The beginning of hostilities in Afghanistan

By the beginning of 1980, the military-political situation in Afghanistan was unclear and contradictory. The entry of Soviet troops took place without organized opposition from the formations of the armed Afghan opposition. The Afghan army also did not put up any resistance to the units and formations of the 40th Army entering the country. In addition, the national armed forces have recently decreased in size by about half as a result of desertions.

At first, the situation was both generally and generally calm. In the first days of the new year, the local population seemed to be in a daze. However, gradually the activity of the opposition formations began to grow. The first attacks on the columns of Soviet troops followed. The attacks from the side of the rebels on the vehicles and armored vehicles of the Soviet troops were noted already on December 30-31, 1979. The first killed and wounded appeared.

However, what to do in the developing situation, it was not clear to the units and subdivisions of the 40th Army. The commanding staff of the association was in some confusion. No intelligible tasks and instructions were received from the higher management. The generals and officers of the 40th Army were convinced that their stay on Afghan soil was exclusively temporary. The formations and units were preparing to perform some mythical combat missions. This can be judged on the basis of the combat activities of the 108th Mechanized Infantry Division, stationed in Kabul.

Recall that the 108th Mechanized Infantry Division in full complement made a march to Kabul on its own and by the end of 12/29/1979 took up defensive positions in the indicated area (covering the capital of Afghanistan), having a classic battle formation in two echelons: 1st echelon - 180 MSD with 1074 ap without ad, 181 ms with ad 1074 ap, 1/234 TP; 2nd echelon - 234th tp with oredn.

The units received the following combat missions:

- 180 MSR with 1074 AP without ADN to defend the area of ​​Khadzhivazak, Karga, Dehmuratkhan, Chihiltukhun, concentrating main efforts on the Kabul-Lagman, Kabul-Gardez direction with the task of blocking possible mutinous actions 7, 8 PD, 37 divisions of the national armed forces Afghanistan and prevent them from entering Kabul;

- 181 MSR with adn 1074 ap to defend the Kalasclu area, lane. roads (2032.2), elevation 1877, southeastern slopes of the city of Garibgar. Concentrate main efforts on the Kabul-Jalalabad direction with the task of blocking possible mutinous actions of the 4th and 15th withdrawals of the Afghan national armed forces and preventing them from entering the city of Kabul;

- 177 MSR to defend the area of ​​Doshi, Chaugani, lane. Bugain, Sinjitak, concentrating the main efforts on the Puli-Khumri, Kabul direction, with the task of blocking the actions of the rebels from the north and preventing them from entering Kabul;

- 234 TP with average to defend the section of the bend of the power transmission line, lane. Dehkepak, Kalagulami, per. Khazarain-Bagal, concentrating the main efforts in the direction of Khazarain-Bagal, with the task of blocking the entry of the rebels from the northern outskirts of Kabul;

- 1049 zenap to cover from a possible attack of the command post of the mechanized infantry division, ordn, 234 tp, oredn OP in the Khazarain-Bagal area;

- KP 108th mechanized infantry division - 1 km north-east elevation. 1825.

That is, there was no talk of a possible repulsion of the aggression of any external forces (which was largely justified by the Soviet leadership to bring troops into Afghanistan) by definition. The 108th mechanized infantry division was definitely not preparing for this. In the last days of December 1979, units of the division improved their defenses, dispersed equipment and personnel in the indicated areas. On January 7, 1980, the command post of the 108th mechanized infantry division was visited by the commander of the district troops and a member of the military council of the TurkVO.

At the beginning of 1980, the 40th Army controlled all major cities (including 21 provincial centers and airfields in Kabul, Bagram, Shindand, Kandahar, Kunduz, Jalalabad, Gardez, Herat and Faizabad) and the Termez highway - the Salang pass - Kabul, Jalalabad - Gardez in the east and Kushka - Herat - Shindand - Kandahar in the west. Gas processing plants in Jarkuduk and Shibargan, power plants in Surubi, Naglu, Puli-Khumri, Kabul, a factory in Mazar-i-Sharif, as well as the Salang tunnel were taken under protection.

The first major battle of the 40th Army units was associated with the suppression of the mutinous 4th Artillery Regiment of the Afghan Armed Forces in the city of Nakhrin.

Artillery regiment mutiny

To suppress the anti-government actions of the 4th AP of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan (about the very beginning of the rebellion in the next article of the "VKO"), the 2nd ICB of the 186th MRB, reinforced by a tank company, ADN regiment, 2nd MRC of the 1st MSB, were used. a tank platoon and a battalion ministry.

On January 9, 1980 at 9.00 (local time), the battalion passed the starting point at elevation. 525.0 and began moving along the route: Kunduz, Ishakun, Ishkashim, Burka, Nakhrin airfields. 2nd MSR started moving at 11.00 on 9.1.80 (two hours later) along the route: Baghlan, lane. Shehjamal, Nahrin.

The head marching outpost of the 2nd MSB, having passed 4 km after the starting point, was fired upon by a group of horsemen numbering 100 people. Combat helicopters escorting the convoy scattered the rebels. However, the matter did not end there. GPZ of the 2nd MSB by 10.30 a.m. Ishakchi met resistance from a rebel group of up to 150 people. (with three guns), whose firing positions were located on the southern outskirts of Ishakchi. With organized fire from the GPZ, a tank platoon and with the support of helicopters, the rebels retreated into the mountains and suffered losses of up to 50 people. killed. All three weapons of the rioters were destroyed.

By 11.30 the 2nd MSR reached the Shekhjamal pass, where it met a blockage covered by a group of rebels with two mountain guns. Having destroyed up to 15 soldiers and both guns, the company, having cleared the blockage, continued its advance.

By 15.00 on 9.1.80, the GPZ of the 2nd ICB again met on the northern outskirts of Burka a group of horsemen numbering up to 50 people. The company turned around and, together with the infantry company of the Afghans, attacked the rebels and by 16.00 reached the southern outskirts of Burk. At 17.00 the 2nd MSB went to the Tovamakh pass (3 km north of the city of Nakhrin), where it came across a blockage. It was not possible to pass the pass on the move. Only after clearing the debris did the battalion continue its advance.

By this time the 2nd MSR had reached the Avsari region. Not meeting resistance, the 2nd MSB from the north, the 2nd MSR from the west by 21.00 left for the city of Nahrin and blocked the roads from the city, surrounding the military town of the 4th ap of the Afghan army. During the night, the units were on standby in case of repelling an organized demonstration by the rebels of the 4th ap.

From 10.00 10.1 artillery deployed at firing positions in readiness to open fire on the Afghan military town. Under the cover of the fire of combat helicopters, the Soviet units, on the BMP, quickly moved to the barracks of the 4th ap, dismounted and disarmed the garrison.

The losses of the 4th artillery regiment were: killed - up to 100 people, destroyed 7 guns and 5 cars. Losses of Soviet troops: killed - 2 people, wounded - 2 people, one BMP fell into a cliff on the pass. Trophies: 76-mm guns - 15 pcs., Ammunition for 76-mm guns - 500 boxes, for 122-mm howitzers - 75 boxes, for 82-mm mortars - 60 boxes, cars - 20, armored personnel carriers - 2, 57-mm guns - 3 pcs.

The suppression of the mutiny in the city of Nahrin is the first organized battle of the 40th Army in the almost ten-year Afghan war.

Riots in Kabul

On the evening of February 21, 1980, massive demonstrations took place in Kabul. Thousands of people took to the streets, chanting slogans of anti-karmalist and anti-Soviet content. Mass demonstrations by Afghans resumed on the morning of 22 February. The number of their participants reached, according to various estimates, about 400 thousand. The masses of the people filled all the central streets. Access to administrative buildings was blocked, the Soviet embassy came under fire, resulting in the deaths of Soviet citizens. This is how the direct participants in those events described it.

In Kabul from 20.00 21.2 to 3.30 22.2.80, an anti-government and anti-Soviet manifestation was held. Crowds of several hundred people walked along the streets, shouting with the help of megaphones: “Down with Moscow!”, “Get away from us!”, “Allah akbar!”. A crowd of Afghans showed particular activity at the stadium, where six police vehicles were burned, which were sent to disperse the demonstration. The demonstrators burned torches, barrels all night, tried to make blockages in the streets. Demonstrators opened fire on patrols of Soviet troops on armored personnel carriers. 9 Pakistanis were captured by the police among the demonstrators. According to the detainees, there were 170 Pakistanis in the city at that time.

From 9:00 am on February 22, 1980, demonstrations with flags in Kabul resumed. The shops were all closed in the morning. There are many armed people among the demonstrators. Explosions and shots are heard in the city. Crowds of people were heading for the Soviet embassy, ​​which was guarded by a reconnaissance company of the 103rd Airborne Division. The demonstrators seized an elevator and a trolleybus park, which were set on fire. The 3rd MSR of the 180th MSR was sent to seize the elevator and disperse the demonstrators in the area. During the capture of the elevator, a soldier of the 3rd MSR was wounded. In the area of ​​the television center, weapons were seen being handed over to demonstrators. A platoon was sent there to the BMD from the 103rd Airborne Division. In this area, Art. l-t Vovk 103rd Airborne Division. At the same time, crowds of many thousands gathered at a distance of 6 to 20 km from the city and began to move towards Kabul. In this regard, martial law was introduced in the city, the protection and defense of facilities, and patrolling were strengthened. Bridges over the river. Kabul is blocked by Soviet and Afghan units. Joint Soviet-Afghan barriers were also set up in all the main directions approaching Kabul. Major General A. Kadyr was appointed commandant of the city.

Thanks to the measures taken, the crowds of demonstrators on the outskirts of Kabul were dispersed. Nobody managed to get into the capital of Afghanistan. The weapon was used twice - during the defense of the TV tower by a strike from Mi-24 helicopters and at the elevator.

In total, to fight the rebels in Kabul, the following were involved: Soviet troops - 24 companies (over 2 thousand people), 30 tanks, up to 200 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers; from the NVS DRA - 11 companies (over 1,000 people), 43 tanks, up to 40 armored personnel carriers and armored personnel carriers.

Low-altitude aviation flights were widely used to intimidate counter-revolutionary elements in and around the city. Soviet aviation made 158 sorties, Afghan - 49.

Losses of the 40th Army: killed - 1, wounded - 2. Wounded in the NVS DRA - 5.

Over 900 active participants in the performances were arrested. Some of them were in military uniform. By 18.00 on 22.2.80 (local time) order in the city was restored. Units of the 108th mechanized infantry division and the 103rd airborne division carried out control and maintenance of order in Kabul. The reconnaissance company of the 103rd Airborne Division was guarded by the Soviet embassy. 3/180 msp was located in the area of ​​the elevator and trolleybus park.

On the night from 22.02 to 23.02 and from the morning of 23.2 there were unrest in the settlement. Mirbachakote (north of Kabul) and Karabag. In particular, attacks were carried out on local activists and police posts. From the morning of 23.2 on the minarets of mosques in Mirbachagot, powerful amplifiers were installed. The local population was called upon to overthrow the existing government of Afghanistan and attack the Soviet troops.

At about 11.00 23.02 in Mirbachagot, a gathering of about 200-250 armed people was noted, who moved through the streets, trying to start the physical destruction of local activists and residents who support them. At this time, there was an attack on the Soviet post on the southern outskirts of Mirbachagot (as part of the 1st MSV of the 2nd MSR of the 181st MSR). Our post opened warning fire into the air, but this did not give the desired results. The fire from the side of the rebels continued, as a result of which he was wounded in the bridge of the nose of Art. l-t Satansky I.V.

The events in Kabul are clearly evidenced by the reports of Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L.Sokolov

From the report of Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L.Sokolov to Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F.Ustinov (24.02.1980)

The tense political situation remained in the country. Martial law in Kabul has not been lifted. The troops are in their positions. From the morning of February 23, 1980, reactionary forces in Kabul tried to organize anti-government demonstrations by the population. On several streets, groups of residents of 300-400 people. shouted anti-government slogans and carried green (Islamic) banners. Through the efforts of the Tsarandoy, state security agencies and low-altitude aviation flights, the main groups were dispersed. By 18.00 23.02 the situation in the city has basically returned to normal. The weapon was not used by the Soviet and Afghan troops. On February 24, 1980, the situation in the city remained calm. When a group of rebels entered the elevator with the aim of undermining it, 10 people were detained with weapons. Attempts to provoke anti-government and anti-Soviet demonstrations were noted in Kandahar, Shindand, Herat and Charikar. They were suppressed by the police and Afghan troops without the use of weapons. In the rest of the country, the situation is calm. NVS DRA did not conduct active hostilities. Aviation carried out reconnaissance of the city and its environs day and night. Part of the forces carried out the search and destruction of rebel groups in the provinces of Nangarhar and Laghman. Several gangs were found and hit. Our aviation made 224 sorties, Afghan - 51, of which 23 were combat. On the night of 23.02.80, a company of the 31st regiment of the 9th regiment from the Chaukani garrison (30 km south-west of Asadabad) in the amount of 56 people with weapons went over to the side of the rebels. At the same time, the company commander and his deputy for political affairs were killed. A search for the company and an investigation into the causes of the incident were organized.

Sokolov

From the report of Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L.Sokolov to Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F.Ustinov (26.02.1980)

1. The situation in Kabul is gradually returning to normal, but it remains difficult. At night, active counter-revolutionaries and their accomplices are arrested, who in a number of cases offer armed resistance to Tsarandoy units and Afghan counterintelligence agencies.

Soviet troops do not participate in these activities, continuing to protect the most important military, administrative and economic facilities. According to intelligence reports, the rebels in Kabul are preparing armed uprisings against the government on 29.02. In this regard, the martial law in the city remains. The plan of joint actions of the Soviet and Afghan troops in this case has been clarified.

186 omsp 27.02 from Charikar moves to the north. env. the city of Kabul, and a battalion of the 56th brigade from Jabal-Ussaraj to Charikar in readiness for action in Kabul.

In other cities and provinces, there were no large rebel groups or anti-government actions by the population.

The situation remains difficult in the province of Kunar, which is almost entirely under the control of the rebels. In the Shigal region (15 km northeast of Asadabad), several armed formations numbering up to 2.5 thousand people were found. under the command of the former commander of the 30th GRP, who went over to the side of the rebels, and others. The 9GPD units deployed in the Kunar province have a low combat capability and cannot independently solve the problem of defeating these formations.

In this regard, on 29.02-2.03 hostilities were planned to destroy the rebel forces northeast of Asadabad with the involvement of two infantry divisions of the 103 airborne divisions (one on BMD, the second as a helicopter landing), reinforced by 181 ISB 108 ISB and 71 infantry regiment 11 with the support of the main aviation forces of the 40th Army.

2. The troops of the 40th Army and the National Armed Forces of the DRA carried out combat service, engaged in combat and political training according to the plan. 353 aabr, making a march from Puli-Khumri to Charikar, was stopped at the approaches to the Salang tunnel due to worsening weather conditions (heavy ice) before dawn.

Sokolov

From the report of Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L.Sokolov to Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F.Ustinov (28.02.80)

The situation in Kabul has not changed significantly. All preparatory measures have been taken in case of a counter-revolutionary attack on 29.02. The interaction between the troops, the police ("tsaranda") and the state security agencies (KHAD) has been clarified. To strengthen the Kabul garrison from the Charikar area, 186 motorized brigades were withdrawn, which is concentrated 1 km north-west of the city of Kabul. His actions in the city were planned, a reconnaissance was carried out with the commanders of the units.

In the provinces of Herat, Kandahar, Faizabad, an increase in tension is noted. Private shops closed. The population cannot buy food for several days. According to intelligence information, the leadership of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan decided to ban the supply of food from Pakistan. By means of threats and terror, compel car owners to stop exporting Soviet cargo from the ports of Hairaton and Sherkhan, create economic difficulties for Afghanistan, than cause discontent of the people with the government's policy.

There were no major hostilities. The troops of the 40th Army and the National Armed Forces of the DRA are on combat duty, are engaged in combat and political training according to the plan.

122 MRR replaced 149 MRR 201 MRR on the protection of the gas pipeline and the road Termez, Puli-Khumri, having two MSB in Shibargan, one MSB in Asiabad, the rest of the units - 16 km north-west of Tashkurgan. 149 MSR 201 MSD decreases to the place of permanent deployment - Kunduz.

4/56 ODBR concentrated in the Charikar area in readiness to advance to Kabul by special order.

353 ABR concentrated 2 km southwest of Jabal-Ussaraj. Zrtb and orb finish overcoming the Salang pass and by the end of the day they are concentrated in the Bagram area.

In Puli-Khumri, 48 dshb are concentrated (intended for 66 OMRB), the 108th mechanized infantry division and the 40th Army's orvb. Continuation of the march - from 29.02.80

Preparations have been completed for military operations to destroy a large rebel gang northeast of Asadabad (Kunar province). The troops were withdrawn to the initial area (8 km northeast of the city of Jalalabad). The reconnaissance of the enemy group has been completed. Under favorable weather conditions for aviation, hostilities will begin in the morning of 02/29/80.

Aviation continued aerial reconnaissance of the area of ​​upcoming hostilities, as well as border areas in the interests of ensuring measures to close mountain passes and organize the protection of the state border in accordance with the approved plan. Our aviation made 109 sorties, Afghan - 24.

Sokolov

By the joint actions of the 1st MSV and part of the forces of the 2nd MSV of the 2nd MSR of the 181st MSR under the command of the company commander, Captain Makovsky V.N., this group of rebels was dispersed. At the same time, 22 armed oppositionists were destroyed. In addition, the transmitting center in n. the village of Mirbachagot.

The uprising in Kabul demonstrated that the state of numbness among the local population was over. Open resistance intensified. Religious propaganda has skyrocketed. The Afghan government was openly branded as an agent of communism.

After the unrest in Kabul, shelling of Soviet convoys on the Termez-Kabul and Kushka-Kandahar highways became systematic and organized. Attempts were made to storm small garrisons by the rebels. The situation worsened so much that the command of the 40th Army had no choice but to take appropriate measures. In response to the numerous shelling of their garrisons and transport convoys, units and formations of the 40th Army began to conduct combat operations to localize and defeat the enemy's armed formations. The scale of hostilities has steadily expanded over time.

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 MOROZOV EVGENY ARKADIEVICH 4.01.55 - 12.11.85 Major A native of Chelyabinsk. Russian. Higher education. Member of the CPSU. Married. Wife - Tatyana Emelyanovna Morozova. Daughters - Olga and Svetlana. In Afghanistan - the commander of a tank battalion (military unit np 51884). In 1972, after graduating from high school No. 84, he entered the Omsk Higher Tank Command School, from which he graduated in 1976. From 1976 to 1985, he served in the Red Banner Central Asian Military District, in the 374th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 155th Motorized Rifle Division of the 1st Army Corps as commander of a tank platoon and commander of a tank company. Since April 1985 - Afghanistan. On November 12, 1985 he died on a combat mission. Awarded with a medal "For Military Merit". By the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, he was awarded (posthumously) the Order of the Red Star. Buried at the Assumption Cemetery in Chelyabinsk. Morozov's wife E.A. with their daughters Olga (born 1984) and Svetlana (born 1977) and Evgeny's brother, Yuri Arkadievich, live in Chelyabinsk. Lieutenant Morozov began his difficult career as an officer as the commander of a tank platoon of military unit 47165 in the Central Asian Military District. His wife Tatiana was there with him. Their daughters, Svetlana and Olga, were also born there. Yevgeny served honestly and conscientiously, as required by the Charter, as demanded by his officer's sense of duty. His diligence in the service was appreciated by the command. Having received the next military rank "senior lieutenant", he was appointed commander of a tank company. And on April 8, 1985 he was sent on a business trip to Afghanistan. Captain Morozov E.A. became the commander of a tank battalion of the military unit No. 51884. He distinguished himself more than once in conducting military operations and raids to destroy rebel bases. Captain E.A. Morozov especially showed himself. October 20, 1985 in the area of ​​the village of Hidjan, Parwan province. A tank company under his command cut off all routes of withdrawal of a large group of armed rebels from the blockade area. As a result of a fierce battle, the entire group of bandits was eliminated, and Yevgeny Morozov himself destroyed eight rebels during the battle. For a well-organized and skillfully conducted military operation, he was awarded the medal "For Military Merit" and he was awarded the military rank of "Major". And on November 12, 1985, the commander of a tank battalion, Major Morozov Yevgeny Arkadyevich, died near the city of Kabul, carrying out a combat mission of the command, faithful to his military oath and international duty, while showing courage, stamina and heroism. Major E.A. Morozov was buried. at home, in Chelyabinsk. There is a marble monument on his grave. His photograph, a description of the combat path and military merits in the Afghan war are in the Museum of Internationalist Warriors of the Traktorozavodsky Regional Branch of the RSVA and in the Traktorozavodsky RVK in Chelyabinsk. These data were taken from the all-Union book of memory of the fallen: MOROZOV Evgeny Arkadievich, major, tank commander, battalion, genus. 01/04/1955 in Chelyabinsk. Russian. In Armed. Forces of the USSR from 1.8.72. Graduated from Omsk VTKU. In Rep. Afghanistan since Apr. 1985. Proved himself a courageous and resolute officer. Commanding a battalion, he took part in military operations many times. 10/20/85, being in one of the tanks, companies operating with us. point of Khinjan of Parwan province, skillfully organized its battle, as a result of which the paths of the rebel detachment's retreat to the mountains were cut off. 11/11/1985 M. died in battle. Nagr, medal "For Military Merit" and hordes. Red Star (posthumously). Buried at the Assumption Cemetery in Chelyabinsk. COMMANDER His eyes are the eyes of his father, His thoughts are the mind of victory, Wrinkles hidden faces are a soldier of trouble. His words are law to the fighters, His smile is like a reward, And if he doesn't get tired, then we don't need rest. His path is an example for us! His reward is our glory! We approve of the severity of the measures approved by the Charter! To teach in the conditions of the field, What is necessary in a war - All this in the thoughts of the young He fixed irreversibly. We, like a mother, keep our Motherland from malicious robbery, And if necessary, we can stand Under the bullets in the very center of the battle! We will get up and go forward, A wall of immense width, And the commander will go first, And we follow him, as we were taught. And if the world suddenly explodes, In battle we will prove by right, - It was not in vain that the commander taught us To love and defend the state! And for us to keep, leaving in reserve, Carry us for a long century The last battle order - Always be a man!

In early December 1979, the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. people

Objections of the Chief of the General Staff of Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov, as well as his attempts to prove that such a number of troops are not able to solve the task of eliminating the opposition movement (if troops are brought in for this), especially since the Afghan army can resist, led nowhere. Dmitry Ustinov was deeply convinced that as soon as Soviet troops appeared in Afghanistan, the rebels would immediately cease hostilities against official Kabul and peace and tranquility would be established in the country.

Operational deployment and preparation of OKVS

December 10, 1979, i.e. even before L.I.Brezhnev made a final decision (obviously, he was sure that he would not take another decision), the USSR Minister of Defense began to give orders to the General Staff to create the necessary grouping of troops.

On December 13 (the day after the decision was made) to assist the command of the TurkVO in carrying out mobilization measures, the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense (OG of the USSR Ministry of Defense) was formed, headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army S.F.Akhromeev.

Later, this group was headed by the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L.Sokolov (urgently recalled from vacation). On the evening of December 14, 1979, the OG of the USSR Ministry of Defense arrived in Termez and began work.

On December 16, 1979, an order was given to separate the 40th Army from the TurkVO administration and to mobilize the field administration. The first deputy commander of the TurkVO troops, Lieutenant General Yu.V. Tukharinov, was appointed commander of the army for operational purposes.

Due to the fact that the General Staff did not have a plan for the introduction of troops into Afghanistan (the task of developing such a plan was not assigned to it), a general directive to mobilize the troops was not given. Formations and units were brought to readiness by separate orders after receiving the appropriate oral instructions from D.F. Ustinov.

In just three weeks (until December 31, 1979), more than thirty such orders were issued. The rear and repair units and bodies of the 40th A were deployed last (some of them already in the course of the beginning of the introduction of troops).

The formations and units of the 40th Army - type "B" motorized rifle divisions, parts of the army kit were mobilized 10-12 days before entering, and the formation of the airborne assault brigade was just being completed. The only personnel formation in the army was the 103rd Airborne Division.

From the second half of January to mid-February 1980, the entire enlistment staff was replaced by cadre units received from the formations and units of all military districts and groups of forces.

During the creation of the grouping of forces, about 100 formations, units and institutions were deployed. More than 50 thousand officers, sergeants and soldiers were called up from the reserve for staffing the troops, about 8 thousand cars and other equipment were allocated from the national economy.

Similar in scale mobilization measures in TurkVO and SAVO in the post-war period have never been carried out. They revealed a number of serious shortcomings in the activities of local authorities, heads of enterprises, farms, military registration and enlistment offices and military units.

But the most intolerant of them were in the training of reserve officers. 70% of the total number of drafted officers did not serve in the army at all (they were trained at the military departments of universities). The overwhelming majority of them showed complete unpreparedness and inability to command subordinate units or perform other duties assigned to them in service.

Often, motorized rifle, artillery, sapper platoons, where the commanders were reserve officers, were practically uncontrollable on marches and in battle. About 20% of the officers called up from the reserve, who were trained with units from among the sergeants, also did not have practical command skills. The reserve officers of the armored, automobile and tractor services and the rear services showed completely unsatisfactory professional training.

The experience of mobilizing, sending troops and conducting hostilities during the first two months, while the reserve officers were in the army, convinced that their unpreparedness for the performance of duties in wartime is not a consequence of some individual, maybe even major, shortcomings, but major flaws in the general system of their preparation.

The experience of the deployment of the 40th Army in December 1979 showed that it is necessary to completely revise the entire system of training reserve officers in the Armed Forces of the USSR. It was outdated in 1979 and did not meet even the minimum requirements of modern warfare. Experts agreed in their assessments - there can not be an officer liable for military service and command subordinates, if he did not serve in the army at all.

It became obvious that a new system of training reserve officers was needed. After development, it should be tested in practice and put into operation. However, by and large, very little has been done in this area today. Unfortunately, the changes for the better are minimal.

In the first days of mobilization, neither the military enlistment offices nor the military units paid any attention to the quality of the staffing of the units. Everyone was sure that a routine check was underway, which would end as soon as the units reported the completion of the acquisition. In this regard, the military registration and enlistment offices sought to quickly send conscription resources, and the military units - to quickly staff the units with personnel and report to the instance.

After the arrival of the OG of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the general orientation of the relevant commanders and military commissars on the possible performance of serious tasks, the situation improved significantly. The replacement of those already called up and sent in part of the military service, who are not capable of performing combat missions, has begun. The replacement lasted 8 days (and in some parts and more).

When manning the troops, there was an acute shortage of many specialists: mechanics-drivers of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, operators of anti-tank systems and radars, gunners, artillery computers, radio operators, etc. This is largely due to the fact that many military personnel of the Central Asian republics served in the construction troops.

The officers who came from the reserve, trained at the military departments of civilian universities, in the overwhelming majority have never served in the army and therefore did not have practical skills in working in their specialty and, especially, with people. Many of them did not speak Russian well. All persons liable for military service were characterized by extremely low physical fitness.

A large number of those liable for military service were not found due to violations of the passport regime during registration, lack of information about the demolition of houses, confusion in the names of streets, etc.

Military enlistment offices and military units faced significant and sometimes unforeseen difficulties in the supply and acceptance of equipment from the national economy. The heads of the motor depots in large quantities supplied not new ones assigned to the troops, but old cars that had a mileage of more than 500 thousand km. Some of them arrived without spare wheels, driver's tools, entrenching tools and repair kits. Many cars were not equipped for the transportation of personnel.

Within a few days, it was necessary to organize and carry out work on replacing cars or repairing already received cars and equipping them with tools directly in the areas of concentration of units. These measures were carried out both at the expense of obtaining property and material resources from civilian organizations, and at the expense of the reserves of the military district.

In a word, the technical condition of the automobile equipment assigned and supplied by the military registration and enlistment offices was clearly unsatisfactory. So, 20% of cars arrived with mileage up to 100 thousand km, 30% - up to 250 thousand km and 50% - more than 250 thousand km. Up to 80% of the delivered machines had a service life of 5 years or more.

Tank trucks were in a particularly poor technical condition. Of the 500 vehicles presented for staffing of the tanker automobile battalion, only 221 were selected, and the rest were returned for uselessness. Up to 80% of the supplied gasoline filling stations, due to the lack of filling nozzles, meters of the established diameter, turned out to be unsuitable for use. There were many other shortcomings as well.

All this required the adoption of additional measures to find material and human resources and seriously hampered the implementation of tasks on time.

In addition, when the cars were removed from long-term storage, a large number of equipment was faulty and incomplete with the required property. The mobile repair shops that arrived from the national economy were replenished with tools, since they were almost completely absent in the workshops. When preparing the troops for the advance, all equipment was subjected to an in-depth check, supplemented, refueled, maintenance No. 2 was carried out, part of the equipment was checked by test runs.

Despite the shortcomings in mobilization, the command of the TurkVO and SAVO, the commanders of formations and units, the military enlistment offices eventually managed to cope with the assigned tasks. By the end of December 24, 1979, the main forces of the 40th A were ready for action.

On December 24, 1979, DF Ustinov held a meeting of the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which was attended by deputy ministers, commanders-in-chief of the Ground Forces, Air Force, Air Defense Forces of the country, the commander of the Airborne Forces, some chiefs of the main and central directorates. At this meeting, the Minister of Defense of the USSR announced the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. The hopes of the generals and officers, who had been informed earlier about the possibility of such a decision that this would not happen after all, were finally dispelled.

On the same day, the Minister of Defense of the USSR signed a directive to the troops, which, in particular, said: favorable conditions for the prohibition of possible anti-Afghan actions by neighboring states. " This task for commanders of all levels was, frankly, very vague.

The directive did not provide for the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of Afghanistan. Moreover, the procedure for the use of weapons, even for self-defense purposes, has not been determined. It meant that our formations and units would become garrisons and take under protection important areas and facilities, thereby freeing up Afghan troops for active military operations against the opposition, as well as against a possible external enemy.

By a separate order, the commander of the 40th A, Lieutenant General Yu.V. Tukharinov, was instructed to meet with the Chief of Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Afghan Army, Lieutenant General Babadzhan, and discuss with him issues on the deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan (Babadzhan received relevant instructions from Kh.Amin ).

The Minister of Defense of the USSR established the beginning of the crossing of the state border at 15.00 Moscow time (16.30 Kabul time) on December 25, 1979. Commanders of all levels had less than a day left to organize the march.

On the instructions of the Soviet leadership on December 2, 1979, the Soviet ambassador informed H. Amin that the Soviet government found it possible to satisfy his request and send two Soviet battalions (special purpose and parachute) to Afghanistan to strengthen the protection of the residence of the head of state and the Bagram airfield. In agreement with X. Amin, on December 3 and 14, 1979, these units were transferred to Afghanistan by BTA aircraft and began to guard the objects assigned to them.

On December 14, 1979, B. Karmal illegally arrived at the Bagram airfield with one of the battalions, where he was among the Soviet officers and soldiers until the end of the month. Somewhat earlier (December 11, 1979), A. Vatanjar, S. Gulyabzoy, A. Sarvari and Sh. Mazduryar were transported to Afghanistan from Moscow by a Soviet transport plane to Afghanistan - that "four", which on the eve of X. Amin's coming to power took refuge in the Soviet embassy ... In order to preserve their lives, they were at one time secretly removed from the territory of the embassy in Kabul, and then from Afghanistan to Moscow - after Kh. Amin came to power. The plan, developed in Moscow, began to be implemented. There is no documentary evidence, but, undoubtedly, B. Karmal and the "four" took part in the development of the plan. In any case, they knew much more about him than the officers of the Soviet General Staff.

On December 22 or 23, 1979, the Soviet ambassador informed Kh. Amin that the Soviet leadership had fully decided to satisfy his requests to send troops to Afghanistan and on December 25, 1979, was ready to start bringing them in. H. Amin expressed gratitude for this decision and instructed the General Staff to assist in its implementation in every possible way.

Entering the group of Soviet troops in Afghanistan

In pursuance of the instructions of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, on the night of December 24-25, the remnants of the 345th separate parachute regiment were airlifted from the Fergana airfield to the Kabul airfield (two battalions of the unit were deployed earlier and carried out tasks to protect the airfields of Kabul and Bagram). From 9:00 on December 25, the transfer of parts of the 103rd airborne division there began.

The grouping of TurkVO troops for entering Afghanistan looked like this - 40th Army (108th and 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Divisions, 56th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade, 860th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment, 353rd Artillery Brigade, 2 -I anti-aircraft missile brigade; 103rd Guards Airborne Division and 345th Guards.Obdp; 34th Mixed Aviation Corps). In addition, after mobilization, to have as a reserve: 68th mechanized infantry division in the Kushka area and 201st mechanized infantry division in the Termez area.

Simultaneously with the beginning of the advancement of the 108th Mechanized Infantry Division in the Termez direction, the landing was flown and disembarked at the following airfields: Kabul - 103rd Airborne Division; Bagram - 345th PDP.

The introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was planned to be carried out in two directions along the routes Termez - Kabul - Ghazni and Kushka - Herat - Kandahar with the task of deploying troops along this ring in the most vital areas, creating conditions for stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan.

It was also meant to introduce the 860th motorized brigade through Khorog to Faizabad in the northeast of the country.

Upon receipt of instructions, now with specific terms, the calculations of the march were clarified, tasks were set for formations, units and subunits, and the goals of the entry were explained to all personnel. Troops control during border crossing and advancement to designated areas, as well as appropriate control, have been organized.

When carrying out explanatory work with the personnel, the emphasis was on the fact that the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan is carried out at the request of its legitimate government, to provide international assistance in the fight against external aggression, which in the future could pose a threat to the southern borders of our Motherland. No other goals are pursued. As soon as outside interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan ceases, Soviet troops will immediately be withdrawn from the country. Such explanations were met with understanding on the part of the personnel.

Bridges

A serious problem for the troops in the Termez direction was the organization of overcoming the Amu Darya - a capricious and wayward river, with a strong current and constantly changing its course. Its sandy shores are easily washed away. All this extremely complicated the organization of both the ferry crossing of the troops and the guidance of a pontoon bridge across it.

Thus, one of the important tasks of engineering support for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was the equipment and maintenance of the floating bridge in Termez, as well as the construction and maintenance of a temporary high-water bridge in Ayvadzh.

By the time the contingent of Soviet troops entered Afghanistan into the territory of TurkVO, three pontoon-bridge regiments had been transferred by rail from the central military districts of the country to the Termez region.

After long reconnaissance work and calculations carried out under the leadership of the chief of the engineering troops of the district, Major General A.S. Korolev, with the involvement of specialists from the Military Engineering Academy summoned from Moscow, a place was finally selected for building a pontoon bridge.

The technology of its guidance and fastening on a strong current was determined, as well as the necessary additional work to secure the banks and unstable soil of the island, which fit into the structure of the bridge (between the coast and the island - several links of the pontoon-bridge park, along the island - concrete slabs and further - the bridge ).

This floating 60-ton bridge from the PMP park was built within seven hours (work began at 7:00 on December 25, 1979) In March 1980, due to the approaching spring flood, it was replaced by a combined bridge from the PMP and PPS parks.

To prevent the erosion of the island and destruction of its surface along the water's edge, metal pins protruding 1 m above the water were hammered into the bottom of the river, braided with reeds and straw, after which the braid was fixed by adding clay. A strip 1 m high was made of the same material on the roadway of the island, and reinforced concrete slabs were laid on top of the clay.

With the consolidation of the soil on the approaches to the river and on the island, the leaders of the Surkhandarya region, Karimov A.K. and Mikhailov V.M., rendered significant assistance to the troops by donating a significant amount of reinforced concrete road slabs from the reinforced concrete structures plant and ensuring their removal on special slab trucks.

The constructed bridge had a lead-out part, which provided navigation on the river. Due to the strong current, great difficulties arose in building the bridge, and especially in holding it, which explains such a long period of its building on December 25, 1979.

To duplicate the bridge in Termez, as well as to ensure the construction of a temporary high-water bridge and a bypass road to Tashkurgan by the forces of another pump, in January 1980, a floating 60-ton bridge from the PMP park was built in the Ayvaj area.

Later, the forces of engineering troops in the shortest possible time - in 51 days in difficult hydrological conditions, built a high-water bridge 588 m long for loads up to 40 tons.The bridge supports - metal pipes with a diameter of 320 mm, a driving depth of 20 m. sets MLRM and BARM. The presence of two bridges made it possible to timely carry out preventive measures on them. Thanks to this, the long-term operation of floating bridges from service parks with heavy traffic (up to 1000 units of equipment per day) was ensured.

March to Kabul

The first Soviet unit to cross the Soviet-Afghan border was the 781st separate reconnaissance battalion of the 108th Guards. motorized rifle division. On the Afghan coast, Soviet troops were met by H. Amin's elder brother, Abdullah Amin, who was responsible for suppressing the opposition movement in the northern provinces of the country.

The passage of personnel of Soviet troops across the border was carried out by border authorities without customs inspection according to pre-prepared lists, which were handed over to border detachments before the units left the pontoon bridge. The lists of the Airborne Forces personnel were transferred to the border authorities at the airfields of the last aircraft refueling.

At the command and observation post in the area of ​​the bridge were the commander of the TurkVO troops, Colonel-General Yu. P. Maksimov, the commander of the 40th A, Lieutenant-General Yu.V. Tuharinov, and Colonel-General V. Merimsky, who headed the task force of the Ministry of Defense.

They watched as, at the set time, the 180th Motorized Rifle Regiment on the BMP, which constitutes the vanguard of the 108th Guards. MSD, and the forward echelon of the 103rd Guards. Airborne troops crossed the state border with Afghanistan on the ground and in the air. The generals stayed at the KNP near the river until morning, until the last column crossed the left bank.

Building a marching order of the 108th Guards. The mechanized infantry division on the march looked like this: reconnaissance detachment - 781st orb, head marching outpost - 180th MRR (MSR and TV), traffic support detachment - 271st separate engineer battalion, vanguard - 1/180 MSR from ADN regiment , 180th mechanized infantry regiment, forward command post (PKP) of the mechanized infantry division, 234th tank regiment, separate rocket battalion, 177th infantry regiment, 1074th artillery regiment, command post of the mechanized infantry division, separate missile division, 1049th zenap, 181st MSD, a hotel chemical defense battalion, a rear command post (TPU) and the rear of the MSD.

The length of the march for the 108th division was 510 km. The march was made in two crossings. The first one is 300 km long, of which 140 km is on flat terrain, 160 km is on mountainous terrain. The second one is 210 km long in mountainous terrain.

The first crossing of the march took 25 hours, including 4 hours for a big halt to refuel equipment. The reconnaissance detachment and the advance detachment of the division (SME to BMP) overcame the second transition of the march in 18 hours, the main forces of the division in 21 hours.

The march was made in mixed columns with an average speed of movement: on the plain at night - 20 km / h, during the day in the mountains - 15 km / h. Fuel consumption from the norm on the march was 2.9 refueling for gasoline, 3.0 for diesel fuel.

The organization of the first transition of the march took place in the starting area, the first tasks were completed by issuing a combat order. 20 hours were allotted for the organization of the 1st crossing, 18 hours were allotted for the 2nd crossing. Tasks were brought up by a combat order. Management was from the PKP, which was promoted behind the vanguard.

It should be noted that the practically newly formed division made the most difficult six-hundred-kilometer march along an alpine route in winter conditions. Due to wet snow and the onset of frost, the road froze at night, the equipment skidded on the ascents, and often skidded on the descents. The precautions provided in advance turned out to be very handy - traffic support units with a supply of sand, tractors and road equipment, wooden wheel pads for each car, rigid couplings, etc.

A serious obstacle turned out to be a tunnel on the Salang pass with a length of 2,700 meters, designed for the passage of single and small groups of vehicles with carburetor engines, but not diesel vehicles - infantry fighting vehicles, tanks. I had to go through the tunnel in small units at certain intervals between them.

All this significantly influenced the decrease in the rate of advancement of divisional units. And yet, by the appointed time, the forward detachment of the division - the 180th MRP was in Kabul, having established contact with units of the 103rd Guards. airborne The commander of the 180th mechanized infantry division, Lieutenant Colonel T.E. Kasymov, showed his best side here.

During the march, the division did not fight.

By the end of 12/29/1979, the 108th Guards. Ministry of Internal Affairs took up defenses in the area of ​​the capital of Afghanistan - Kabul. The division was commanded by Colonel Mironov Valery Ivanovich, who had just been appointed to this position. In fact, Mironov took over the division on the march, in extremely difficult and harsh conditions.

We must honestly admit that the newly mobilized units of the 108th Guards. MSD outwardly little resembled the victorious Soviet Army. This was clearly not a demonstration of Soviet military power. The appearance of most of the summoned fighters did not arouse much respect for them. The mobilized fathers of large Uzbek and Tajik families least of all resembled the brave soldiers who had arrived to provide international assistance to the Afghans.

The divisional headquarters and some units were concentrated on the northern outskirts of Kabul in a village called in Russian "Teply Stan", and motorized rifle regiments and a tank regiment were deployed on the approaches to Kabul from all directions, creating a sort of outer ring of the city's defense.

Winter in Kabul 1979-1980 stood out frosty. In parts of the 108th Guards. The Ministry of Internal Affairs did not have enough stoves or fuel. Any piece of wood was used for cooking, heating tents and dugouts. There were cases when decorative and even fruit trees were cut down for fuel. This caused serious conflicts with local residents. They were settled with considerable difficulties.

And another feature that was not taken into account by the rear services. Kabul is a high-mountainous region. Cooking in open cauldrons required almost 1.5 times more time and fuel than on the plain. In connection with this circumstance, many problems arose.

Nevertheless, despite all the difficulties, the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan continued.

Airborne operation

And when the introduction of troops into Afghanistan became obvious, it was necessary to use the 103rd Airborne Division, which was located in the European part of the USSR, several thousand kilometers from the border of Afghanistan (the point of permanent deployment is Vitebsk, the commander of the formation is Major General Ryabchenko I. F.).

In mid-December 1979, the 103rd Airborne Division was raised on alert and, with full ammunition and reserves, was withdrawn to the initial area, and then to the take-off airfields of the VTA units. By this time, the headquarters of the Airborne Forces and VTA had already planned the transfer of the division from Belarus and its landing in Afghanistan at the airfields of Kabul and Bagram.

For these purposes, almost the entire aircraft fleet of the BTA was involved. Provided for intermediate refueling of aircraft at the airfields of the Volga region, the South Urals and Kazakhstan. It was also supposed to feed the paratroopers with hot food.

All preparations for the transfer and landing of troops took place in secret under the guise of conducting tactical exercises with practical landing. It began by putting the units on high alert.

The landing (except for units intended to seize airfields in order to ensure the landing of the main landing forces) was planned to be carried out by the landing method.

Since the airfields of the original area were at a considerable distance from the locations of the division's units, the advancement of troops to the airfields was carried out in a combined way: to the nearest airfields - on their own and by rail, to the most distant ones - by VTA aircraft.

To ensure secrecy, the combat mission of units and subunits was set preliminary and only for the landing (without disclosing the areas and airfields of the landing). The personnel received the task of preparing for the landing and engaging in battle immediately after the landing.

For several days, the airborne units and subunits were at the airfields of the initial region. Weapons and equipment were loaded onto the planes. At some airfields, they were concentrated in field parks, grouped by aircraft groups. The leader of each group knew the aircraft number, the parking area and the name of the crew commander. This subsequently ensured quick loading and landing.

The personnel were equipped for winter. In addition to felt boots, each paratrooper had boots that were dressed depending on the weather. Combat equipment included personal weapons, a complete backpack, and other essential equipment.

The technical and logistical support of the landing in the initial area was carried out by the forces and means of the airfield technical units of the Air Force. This contributed to the preservation of stocks of materiel of units of the 103rd Airborne Division. To maintain the combat readiness of the BMD and vehicles at low temperatures, the batteries were periodically recharged. In the planes loaded with military equipment, when they were in the parking lot, the proper temperature regime was maintained. The squadrons and regiments of the VTA, airborne the forward detachments of the landing to capture airfields, could take off in 40-50 minutes after receiving the order.

Landing of the 103rd Guards. The airborne division was carried out by a landing method. No forward detachments were required. Both airfields (Kabul and Bagram) by this time were taken under the control of units of the 345th division of the brigade.

The landing and take-off conditions of the closely located airfields of Kabul and Bagram determined the need to carry out the landing in groups of 6-12 aircraft with the expectation of no more than an hour for their landing, unloading and take-off of the group. It took 15 to 30 minutes to unload one aircraft.

After landing, the unit commanders received a large-scale plan of the city and maps with marked military objectives, a combat mission and a short explanatory note directly at the airfield. These documents were prepared in advance by the Airborne Task Force.

When performing combat missions, the main responsibility was assigned to the parachute regiments. They in December 1979 in the 103rd Guards. Airborne divisions were commanded by: 317th PDP - Lieutenant Colonel N.V. Batyukov, 350th PDP - Lieutenant Colonel Shpak G.I., 357th PDP - Lieutenant Colonel K.G. Litovchik, 345th PDP was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Serdyukov N.I.

To transport personnel and military equipment of the 103rd Airborne Division, 343 aircraft flights were made (including 66 An-22 flights, 76 Il-76 flights, 200 An-12 flights). In total, 47 hours were spent on the landing of airborne units and subunits at two airfields (landing of the first aircraft in Kabul at 4:15 pm on December 25, the last at 2.30 pm on December 27, 1979).

The planes landed day and night every 15 minutes on average. During this time, 7,700 people were delivered to Kabul and Bagram. personnel, 894 units of military equipment and 1062 tons of various cargo.

Unfortunately, during the transfer of airborne units in Kabul on December 25, 1979 at 19.33 (Moscow time) an Il-76 plane with personnel and equipment crashed. The crew of 7 people (commander Captain V.V. Golovchin) and 37 paratroopers were killed. The cause of the disaster was an error in piloting, a collision of an aircraft with a mountain with a height of 4662 m when approaching the Kabul airfield (Captain V.V.Golovchin landed at the Kabul airfield, known for its complexity, especially at night). This disaster opened the list of our losses in Afghanistan.

The areas of concentration of units and subunits of the Airborne Forces were pre-selected and recalled by the officers of the Airborne Forces operational group, headed by the Deputy Commander of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General N.N. Guskov, who arrived in Kabul on December 23, 1979.

On the morning of December 25, 1979, Soviet military advisers and specialists working in the Afghan Air Defense Forces, in order to exclude possible hostile actions by Afghan servicemen during the landing of the Airborne Forces, established control over all anti-aircraft weapons and ammunition storage sites. Some anti-aircraft guns were temporarily disabled by them (sights, locks, etc.) were removed.

During the exit and disembarkation of our troops at the points assigned to them, sometimes difficulties arose. So, with the onset of darkness at the Bagram airfield, the lighting system for landing was suddenly turned off. At this time, the planes with the landing party were already on their way. It turned out that the system was turned off by order of the chief of the aviation garrison, who decided to prevent the arrival of troops. Only the decisive actions of Lieutenant General N.N. Guskov removed the tension, eliminated grave consequences and ensured the fulfillment of the task.

After the landing, the units of the 103rd Airborne Division went to important administrative and other objects (the Central Committee of the PDPA, the buildings of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the security service, the Ministry of Communications, the barracks of some units) and strengthened their security. In fact, the control of the Soviet troops was established over these objects. In some places, officers - opponents of Kh. Amin, not knowing why the Soviet troops had come, tried to resist them, but were relatively quickly disarmed.

By the new 1980, the deployment of regiments of the 103rd Airborne Division in Afghanistan was completed. 317th Guards. The PDP was stationed in the center of Kabul (on the palace territory of Delkush), a battalion of the same regiment was allocated to guard the residence of Babrak Karmal. 357th Guards. PDP is located in the Bala Hisar fortress. 350th Guards. the PDP remained in tents on the outskirts of the airfield next to the division headquarters. The artillery regiment and special units of the division were also located there. The few capital buildings that the paratroopers inherited were in a terrible state. Ruined and filthy, they required a lot of labor and materials to adapt them for housing. Moreover, they had no heating.

On the whole, in December 1979, an airmobile operation of unprecedented scope and organization was carried out to transfer troops from one theater of operations to another at a distance of about 4.5 thousand kilometers. Comparable with this operation, and even then only partially, the transfer of two airborne divisions to Prague and Brno during one night in August 1968, when the combined armed forces of the Warsaw Pact entered Czechoslovakia. As it turned out later, this was the last airborne operation of the Soviet army.

First Herat, then Kandahar

On the night of December 27-28, 1979 (at 3.00 local time), by an additional order of the USSR Minister of Defense, another motorized rifle division entered Afghanistan - the 5th Guards Mechanized Infantry Division.

The connection made a march along the route: Kushka - Herat - per. Mir-Ali - Adraskan - Shindand. The length of the march was 280 km.

The division moved along one route. The column of the main forces was dismembered in depth into columns of regiments, which moved at reduced distances. Between parts - 2 km, between battalions - up to 1 km.

These shorter distances resulted in difficult movement along the route, especially when overcoming passes. The formed congestions in the sections did not contribute to the rapid completion of the march and reduced the average cruising speed, which was 20 km / h for tanks - during the day - 15 km / h, at night - 15 km / h, BMP during the day - 30 km / h, at night - 20 km / h, cars - 35 km / h during the day, 30 km / h at night. When overcoming the passes, the average speed for all equipment was 5 km / h.

The organization of the march took place in the starting area. The tasks were brought to the units by the combat order of the division commander, Major General Shatalin Yu.V.

The headquarters of the Ministry of Internal Affairs prepared all the necessary data for making a decision by the unit commanders.

The decision determined the order of the march, the number of marching columns, the composition of the forward detachment and marching security, the order of action when meeting the enemy, the formation of marching order and the distribution of forces and assets among the columns, the number of halts and their duration.

The tasks for the units were assigned to the first daily march.

Management on the march was organized with PKP, KP and TPU. The total time spent on the march was 28 hours, taking into account the halts and refueling of equipment. To complete the march, it was consumed: motor gasoline - 188.5 tons (0.88 refueling); diesel fuel - 248.8 tons (0.7 refueling).

By the end of December 28, the 5th Guards. The mechanized infantry division occupied the target areas south of the city of Herat and at the Shindand airfield. Subsequently, the division's area of ​​responsibility expanded to Kandahar, where its 373rd mechanized infantry brigade entered, which was then transformed into a separate motorized rifle brigade (70th motorized rifle brigade).

The entry of the 5th Mechanized Infantry Division was smoother (in comparison with the 108th Motorized Rifle Division) and without serious deviations from the planned plan. The division commander, Major General Yu.V. Shatalin, showed himself as a mature and competent military leader during his advance.

Labor road to Faizabad

Particularly noteworthy are the unfavorable conditions for the advance of the 860th separate motorized rifle regiment from the Khorog region to Faizabad (Afghan province of Badakhshan). The regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel V.S.Kudlai for a long time moved under almost continuous fire from small groups and opposition detachments, restoring the road completely destroyed by the militants - the only road in this mountainous region.
The rate of advance of the regiment was up to 10 km per day. Obviously, the fact that a large number of former Basmachi and their descendants who fled from Soviet Central Asia lived here was affected. Despite the difficulties and losses in personnel and military equipment, the regiment completed its combat mission.

As an example, we will cite a few lines from the 40th Army's combat log.

11.1.80 - the 860th OTR without artillery and wheeled transport was concentrated in the Gulkhan area. The reconnaissance regiment consisting of four infantry fighting vehicles was stopped in front of a blockage in the Kazdekh region (23 km north-west of Gulkhan). The road from Gulkhana to Kazdekh is difficult for the BMP - sheer cliffs. After the passage of the BMP, the edges of the roads crumble. There is a constant threat of disruption of tracked vehicles into the abyss. The road is impassable for wheeled vehicles. When trying to clear the blockage, a gang of rebels opened fire. A firefight began. In the course of it, 2 officers of the 860th OMS were wounded.

13.1.80 - 860th Omsk is located in the area of ​​Gulkhan and Ishkashim. By the end of the day, the reconnaissance group and the advance detachment of the regiment as part of the ISB dismantled a blockage on the route up to 120 m deep. 15 km north-west of Gulkhan, they again met a destroyed section of the road. They could not overcome it. In the morning, the 15.1 regiment will begin restoration work and continue reconnaissance along the route. Exploration was carried out south of Gulkhan to a depth of 12 km to the village of Falakhmadin. Further, the BMPs could not pass, since the roads are accessible only for pedestrians and pack vehicles.

16.1.80 - The 860th Specialized Motorized Rifle Regiment continues to clear the road in the Gulkhan area in readiness to carry out the task in the direction of Faizabad. It needs air support (by helicopters) for reconnaissance and landing of small units in order to protect dangerous sections of the road and prohibit enemy actions on the route.

20.01.80 - the 860th OMS continues to carry out the assigned task. At 15.30, the head outpost came under fire and fought all night. There are 14 wounded in the regiment (including 1 officer) and killed - 3 people. (including 1 officer).

To help the 860th brigade, units of the 56th brigade (brigade commander Colonel Plokhikh) were sent to meet him from Kunduz. However, the brigade's heavy equipment soon ran into a blown up bridge over one of the mountain gorges. The bridge across it was built later from duralumin structures made according to the drawings of the troops by the Tashkent aviation association named after I. Chkalov (director at that time - V. Sivets), delivered and mounted by helicopters Mi-6 and Mi-8.

Aviation

The Soviet aviation group in Afghanistan was created by mid-March 1980, taking into account the deployment and conduct of hostilities by combined-arms formations and units in isolated operational areas. The basis for the basing of aviation units was the airfield network of the Afghan Air Force, which provided, if necessary, the regrouping of aviation in order to increase its efforts in certain areas (areas).

Units of Soviet and Afghan aviation were jointly based at most of the airfields in Afghanistan. This ensured closer interaction between them, reduced the time needed to restore the combat effectiveness of the Afghan aviation units and put them into battle.

To strengthen the protection and defense of airfields, one motorized rifle (airborne) battalion (company) was allocated for each of them.

At the base airfields, radio navigation and communication facilities were additionally installed, joint command posts for flight control, combat operations control, as well as air traffic of Soviet and Afghan aviation over the territory of Afghanistan were created.

Soviet air units, together with Afghan ones, were based at four airfields (Kabul, Bagram, Shindand and Kandahar), at four airfields, Soviet (Kunduz, Faizabad and Jalalabad) and Afghan (Mazar-i-Sharif) units were based separately.

When regrouping aviation in the interests of forthcoming operations, Soviet and Afghan aircraft and helicopters were jointly deployed at practically all available airfields.

The general staffing of the Soviet aviation group in Afghanistan (Air Force 40 A) included two aviation regiments and one squadron of combat aircraft, one mixed aviation and three separate helicopter regiments, three separate helicopter squadrons and one helicopter squadron. A total of 60 combat aircraft and 19 military transport aircraft, 253 combat and transport-combat helicopters.

Taking into account the physical and geographical conditions and the deployment of combined-arms formations and individual units of 40 A and the areas of combat operations assigned to them, the aviation group in Afghanistan (Air Force 40 A) was divided into four groups: "North", "Center", "South" and " West".

Group "North" - 181 regiment with a squadron of helicopters 335 regiment and 146 regiment 201 mechanized infantry division, the area of ​​hostilities is beyond the Hindu Kush ridge in the northern and northeastern regions of Afghanistan (from Shibargan to Faizabad). Airfields based - Kunduz and Faizabad. During the hostilities, the Mazar-i-Sharif airfield and the Puli-Khumri, Baghlan, Sari-Pul, Shibargan, Ishkashim, Gulkhana, Jarm and others helicopter pads were used for temporary deployment. The total number of the "Sever" combat personnel is 81 helicopters, of which 60 are combat and transport-combat helicopters.

Group "Center" - 50 OSAP, 263 OAETR, 115 Guards. ip, 262 ove, 292 ovp. It was intended for operations in the central and southeastern regions of Afghanistan (south of the Hindu Kush ridge to the border with Pakistan). Airfields based - Kabul, Bagram, Jalalabad. During the hostilities, the following airfields were used: Ghazni, Gardez, Chagcharan (all - only for helicopters), as well as the sites Baglan, Chak, Urgun, Khost, Asadabad, Asmar, etc. The total number of combat personnel of the Center group is 26 combat aircraft and 114 helicopters (including 110 combat and transport-combat).

Group "South" - two squadrons of the 280th regiment and one squadron of the 136th regiment. It operated in the southern regions of Afghanistan (Zabol, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Helmand provinces). Home base - Kandarap. During the hostilities, the Lashkargah airfield, the Girishk, Kalat, Tarinkot and others helipads were used. The total number of the group is 12 combat aircraft and 26 helicopters (of which 16 are combat-transport).

Grouping "West" - 302nd OVE, one squadron of 280th OVP and 136th APIB each. The war zone is the western and southwestern provinces of Afghanistan (Badgiz, Herat, Farah, Helmand).

Home base - Shindand. In the conduct of hostilities, the airfields of Herat, Meimene, Dilaram, Daulatabad, Zaranj, Farah, Khash and others were used. The total strength of the "West" group is 12 combat aircraft and 32 helicopters (of which 30 are combat and transport-combat).

In some cases, during major operations, individual aviation subunits from these groups were recruited for operations in other areas, however, when planning hostilities, they tried to avoid this due to the difficulties in regrouping aviation.

With the redeployment of fighters and fighter-bombers to Afghanistan at the Bagram airfields (115th guards iap), Kandahar (136th apib) and Shindand (217th, then airborne 136th apib), combat duty of Soviet aircraft was introduced in the general air defense system of Afghanistan.

Completion of the entry of troops

By mid-January 1980, the entry of the main forces of the 40th A was basically completed. Two motorized rifle divisions (108th and 5th Guards Msd) and one airborne division (103rd), an airborne assault brigade (56th Airborne Brigade) and two separate regiments (345th Separate Regiment and 860 th Omsp).

On February 2, 1980, another division was accepted into the 40th Army - the 201st Mechanized Infantry Division (the former point of permanent deployment of the division's command - the city of Dushanbe) as part of the 149th Guards. msp, 122 msp, 191 msp, 285 tp, 998 ap, 990 zenap, 71 ordn and other parts. At the time of commissioning, the connection was 100% provided with equipment and weapons, ammunition, and fuel and lubricants. The political and moral state of the division's personnel was noted as healthy. The 201st Mechanized Infantry Division was characterized by a formation that was combat-ready and ready to perform a combat mission.

To understand the conditions under which the troops of the 40th Army sometimes moved, one should cite at least a few examples (lines from the combat operations log of the 40th Army, entry dated January 20, 1980):

": The 186th motorized rifle regiment continued to carry out the previously set task. North of 21 km of Kishim, not reaching 800 m to the bridge, it stopped. The bridge was blown up by the rebels. The cornice section of the rock was blown up and collapsed. A blockage was made on the road. From the road to the rock 2- 2.5 meters. The width of the roadway can only be increased by cutting into the mountains. The depth of the gorge in this area is more than 18 meters. There are no possibilities for the deployment of TMM and MTU (heavy mechanized bridges and tank bridge layers). the main road and defining the scope of work to restore the destroyed bridge. "

Or at least one of the reports on the nature of the destruction of the road on one of the routes of the advancement of units of the 40th Army: ": the left half of the carriageway on a section of 10 meters collapsed into an abyss. The carriageway 1.5-2 m wide is left. On the right is a monolithic wall. , which hangs over the roadway. The rocky ground cannot be worked out by means of overhead charges or manually: ".

And, nevertheless, the tasks assigned to the units and subdivisions of the 40th Army were carried out.

Command and control of troops in Afghanistan was carried out by the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense (located in the Termez region) directly or through the commander and headquarters of the TurkVO. Its chief, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov, controlled the advance of the troops, flying to them by helicopter with a group of officers.

In Kabul, the command of the troops was assumed by the operational group of the Airborne Forces headquarters, headed by the Deputy Commander of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant-General N.N. Guskov. At first, the entire group introduced into Afghanistan was subordinate to him.

At the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, a group of officers of the Main Operations Directorate worked around the clock, which monitored the progress of the entry of troops, changes in the situation in Afghanistan and around it, prepared reports and proposals to the leadership of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR and the state. The duty shifts of this group were headed by the chiefs of the operational management of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

During the period of the introduction of troops, reconnaissance and other types of combat support, technical and logistical support were carried out by the standard forces and means of the troops being deployed, since the army bodies had not yet been alerted. The secrecy of the creation of a grouping of troops was ensured by a period of mobilization extended over a period of time and the alternate bringing of formations and units to combat readiness, and most importantly, by the fact that no one in the troops assumed that such a decision was at all possible.

The total number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan by the beginning of February 1980 reached 81.8 thousand people. (military personnel - 79.8 thousand, including in combat units of the Ground Forces and the Air Force - 61.8 thousand people.

Changes and renames

In subsequent years (up to 1986 inclusive), the combat composition of the grouping of Soviet troops in Afghanistan changed several times. Reorganization of some units was carried out in order to increase their combat capabilities.

As a result, the final composition of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces was as follows: command of the 40th Army with support and maintenance units; divisions - 4; brigades - 5; separate regiments - 4; separate guard battalions - 6; aviation regiments - 4; helicopter regiments - 3; support team; pipeline crew; medical, repair, construction, apartment maintenance and other parts and institutions.

The maximum number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was 108.8 thousand people in 1985. (military personnel - 106 thousand), including in combat units - 73.6 thousand people. (the number of combat troops never exceeded that determined by the Soviet political leadership back in December 1979).

In early January 1980, the question arose of what to call the troops in Afghanistan. They continued to be part of the troops of TurkVO and SAVO and for this reason could not be called the Group of Forces. Calling them the 40th A was not entirely legitimate. In addition to the 40th A itself, in Afghanistan there were a division and a separate regiment of the Airborne Forces, an airborne assault brigade, several regiments of the Air Force combat aviation, regiments of combat and transport helicopters, and parts of the rear of the Center.

The political leadership wanted the general name of our troops to reflect their quantitative limitations and the temporality of their stay in Afghanistan. Ultimately, the name "Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan" (abbreviated - OKSV) was approved. It was decided to abandon the indication in the name of the temporary stay in Afghanistan, so as not to complicate the abbreviation.

The original propaganda meaning of the name, which undoubtedly existed, disappeared over time. This name began to be perceived by everyone as official, open to the press and everyday communication,

The entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Afghanistan by the Afghan population, especially the poor, was initially well received. People willingly made contacts with Soviet servicemen, showed interest in life in the Soviet Union. The people sincerely hoped that our troops would help end the war and help establish peace and tranquility in the country. The word "shuravi" (Soviet) was pronounced with special warmth.

During the march of the troops, when they stopped in settlements, impromptu rallies took place, at which it turned out that the population of the villages adjacent to the highway knew about the impending arrival of Soviet troops. Particularly friendly to the Soviet Army were the soldiers of the Afghan army, as well as members of the committees for the defense of the revolution. In speeches at the rallies, Afghan servicemen thanked our soldiers for their help and expressed their readiness for military cooperation. The slogans of the Soviet-Afghan military friendship were chanted.

At the same time, the well-to-do strata of the population were wary of the Soviet troops and did not enter into contacts. There were also some hostile manifestations. There were, in particular, cases of shelling of some Soviet vehicles on the march (mostly stragglers).

There was also an attempt to prevent the establishment of Soviet control over the Salang Pass. A large group of rebels tried to strike at the airborne assault battalion of Captain L. Khabarov during his posting at the pass. This group had at its disposal armored personnel carriers and even a tank (as it turned out later, stolen from the Afghan unit by soldiers of the Afghan army who had gone over to the side of the rebels). Combat reconnaissance patrol of the battalion under the command of Lieutenant N. Krotov discovered the rebels and repulsed their attack. During the battle, Lieutenant N. Krotov was killed. This was one of the first officers of the OKSV to die.

The Soviet troops brought into Afghanistan, in agreement with the government of the country and together with Afghan units and subdivisions of the army, Tsarandoi (Ministry of Internal Affairs of Afghanistan), and the security services performed a complex of various tasks. They took all the main highways under protection: Kushka-Herat-Shindand-Girishk-Kandahar; Termez-Puli-Khumri-Kabul; and also, Kabul-Jalalabad and Puli-Khumri-Kunduz-Faizabad.

Many objects of Soviet-Afghan economic cooperation were taken under protection, where Soviet civilian advisers and specialists lived and worked. These facilities included the Dzharkuduk and Shibargan gas fields, power plants in Surubi, Naglu, Puli-Khumri and Kabul, a nitrogen fertilizer plant in Mazar-i-Sharif, a tunnel and all structures of the Salang pass, some educational institutions in Kabul, and other facilities.

The protection and uninterrupted operation of the airfields of Kabul (including its international part), Bagram, Kunduz, Faizabad, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Shindand, Herat, Lashkargakh were ensured. The deployment of Soviet garrisons in every possible way supported and strengthened the organs of state power in 21 provincial and many county and volost centers.

An important task of the Soviet troops was to conduct, together with Afghan units and subunits, combat operations of various scales to defeat the most dangerous, aggressive detachments and armed opposition groups, as well as fight against caravans that delivered weapons and ammunition to Afghanistan from Pakistan and Iran. This task was designated from March 1980 and finally became one of the main ones since 1981.

(abbreviated - 108th mechanized infantry division) - military unit of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan. The division was formed from the 360th Infantry Nevelsk Red Banner Division, which was formed in accordance with the Decree of the State Defense Committee of August 13, 1941 and the order of the Commander of the Volga Military District, Lieutenant General V.F. Gerasimenko of August 14, 1941.

History

The combat path of the division during the Great Patriotic War

The division began to form in the city of Chkalov (now Orenburg), and some of its units and divisions - in the cities and villages of the Chkalovsk (now Orenburg) region. By October 1, 1941, the division was mostly manned. The combat path of the 360th Infantry Division began on November 12, 1941, when the first echelon, loaded with personnel, equipment and weapons, moved west. As part of the troops of the Western Front, units and subunits of the division occupied the second line of defense, erected defensive structures, where they received the first attacks of the enemy.

On December 25, 1941, by order No. 0508 of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the division was included in the 4th Shock Army of the North-Western Front.

On January 29, 1942, the division launched an offensive against the city of Velizh. As a result of a two-hour battle, the first battalion of the 1193rd Infantry Regiment, attacked from the right flank, broke into the city and started street battles. The 1197th Rifle Regiment was advancing on the northern outskirts of the city. One of the units of the 1193rd Infantry Regiment blocked the enemy's escape routes and the approach of his reserves on the Nevelskoye Highway. By the morning of January 30, the 1195th Rifle Regiment cut the Vitebsk highway with a blow from the southwest, broke into the outskirts of the city and began to move towards the center. From the southeast, crossing the Zapadnaya Dvina River on the ice, the soldiers of the 1197th Infantry Regiment occupied the outskirts of the city. Thus, the enemy garrison in the city of Velizh was completely surrounded.

In the battles for Velikiye Luki, which lasted from December 24, 1942 to January 14, 1943, divisions of the division destroyed 23 guns, 72 machine guns, 5 six-barreled mortars, 30 vehicles, 81 tanks and 4 aircraft, up to 7,000 enemy soldiers and officers. The 205th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht, sent to help the encircled garrison, was unable to break through to the city; the garrison was destroyed and partly taken prisoner. In the order of the commander of the 3rd Shock Army on January 23, 1943, it is noted: “360 Rifle Division coped with the assigned task. The enemy was hit and he was forced to turn from the direction on which the 360th Infantry Division stood as a solid wall. " For skilful actions in the Velikiye Luki area, the entire personnel of the 360th rifle division was commended by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

On October 6, 1943, after a two-hour battle, the division captured the settlements of Volch'i Gory, Isakov, Gerasimov, Krasny Dvor and cut the Nevel-Velizh highway. The 236th Tank Brigade followed the division on the highway and suddenly burst into the streets of the city of Nevel. By the end of the day, the division had completed its immediate and subsequent mission; having passed 20 km with battles, helped in the capture of the city of Nevel. The units and subunits of the division defeated the 2nd Infantry Division and the 83rd Regiment of the enemy. In his order of October 7, 1943, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief declared gratitude to the personnel of the division. The division was named "Nevelskaya".

On February 3, 1944, the division launched an offensive in the direction of Volkovo. As a result of numerous battles, by February 16, she captured the settlements of Volkovo, Gorbachi, Bryl, Prudnaki and crossed the Zaranovka River. Until April 10, 1944, the division fought in various sectors of the 1st Baltic Front.

On April 29, 1944, the division went on the offensive and captured the strong points of Glistinets, Tikhonov, Yasinovtsy. The Germans threw fresh reserves into battle. Division units fought off 6-10 counterattacks a day. During the fierce battles that lasted from April 29 to June, the division exhausted the enemy and on June 27, 1944, going over to a decisive offensive, captured the village of Rovnoe, broke through the German defenses and began to move towards Polotsk. 3a excellent combat operations in the battles for Polotsk, the division received the third commendation of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

On July 27, 1944, scouts, followed by the rest of the 1193rd Infantry Regiment units, broke into the streets of Dvinsk. For skillful actions in the battles for the capture of the city of Dvinsk - an important railway junction and a powerful stronghold of the Germans in the Riga direction - the division received the fourth commendation of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The 1193rd Infantry Regiment was named "Dvinsky". Until the end of 1944 and in January 1945, the division fought in the area of ​​the Venta River (the settlements of Zavkalma, Dangas, Sunas, Lichi). As a result of stubborn and fierce battles, the division crossed the Venta River and advanced significantly forward.

In 1944, the division fought over 335 km from Polotsk to the Venta River, liberated up to 500 settlements, including the cities of Polotsk, Dvinsk, Drissa, Volyntsy and others. Division units destroyed over 10,000 enemy soldiers and officers, 58 tanks, 74 self-propelled guns, 160 machine guns.

On May 7, 1945, the division crossed the Viesata River, knocked out the defending units of the 205th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht from their positions and began to pursue the retreating enemy. On May 8, German resistance began to weaken, and by the end of the day more than 600 soldiers and officers had surrendered. Pursuing demoralized enemy units, on May 8 the division captured the city of Kandava, on May 9 - the town of Sabile. The 1193rd Infantry Regiment continued the offensive, occupied the city and port of Vindava (now Ventspils), and reached the Baltic Sea. On May 9, the division began to disarm the surrendered enemy units: the 205th Infantry Division, the 12th Panzer Division, the 218th Infantry Division, the mechanized mechanic brigade, the "Courland" 24th Infantry Division, the 15th and 19th Light Infantry Divisions, 16th and 38th Panzer Corps.

During the Great Patriotic War, the division fought over 850 kilometers, during redeployments and maneuvers made marches with a length of 2500 km, liberated more than 2500 settlements. During this time, it destroyed over 50,000 Nazi soldiers and officers, 100 tanks, more than 200 guns and 650 machine guns, captured more than 11,000 enemy soldiers and officers; captured 200 tanks, 250 guns, 800 machine guns and many other weapons and property. For excellent combat operations during the Great Patriotic War, the division received a total of five commendations from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The 1195th Infantry Regiment was awarded the Order of Suvorov III degree.

The composition of the division 1941-1945

• Management (headquarters)

• 1193rd Infantry Regiment

• 1195th Infantry Regiment

• 1197th Infantry Regiment

• 920th Artillery Regiment

• 664th separate anti-aircraft division

• 419th separate motorized reconnaissance company

• 637th separate sapper battalion

• 435th separate chemical protection company

• 472nd separate autotransfer

• 442nd separate medical and sanitary battalion

• 221st Field Bakery

Post-war history of the division

The division was part of the Leningrad Front and the Baltic Military District until October 1945, when it was redeployed to the city of Termez and became part of the Turkestan Military District. By November 1, 1945, the division was stationed in military camps at its new location and until the end of the year was engaged in combat and political training. In November, the division carried out the second phase of demobilization of the older age groups; in November-December, units of the division received replenishment, divisions were created for the new states.

Until December 1979, the former 360th Infantry Division, and now the 108th Nevelskaya Red Banner Motorized Rifle Division, ensured the security of the Soviet Union on the southern borders.

Combat path of the division in Afghanistan

In December 1979, the war in Afghanistan began, and the 108th Red Banner Nevelsk Motorized Rifle Division again found itself in the fire of battles. By that time, the division was "Cropped"- that is, with a partially deployed state. In a short two-week period, all units of the division were supplemented by officers, soldiers and sergeants called up from the reserve - the so-called "Partisans"- residents of the Central Asian republics and the south of the Kazakh SSR. Exactly "Partisans" and will make up to 80% of the personnel of the division when troops are deployed to Afghanistan.

On December 10, 1979, by order of the General Staff, the division was put on high alert, one motorized rifle and one tank regiment - in full. On December 13, the entire division was brought to full combat readiness. On December 24, the Minister of Defense signed a directive on the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, where the time for crossing the state border was determined - 15.00 on 25 December. At 15.00 on December 25, 1979 108msd began crossing the pontoon bridge in the Kabul direction.

The first unit of the Soviet Army to enter the territory of Afghanistan by land was 781st Separate Reconnaissance Battalion 108msd... At the same time, the border was crossed by BTA aircraft with units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division (previously stationed in Vitebsk), which was transferred to the Kabul airport. By the middle of December 27, advanced units entered Kabul. 108th mechanized infantry division, which have strengthened the security of military administrative facilities. On the night of December 27-28, it entered Afghanistan 5th Guards Msd in the Herat direction. By mid-January 1980, the entry of the main forces of the 40th Army was basically completed. By the spring of 1980, all servicemen called up from the reserve ( "Partisan") in the personnel of the division, they were replaced by conscripts who arrived from the USSR.

• From 1980 to 1989, the division carried out the tasks of ensuring the safety of the movement of convoys along the routes Doshi-Kabul, Kabul-Jalalabad, protecting objects of great importance (an elevator, a warehouse of fuels and lubricants, a power plant in Kabul, a dam and a hydroelectric station in Surubi, an airfield Bagram, etc.)

• The entire period of the division's stay can be divided into stages:

December 1979 - February 1980 The entry of the division into Afghanistan and the deployment of the division in garrisons, the organization of the protection of the points of deployment;

March 1980 - April 1985. Conduct of active hostilities, including large-scale ones, work to strengthen the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan;

April 1985 - January 1987. Transition from active operations mainly to support of Afghan troops with artillery and sapper units. Assisting in the development of the armed forces of the DRA and participation in the partial withdrawal of Soviet troops from the DRA;

January 1987 - February 1989. The participation of troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation, continued support for the Afghan troops, preparation of units and divisions of the division for a complete withdrawal from the DRA.

The stages of the war in Afghanistan were not uniform and differed in the nature of the hostilities. So, for the 3rd and 4th stages, the accumulation of rebel forces is characteristic, the deployment of numerous bases on the territory of Afghanistan, which led to more active hostilities.

In terms of the number of personnel, it was the largest motorized rifle division in the Armed Forces of the USSR at that time. Number of personnel 108th mechanized infantry division at the time of the withdrawal, there were 14,000 troops. She was the only one of its kind in the Armed Forces in terms of the structure, quantity and quality of weapons and military equipment. It consisted of four motorized rifle regiment, each of which numbered 2,200 troops.

In the period from the beginning of 1985 to the end of 1986, the 1074th artillery regiment (1074th ap) 108th mechanized infantry division was the only artillery regiment The USSR Armed Forces were armed with 6 types of guns at the same time.
The standard number of types of guns for such a unit in the structure of the Soviet motorized rifle division did not exceed 3: 2 howitzer battalions D-30, 1-n rocket battalion BM-21 "Grad" and 1-n self-propelled gun battalion 2S3 "Akatsia".
The leadership of the USSR Armed Forces decided in practical terms to find out the effect of using large-caliber guns for the destruction of adobe buildings with thick walls, duval (adobe walls), caves and shelters made of stones that were used by the Afghan mujahideen.
To this end, as an experiment, it was decided to reorganize the 1074th artillery regiment and the 28th army artillery regiment.

Merimsky V. - In pursuit of the "Lion of Panjshir":

Thus, the army does not have the means, except for fighter-bomber aircraft, to destroy adobe buildings with walls up to 2 m thick, duval, caves, rock shelters, etc., behind which the rebels take refuge, since this requires artillery system caliber not less than 152 mm.

The degree of fire damage to the enemy decreased.

Further, it was proposed to conduct a study on the use of new large-caliber, high-precision long-range systems for solving various problems in the conditions of Afghanistan. To conduct the research, create an experimental organization and replace in one artillery regiment division 108th Motorized Rifle Division 122-mm howitzers for two M-240 batteries of Tulip mortars and two batteries of 152-mm Hyacinth guns ....

For the purpose of this experiment, in the 1074th ap from the beginning of 1984, the 2nd Howitzer Artillery Division in 2nd Mixed Artillery Division... Formed 2nd cannon artillery batteries 152 mm towed guns 2A36 "Hyacinth" and 1 mortar battery towed mortars M-240. From the beginning of 1985 to the end of 1986, the M-240 mortars were gradually replaced by their self-propelled version - the 240 mm 2S4 "Tulip" mortar.
At the time of withdrawal from Afghanistan, at the end of December 1988, the 1074th ap had 5 types of guns - 2S3 (18 units), D-30 (18 units), BM-21 (18 units), 2A36 (8 units) .), 2C4 (4 units).
On February 11, 1989, the division, acting in the rearguard of the 40th Army, was withdrawn from Afghanistan and concentrated in Termez.

"Standing in Rukh" - the situation with the 682nd motorized rifle regiment

The critical situation in which the personnel of the 682th motorized rifle regiment was from April 26, 1984 to May 25, 1988.

Losses of personnel of the 108th mechanized infantry division in the Afghan war

For the period from January 1, 1980 to September 1, 1988 (4 and a half months before the complete withdrawal of troops), the irrecoverable losses of the division ( killed, died from wounds and diseases, died as a result of accidents) made up - 2972 ​​servicemen.
For comparison, during the same period, the 5th Guards. The Ministry of Internal Affairs lost 1,135, and the 103rd Guards Airborne Division lost 902 servicemen.

Composition and locations of units 108th mechanized infantry division in OKSVA

Organizational Staff Structure
781st separate reconnaissance battalion
108th Motorized Rifle Division for autumn-1988

• Division headquarters - Bagram city, Kurugulay suburb.

• Propaganda detachment.

• Bakery.

• Military fire brigade

• 632nd courier-postal station.

• 545th Command and Artillery Reconnaissance Battery.

• 581st bath and laundry point.

• Commandant company

• Field office of the State Bank of the USSR

• 113th Detached Flamethrower Company(until 01.03.85 - 113th Separate Chemical Defense Company).

• 177th Dvinsky motorized rifle regiment... Jabal-Ussaraj city.

• 180th Motorized Rifle Red Banner Order of Suvorov Regiment.

In everyday speech - "Court regiment"- due to the deployment near the headquarters of the 40th Army located in the Taj Bek palace. Kabul district Darulaman.

• 2nd motorized rifle battalion 180msp- The restricted area of ​​the Bagram airfield.

• 181st motorized rifle regiment... Kabul, Tyoply Stan district (Khairkhana).

• 285th Uman-Warsaw Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Tank Regiment... Reformed from March 15, 1984 to 682nd SME.

• 682nd Uman-Warsaw Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Motorized Rifle Regiment... Until March 1984 - Bagram. Since March 1984 - the village. Rukha in the Panjshir gorge. On May 25, 1988, he was fought out of the Panjshir gorge and scattered around the outposts around the "Charikar green" with the regiment's headquarters in Jabal-Ussaraj.

• 1074th Lviv Red Banner Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky Artillery Regiment... Kabul district Tyoply Stan (Khairkhana).

• 1049th anti-aircraft artillery regiment... December 1, 1981 left for PrivO, in return arrived 1415zrp.

• 1415th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment... Kabul district Darulaman. Released October 20, 1986

• 781st Separate Order of the Red Star Reconnaissance Battalion... Bagram.

• ... Bagram.

• 1003rd Separate Logistics Battalion... Bagram

• 808th separate communications battalion... Bagram

• 333rd repair and restoration battalion... Bagram.

• 100th separate medical battalion... Bagram.

• 738th separate anti-tank artillery division... Bagram.

• 646th Separate Missile Division... Released September 1, 1980

Compositional supplement 108th mechanized infantry division in OKSVA

Organizational and staff structure 108th mechanized infantry division as of September 1986

Organizational and staff structure1074th artillery regiment

108th mechanized infantry division as of July 1986

Inclusion and exclusion from the division of the 186th motorized rifle regiment]

In the original composition 108th mechanized infantry division, introduced into the DRA, was the 186th Vyborg Motorized Rifle Regiment ( 186th SME). Before entering 186th SME was not included in 108th mechanized infantry division, and was attached from the 68th Novgorod motorized rifle division SAVO.
After entering 186th SME will be stationed in Kabul.
On March 1, 1980, on the basis of the regiment, the 66th separate motorized rifle brigade will be formed (by reorganizing the regular structure of units and including 48th separate air assault battalion) and will subsequently be relocated to Jalalabad.

Rotation of tank regiments

Before entering the DRA as part of 108th mechanized infantry division had its own staff tank regiment- 281st tank regiment ( military unit 44077), which was formed in 1947 on the basis of 845th separate self-propelled artillery battalion (845th Siege) Same 108th mechanized infantry division... He remained on the territory of the USSR due to the fact that he had outdated weapons (T-34, T-44, BTR-152).
Instead, on January 28, 1980, the 108th mechanized infantry division the 234th Permyshl-Berlin Red Banner Order of Suvorov Tank Regiment ( 234th TP or military unit 71177).
In turn 234th TP turned out to be part of the previously squadron 201st mechanized infantry division, stationed on the territory of the Tajik SSR and did not have its own full-time tank regiment, from the 58th Roslavl motorized rifle division, stationed on the territory of the Turkmen SSR.
except 234th TP the 201st mechanized infantry division will be subordinated to the 2nd in a row before the entry of troops tank regiment from the 60th Sevsko-Warsaw Red Banner Order of Suvorov Tank Division MVO - 285th Uman-Warsaw Red Banner Order of Kutuzov 3rd Class Tank Regiment ( 285th TP).
By September 1, 1980, stationed in Kabul 234th TP will be withdrawn to the USSR - 108th mechanized infantry division again will be without tank regiment.
And in the period from December 30, 1980 to January 5, 1981, the 285th Tank Regiment (without 1st tank battalion remained on the reinforcement of the 860th separate motorized rifle regiment in the city of Fayzabad) was redeployed to the city of Baghram, Parwan province, and reassigned from the 201st motorized rifle regiment to 108th mechanized infantry division.

Mobilization of the 285th tank regiment, deployment to wartime states, replenishment and entry into the territory of Afghanistan:

… 285 TP(military unit 77755, Dzerzhinsk, Gorky Region) 60th TD, Gorky.

From January 2, 1980 in accordance with the directive of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces 285th TP, in the place of permanent deployment, was transferred to new states, completed to full strength ... and in full strength was transferred to the subordination of the 201st mechanized infantry division Turk. VO, replacing in the division 234th TP...

Following the order on December 30, 1980. - January 5, 1981 285th TP(without 1 TB, the commander, Mr. Kuksov, remained to carry out the task in the area of ​​Faizabad, the airfield) made a march along the route Kunduz - Puli-Khumri - Salang - Bagram, concentrated in the area of ​​Bagram and became subordinate 108th mechanized infantry division...

After withdrawal from Afghanistan

• After February 1989, units and subdivisions of the division were stationed for permanent deployment in the cities and towns of the Surkhandarya region of the Uzbek SSR in the following composition:

• Headquarters and administration 108msd - Termez

• 180msp on BMP - Termez

• 177msp on armored personnel carriers - Termez (fortress)

• 181msp on armored personnel carriers - pos. Uchkizil

• 285tp- Termez city (northern gates of the city). Re-formed from 682msp.

• 1074ap- Termez city (northern gates of the city)

• 1415zrp- Termez (fortress)
• ordn

• 738optdn- Termez city (northern gate)

• 781orb- Termez city (northern gate)

• 808obs- Termez

• 271oisb- Termez

• 100msr- Termez

• 1003obmo- Termez

• 333orb- Termez city (northern gate)

• 113orkhz- Termez city (northern gate)

• Command company- Termez (fortress)

• 720th training center(later 787th umsp).

After the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, units and subdivisions of the division, using the experience of conducting combat operations in mountainous desert areas, were intensively engaged in combat training.
Through the division, the provision of weapons, equipment, ammunition and military equipment to the Afghan army continued. For example, on May 15, 1989, a convoy of 130 T-62 tanks and other equipment passed through the Friendship Bridge, which in the river port of Hairaton were transferred to the recruitment of a tank brigade and a battalion of the Afghan Ministry of State Security. The equipment, prepared by the division's specialists, successfully reached Kabul and took part in battles against anti-government forces.

The situation with battle flags

• 108th motorized rifle Nevelskaya twice Red Banner division In the period from the 60s to December 1993, she used the Battle Banner of the 360th Infantry Nevelsk Order of the Red Banner of the division, on the basis of which it was formed, as the Battle Banner.

• The 682nd Motorized Rifle Uman-Warsaw Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Regiment of the 108th Motorized Infantry Division in the period from March 1984 to February 1989 used the Battle Banner of the 285th Tank Uman-Warsaw Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Regiment of the 108th Motorized Infantry Division as a Battle Banner, at the base which was formed.

Heroes of the Soviet Union of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division

"For the courage and heroism shown in the provision of international assistance to the Republic of Afghanistan, by decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, internationalist soldiers were awarded":

• Aushev Ruslan Sultanovich. Site "Heroes of the Country".

• Kremenish Nikolay Ivanovich. Site "Heroes of the Country".

• Shikov Yuri Alekseevich. Site "Heroes of the Country".

• Grinchak Valery Ivanovich. Site "Heroes of the Country".

• Vysotsky Evgeny Vasilievich. Site "Heroes of the Country".

• Anfinogenov Nikolay Yakovlevich. Site "Heroes of the Country".

• Shakhvorostov Andrey Evgenievich. Site "Heroes of the Country".

• Sokolov Boris Innokentyevich. Site "Heroes of the Country".

• Gromov Boris Vsevolodovich. Site "Heroes of the Country".

Commanders of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division

• Kyzmin, Konstantin Aleksandrovich - in December 1979 he entered the division into the DRA,

• Mironov, Valery Ivanovich - 1979-1982

• Ustavshchikov, Grigory Ivanovich - 1982-1983

• Loginov, Viktor Dmitrievich - 1983-1984,

• Skoblov, Valery Nikolaevich - June 1984-October 1984

• Isaev, Vasily Ivanovich - 1984-1986

• Barynkin, Viktor Mikhailovich - 1986-1988

• Klynkin, Yuri Andreevich - 1988-1989

108th Mechanized Infantry Division in the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan

Since January 1992, the division has been part of the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan.
In 1992-1993, the deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan continued, and the Civil War began in Tajikistan.
Under these conditions, the leadership of the Republic of Uzbekistan, fulfilling the CSTO Charter, sends parts 108th mechanized infantry division and the 15th separate special-purpose brigade for a joint, with 201msd RF Armed Forces, a combat mission to destroy the paramilitary groups of the Tajik opposition and Afghan mujahideen on the territory of the Republic of Tajikistan.
In December 1993, by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, in connection with the transition of the structure of troops to brigade recruitment, 108th mechanized infantry division was disbanded, and its units and divisions, after reorganization, became part of 1st Army Corps (1st AK) with the headquarters located in Samarkand, some of them were transferred to the Central Subordination.
The following reorganization of regiments, separate battalions and divisions took place. 108th Nevelsk motorized rifle division:

• 180th motorized rifle regiment (180th SME) reformed into 7th motorized rifle brigade (7th MSBR) (military unit 11506), Kokayty settlement, Surkhandarya region

• 177th motorized rifle regiment reformed into 3rd MSBR(military unit 28803), Navoi

• 181st motorized rifle regiment reformed into 21st MSBR(military unit 36691), Khayrabad settlement, Surkhandarya region

• 285th Tank Regiment in 22nd MSBR(military unit 44278), Sherabad, Surkhandarya region

• 1074th artillery regiment v 23rd artillery brigade(military unit 54831), Angor, Surkhandarya region

• 1415th anti-aircraft missile regiment in 193rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade(military unit 25858), Sherabad, Surkhandarya region

• 271st separate engineer battalion v 80th engineer brigade(military unit 93866), Angor, Surkhandarya region

• 738th separate anti-tank division v 6th optdn(military unit 62387), Angor, Surkhandarya region

• 333rd hotel repair and restoration battalion v 101st orvb(military unit 49976), Sherabad, Surkhandarya region

• 781st hotel reconnaissance battalion v 50th Separate Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Battalion (50th artillery bombardment or military unit 71308), Termez. Disbanded in 2001.

In 2000, as a result of the ongoing reform in the Ministry of Defense Of the Republic of Uzbekistan, formed Southwest Special Military District with headquarters in Karshi. It currently includes the formations of the former 108th mechanized infantry division.

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08.10.1965 - 02.07.1986
Chase, chase, chase ... In hot blood ...

The Afghan war, which is now somewhat arrogantly interpreted as often completely unprincipled, devoid of any tactical, operational "zest", in fact gave a lot of new for the science of troop command and control and the organization of hostilities. One of these new products is mobile armored groups that combine armored vehicles, motorized rifle units, and, if necessary, artillery. Such groups are not provided for by the charter, but in the conditions of partisan war they have shown their indispensability. Possessing high mobility, maneuverability combined with great firepower, these groups became the trump card of the Soviet command in the fight against the ubiquitous

by gangs of spooks. Many of our fellow countrymen-Penza residents became famous as part of such groups, including Alexander Alonzov, a native of the regional center of Sosnovoborsk. During the 14 months of the Afghan war - from April 1985 to June 1986 - he managed to take part in 17 military operations! And in the years of the frantically tense Great Patriotic War, not every fighter had such a load! And at first, nothing seemed to portend such an extraordinary fate for Sasha Alonzov. He was born on October 8, 1965 in a prosperous working family. Secondary specialized education, graduated from vocational school # 36 with a degree in tractor driver-machinist. He was drafted into the army on October 28, 1984. He studied to be an infantry fighting vehicle driver, almost immediately after the "training" was sent to Afghanistan in 180 MRP 108 MRD (Kabul), which took an active part in the hostilities. And the fiery carousel of war spun the young warrior: raids on the bases of Dushman troops, escorting transport convoys, but you never know what else! In these battles, while completing assignments, the combat experience of our fellow pine-fighter grew, his military skills were strengthened. Within a few months, he was already an experienced soldier. This was also noted by the command, having awarded him the qualification "senior mechanic-driver".
What does it mean to fight in the mountains? This means that purely physiological factors are added to the usual tension of battles. Due to the strong rarefaction of the air, there is a lack of oxygen: twenty steps uphill, and before the eyes already "white flies" are circling. Constant tiredness. Weakened attention, delayed reaction.
Moreover, the mountains are almost complete impossibility to use heavy armored vehicles: they simply cannot follow the paths along which the caravan of donkeys hardly moves. These are difficulties with the use of helicopters: rotorcraft often simply did not have enough "ceiling" in order to support our units, conduct aerial reconnaissance among the heap of gorges, peaks, gorges, high-mountain plateaus.
The support of armored vehicles and aviation was so necessary for the Soviet fighters: it is difficult to think of a more convenient terrain for ambushes, surprise attacks, roundabout maneuvers than mountains with their ridges, gorges, caves, narrow winding paths! Moreover, the headquarters of the "Panjshir Lion" himself - the legendary Ahmad Shah Masud - was nearby! This is the kind of enemy and under what conditions our Russian soldiers had to fight. And they proved with their lives, and often death, that they were worthy of the glory of their ancestors - the heroes of the Great Patriotic and Imperialist, Japanese and Turkish wars.
... On June 2, 1986, the 180th motorized rifle regiment of the 108th division, in which Alexander served, was moved to the area of ​​intense hostilities in the vicinity of the city of Faizabad, Badakhshan province. But during the march, a convoy of vehicles loaded with ammunition came under fire. The "spirits" that had settled on the surrounding peaks fired from large-caliber machine guns. By pressing the firing fighters to the ground, they were about to push the grenade launchers forward and destroy the convoy: it is easy to imagine what effect one grenade could cause when it landed in a box with shells! Not to mention the fact that the regiment, deprived of ammunition, at best would be forced to abandon the combat mission, leaving the fate of those to whom it went to the aid.
The armored group, which included the BMP of Alexander Alonzov, rushed to cut off the Mujahideen from the convoy. An experienced driver-mechanic, Alexander assessed the situation at a glance. He pulled the levers, bringing up a column of dust and exhaust gases from the armored vehicle to an advantageous position, where the gunner-operator could, raising the barrel of the turret cannon high up, “shave off” the parapets of the firing points of the spooks with bursts of 30-millimeter shells. Noticing a ravine in which turbans of "spirits" dived one after another, Alonzov drove his car there in order, like our grandfathers in that Great War, to give an object lesson to the insolent enemy with fire and caterpillars. Was this decision a mistake? Is it possible to foresee everything and everyone in the whirlwind of battle? And for how many guys from the Russian hinterland, the obelisk has become a fiery black pillar of torn earth - the land in which a mine was hidden?
The enemy once again proved his cunning. Russians - their courage. For the heroism shown in this battle, Alexander Alonzov was awarded the Order of the Red Star. Alas, posthumously. He was buried in his native Sosnovoborsk, so similar and so unlike distant Afghan villages.