
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Khrushchev straight accused Stalin that he, establishing his cult, unleashed mass repressions against the "honest communists", which were hardly killed immediately after their arrests. Allegedly a reason for repression against these innocent people, the mysterious killing of the first secretary of the Leningrad Committee of the Party of Sergei Kirov was served. Khrushchev directly hinted in his report that it was Stalin who was involved in the death of Kirov ...
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First, as historical science has already established today, Stalin did not have a leader of the Leningrad Communists to death, Kirov, in the attack of jealousy, shot a small party worker on the surname of Nikolaev, who had a robust love romance with Kirov.
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Secondly, at the beginning of the 30s, there was a powerful anti-Stalinist opposition in the party, and many opponents of communism were found in the country, which remained from the revolution, which manifested themselves during the Great Patriotic War.
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At the same time, the internal partare opposition was also intended to fight the leader of the party and the state by no means of discussion. As follows from recently declassified archival documents, the oppositionists intended to act according to the tactics, which used in the bloody years of the revolution and the Civil War - beat the enemy to its full physical destruction. In particular, one of the leaders of the opposition, the major leader of the Comintern Osip Pyatnitsky in 1936 did not just call for his associates to overthrow Stalin, but also to eliminate it.
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And now imagine the country, which in front of World War I literally speak such internal contradictions, where since the revolution there is a "fifth column", where the ruling party is on the verge of split ... Agree that Stalin, although it is very hard, but allowed this problem - exactly in the spirit of his hard and terrible time.
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By the way, Khrushchev was wrong when talking about the "illegality" of Stalinist repression. This is what Alexey Kazannik wrote, a convinced democrat and an antistalist, who headed the General Prosecutor's Office of Russia in 1993 to 1994:
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"At the Law Faculty of the University of Irkutsk, we were given - there was a Khrushchev thaw - the tasks to write a course work on the materials of the criminal cases that were investigated in the thirties - the fifties. And to his horror, while still a student, I was convinced that even then the legality in the strict sense of the word was not disturbed, even though draconian laws were, but they were performed exactly. "
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In war, defeated Stalin.
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This is probably the most blatant lies of Khrushchev. He colorfully painted the delegates of the congress, as Stalin was confused in the first days of the Great Patriotic War, as he looked at the military operations, focusing on topographic cards, but by ... School Globe (!), As his cult cult was only prevented by the country.
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Already immediately after the congress, our military leaders called these Khrushchev attacks with "nonsense of the Svoy Mare".
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And indeed, what kind of confusion of Stalin, who was supposedly hidden from everyone in June 1941, can be said if today is the diary of visits to Stalinsky Cabinet in the Kremlin published today? And there is clearly indicated on that, all the first days of the war to the leader went through a continuous flow of people - generals and admirals, addresses, state security officers, diplomats, director of factories ... That is, the head of state with the first volley of the war did not sit down in the scare in the country, but a lot Worked hard.
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And reasoning about the leadership of combat actions "on the school globe" can be attributed only to the violent fantasy of Nikita SERGEEVIC itself. The same can be said about the Khrushchev assessment of the role of Stalin as a military leader. Marshals of Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Vasilevsky and many other high-ranking officers considered Stalin outstanding commander-in-chief. I will dwell only in the opinion of General Peter Grigorenko, which in the 1960s by the Soviet dissident:
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"Operational and strategic decisions, starting with the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, the coordination of the efforts of fronts, childbirth of troops and aviation is out of serious criticism. That is definitely not the merit of one Stalin. But it is also impossible to say what it was done without him ... His competent participation is felt in the development of all operations ...
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The brilliant offensive operations of the Soviet troops are samples of martial arts. Many generations of the military throughout the world will study these operations, and no one comes to the head to prove that they were preparing and carried out without the participation of Stalin or the more despite his will. "
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Prepared to democratization of the country?
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The American researcher Grover Ferr called his work on Khrushchev exposure at the 20th Congress of the Antistaline Energy Party. In his opinion, Khrushchev went to such a step because sharply opposed Stalin's plans for ... democratization of the Soviet society?! Yes Yes exactly. The historian writes that at the end of his reign, Stalin conceived the cardinal transformations:
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"Their essence came down to ensure that the role of the Communist Party in the State Management was narrowed to normal (as in other countries) limits, and the nomination of the state managers would not take place on party lists, but on the basis of legal, democratic procedures. That is, according to the real merits of certain people. "
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This is the representatives of the partner of the partner in any way. And as soon as Stalin died, his party successors, in his face, first of all, Khrushchev, tried to get rid of Stalin heritage, consolidating the position of the party as the leadership and guiding force of the Soviet society. And Stalin accused of all imaginable and inconceivable sins ...
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As a result, these people did not kill Stalin's personality cult, but the entire Soviet country. For the collapse of the USSR and the entire Soviet society in reality began after the 20th Congress, when, together with Stalin Volia-Neils, the whole of our story was issued after the October 1917 October Revolution.

XX Congress is usually considered a moment that put the end of the Stalinist era and made a discussion of a number of public issues somewhat more free; He marked the weakening of ideological censorship in the literature and art and the return of many before the forbidden names. However, in fact, the criticism of Stalin sounded only at a closed meeting of the Central Committee. At the congress, the reports of the central bodies of the party and the basic parameters of the 6th gureate plan were discussed. The congress condemned the practice of the separation of "ideological work on the practice of communist construction", "ideological dogmatism and launching."

The international situation was also discussed The role of socialism as a global systemand the struggle with imperialism, the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism and the formation of new developing countries. In this regard, the Leninsky principle was confirmed on the possibility of peaceful coexistence of states with various social buildings.

The congress made a decision on the diversity of forms of the transition of states to socialism, indicated that civil wars and violent shocks are not the necessary stage of the path to a new public formation. The congress noted that "conditions can be created for the peaceful way of indigenous political and economic transformations."

Condemnation of the cult of the personality of Stalin

The main events that made the congress are famous, occurred on the last day of work, 25Phevral, in a closed morning meeting. On this day, N. S. Khrushchev made a closed report "On the cult of personality and its consequences", which was devoted to the condemnation of co-cultivities of I. V. Stalin. It was announced a new point of view on the recent past of the country, with the transfer of numerous facts of crimes of the second half of the 1930s - early 1950s, the wines for which was pinned in Stalin. The report also raised the problem Rehabilitation of party and military leaders repressed under Stalin.

Despite the conditional closure, the report was distributed throughout the part of the country's cells, and non-partisans were attracted to his discussion on a number of enterprises; The discussion of the report was also in the cells of the WLKSM.

The "relative" version of the report was made public as a resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Central Committee of June 30, 1956, called "On overcoming the cult of the personality and its consequences", in which the framework of the permissible criticism of Stalinism was asked . Solutions of the transportation of transport.

At the congress, it was decided to start mass introduction on the Soviet railways of diesel and electric traction, as well as the cessation of the construction of steam locomotives. Instead, these plants switched to the release of TE3 diesel locomotives

63. The Foreign Policy of the USSR is first after the Stalin Decade.

By the mid-1950s. The international stage existed a sufficiently intense situation. The hard "Cold War" continued. The creation of military blocks aimed at deterrent to the influence of the Socialist Camp (Sento, Seato, Angryus) was made. After signing in October 1954, Paris agreements between the United States, England, France, Germany and other Western countries, Western Germany received the right to restore their armed forces And joined NATO. It violated the balance of power in Europe and affected the geopolitical interests of the USSR. FRG refused to recognize post-war borders with Poland and Czechoslovakia. In the face of a real military threat on May 14, 1955. Socialist countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, GDR, Poland, Romania, USSR and Czechoslovakia) signed the Warsaw Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. On the basis of this document, the organization of the Warsaw Agreement (ATS) was established for the joint defense policy of socialist countries. Within its framework there was a combined military command and coordination of foreign policy activities was carried out. The presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Central and Southeast Europe received a legal basis. The creation of military political blocks has gone out an international situation, contributed to strengthening confrontation. In the US, since the beginning of the 1950s, there was a law, in accordance with which the country's assistance received from them was obliged to interrupt all trade relations with socialist countries. In turn, socialist countries maximally limited contacts with the capitalist world. All their foreign trade activities took place within the framework of CEV.

Liberalization of internal life after 1953 leads to serious changes in the international policy of the Soviet state. The updated Soviet leadership (in 1956 received a resignation Minister of Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov, and from February 1957. For 28 years, this post occupied A.A. Gromyko) Guide understood that the "Cold War" with her arms race lead world Community in a dead end. It refuses unrealistic and dangerous Stalinist foreign policy. The suspension of the Cold War contributed to the successful test in the USSR in August 1953 of the hydrogen bomb. It created a temporary military-strategic advantage of the Soviet Union and forced the Western powers to change policies regarding it. The search for new approaches to solving complex international problems accumulated in the first post-war decade begins. Among the most important tasks of Soviet diplomacy in the international arena: a decline in military threat, the completion of the Cold War, the expansion of international relations and strengthening the influence of the USSR in the world as a whole.

Positive shifts in the international arena began already since 1953

On June 27 of this year, an agreement on the cease-fire in Korea was finally signed. The 1954 Geneva Conference was successful, the decisions of which settled the situation in Indochite. France brought his troops and recognized the independence of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. On May 15, 1955, the USSR, USA, United Kingdom and France signed an agreement on the restoration of independent and democratic Austria, the parliament of which decided to constant neutrality.

The path to the discharge of tensions The new leadership of the USSR sees in the settlement of bilateral relations with many countries. In 1955, diplomatic relations were restored with Austria and Yugoslavia. After the visit in September 1955, diplomatic relations with Germany were established to Moscow Chancellor C. Adenauer. In October 1956, relations with Japan were normalized as a result of negotiations. The USSR refused reparation claims and supported the request of Japan on joining the UN. However, the peace treaty was never signed due to territorial disagreements. By the end of the 1950s, the Soviet Union had trade and diplomatic relations with more than 70 countries of the world. B1954 - 1964. Soviet leaders visited dozens of European, Asia and America. Visits to Moscow inflicted prominent politicians and entrepreneurs of the United States, England, France, Italy and many other countries of the world. The Soviet Union at this time was proposed a new form of foreign policy activity - public diplomacy.

The influence of the USSR is growing after his entry in 1954 in UNESCO - an organization on education, science and culture under the UN - and in the International Labor Organization (ILO). In 1958 The Soviet Union resumed membership in the World Health Organization (WHO).

The impulse of the foreign policy rate Khrushchev gave the XX Congress of the CPSU in February 1956. A new foreign policy doctrine of the Soviet state was formulated on it, in which the return to the politics of the peaceful coexistence of states with various social builds was proclaimed, the possibility of preventing wars in the modern era and recognized various forms of transition of countries to socialism. The proclaimed course was distinguished by sufficient contradiction. On the one hand, respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries was declared, and on the other, it was emphasized by the need to assist both countries of the socialist camp and the world communist and national liberation movement, i.e. In fact, it was about interference in the internal affairs of capitalist and developing countries. The USSR did not refuse confrontation with the West. Peaceful coexistence was understood as a specific form of class struggle. The doctrine had a pronounced class orientation. She allowed the use of various ways of exposure to class opponents in the international arena from force pressure to peaceful initiatives.

As the main direction in ensuring peace on Planet, Khrushchev proposed to create a collective security system in Europe, and then in Asia, as well as begin immediate disarmament. Wanting to demonstrate the seriousness of these intentions, the Soviet government went to one-sided reduction of the armed forces. The army cuts conducted in 1955 - 1960, made it possible to reduce it by almost 4 million people and bring the number of Soviet troops to 2.5 million. Significant reductions in their armies also conducted other socialist camp countries. Finally, in 1957, the USSR was submitted to the UN to suspend tests of nuclear weapons and committing obligations to refuse to use atomic and hydrogen weapons, as well as on the simultaneous reduction in the Armed Forces of the USSR, USA and China to 2.5 million, and then to 1 , 5 million people. In 1958, the Soviet government unilaterally declared a moratorium on nuclear testing and turned to the parliaments of all countries to support this initiative. However, break the vicious circle of arms race in the 50s. So failed. Western countries skeptically treated Soviet proposals and advanced unacceptable conditions. In the fall of 1959 N.S. Khrushchev first from the Soviet leaders visited the United States. Great resonance in the world caused his speech at the UN General Assembly on the problem of universal disarmament. In his famous speech, he proposed to completely eliminate the national army and the fleet and leave only police forces from the states. This initiative has sharply raised the authority and prestige of our country in the international arena and contributed to the weakening of tensions in Soviet-American relations.

However, the Soviet leadership was not sincere in his desire for peace. Apparently, it is more correct to assume that it tried to win the time in the arms race. The peaceful initiatives of the Soviet state have nominated against the background of significant success of Soviet scientists in improving weapons and rocket technology. In August 1957, tests were successfully conducted by the first intercontinental ballistic missile in the USSR. For the first time, the territory of the United States turned out to be a potentially vulnerable to applying a rocket-nuclear strike. At the same time, not only the large-scale equipment of the air defense armament, the Air Force and the Ground Forces of the Soviet Army, but also the creation of a new type of armed forces - strategic missile troops (since 1962). In addition, the submarine fleet of the USSR Navy and Nuclear Weapon received. The pressure on the enemy "from the Power Position" still remained the main tool of Soviet foreign policy. As Khrushchev declared, "another policy can not be, our opponents do not understand the other language." It is due to the threat of the Soviet "nuclear retaliation" in 1956 it was possible to prevent the combined aggression of the countries of the West against Egypt during the Suez crisis period. The USSR has consistently strengthened, and then consistently expanded the sphere of Soviet influence in countries freed from colonial dependence in both Asia and Africa.

The expansion of multilateral relations with socialist countries was one of the priorities of the USSR's foreign policy. New in relations with the socialist countries was the dentalinization - the exposure of the cult of personality, the refusal of the theory and practice of Stalinism. From Moscow, there was a call for the leaders of these countries to carry out democratization of their internal and foreign policy on the sample of the USSR. This appeal caused the growth of a democratic movement, which united opponents of the Stalinist model of socialism. The weakening of censorship and the rehabilitation of political prisoners reinforced the criticism of the modes and led to the radicalization of the population. In the summer of 1956, a universal strike broke out in Poznan (Poland), and then street riots began. Speech was suppressed by army parts. Only due to the flexible policy, the Secretary General of the Polish United Worked Party, V. Gomulki, was able to prevent Poland with the help of Soviet troops to power.

Under the influence of Polish events, the situation in Hungary sharply agrees. In September - October 1956, on the wave of student and working manifestations, the new government led by Imre Napa tried to get out of the tough dependence on Moscow, to break the allied relations with the USSR and other countries of the People's Democracy, to achieve accession to NATO. The Hungarian Party of Workers was pushed from power and actually turned out to be outlined. The total control over all parties to the life of the Hungarian society from punitive organs was stopped. At the request of the government, the propellant of the Soviet troops, quartered in Budapest and other cities, were removed from the country. At the same time, the border with Austria was opened. The events of the Hungarian "October Revolution" were the events of October 2, 1956, when the armed students and workers destroyed the monument to Stalin gathered at the rally in Budapest. In response to these actions, the Soviet leadership decided to decide on military intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary (relying on the formal appeal of the "temporary worker-peasant government" Ya. Kadar). On the night of November 4, Budapest was occupied by Soviet troops. The popular uprising was suppressed. About 2.5 thousand rebels died, tens of thousands of Hungarians were injured, many emigrated from the country. The power of the Communist Party and allied commitments of the VDR with respect to the USSR and the countries of the ATS were restored.

After the events in Hungary, a tendency of some liberalization was discontinued, an ideological pressure intensified and the control over the political situation in the countries of the socialist camp became more stringent. Unity in it was now held at the ATS troops.

The second half of the 1950s is marked by a sharp deterioration in relations with the PRC. Since 1957, China's leadership began to express sharp critical comments on the Soviet model for building socialism and developed in the USSR campaign to expose co-cultivation. Mao Zedong openly began to claim the role of the second leader in the socialist world and the global communist movement. China no longer wanted to put up with the role of the "younger brother" in the family of socialist peoples. Moscow attempts to smooth out the Soviet-Chinese contradictions through the meetings of the Communist and Workers' Parties in 1957 and 1960. Success did not have. By accusing the Soviet leadership in the principles of Marxism-Leninism and in revisionism, Beijing sharply acted for coagulation of relations from the USSR: in 1960, China presented claims to a number of border areas of the USSR and Mongolia. At the same time, problems occurred in the relationship between the USSR with Albania, which supported the policy of MAO in the international arena. In 1961, Albania refused to provide the USSR naval databases and arrested Soviet submarines, which were in its ports. In 1962, Soviet-Albanian relations were actually broken, and in 1968, Albania came out of the ATS. Since 1962, armed conflicts began on the Soviet-Chinese border. A special position in the Socialist Camp was also taken by Romania, which in 1958. I achieved the withdrawal of Soviet troops from its territory. Significantly focused on China and the leaders of North Korea. Thus, in the years of "thaw" begins a violation of the unity of the countries of socialism.

The end of 1950 - the beginning of the 1960s became the time of the colonial system of colonial system. Strengthening ties with the countries of the Third World ("Developing" countries) the USSR paid great attention for two reasons. First, the involvement of the liberated countries to their side, he tried to keep the balance of forces on the world stage. As soon as the help of the Soviet Union weakened, they automatically grew the influence of the United States. Secondly, the XX CPSU Congress ranked a national liberation movement, along with communist and working movements, to the components of the global revolutionary process. Therefore, the expansion of cooperation with these countries was considered as a form of combating global imperialism. "Developing" countries received serious diplomatic support from the USSR, but most importantly, huge financial assistance. Especially close contacts were formed with India, Indonesia, Burma, Afghanistan, and others. They were assisted in the construction of industrial enterprises and other objects. With the help of Soviet specialists in India, the PHILANE Metallurgical Plant was built, and in Egypt Asuan Dam. In total, this time, with the financial and technical support of the USSR, about 6 thousand industrial facilities were built in different countries of the world.

The most important problem of the international situation in Europe of this period was the settlement of the German issue, which was now in determining the status of West Berlin. According to the decisions of the Potsdam Peace Conference of 1945, the capital of Germany, like the entire territory of the country, was divided into occupation zones. The Soviet zone in 1949 turned into a GDR, and Berlin became the capital of Socialist Germany. The territory of West Berlin was actually part of Germany. In November 1958, the Soviet government applied to West countries with a request to revise the status of West Berlin, which was supposed to become a free and demilitarized city. The goal was to eliminate the "outpost of imperialism in the socialist German land." A fundamental solution to the question of the status of Western Berlin was postponed (in accordance with the agreements between Khrushchev and Eisenhower) for May 1960, when the Conference of the Governments of the USSR, USA, France and England was supposed to be held. But the meeting did not take place: on May 1, 1960, the American aircraft Y-2 was shot down over the Soviet territory (Powers pilot was detained at the site of the landing and gave testimony that was shied as a spy).

Relationship East - West sharply aggravated. Meanwhile, the Berlin crisis was deepened. The western sector of the city quickly recovered with the help of investments from the United States (Marshall Plan). The standard of living in here was incomparably higher than in the eastern sector. In the spring - in the summer of 1961 a significant part of the population, mostly young people and students in large cities, openly made a change in political system. In this regard, after prior approval with Moscow on the initiative of the head of the GDRV. Ulbricht around West Berlin On the night of August 13, 1961, a wall of concrete and barbed wire was erected. This measure made it possible to prevent the "voting of the legs" against the socialist building. Berlin crisis has adversely affected the development of international relations in Europe. In September 1961, the USSR unilaterally refused the agreement with the United States on the moratorium on nuclear tests in the atmosphere and conducted a series of nuclear explosions. The confrontation of East - West soon delivered humanity to the face of the world war, when the Caribbean crisis broke out in October 1962. The reason for him was that the United States, trying to overthrow the Castro regime, in April 1961 organized landing of the landing in the area of \u200b\u200bPlaya-Gyrone. To protect against the American expansion F. Castro in the spring of 1962, he achieved the placement of medium radius with nuclear warheads from the Soviet Union with nuclear warheads. Since Cuba proclaimed himself a socialist country, Khrushchev considered his duty to protect the "Freedom Island". I also seduced the opportunity to place a military base in close proximity to the United States. Since the spring of 1962, the USSR began to secretly carry out the transfer of missiles. In October 1962, this became aware of Americans. President D. Kennedy announced the naval blockade of Cuba and demanded the immediate export of Soviet missiles from the island. In complete combat readiness, not only US troops and the USSR, but also NATO and the OVD were given. Political ambitions of the leaders put the world on the threshold of a nuclear catastrophe. But still the saving compromise was found. In the course of intensive negotiations on the direct wire between N.S. Khrushchev and D. Kennedy The part agreed that the USSR would remove rockets from Cuba, and the United States from Turkey and Italy. In addition, Kennedy guaranteed the security of the Castro mode. When resolving the Caribbean crisis there was a new effective form of interstate relations - the personal contacts of the heads of state. They allowed to achieve some mitigation of international tensions. However, the murder of D. Kennedy in November 1963 and the resignation of N.S. Khrushchev in October 1964 ceased this process. From the middle of the 1960s, a new round of the arms race begins.

Emotions experienced in the days of the Caribbean crisis, clearly showed the need for a treaty of the restriction of nuclear weapons. In 1963, an agreement was signed in Moscow between the USSR, the United States, England about the prohibition of nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Soon more than one hundred states joined this agreement.

In the period of "thaw" of the USSR, it was possible to achieve a decline in the "Cold War" gas and strengthen its position of one of the world powers

64. USSR during a period of stable development (65 - early 80s)

The period from the mid-60s to the mid-80s, when the political leadership of the country was headed by L. I. Brezhnev, called the time of stagnation - time of lost opportunities. It began with enough bold reforms in the field of economy, it ended with increasing negative trends in all spheres of public life, and in the economy, the crisis of the socio-political system.

I marked the beginning of the new turn of Soviet history Oktyabrsky (1964) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

On October (1964), the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was a change in the leadership of the party and the country. First secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Brezhnev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Kosygin.

As Khrushchev, the prominent Soviet economists advocated the proposals of the radical economic reform, the essence of which consisted in the transition from the administrative, command economy to market relations. This idea was supported by Khrushchev, and after his suspension from power, the development of a new economic reform was headed by Kosygin. Decisions of March (1965) and September (1965) Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, this reform received formal approval and support from the party.

The essence of the reform of 1965 can be reduced to the three most important areas:

1) Changes in the structure of the management of the national economy - to eliminate the territorial councils of the national economy and carry out the transition to the sectoral principle of management of industrial enterprises. Union and Union-republican ministries were recreated.

2) Correction of the planning system. Since the former planned system was oriented to achieve the growth in the production volumes of enterprises based on gross production, it was supposed to target plans for realized products.

3) Improving economic stimulation. It included: Improving the pricing system, improving the wage system.

In line with these areas, it was envisaged:

1. Evaluate the results of the economic activity of enterprises on the products sold, received profits to fulfill the tasks;

2. Put the payment of labor into dependence not only on the results of their individual labor, but also from the general results of the work of enterprises;

3. Put the basis of economic relations between enterprises the principle of mutual liability. Develop direct links between manufacturers and consumers of products. Enhance the role of economic contracts.

The XX Coupss Congress was held from 14 to 25 February 1956 in Moscow in the Greater Kremlin Palace with the participation of almost one and a half thousand delegates, as well as representatives of 55 communist and workers' parties of the world.

In accordance with the announced agenda, the congress was to hear and discuss the reporting reports of the Central Committee and the Central Audit Commission of the CPSU, the report on the directives on the sixth five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR and to make elections of the central batch bodies.

The main event of the congress occurred on the last day of his work, February 25, 1956, in a closed morning meeting. On this day, the first secretary of the Central Committee (Central Committee) of the CPSU Nikita Khrushchev made a report with the exposure of the cult of the personality of Stalin.

The revision of the estimates of the Stalinist policy began immediately after Stalin's death in 1953 in connection with the rehabilitation process of the victims of repression. On December 31, 1955, a Commission was created on the eve of the XX Congress of the Party to study the materials on mass repressions of the pre-war period. The findings of this commission, set out at the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on February 9, 1956, forced the leadership of the party to decide on the need to condemn at the congress of the policies of Stalinist repression. The report on this issue was decided to make a meeting of the congress on the final, closed (without foreign guests) to avoid the general publicity of the discovered facts that represented the party as a whole and its separate figures in a disadvantage.

He headed the Commission of the Secretary of the Central Committee Peter Pospelov and Averkie Aristov prepared the first version of the text, with which, after the serious editing of Khrushchev and the secretary of the Central Committee on the ideology of Dmitry Shepilov, introduced all members of the Presidium of the Central Committee. Stalin's sharp assessments made his former coming colleagues - Lazar Kaganovich, Clement Voroshilov and Vyacheslav Molotov. But most of the Presidium of the Central Committee supported Khrushchev.

The report on the cult of the personality was recognized by numerous lawlessness of previous years, the scale of repression. Khrushchev spoke of the full neglect of Stalin's principles of collective leadership, about personal involvement in repression. They sounded the names of those who were illegally condemned and shot on the eve of the war, including Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky. However, the names of political oppositionists (Trotsky, Bukharin, Rykov, Kamenev) were not mentioned.

The causes of mass repression in the report were explained solely by the personality of Stalin (i.e. subjective reasons), emphasizing that the USSR could not have objective prerequisites for lawlessness, and the political course since 1917 was absolutely correct. Moreover, the party itself suffered from repression, first of all. Stalin Khrushchev also laid responsibility for unwillingness to war, cruel defeats 1941 and 1942.

On June 30, 1956, the decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On overcoming the cult of personality and its consequences", in which Stalin's assessment was somewhat less sharp than in the report. Recognized that he was "actively fought for the implementation of the Lenin Covenants."

The historical importance of the congress of the XX Congress of the CPSU is to condemn Stalinism. A direct consequence of the decisions of the congress was a certain liberalization of the country's socio-political life (the so-called thaw).

Material prepared on the basis of RIA news and open sources