“The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism” not only brought Weber wide recognition, but also became for the author a kind of “experimental field” on which he developed his own methodology of sociological knowledge.

It is no coincidence that Weber's most significant work, dedicated to methods of comprehending reality, was published in 1904, almost immediately after The Protestant Ethic.

And although the entire study, entitled “Objectivity of socio-scientific and socio-political consciousness,” fit into one article, it can be recognized as a kind of “quintessence” of Weber’s methodology.

“The fate of a cultural era that has “tasted” the fruit of the tree of knowledge lies in the need to understand that the meaning of the universe is not revealed by research, no matter how perfect it may be, that we ourselves are called upon to create this meaning, that “worldviews” can never be the product of a developing experiential knowledge and, therefore, the highest ideals ... at all times find their expression in the struggle with other ideals.”

As for culture, it is just “a finite fragment of a meaningless world infinity, which, from the point of view of man, has meaning and significance.”

To understand the meaning and significance of an event or phenomenon means, according to Weber, just to interpret them clearly. At the same time, the interpreter must initially come to terms with the fact that he hardly knows the true causes and content of the fact he is studying, and, therefore, not a single deepest theory can claim to know the whole. “Every mental cognition of infinite reality by the finite human spirit is based on the tacit premise that in each given case only a finite part of reality can be the object of scientific knowledge.”

About the natural sciences and humanities

So, complete and absolute knowledge of the truth is inaccessible to man.

But how should we try to comprehend reality with our very imperfect capabilities?

“intuition” is accepted as a method of the humanities, and indirect knowledge, rational, conceptual, logical, is accepted as a method of the natural sciences.

Such a “psychological” justification of the humanities in reality could not refute the point that knowledge obtained directly with the help of intuition, by getting used to the world of someone else’s soul, does not have the necessary guarantee of reliability. In this regard, the question arose of how to ensure that the cultural sciences have the same rigor and significance as the natural sciences?

Weber, unlike Dilthey and the representatives of historical science who followed him, resolutely refused to be guided by the method of direct experience when studying social life. He insisted on including rational (logical) methods based on the use of various levels of abstractions in the process of historical knowledge.

“The very first step towards making a historical judgment,” wrote Weber, “is, therefore, a process of abstraction, which proceeds through analysis and mental isolation of the components of a directly given event (considered as a complex of possible causal connections) and must end in the synthesis of the “real” causal connection Thus, the very first step transforms this “reality” so that it becomes a “historical fact” into a mental construction - in the fact itself lies ... a theory” (“Objectivity of Social Scientific and Socio-Political Consciousness”).

If a historian tells the reader only the logical result of his reasoning, without giving proper justification for it, if he simply instills in the reader an understanding of events, instead of pedantically reasoning about them, then, according to Weber, he creates a historical novel, and not a scientific study. It will, rather, be a work of art in which there is no solid basis for reducing the elements of reality to their causes.

The general meaning of Weber’s methodology in the field of historical knowledge was that history can lay claim to the status of a scientific discipline only if it uses logical techniques that make it possible to make broad generalizations (generalizations), which make it possible to reduce the elements of reality to their reasons.

“Understand life in its uniqueness”

Agreeing with his predecessors (W. Wildeband and D. Rickert) that all sciences are divided into two types - “sciences of culture” and “sciences of nature”, Weber considered these types different in methods, but identical in methods of cognition and concept formation. In his opinion, this difference did not at all undermine the very unity of the scientific principle and did not mean a departure from scientific rationality.

Touching upon the question of the “materialist understanding of history,” Weber wrote that such an understanding of the “Communist Manifesto” in “its old brilliantly primitive sense” prevails only in the minds of profane and amateurs. In general, “reduction to economic reasons alone cannot be considered exhaustive in any area of ​​culture, including in the area of ​​economic processes” (“Objectivity of socio-scientific and socio-political consciousness”).

Weber saw his task in the field of social sciences as understanding real life in its originality.

However, this was hampered by the cognitive principles established in the cultural sciences, which, as the final result of the study, assumed the establishment of certain patterns and causal relationships. That part of individual reality that remains after isolating the natural is considered, according to Weber, either as a remainder that has not been subjected to scientific analysis, or it is simply ignored as something “random” and therefore not essential for science. Thus, the author argued that in natural scientific knowledge only “natural” can be scientific (true), and “individual” can be taken into account only as an illustration of the law.

As Weber believed, knowledge of cultural processes is possible only if it proceeds from the meaning that individual reality has for a person.

However, in what sense and in what connections this or that significance is revealed, no law can reveal, for this is decided depending on the value ideas from the angle of which we consider culture. In other words, as people of culture, we take a certain position in relation to the world and bring meaning into it, which becomes the basis of our judgments about various phenomena of our coexistence.

Weber interpreted the very concept of culture extremely broadly, understanding by it everything that was “done” by man. In this regard, he wrote: “Speaking... about the conditionality of the knowledge of culture by ideas of value, we hope that this will not give rise to such a deep misconception that, from our point of view, cultural delusion is inherent only in value phenomena. The German thinker emphasized that prostitution is a cultural phenomenon no less than religion or money, and all of them together... directly or indirectly affect our cultural interests; because they excite our desire for knowledge from those points of view that are derived from value ideas that give significance to the segment of reality conceived in these concepts” (“History of Economics”).

"Ideal Types"

The development of a unified and sufficiently reliable methodology in the cultural sciences had to have a certain starting point, which for Weber was... the economic theory of Marx. In his opinion, this theory gives an ideal picture of the processes occurring on the market in a society of commodity-money exchange, free competition and strictly rational behavior. Another thing is that in reality such a construction has the character of a utopia, obtained by mentally bringing certain elements of reality to their full expression. Weber called such mental constructions “ideal types,” which, in his opinion, “are heuristic in nature and are necessary for determining the value of a phenomenon.”

Taking the concept of “ideal type” into service, Weber responsibly declared from the very beginning that such constructions do not exist, and they cannot exist in reality, and therefore used another term in relation to them - “utopia”. Yes, ideal types, like any scientific model, are based on knowledge of empirical facts, but this is not enough to consider them a mirror image of reality. At the same time, the very concept of “ideal” should not be misleading, since it does not mean idealization, a perfect example or the highest goal, the state to which we strive. The ideal is just non-existent.

The ideal type should not be confused with a hypothesis - a scientific assumption that a researcher puts forward to explain a phenomenon. A hypothesis requires verification by experiment: if it is confirmed, it becomes a theory; if not, it is rejected. However, the ideal type cannot be rejected by definition. At the same time, it does not require verification by real facts, and reality is compared with it only in order to understand how different it is from the ideal-typical construction created by the researcher.

As Weber himself wrote: “The ideal type is not a “hypothesis,” it only indicates in which direction the formation of hypotheses should go. It does not provide an image of reality, but it provides unambiguous means of expression for this.”

Ideal types are created through the unilateral strengthening of one or more points of view and the connection of individual phenomena into a single mental image. Weber especially emphasized that in reality this mental image never occurs. The author saw the task of historical research as establishing in each individual case how close or far reality is from the corresponding mental image.

Thus, with the help of this method, as Weber believed, it is possible to create an “idea of ​​craft” in the form of a utopia, combining certain features of the crafts of the most diverse eras and peoples into one ideal image free from contradictions. The ideal type of “craft” can be contrasted, abstracting certain features of modern large-scale industry, with the ideal type of capitalist economy.

When constructing his ideal types, Weber very often acted according to the scheme: what would happen if the phenomenon or process under study developed unhindered in the direction we indicated. To do this, he, for example, simulated a situation of stock exchange panic, after which he tried to answer the question: “What would be the behavior of players on the stock exchange if they did not succumb to strong emotions and acted absolutely calmly, with knowledge of the matter?”

Having painted this “ideal” picture of what was happening, Weber got an idea of ​​how much it was distorted by irrational moments in people’s behavior, how exactly fear and despair affected the results of their activities.

The scientist tried to approach the analysis of the results of any military or political action in exactly the same way. At the same time, he necessarily sought to understand: what would be the behavior of the participants in the event if they fully possessed all the necessary information and successfully found the means necessary to achieve the task.

Although, as Weber himself noted, the “ideal types” (or “utopias”) constructed in this way cannot be found in reality, they “really reflect the well-known, uniquely significant features of our culture, taken from reality and united in the ideal image” ( “Objectivity of socio-scientific and socio-political consciousness”).

Drawing a line on the unbiased nature of scientific knowledge in the field of social sciences, Weber warned against the use of ideal types in the form of samples bearing the character of an obligation. Ideal types must be motivated and, as far as possible, “objective” and adequate. In determining their scientific value, there can only be one criterion - “to what extent will it contribute to the knowledge of specific cultural phenomena in their interrelation, in their causality and meaning” (“Objectivity of socio-scientific and socio-political consciousness”).

Thus, Weber saw the formation of abstract ideal types not as a goal, but as a means of knowledge. This attitude applies to almost the entire set of ideal types he uses.

"Value" according to Weber

Although the term “ideal type” itself was already used by E. Durkheim and F. Tönnies, it was Weber who was the first to argue that this concept is based on very specific value preferences of the researcher.

A scientist, according to Weber, can only be interested in those aspects of endlessly diverse phenomena to which he himself attributes cultural significance or value.

But what is “value”? For Weber it is neither “positive” nor “negative,” neither “relative” nor “absolute,” nor “objective” nor “subjective.”

For the analytical scientist (as Weber himself considered himself), value is far from personal emotional experience, approval or blame. It cannot be “bad” or “good,” “right” or “wrong,” “moral” or “immoral.” Value is also absolutely devoid of any moral, ethical or aesthetic content. It must be seen as the form through which people organize their life experiences.

According to Weber, value is what is meaningful to us, what we focus on in our lives and what we take into account. She is the way of human thinking. Like the Kantian categories of “space” and “time,” Weber’s value gives a person the opportunity to order and structure the “chaos” of his thoughts, impressions and desires. This is a “purely logical method of understanding the world,” equally characteristic of both the scientist and the layman.

A person is a bearer of values, and he needs them to determine the goals that he sets for himself. Their place in the motivation of actions is much deeper than goals and interests, since it is to values ​​that the human will is ultimately directed.

Some modern researchers tend to equate Weber's concept of “value” with “norm,” which is a gross simplification.

In Weber's interpretation, value, unlike a norm, cannot be an unambiguously understood command; she is always a wish. We definitely need someone who, accepting it for one reason or another, will embody it with his life. Moreover, the choice of values ​​itself is not simply a choice between “right” and “wrong.” The “correct” values ​​are generosity and frugality, mercy and justice, active struggle against evil and non-resistance to violence.

However, in each specific situation a person has to choose one of two virtues that are difficult to combine with each other. At the same time, values ​​themselves “do not provide direction,” but only provide the opportunity to consciously choose a direction. So the alternative facing a person “makes sense only as an appeal to freedom, just as freedom in the sense of choice is possible only where there is an alternative” (“Science as a Vocation and Profession,” 1920).

Otherwise, values ​​automatically become norms that underlie social order.

The normative behavior of people is completely predictable and devoid of individual characteristics. But this interpretation does not suit Weber. He focuses on the dual nature of values, highlighting, in addition to the normative, another side - their necessary and inevitable refraction in the individual experience of a particular person.

This or that person always “deciphers” values ​​for himself, puts a certain meaning into them, that is, understands them in a way that only he and no one else can understand. Human freedom is an internal state, which consists in the possibility of independent and responsible choice of values ​​and their interpretation.

A research scientist possesses both in equal measure.

“Freedom from evaluation” and the objectivity of the scientist

Unlike most other people, the value choice of a scientist concerns not only himself and his immediate environment, but also all those who will someday become acquainted with the works he has written. Here the question immediately arises about the responsibility of the scientist. Although one could just as easily raise the question of the responsibility of a politician or a writer, Weber naturally prefers to concentrate on a topic that is closer to him personally.

Defending the right of the researcher to his own vision, Weber writes that “the knowledge of cultural reality is always the knowledge of very specific special points of view. This analysis is inevitably “one-sided,” but the subjective choice of a scientist’s position is not so subjective.

It “cannot be considered arbitrary as long as it is justified by its result, that is, as long as it provides knowledge of connections that turn out to be valuable for the causal (causal) reduction of historical events to their specific causes” (“Objectivity of socio-scientific and socio-political consciousness”).

The value choice of a scientist is “subjective” not in the sense that it is significant only for one person and understandable only to him. It is obvious that the researcher, in determining his analytical perspective, selects it from among those values ​​that already exist in a given culture. The value choice is “subjective” in the sense that it is “interested only in those components of reality that are in some way - even the most indirect - connected with phenomena that have cultural significance in our minds” (“Objectivity of socio-scientific and socio-political consciousness”) .

At the same time, a scientist as an individual has every right to a political and moral position, aesthetic taste, but he cannot have a positive or negative attitude towards the phenomenon or historical figure he is studying. His individual attitude must remain outside the scope of his research - this is the duty of the researcher to the truth.

In general, the topic of a scientist’s duty, the problem of truth free from subjectivism, was always very relevant for Weber. Being a passionate politician, he himself strove to act in his works as an impartial researcher, guided only by the love of truth.

Weber's demand for freedom from evaluation in scientific research is rooted in his ideological position, according to which scientific values ​​(truth) and practical values ​​(party values) are two different areas, the confusion of which leads to the replacement of theoretical arguments with political propaganda. And where the man of science comes with his own value judgment, there is no longer room for a full understanding of the facts.

Weber's "understanding"

Here it makes sense to introduce another fundamental concept of Weber’s sociology - the category of “understanding”. In his opinion, it is the need to understand the subject of one’s research that distinguishes sociology from the natural sciences. However, “understanding” people’s behavior does not yet indicate its empirical significance, since behavior that is identical in its external properties and results can be based on different combinations of motives, and the most obvious of them is not necessarily the most significant. The “understanding” of certain connections found in human behavior should always be subject to control using the usual methods of causal explanation. At the same time, Weber does not oppose understanding to causal explanation, but, on the contrary, closely connects them with each other. Moreover, “understanding” is not a psychological category, and understanding sociology is not part of psychology.

Weber considers individual behavior as the starting point of sociological research. According to his own definition, “the goal of our research is to prove that “understanding” is, in essence, the reason that understanding sociology (in our sense) considers the individual and his action as a primary unit, as an “atom” (if we consider it acceptable this in itself is a dubious comparison)” (“Basic Sociological Concepts”, 1920).

For the same reason, for sociological research, the individual represents in Weber the upper limit of meaningful behavior, since it is the individual who is its only bearer.

Social Action Theory

However, psychology also studies individual behavior, and in this regard the question arises: what is the difference between psychological and sociological approaches to the study of individual behavior?

Weber answered this question at the very beginning of his final work, Economy and Society. Sociology, in his opinion, is a science that wants to understand and causally explain social action in its course and manifestations.

In this case, the revolutionary nature of Weber’s scientific views lies in the fact that it was he who singled out as the subject of sociology an elementary unit that underlies all social activities of people, processes, organizations, etc.

The main characteristic of social action as the foundation of social existence, according to Weber, is meaning, and it itself is not just an action, but a human action, the author emphasizes. This means that the acting individual or acting individuals "associate a subjective meaning with it." Actually, a “social” action “should be called such an action which, in accordance with the meaning inherent in it by the actor or actors, is aimed at the behavior of others and is oriented in this way in its course.” Weber called the way in which an action or system of actions is performed “behavior adequate to meaning” (“Basic Sociological Concepts”).

The main components of social action, according to Weber, are goals, means, and norms. Social action itself, containing meaning and orientation towards others and their actions, is an ideal type. The criterion for identifying types of social action is rationality, or more precisely, its measure.

In this case, Weber used the concept of rationality in a purely methodological sense. With the help of this concept and on its basis, he built a typology of social actions. The gradation was based on the degree of real meaningfulness of the action from the point of view of calculating goals and means. Weber had four such types.

1. “Purpose-rational” action contains the highest degree of rationality of action. The goal, means and norms in it are mutually optimal and correlated with each other.

The most illustrative example of “goal-rational” action is action in the sphere of capitalist economy.

2. “Value-rational” action is associated with increased pressure from norms, such as beliefs. The capitalist who gives money to charity, the church, spends it on playing cards, etc., rather than investing it in production for the purpose of achieving further success, behaves in accordance with this type of social action.

3. Weber considers traditional action by analogy with “stupid stay” in routine circumstances. This action is according to a pattern, according to habit, according to a traditional establishment.

Understanding such a “stay” is possible in two cases: as a breakthrough of traditionality and as its conscious justification for the purpose of pragmatic use.

4. Affective action also has its own goal, the understanding of which is dominated by emotions, impulses, etc. The goal and means do not correspond to each other and often come into conflict.

An example is the behavior of football fans, which is characterized by the lowest level of rationality.

The possibility of using the category “social action” in science puts forward a clear requirement: it must be a generalizing abstraction. The formation of a typology of social actions is the first step on this path. Weber defined social action as the generalized average value of mass, for example, group behavior and its motives. Understanding this action is possible only on the basis of external, “objectively given situations” that influence its “courses and manifestations.” The instrument of such analysis is the ideal type, since the social context is obviously included in the content of the categories “participating” in its construction.

Understanding, like social action itself, is also a generalized and averaged value and is directly related to it. According to Weber, this is the “average and approximately considered” meaning of an action. The typology of social actions is an ideal-typical image of “averaged” and therefore “understandable” modes of behavior, typical orientations in typical conditions.

Sociology and other socio-historical sciences that operate with ideal types provide “knowledge about certain rules known in experience, especially about the way in which people usually react to given situations” (“Basic Sociological Concepts”).

About social relationships

Taking the concept of “social action” as the basis of “sociality in general,” Weber writes:

“We will call social relations the behavior of several people, correlated in their meaning with each other and oriented towards this,” the scientist wrote.

As a prerequisite, the author pointed out that the social relationship “consists entirely and exclusively in the possibility that social action will have a character accessible to (meaningful) definition,” regardless of what this possibility is based on (“Basic Sociological Concepts”) .

At the same time, the signs of social relations include the widest possible range of different actions: struggle, enmity, love, friendship, respect, rivalry of an economic, erotic or political nature, belonging to the same or different class, religious, national or class communities, etc.

Since social actions occur regularly enough to justify this connection, Weber introduced two more terms. By “mores” he meant the habit of acting in a certain situation one way and not another. Customs are mores that take root over a long period of time and are determined by the “goal-rational” orientation of the behavior of individuals towards the same expectations.

Social relations become more complex, he believed, when individuals begin to focus on a legitimate order that enhances the regularity of social relations.

Weber called the content of social relations themselves “order” only in those cases when an individual in his behavior is guided by clearly defined moral, religious, legal and other norms. In his opinion, various reasons can force people to take these norms into account, but most of them are of a purely internal nature. A specific individual can consider the existing order legitimate: 1) affectively, that is, guided by his emotions; 2) value-rational, believing in the absolute significance of order as an expression of the highest immutable values ​​(moral, aesthetic, etc.); 3) based on religious considerations.

On the other hand, the legitimacy of an order can be guaranteed by the expectation of specific external consequences. Weber divides these expectations into two types - “convention” and “right”.

Under the law, the possible “external consequences” include a special group of people exercising coercion (the simplest example is the police). In convention, such a group is absent, but at the same time, any deviation from “generally accepted behavior” is met with clearly tangible censure within a certain circle of people.

Social formations

From the analysis of social relations, Weber moved on to the analysis of various types of social formations. He proceeded from the fact that the process of integration taking place on the basis of social actions leads to the emergence of two social associations that are different in nature. The author called some of them associations of a public type, others - communal (or communal). He considered the first type to be the main one and included in it those associations whose members are guided in their behavior by motives of interest. Associations of a community type, according to Weber, are based on feelings of belonging to a particular community, and the motivation here is either affective or traditional.

Here Weber, in essence, only repeated the scheme proposed by F. Tönnies, although he developed it at a slightly different level. Thus, he called one of the options for uniting people into a “society” the so-called “target union”, each of the members of which, to a certain extent, relies on the fact that the other participants in the union will act in accordance with the established agreement and proceed from this with a rational orientation of their own behavior.

As another important social association, Weber introduced the concept of “enterprise.” As in the previous case, the enterprise must include a fairly constant number of members guided by “goal-rational” motives. However, unlike a regular target union, the enterprise also has a certain administrative body that carries out management functions.

At the same time, Weber noted that each individual constantly participates in spheres of action that are very diverse in nature - both communal, based on consent, and public, where purely rational motives prevail.

But in addition to the consensus-based “target unions,” there are other associations, or so-called “institutions.” Here, voluntary entry is replaced by enrollment on the basis of purely objective data, regardless of the desire and consent of the enrollees. The apparatus of coercion acts as one of the determining factors of behavior. The most striking and obvious examples, according to Weber, are the State and the Church. On the other hand, understanding the complexity of social actions leading to the emergence of associations of one type or another, he emphasized that the transition to an “institution” itself is not sufficiently defined, and there are not so many “institutions” of a pure type.

Weber classes

Fundamentally important for Weber was the concept of “struggle”, which is opposed to another concept - “consent”.

Here he proceeded from the fact that “the predominant part of all establishments - both institutions and alliances - arose not on the basis of agreement, but as a result of violent actions; that is, people and groups of people who, for whatever reason, are capable of actually influencing the collective actions of the members of an institution or union, direct it in the direction they need, based on the “expectation of consent.”

It was the struggle, according to Weber, that turned out to be the decisive factor in many processes and phenomena. True, in contrast to the interpretation of K. Marx, he did without any political and economic factors, explaining everything by the natural qualities of man.

Each individual, according to Weber, seeks to impose his will on another, either through open physical influence or through what is called competition.

Nevertheless, Weber by no means ignored the economic factor. It’s just that the sphere of economic action merely served for him as a kind of logical prerequisite for presenting the so-called “stratification theory.”

Here another concept is introduced - “classes”.

The existence of a class, as the scientist believed, can only be said in those cases when: 1) a certain set of people are united by a specific “causal component” that concerns their vital interests; 2) such a component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the acquisition of goods or receipt of income; 3) this component is determined by the situation developing in the goods or labor market.

Weber divided the class as a specific group of people into three main types: 1) the class of owners; 2) the acquisitive class, exploiting services on the market; 3) social class, consisting of many classes. new statuses, between which changes are observed, occurring both on a personal basis and within several generations.

At the same time, Weber stated that the unity of social classes is relative, and their differentiation only on the basis of property is not the result of class struggle or class revolutions. Radical changes in the distribution of wealth, in his opinion, are more accurately called “property revolutions.”

Weber paid special attention to the so-called “middle class,” referring to those who, thanks to appropriate training, own all types of property and are competitive in the labor market. Here he included independent peasants, artisans, officials employed in the public and private sectors, persons of liberal professions, as well as workers occupying an exclusively monopolistic position.

His examples of other classes were: - the working class as a whole, engaged in the mechanized process;

- “lower” middle classes; - engineers, commercial and other employees, as well as civil officials, that is, the “intelligentsia” without independent property; - a class of people who occupy a privileged position due to property and education.

Exploring the class structure of society in a “dynamic way,” Weber constantly looked for points of contact and transitions both between individual groups within one class and between the main classes. As a result, his proposed diagram of the class structure of society turned out to be so confusing that, based on it, it is difficult to even compile a complete list of classes.

In any case, according to the sociologist, the decisive factor determining a person’s belonging to one or another class of society was his opportunities in the labor market or, to be more precise, the payment that he could receive for his work.

Thus, if for Marx the “front line” was between workers and employers, then for Weber it was between the buyers of labor and its sellers.

However, based on this theory, the main factor creating class is economic interest, as well as the presence or absence of property.

This interpretation was quite close to the Marxist one (at least, it did not contradict it logically), and then, in order to get out of the political plane, Weber gave an additional explanation: manifestations of class struggle are not significant in themselves, but only as an average typical reaction to economic incentives .

Fight for status

In contrast to classes, Weber introduced another concept - “status groups”. He believed that, unlike classes, which are determined by a purely economic situation, status groups are determined by a “specific social assessment of honor.” Honor in this case can mean any quality appreciated by the majority.

Moreover, the entire social order is, according to Weber, just the way in which “social honors are distributed in a community among the typical groups participating in such distribution.”

The social order, associated with the legal order (by political power), is largely determined by the existing economic system, but at the same time is able to influence it.

The main “passions” in the world boil precisely around status honors, which Weber considered as signs of a certain lifestyle. The expectations associated with this style act as certain restrictions on social communication, that is, status is a closed joint action based on agreement. And as the degree of closedness of a status group increases within it, the tendencies towards a legal monopoly on certain positions and privileges intensify.

The importance of Max Weber's methodology

A humanities scientist, according to Weber, needs precisely types of action, and not the substantive characteristics of the processes in which these actions are intertwined. “In sociology,” he wrote, “such concepts as “state”, “cooperative”, “feudalism” and the like... designate categories of certain types of human interaction, and its task is to reduce them to “understandable” action, namely action participating individual individuals” (“Basic Sociological Concepts”).

Weber not only never considered the essential characteristics of, for example, the state, but also specifically stipulated his refusal to analyze them. Thus, in relation to religion, he emphasized: “We are not dealing with the “essence” of religion, but only with the conditions and results of one specific type of group social action” (“Theory of Degrees and Directions of Religious Rejection of the World,” 1910). In the same way. Weber avoided meaningful analysis of other phenomena important to his ideology.

The categories of “ideal type” and “social action” he used were developed in the specific social and cultural context of Germany, in discussions, in opposition and as a response to other, now poorly known and no longer relevant theoretical positions. Weber sought answers to the questions of science and politics of his time, rather than elevating his ideas to the rank of a universal paradigm. Therefore, all the main categories he introduced into sociology have very specific historical perspectives and accents. The discussions that Weber had with Marxists, as well as national economists of the old and new schools of economics, were significantly complicated by methodological and other problems that arose in specific circumstances.

It should be noted that at the beginning of the 20th century, and in addition to Weber, very successful developments of the conceptual tools of the social sciences were already underway. Here we can mention the concept of normal concepts of F. Tönnies, and the theory of general concepts of K. Menger, and even the Marxist concept of concepts, the inconsistency of which has not yet been proven by anyone. Marx’s repeated and insistent use “in its pure form” (in his words) of the concepts “capital” and “value” allows us to draw a parallel between Weber’s ideal types and these “pure” concepts of Marx, if we give the latter a model interpretation.

Thus, “Capital” gives an idealized image of capitalism, and not its reality. However, this image itself is not a fiction, since it contains the essence, the internal law of motion of such a complex phenomenon as capitalism. And in this sense, ideal types and models are of great methodological importance for the analysis of specific forms of historical reality.

Today, Weber's main categories are clearly insufficient and require certain changes and additions caused by the growth of scientific knowledge, its internationalization, and the development of logic and methodology of social science. The criticism leveled at Weber in the USA and Germany focuses on the impossibility of unconditionally observing the “principle of freedom of science from value judgments,” as well as the difficulty of building an integral sociological theory on their basis due to limitations and uncertainty. In France, variants of “practical” sociology arose, leaving aside and behind theories built on the basis of Weber’s principles.

But will they work?

One way or another, with all due respect to Weber, in today's sociological science there is an increasingly stronger desire to go beyond the limits outlined by the key ideas of his theory.

And this is quite natural, since he himself saw the purpose of scientific ideas to be overcome.

Max Weber(1864-1920) - an outstanding sociologist of the late 19th - early 20th centuries. When studying society, M. Weber believed, one must proceed from the fact that human behavior is conscious and requires understanding rather than external description. Therefore, human behavior should be studied by sociology not by the method of intuitive “feeling”, but through a rational understanding of the meaning that acting individuals put into their actions. Therefore, a key aspect of sociology will be the study of the intentions, values, beliefs and opinions that underlie human behavior. Weber designated the procedure for comprehending meaning with the category “understanding” (Verstehen). It is worth noting that he proposed the concept of understanding as a method that precedes and makes sociological explanation possible. This method essentially consists in the fact that the sociologist mentally tries to put himself in the shoes of other people and understand the rational reasons for their actions. Unlike Durkheim, Weber believes that sociologists should study not the forms of collectivity, but the individual. It is the individual, and not the supra-individual “collective consciousness”, that will be the true subject of social action. This is not an element of a self-sufficient social reality, but its active creator, possessing intelligence and will. Therefore, studying society means studying individuals, exploring the motives of their actions, and looking for their rational explanation. It follows that sociology must become a strictly rational science about the meaning of social action and operate with special conceptual constructs that would allow it to highlight that meaning.

We should not forget that the most important methodological tool in Weber’s arsenal will be the concept of the ideal type. Ideal type -϶ᴛᴏ a theoretical construct designed to highlight the main characteristics of a social phenomenon. It is worth noting that it is not extracted from empirical reality, but is constructed as a theoretical scheme. We can say that ideal types are research “utopias” that have no analogues in reality.
The concept of an ideal type makes it possible to study specific historical events and situations, serving as a measuring bar with the help of which sociologists can evaluate actual events.

The construction of ideal types, according to Weber, should serve as a means of “value-independent” research. In their works, Weber emphasized the need to develop a sociology free of value judgments.

When exploring social action, Weber uses the construction of an ideal type of action—purposive-rational. Considering goal-rational action as the methodological basis of sociology, he shows that the subject of sociology should be the individual as a subject of meaningful goal-setting. At the same time, empirical social action will not be completely goal-rational; it also contains an element of the irrational, determined by the psychology of the individual.

Weber made a significant contribution to the study of religion and its place in society, explored the phenomenon of power and dates and typology of forms of domination. At the same time, the researchers note that, despite the colossal breadth of coverage of specific material and the abundance of theoretical concepts and developments in various spheres of social life, the main subject of Weber’s research will be capitalism, and not taken in the water dimension, but in its cultural and historical integrity, embodying everything the diversity of its dimensions and therefore representing not just a political-economic concept, but to a greater extent a cultural-sociological one.

The main work in which Weber’s research on capitalism, its essence, origin and influence on social development is reflected will be “Protestant data and the spirit of capitalism,” where Weber clearly expresses the adequacy of the spirit of capitalism and the spirit of Protestantism. The importance of this work is difficult to overestimate, since Weber’s understanding of the phenomenon of Western European capitalism with its “spirit of formal rationality and individualism” became the foundation for the analysis of capitalism and the study of the paths of development of humanity as a whole, since he was the first to document the importance of the cultural-data attitudes of Protestantism for the capitalist development of the West . Despite the fact that discussions around Weber’s concept of capitalism continue to this day (according to some scientists, for example P. Berger, Weber underestimated the power of capitalist development in non-Protestant countries and civilizations), the scientific value of Weber’s creative heritage cannot be disputed and is confirmed by many scientific developments and works appealing to the ideas and scientific positions put forward by this great German sociologist.

Sociology of M. Weber

Max Weber(1864-1920) - German economist, historian, leading sociologist. His most famous works are “Methodology of the Social Sciences” (1949) and “Protestant Data and the Spirit of Capitalism” (1904). He showed interest in the social and political affairs of Germany. His views were critical, liberal, anti-authoritarian, anti-positivist, which is why his sociology is called “understanding”.

Weber introduces the concept of “ideal type” into sociology. The latter are fundamental social science concepts that are not a copy of social reality, but constructed from elements of that reality as a method of knowing it. The ideal type (definition) must comply with the requirements of formal logic. The task of sociology is to develop such ideal types: social action, power, state, people, justice and others. Social reality is assessed by these ideal types and thereby cognized. In particular, Weber believed that Marx's "socio-economic formation" does not represent a specific society, but an ideal type.

The subject of sociology according to Weber

Weber considered social activity (behavior) to be the subject of sociology. Let us note that he thereby opposed the study of public spheres, the state, and the social organism outside the activities of people. “Social,” Weber said, “we call such an action, which, according to the meaning assumed by the actor or actors, correlates with the action of other people and is oriented towards it.” Weber identified the following ideal types of ideal social actions: 1) purposive-rational (carried out under the influence of a clearly defined goal), 2) value-rational (motivated by some value), 3) traditional (custom-oriented), 4) affective (under the influence of feelings ) Unlike Marxism, which focuses on the objective result of people’s activities, Weber focuses on the meaning - the motive of people’s activities, and typical activities.

We should not forget that Weber’s most important idea will be the steady rationalization of all social life, which is a sign of its development. This is accompanied by a strengthening of the role of scientific knowledge in all spheres of public life. For Weber, the transition from an agrarian (pre-industrial) to an industrial society is associated with the increasing rationalization of social actions (social life) on the basis of bureaucratic-targeted management methods:

• in economics (organization of factory production using bureaucratic-rational methods);
• in politics (the decline of traditional norms of behavior and the increasing role of the party bureaucracy);
• in law (replacement of arbitrary judicial process with legal procedures based on universal laws), etc.

Weber also dealt with the problem of controllability by people, power and domination (political power, i.e. state power) If power -϶ᴛᴏ the ability of one subject to subordinate the behavior of another subject, then domination -϶ᴛᴏ the ability of one official to give orders to another person on the basis of authority (laws) delegated to him by the state. We should not forget that the most important condition for dominance as a relationship between a manager and a subordinate will be legitimacy order, i.e. its (1) ϲᴏᴏᴛʙᴇᴛϲᴛʙiality and (2) the subordinate’s belief that the ϶ᴛᴏ order really ϲᴏᴏᴛʙᴇᴛϲᴛʙ is legal. Weber identifies three types of legitimacy:

• legally legitimate, in which people obey orders because they apparently serve their interests and the laws existing in society (in a democratic society);
• charismatic, in which orders are carried out because they come from the leader - the leader who knows better what needs to be done (for example - in the USSR - Stalin's orders);
• traditional, in which case, execution occurs as a result of time-honored traditions (for example, a change of monarchs)

Weber argues that sociology must proceed from its fundamental difference from the natural sciences. If natural science deals with unconscious phenomena, then social science deals with semantic ones. People perform actions under the influence of some conscious motives and focusing on others. Sociology cannot discover objective laws of social life (which is considered the main task in Marxism). Sociology cannot give scientific forecasts of the type that natural science gives (solar eclipse, etc.), but it can offer probabilistic scenarios for the development of societies.

We should not forget that the most important procedure of a sociologist will be the interpretation of social activity and the results of specific sociological observations. It is worth noting that it presupposes the presence in the consciousness of the sociologist of some criteria (values) and guidelines for the selection and evaluation of empirical material. By participating in the selection and evaluation of empirical material, the sociologist, in fact, constructs assessments, which include his attitudes. The assessment becomes subjective, so the question arises about its objectivity, impartiality, and truth. Weber believes that such values ​​(and attitudes) of a sociologist should express the interests of the era, that is, the leading goals to which elites and peoples strive. Based on all of the above, we come to the conclusion that Weber rejects the positivist and Marxist approach to the analysis of social reality. The material was published on http://site

German sociologist, creator of “understanding” sociology and the theory of social action. His main works: “Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism”, “Basic sociological concepts”, “On some categories of understanding sociology”, etc.

Weber called his sociology "understanding" since it is designed to reveal the meaning of people's behavior, to “understand” and “explain” their social actions. Exactly social action he singled out as subject of sociology. Social actions are expressed in the actions of people focused on achieving certain conscious or unconscious actions. Using your concept "ideal type" Weber identified four “ideal types” of social action (Appendix, diagram 4):

§ purposeful- aimed at achieving a certain result (for example, the economic behavior of an entrepreneur);

§ value-rational - focused on certain values ​​(moral, religious, aesthetic, etc.) accepted by the individual (the captain standing until the end on the bridge of a sinking ship);

§ traditional - dictated by established habits and customs. beliefs;

§ affective - caused by an emotional state, a strong feeling.

Of all the listed types, only the first two. according to Weber, are social, or rational(conscious), since a person performs the third action automatically, according to traditions, and the fourth - unconsciously, obeying feelings (affects). Weber also noted that the degree of distribution of one or another type of social action predetermines the nature and level of development of the society itself. So. Industrial, highly organized societies are characterized by value-rational and, especially, goal-oriented actions, and archaic, primitive societies are characterized by traditional and affective actions.

Using his concept of social action, Weber tried to systematize the variety of forms of political domination and identified three types of legitimate (recognized) domination:

§ legal- based on purposeful, rational action, presupposes submission to rationally based rules, laws, and not to the individual:

§ traditional - based on traditional action, due to adherence to traditions, customs, “the habit of certain behavior”;

§ charismatic - based on faith in the extraordinary, exceptional abilities of the bearer of power (from the Greek. charisma- grace, divine gift) and is associated with affective actions.

Weber proceeded from the fact that in the historical process the degree of rationality of social actions and, in general, all aspects of life increases. The principle of rationality finds its most consistent embodiment in a legal state, which operates on the basis of goal-rational and value-rational interactions between managers and the governed.

According to theories of rational bureaucracy Weber, the more complex the society and production processes, the greater the need for a special class of bureaucracy, the main occupation of which becomes professional management. According to Weber, the ideal manager (bureaucrat) must meet the following characteristics:

§ be guided as little as possible in your activities

§ emotions, but more rational considerations;

§ treat everyone who comes into contact with you equally (impersonally)

§ him in the process of implementing management decisions:

§ strictly comply with the requirements of formal rules and instructions;

§ at work, perceive yourself as a function, a “detail” of a management mechanism.

Weber's work “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism” gained worldwide fame, in which he shows how the ethical principles of Protestantism (thrift, honesty, hard work) contribute to the emergence of capitalism. While studying world religions, Weber came to the conclusion that. that there is a certain relationship between the religious morality prevailing in society and the economic behavior of people, when religious and ethical views influence the nature and motives of economic activity.

Weber also laid the foundations of modern theories of social stratification. He believed that not only the economic factor in the form of property (the theory of Marxism), but also political (power L and also status (prestige) can be considered as criteria for social stratification, which thanks to this becomes multidimensional.

Max Weber can be called the Leonardo da Vinci of sociology. He developed all the basic theories that form the foundation of sociology today.

In the 19th century began to take shape psychological direction in sociology. The most prominent representatives of the psychological school in sociology were G. Tarde, G. Le Bon and F. Tönnies. The merit of these scientists is that they created the socio-psychological concept of sociology and tried to explain the role of the subjective factor in history.

The German thinker Max Weber played an outstanding role in the development of sociology at the end of the last and beginning of this century. Currently, the sociology of Max Weber is experiencing a real revival. Many aspects of his philosophical and sociological views are being reconsidered and rethought. The methodology of social cognition developed by him, the concepts of understanding, ideal types, his teaching on culture, ethics, sociology and religion are adopted. Today, Western sociologists view Weber “as one of those key figures whose appeal opens up the prospect of a fruitful discussion of fundamental issues of sociological theory.”

The original principles of sociology by M. Weber

Weber's sociological concept is closely related to other sociological systems characteristic of the last century. At that time, the leading position was occupied by structural functionalism of the positivist kind, represented primarily by Emile Durkheim, who defended the need to extend rationalism to the knowledge of social phenomena, to the study of them themselves using methods characteristic of the natural sciences. Weber saw the weakness of representatives of this position in the fact that structures entirely determine the behavior of individuals, from which it followed that historical events were considered independently of the intentions of people, and individuals themselves were viewed as accomplices in predetermined events. Weber also did not accept the use of natural scientific approaches to analyze society, emphasizing that, in contrast to the inevitable connections between the phenomena of inanimate nature, qualitatively different causal connections operate in society and a different methodology is needed to understand them. At the same time, Weber was impressed by the idea of ​​rationalism, which acquired a different content and became central to his view of the history and future of human societies.

Marxist sociology had a certain influence on Weber's sociological views, in particular, a number of considerations by K. Marx about society as an arena of opposing social groups, where each has its own economic interests, its own value orientations, corresponding to the socio-economic situation and certain views on the world around us. However, at the same time, they were given a positive critique of the materialistic understanding of history, in which the sociologist showed the importance of ideal factors - religious, ideological and moral guidelines for people's behavior and advocated that sociology should reveal the entire complex system of causal relationships of social reality, which exists not only objectively, but also but also created subjectively thanks to the thoughts and actions of individuals.

Finally, it should be noted the influence of the philosophical school of neo-Kantinianism, whose representatives made a radical distinction, on the one hand, between the external world that we know and the knowing consciousness, and on the other, between value and its evaluation.

The non-classical type of scientific sociology was developed by German thinkers G. Simmel (1858 - 1918) and M. Weber (1864 - 1920). This methodology is based on the idea of ​​the fundamental opposition of the laws of nature and society and, consequently, the recognition of the need for the existence of two types of scientific knowledge: the natural sciences (natural sciences) and the cultural sciences (humanitarian knowledge). Sociology, in their opinion, is a borderline science, therefore it should borrow all the best from natural sciences and the humanities. From natural science, sociology borrows its commitment to exact facts and cause-and-effect explanations of reality, from the humanities - a method of understanding and relating to values.

This interpretation of the interaction between sociology and other sciences follows from their understanding of the subject of sociology. G. Simmel and M. Weber rejected such concepts as “society”, “people”, “humanity”, “collective”, etc. as a subject of sociological knowledge. they believed that only the individual can be the subject of a sociologist’s research, since it is he who has consciousness of the motivation of his actions and rational behavior. G. Simmel and M. Weber emphasized the importance of sociologists understanding the subjective meaning that is put into action by the acting individual himself. In their opinion, observing a chain of real actions of people, a sociologist must construct their explanations based on an understanding of the internal motives of these actions. And here he will be helped by the knowledge that in similar situations, most people act in the same way, are guided by similar motives. Based on your understanding of the subject of sociology and its place among others

Weber's methodological principles

Weber formulates a number of methodological principles on which, in his opinion, sociological knowledge is based:

1. the requirement to eliminate from the scientific worldview the idea of ​​the objectivity of the content of our knowledge. The condition for the transformation of social knowledge into a real science is that it should not present its concepts and schemes as reflections or expressions of reality itself and its laws. Social science must proceed from the recognition of the fundamental difference between social theory and reality.

2. Therefore, sociology should not pretend to be anything more than finding out the reasons for certain events that have happened, refraining from so-called “scientific forecasts”.

Strict adherence to these two rules can create the impression that sociological theory does not have an objective, generally valid meaning, but is the fruit of subjective arbitrariness. To remove this impression, G. Simmel and M. Weber claim:

3. sociological theories and concepts are not the result of intellectual arbitrariness, because intellectual activity itself is subject to well-defined social techniques and, above all, the rules of formal logic and universal human values.

4. A sociologist must know that the basis of the mechanism of his intellectual activity is the attribution of the entire variety of empirical data to these universal human values, which set the general direction for all human thinking. “Attribution to values ​​puts a limit on individual arbitrariness,” wrote M. Weber.

M. Weber distinguishes between the concepts of “value judgments” and “attribution to values.” Value judgment is always personal and subjective. This is any statement that is associated with a moral, political or any other assessment. For example, the statement: “Faith in God is an enduring quality of human existence.” Attribution to value is a procedure of both selection and organization of empirical material. In the example above, this procedure may mean collecting facts to study the interaction of religion and various spheres of a person’s social and personal life, selecting and classifying these facts, their generalization and other procedures. What is the need for this principle of reference to values? And the fact is that a scientist - sociologist in knowledge is faced with a huge variety of facts, and in order to select and analyze these facts, he must proceed from some kind of attitude, which is formulated by him as a value.

But the question arises: where do these value preferences come from? M. Weber answers like this:

5. changes in the sociologist’s value preferences are determined by the “interest of the era,” that is, by the socio-historical circumstances in which he operates

Subject and methods of “understanding sociology”

A new look at the role of natural and social sciences

Max Weber was one of the first to draw a fundamental distinction between the natural and social sciences: if the task of the former is to discover deterministic laws, then the task of the latter is to provide a causal explanation and understanding of the social actions of people in a particular society only in a certain cultural and historical context, given that the general behavioral guidelines determined by specific values ​​are always historical and relative. If so, it may seem that causality disappears altogether, and society is not amenable to scientific knowledge. How then can we study the connections between phenomena as the basis for typifying social processes?

According to Weber, the difference between the natural sciences and the social sciences, first of all, lies in the fact that they interpret causality differently. Causality in social sciences means the probability that an event will occur or that one event is dependent on another. In this regard, according to Weber, human society is not something “historically inevitable”, but the result of “many possibilities.” Thus, the scientist saw in a certain religious view (Protestant ethics) one of the factors in the emergence of the spirit of modern capitalism, but considered it “stupid” to consider this the only social factor. To distinguish causality in the natural sciences from causality in the social sciences, he introduces the concept of “adequate causality” in relation to the social sciences. Hence sociology can initially deal with probabilistic statements about the relationships between social phenomena. Its purpose is to establish the degree to which, given event x, there is a certain degree of probability of the occurrence of event y. As you can see, concepts and knowledge itself in the social sciences have a different content than knowledge in the natural sciences.

The fundamental difference between social sciences and natural sciences, according to Weber, lies in the ability of the former to provide an understanding of social phenomena that are somehow related to thought and rationality. “Sociological explanation,” he wrote, “sets as its goal precisely rational interpretation.” Natural sciences simply do not deal with understanding the behavior of physical bodies, because there is no thought in their movement.

At the same time, social sciences, having their own specifics, have common qualities characteristic of sciences in general. Thus, sociology is a scientific discipline due to the fact that people act rationally, at least a significant part of the time, and this allows for the typification of their behavior, the systematization of social facts themselves.

Social actions: meaning, typification and methods of understanding

Weber puts his own special meaning into the term “understanding.” This is a rational procedure for studying the actions of social actors (micro level), and through them - studying the culture of a particular society (macro level). As can be seen, Weber was a supporter of social nominalism. Nominalism is a theoretical and methodological orientation that assumes that the character of individuals and their actions ultimately determine the essence of society. One of the central points of Weber's theory was his identification of an elementary particle of individual behavior in society - social action, which is the cause and consequence of a system of complex relationships between people.

According to the sociologist, analysis and typification of people's social actions is the main subject of sociology. However, not every behavioral act of an individual can be considered a social action. A person’s action takes on the character of a social action if it contains two fundamental points:

1. . subjective motivation of an individual who puts a certain meaning into his act;

2. orientation to the behavior of other people.

Weber notes: “We call an action a human action (whether it is external or internal, whether it comes down to non-interference or patient acceptance) if and because the acting individual or individuals associate a subjective meaning with it. “Social” we call an action that, according to the meaning assumed by the actor or actors, correlates with the action of other people and is oriented toward it.”

It follows from the definition that an action that a person does not think about is not a social action. Thus, an unintentional fall of a person or an involuntary cry of pain cannot be classified as a social action, because there is simply no thought process in them. An action in which a person simply does not see a real purpose is not a social action. Thus, a person’s unintentional or unconscious participation in a particular gathering, campaign, or political action cannot be considered a social action, because in this case there is no thought process and consciously targeted activity.

The sociologist did not consider actions to be social if they were purely imitative, when individuals are oriented towards some natural phenomenon (the opening of umbrellas by many people during the rain) or when they act as atoms of the crowd, which is characteristic of reactive behavior (behavior as a reaction to a certain stimulus , for example, “danger”).

Emotional outpourings, involuntary cries, manifestations of joy from meetings with heroes and leaders, or outbursts of anger towards “enemies” also cannot be classified as social actions, because they simply do not have an active rational principle as a person’s ability to reflect and comprehend the world without distorting its real content delight or fear.

An action is not social and if it does not affect the interests of other people in any way, it remains unnoticed by them. An example of this is Manilovism, a dreamy, inactive attitude towards the environment, which, as Gogol showed in Dead Souls, is very characteristic of many Russians who are probably not even aware of it.

Another important point that Weber makes is that the subject of his concept is the actions of individuals, not collectives. When using the concepts of state, corporation, family, army unit, etc., it should be borne in mind that these and other social structures are not themselves subjects of social action. Therefore, from Weber’s point of view, it is impossible, for example, to understand the actions of parliament or the presidential administration, a company or a family, but one can and should strive to interpret the actions of the individuals who compose them.

Weber identified four types of social actions of individuals, which differed in the degree of rationality present in them. It goes without saying that in reality a person does not always know what he wants. Sometimes people’s behavior is dominated by certain values ​​or simply emotions. Focusing on the possible real behavior of people in life, Weber identifies the following types of action:

1. purposeful,

2. value-rational,

3. affective,

4. traditional.

Let us turn to Weber himself: “Social action, like any other behavior, can be:

1) goal-oriented, if it is based on the expectation of a certain behavior of objects in the external world and other people and the use of this expectation as “conditions” or “means” to achieve one’s rationally set and thoughtful goal;

2) value-rational, based on faith in the unconditional - aesthetic, religious or any other - self-sufficient value of a certain behavior as such, regardless of what it leads to;

3) affective, primarily emotional, that is, due to the affects or emotional state of the individual;

4) traditional, that is, based on a long-term habit.”

From this classification it follows that there can be a social action in which the meaning of the action and the meaning of the actor coincide; it contains a clearly expressed goal and meaningful means adequate to it. Such an action was designated by the sociologist as a goal-oriented action. In it, both of the above points coincide: to understand the meaning of an action means to understand the actor and vice versa.

An example of purposeful rational actions can be the behavior of people who consciously pursue a political career and make their own decisions. In such behavior there is a meaning of action that is understandable to others, prompting the latter to take adequate independent acts that also have meaning and purpose. Purposeful actions may include the behavior of a student who wants to receive an education, respectively, aimed at successfully mastering the subjects being studied.

If, for example, a strong and courageous person, after being hit on one cheek, turns the other, then we are talking about value-rational action, which can only be understood taking into account this person’s ideas about the values ​​of certain religious dogmas. Value-based rational action is based on faith in certain unconditional values, commandments, ideas about goodness and duty. Their absolutization leads to the fact that a certain component of irrationality inevitably appears in such actions. Thus, if for people the value of their own life is nothing in comparison with the belief in the unconditional correctness of the leader, the party’s course, for the sake of fulfilling the “infallible plans” of which they are ready for hardships and even self-sacrifice, then they are precisely performing value-rational actions.

Affective actions can be observed quite often in team sports - certain involuntary, emotional reactions of players. They are, as a rule, determined by the emotional state of the actor - passion, love, hatred, etc. Naturally, they go beyond the conscious, meaningful activity of the individual.

Traditional actions include everyday behavioral acts performed simply out of habit. People behave almost automatically because that's what they've always done. As a rule, they do not realize why they do this, because they are simply committed to their usual morals and customs. In such actions there is almost no goal setting, and there is no reflection on the choice of means of their implementation.

In Russian history, people practically did not think about why it was necessary to serve the “Tsar-Father,” by what right the transfer of state power by inheritance was carried out, and why they did not have personal rights and freedoms. They acted in a traditional way because their ancestors had always done it this way, being committed to certain morals and customs. In an updated form, traditional actions were preserved in Soviet ways of life, such as communes and “socialist collectives.” All these types of society affirmed herd-traditional imitation and suppressed individuality. The main latent, unconscious function of traditional actions was for each person to destroy his individual thinking and, accordingly, accept thoughtless algorithms of life. The collapse of the Soviet system forced people to abandon thoughtless imitative behavior, to live according to the principles of “like everyone else,” “no worse than others.”

In this classification, the degree of awareness increases from affective and traditional actions to value-rational and goal-rational ones. Strictly speaking, only goal-rational and value-rational actions relate to social actions, because they deal with subjectively implied meaning. In this regard, it must be emphasized that sociology, according to Weber, is “understanding”, since it deals specifically with the meaningful actions of people. “Specifically important for understanding sociology,” he wrote, “is, first of all, behavior, which, firstly, according to the subjectively assumed meaning of the actor, is correlated with the behavior of other people, secondly, is also determined by this meaningful correlation and, thirdly , perhaps, based on this (subjectively) assumed meaning, is clearly explained.”

Weber pays special attention to the problem of understanding social action, identifying several types of understanding. He refers to the first type as understanding through direct observation. An example of this is the observation on television of the immense joy and well-being of one or another modern Russian politician, his corresponding gestures, which sharply contrasts with the image of a politician even in the 80s - always serious, preoccupied, gloomy. The viewer can understand, or rather feel, the positive emotional state of almost any person from politics. The image itself personifies optimism, righteousness, selflessness, and focus on the future. But is this really so? According to Weber, direct observation is not enough to understand the essence of social action.

The second type of interpretation of social action is explanatory understanding. It involves clarifying the motives of a particular social action. In our example, we need to understand what prompted a happy, life-affirming politician to be the hero of a television show - whether he came to celebrate an election victory, to gain support for making the desired decisions, or, as they say, to put a good face on a bad game. In order for this type of understanding to be realized, it is necessary, as Weber believes, to put ourselves in the place of the individual whose behavior we are trying to explain, and thereby find out the motives behind his actions.

The third type is causal explanation. It involves finding out what initiated the very motives that led to the corresponding social actions. Here the sociologist insists on the need to discover connections between a whole series of actions or events. This, of course, presupposes serious sociological research. Weber himself conducted this kind of research, seeking, in particular, to identify connections between religious principles and the behavior of individuals, especially their economic and political activities.

Ideal type concept

The concept of ideal types is also a critical component of the theory of social action. Weber interpreted the ideal type as “the interest of the era, expressed in the form of a theoretical construct.” This is a kind of ideal model of what is most useful to a person, what objectively meets his interests in his contemporary era. In this regard, moral, political, religious and other values ​​and the resulting attitudes of behavior and activity of people, rules and norms of their behavior, as well as traditions of social communication can act as ideal types.

Weber's ideal types characterize, as it were, the essence of optimal social states - states of power, interpersonal communication, individual and group consciousness, etc. Because of this, they act as a kind of criteria, based on which it is necessary to make changes in the spiritual, political and material lives of people.

In other words, according to Weber, in order to understand the actual causal connections that take place in the creation of social reality, and to give the most complete and complex interpretation of social actions, it is necessary first of all to construct the unreal - sharpened, isolated elements extracted from empirical reality, which seem typical for a sociologist in his quest to find general rules of events. They must express what is most characteristic, typical of social phenomena or social actions of their time. “Only with the help of a pure (“ideal”) type is sociological casuistry possible... The more clearly and unambiguously ideal types are constructed, the further they are, therefore, from reality, the more fruitful their role in the development of terminology and classification, as well as their heuristic value,” - concludes Weber.

So, for example, it is possible to construct an ideal-typical model of a student or a civil servant, a family, or even the state itself. But the ideal type model is not the goal of cognition, but a kind of methodological means that allows one to analyze social realities. How to use this tool?

It is clear that in real life, strictly speaking, there cannot be an ideal student or official, family or any other social institution. Various reasons lead to the fact that a social phenomenon will always deviate from the ideal type. This is where opportunities open up for comparing real society with its ideal type. According to Weber, the ideal type allows:

First, to construct a phenomenon or social action as if it took place under ideal conditions;

Secondly, consider this phenomenon or social action regardless of local conditions (it is assumed that if ideal conditions are met, then the action will be performed in this way);

Thirdly, it is possible to compare how similar a phenomenon or action is to the ideal type in its quantitative and qualitative parameters. By deviation from the ideal type, the researcher can establish characteristic trends in the course of events.

The mental formation of an unreal, ideal-typical event allows us to understand how this or that historical event actually took place. At the same time, Weber substantiates a very original view: in his opinion, history and sociology are two areas of scientific interest, and not two different disciplines. So, in order to identify historical causality, it is necessary to build an ideal-typical construction of a historical event, and then one should compare the unreal, mental course of events with their real development. Thus, the researcher ceases to be a simple statistician of historical facts and gains the opportunity to understand how strong the influence of circumstances was, what is the role of the influence of chance or a specific person at a given moment in history.

Weber's doctrine of ideal types has not lost its relevance. It serves for his followers as a kind of methodological setting for social cognition and solving practical problems related, in particular, to the orderliness and organization of the elements of spiritual, material and political life.

M. Weber and modern society.

Until now, only the traditional and charismatic types of domination in various combinations have dominated in our country. They also corresponded to a certain, lower type of social management (in terms of the rationality of the relationship between managers and managed, in terms of the importance of the law as a set of principles regulating all spheres of public life, etc.), determined to a large extent by the personal qualities of the leader. What could a transition to a rational type of legitimate domination give us? And the fact that the rationalism and democracy of the power system would cease to be directly associated with the personality of the political leader. Then the rights and freedoms of all citizens, as well as political institutions, will no longer depend on the will of political leaders, but will actually become guaranteed by laws.

Based on Weber’s methodology, it can be noted that so far in our country the purposeful rational actions of individuals have not received sufficient development. Accordingly, the institutions of civil society, which involve the development of individualism and personal responsibility, have not been formed. Consequently, cultural and social realities that would provide sufficiently serious counteraction to the irrational inclinations of the rulers are still only at the stage of formation.

At all times, Russian power has acquired the character of authoritarianism and destructiveness to a greater or lesser extent. As a result, all regimes (Soviet and current Russian) reacted inadequately and belatedly to the challenges of our time, proposing hasty reforms that should have instantly “made” the people happy. Populism and messianism are concrete manifestations of affective passions by the authorities.

The nature of the social actions of Russians explains the relatively easy establishment of structures based on authoritarian leadership and particularistic formality, on the one hand, which declared guarantees of collective security in the face of external and internal enemies, and on the other, paternalism at the level of the all-powerful party state, which promised material and spiritual wealth and certainly “in full flow,” and, of course, at once, it goes without saying, “for the current generation.” Whether we like it today or not, historical facts indicate that all revolutionary and reformist plans of a non-democratic, authoritarian nature were implemented in Russia quite quickly and successfully - they coincided with the nature of the traditional, affective and value-rational actions of millions. The few attempts to reform the country along the path of developing independent political decision-making, institutionalizing human rights and individual freedoms ran into contrasting sociocultural values ​​and patterns of behavior. The dominant mechanical collectivism and group egoism initially opposed rational-legal political domination.

The current process of democratization of political power in Russia is another attempt to integrate into the world community of countries professing pragmatic, rational socio-cultural values. According to Weber's methodology, the process of rationalization of our power will go parallel to changes in the nature of social actions of Russians.

According to Weber, the commitment of different social groups and individuals to different types of social actions (with varying degrees of rational components in them) objectively leads to the naturalness of political inequality. Not in the sense of people's rights and freedoms, but in the sense of their competence and ability to be an active social agent, freely making decisions and being responsible for their consequences. For Weber, the implementation of the idea of ​​political rationality is associated with varying degrees of participation in political life in general and political power in particular. The sociologist says that one can be:

1) “by politicians “on occasion”, when we cast our ballot or make a similar expression of will, for example, by clapping or protesting at a “political meeting”;

2) “part-time politicians” - to be a trusted person, a member of the board of a party-political union, state councils, etc. In this case, politics “does not become the primary “matter of life” for them, either materially or ideally”;

3) “predominantly professional” politicians.

The tendency to rationalize political life logically follows the idea of ​​transforming politics into a kind of “enterprise” that requires professionally trained people with different knowledge and skills - specialist officials and “political” officials.

If these principles can be implemented into our lives, then the process of rationalization will gradually begin. An order will be established according to which professionally trained, competent people in management who have completed preparatory studies and service, passed special exams proving their ability and ability to work in a political “enterprise” should “go to power”, which should not be confused simply with intellectual abilities. The rest must feel the rationality of being free from professional politics in order to gain freedom to do other things professionally. It should be noted that this does not at all exclude the right for everyone people to influence the government and the nature of political decisions made.

Weber’s recommendations regarding minimizing corruption in government structures may be valuable for our country. “At the expense” of politics as a profession, those who strive to make it a permanent source of income live; “for” politics is someone who has a different goal. In order for someone, in the economic sense, to live “for” politics, under the dominance of the private property order, certain prerequisites must be present: under normal conditions, he must be independent of the income that politics can bring him.

Essentially, it follows from this that given our expression of will, contrary to previous stereotypical attitudes to choose from “our own”, it is recommended to give preference, other things being equal, to a job applicant who already has intellectual or material property and has a regular income, which, as a rule, indicates its predisposition to purposive-rational action and its potential readiness for legal, aesthetic, and ultimately rational politics.

It is noteworthy that Weber does not reduce the problem of corruption to its economic aspect. A country in which the political elite is differentiated faces objective difficulties caused by “corruption of a “party-political” nature,” when “party leaders award all kinds of positions in parties, newspapers, partnerships, health insurance funds, communities and states for faithful service. All party battles are not only battles for substantive goals, but above all also for patronage of positions.” As you can see, the problem of corruption is not specifically Russian, and, therefore, it is possible to use Weber’s considerations of political rationalism to neutralize it. First of all, we must admit that rational bureaucracy, as a functional element of management, is an attribute of rational-legal domination. If the country's political field wants to develop in this direction, then the leaders of parties and political movements must realize that it is in the common interest to minimize corruption.

To do this, after each successive party battle, which ended in gains for some and losses for others, it is not necessary to “shake up” the bureaucratic apparatus of government according to the value orientations of specific parties and political movements. All the more harmful are campaigns that are irrational in essence and aimed at formally reducing a certain percentage of officials. Speaking about the rationalization of political domination, Weber noted the need to form and maintain a new social stratum - modern bureaucracy, as “highly qualified specialists in spiritual work, professionally trained by many years of training, with highly developed class honor, guaranteeing impeccability, without which there would be a fatal danger of monstrous corruption and low philistinism , and this would jeopardize the purely technical efficiency of the state apparatus, the importance of which for the economy, especially with increasing socialization, is constantly increasing and will continue to increase.”

Orientation towards this type of rational political domination would save Russian society from massive irrational changes in state institutions after the next elections, from which, ultimately, the population suffers material and spiritual losses. A good symptom in this sense was the consequences of the election of President V.V. Putin. Public opinion and a number of media outlets anticipated radical personnel changes, which, however, were reduced to a minimum. For the first time in Russian history, the new political elite, which came to the very top of power, had enough wisdom and pragmatism to preserve the bureaucratic apparatus as a whole.

Political corruption can also be minimized by functionally separating the state bureaucracy and party leaders. “The true profession of a real official ...,” notes Weber, “should not be politics. He must “manage”, first of all, impartially - this requirement applies even to so-called “political” administrative officials... A political official should not do exactly what a politician - both the leader and his retinue - must always and necessarily do, - fight".

And one more fundamental point. Rational political domination is by no means identical to anarchy, weak power, much less powerlessness. In this regard, Weber notes that the state is an institution that has a “monopoly of legitimate physical violence”: “the state is considered the only source of the “right” to violence”, “violence is by no means the normal or the only means of the state - there is no question of that - but it is, perhaps, a remedy specific to him.”

It's hard to disagree with this statement. Without decisive action to strengthen the Russian state in this regard, the obvious disproportions in the powers of the center and regions, enshrined in the republican Constitutions, that have arisen on the “democratic wave” will not disappear on their own. An even bigger problem for modern Russia is illegitimate formations, including armed ones, whose leaders, as a rule, hiding behind patriotic, national, religious slogans, in the name of their political ambitions and corruption goals, sacrifice the rights, freedoms and often even the lives of other people . How many more facts are needed to confirm that where there are several sources of the “right” to violence, there is and cannot be either political rationality, democracy, or elementary justice? However, it seems that V. Putin’s regime has begun to realize these dangers for the fate of Russia and is taking measures to rationalize the power vertical.

Max Weber(1864-1920) - an outstanding sociologist of the late 19th - early 20th centuries. When studying society, M. Weber believed, one must proceed from the fact that human behavior is conscious and requires understanding rather than external description. Therefore, human behavior should be studied by sociology not by the method of intuitive “feeling”, but through a rational understanding of the meaning that acting individuals put into their actions. Therefore, a key aspect of sociology is the study of the intentions, values, beliefs and opinions that underlie human behavior. Weber designated the procedure for comprehending meaning with the category “understanding” (Verstehen). He proposed the concept of understanding as a method that precedes and makes sociological explanation possible. This method consists in the fact that the sociologist mentally tries to put himself in the place of other people and understand the rational reasons for their actions. Unlike Durkheim, Weber believes that sociologists should study not the forms of collectivity, but the individual. It is the individual, and not the supra-individual “collective consciousness”, that is the true subject of social action. This is not an element of a self-sufficient social reality, but its active creator, possessing intelligence and will. Therefore, studying society means studying individuals, exploring the motives of their actions, and looking for their rational explanation. It follows that sociology must become a strictly rational science about the meaning of social action and operate with special conceptual constructs that would allow it to highlight this meaning.

The most important methodological tool in Weber's arsenal is the concept of the ideal type. Ideal type - it is a theoretical construct designed to highlight the main characteristics of a social phenomenon. It is not extracted from empirical reality, but is constructed as a theoretical scheme. We can say that ideal types are research “utopias” that have no analogues in reality. The concept of an ideal type makes it possible to study specific historical events and situations, serving as a measuring bar with which sociologists can evaluate actual events.

The construction of ideal types, according to Weber, should serve as a means of “value-independent” research. In his writings, Weber emphasized the need to develop a sociology free of value judgments.

When exploring social action, Weber uses the construction of an ideal type of action—purposive-rational. Considering goal-rational action as the methodological basis of sociology, he shows that the subject of sociology should be the individual as a subject of meaningful goal-setting. However, empirical social action is not completely goal-rational; it also contains an element of the irrational, determined by the psychology of the individual.

Weber made a significant contribution to the study of religion and its place in society, explored the phenomenon of power and dates his typology of forms of domination. However, researchers note that, despite the colossal breadth of coverage of specific material and the abundance of theoretical concepts and developments in various spheres of social life, the main subject of Weber’s research is capitalism, and not taken in the water dimension, but in its cultural and historical integrity, embodying all the diversity its dimensions and therefore represents not just a political-economic concept, but to a greater extent a cultural-sociological one.

The main work that reflects Weber's research on capitalism, its essence, origin and influence on social development is “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,” where Weber clearly expresses the adequacy of the spirit of capitalism and the spirit of Protestantism. The significance of this work is difficult to overestimate, since Weber’s understanding of the phenomenon of Western European capitalism with its “spirit of formal rationality and individualism” became the foundation for the analysis of capitalism and the study of the paths of development of humanity as a whole, since he was the first to document the importance of the cultural and ethical principles of Protestantism for the capitalist development of the West. Despite the fact that discussions around Weber’s concept of capitalism continue to this day (according to some scientists, for example P. Berger, Weber underestimated the power of capitalist development in non-Protestant countries and civilizations), the scientific value of Weber’s creative heritage cannot be disputed and is confirmed by many scientific developments and works appealing to the ideas and scientific positions put forward by this great German sociologist.

Sociology of M. Weber

Max Weber(1864-1920) - German economist, historian, leading sociologist. His most famous works are “Methodology of the Social Sciences” (1949) and “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism” (1904). He showed interest in the social and political affairs of Germany. His views were critical, liberal, anti-authoritarian, anti-positivist, which is why his sociology is called “understanding.”

Weber introduces the concept of “ideal type” into sociology. The latter are fundamental social science concepts that are not a copy of social reality, but constructed from elements of this reality as a method of knowing it. The ideal type (definition) must meet the requirements of formal logic. The task of sociology is to develop such ideal types: social action, power, state, people, justice and others. Social reality is assessed by these ideal types and thereby cognized. In particular, Weber believed that Marx's "socio-economic formation" does not represent a specific society, but an ideal type.

The subject of sociology according to Weber

Weber considered social activity (behavior). Thus, he opposed the study of public spheres, the state, and the social organism outside the activities of people. “Social,” Weber wrote, “we call an action that, according to the meaning assumed by the actor or actors, correlates with the action of other people and is oriented toward it.” Weber identified the following ideal types of ideal social actions: 1) purposive-rational (carried out under the influence of a clearly defined goal), 2) value-rational (motivated by some value), 3) traditional (custom-oriented), 4) affective (under the influence of feelings ). Unlike Marxism, which focuses on the objective result of people’s activities, Weber focuses on the meaning—the motive of people’s activities, and typical activities at that.

Weber's most important idea is the steady rationalization of all social life, which is a sign of its development. This is accompanied by a strengthening of the role of scientific knowledge in all spheres of public life. For Weber, the transition from an agrarian (pre-industrial) to an industrial society is associated with the increasing rationalization of social actions (social life) on the basis of bureaucratic-targeted management methods:

• in economics (organization of factory production using bureaucratic-rational methods);
• in politics (the decline of traditional norms of behavior and the increasing role of the party bureaucracy);
• in law (replacement of arbitrary judicial process with legal procedures based on universal laws), etc.

Weber also dealt with the problem of controllability by people, power and domination (political power, i.e. state power). If power - is the ability of one subject to subordinate the behavior of another subject, then domination - It is the ability of one official to give orders to another person based on the authority (laws) delegated to him by the state. The most important condition for dominance as a relationship between a manager and a subordinate is legitimacy order, i.e. its (1) compliance with the law and (2) the belief of the subordinate that this order really corresponds to the law. Weber identifies three types of legitimacy:

• legally legitimate, in which people obey orders because they appear to correspond to their interests and the laws existing in society (in a democratic society);
• charismatic, in which orders are carried out because they come from the leader - the leader who knows better what needs to be done (for example, in the USSR - Stalin's orders);
• traditional, in which the execution occurs as a result of time-honored traditions (for example, the change of monarchs).

Weber argues that sociology must proceed from its fundamental difference from the natural sciences. If natural science deals with unconscious phenomena, then social science deals with semantic ones. People perform their actions under the influence of some conscious motives and focusing on others. Sociology cannot discover objective laws of social life (which is considered the main task in Marxism). Sociology cannot give scientific forecasts like those made by natural science (solar eclipse, etc.), but it can offer probabilistic scenarios for the development of societies.

The most important procedure of a sociologist is the interpretation of social activity and the results of specific sociological observations. It presupposes the presence in the consciousness of the sociologist of some criteria (values) and guidelines for the selection and evaluation of empirical material. By participating in the selection and evaluation of empirical material, the sociologist, in essence, constructs his own assessments, which include his attitudes. The assessment becomes subjective, so the question arises about its objectivity, impartiality, and truth. Weber believes that such values ​​(and attitudes) of a sociologist should express the interests of the era, that is, the leading goals to which elites and peoples strive. Thus, Weber abandons the positivist and Marxist approach to the analysis of social reality.