Odessa defense 1941- heroic defense of Odessa on August 5 - October 16, 1941 by Soviet ground forces, forces and means of the Odessa naval base (commander Rear Admiral G.V. Zhukov) and the Black Sea Fleet (command Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky) with active participation of the city population against the troops of the 4th Romanian Army (command of General N. Chuperk), who besieged Odessa from land. During the defense, on August 19, it was created Odessa defensive region (OOR).

Chronology

In early August, after the first and quite successful defensive battles on the borders of the USSR, the troops of the Southern Front of the Red Army began to retreat to the east, fearing encirclement, due to the catastrophic defeat of the troops of the Southwestern Front to the north of them.

Units of the Primorsky Army, formed from units of the Primorsky Group of Forces, were given the order to defend Odessa to the last possible opportunity. On August 5, fighting for the city began. On August 8, a state of siege was declared in Odessa. Until August 10, the troops of the Primorsky Army fought on the distant approaches to Odessa, and then retreated to the front line of the city’s defense.

On August 13, Romanian-German troops reached the Black Sea east of Odessa and completely blocked Odessa from land, finally cutting it off from the troops of the Southern Front.

Sailors of the Black Sea Fleet provided assistance to besieged Odessa. A detachment of warships under the command of the commander of the Odessa naval base, Rear Admiral G.V. Zhukov, defended the city from the sea. Dry cargo ships located in Odessa provided sea transportation in the interests of the front. The crews of the submarines M-33 and M-60, led by captain-lieutenants D.I. Surov and B.V. Kudryavtsev, died off the coast of Odessa.

Headquarters issued a directive on organizing Odessa defensive region (OOR). Rear Admiral Zhukov was appointed commander of the area, directly subordinate to the commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

The task was set: to defend the area of ​​Fontanka, Kubanka, Kovalevka, Otradovka, Pervomaisk, Belyaevka, Mayaki, Karolino-Bugaz station. It was necessary to pay special attention to the creation and development of engineering structures, rear lines, and preparations for the defense of the city itself. It was ordered to involve the entire population capable of bearing arms in the defense of the city.

Throughout the defense, the Supreme High Command and the command of the Black Sea Fleet helped the city with personnel, weapons, military equipment, ammunition, fuels and lubricants and food. At the end of August, six detachments of volunteer sailors, totaling 2,400 people, joined the ranks of the city’s defenders.

On September 14, the OOR military council was forced to request urgent assistance due to a lack of reinforcements. On September 15, a response was received with an order to hold out for a few more days. By order of Headquarters, the full-blooded 157th Rifle Division from Novorossiysk with a total number of 12,600 people under the command of Colonel D.I. Tomilov was transferred to Odessa. On September 17, its first echelon arrived at the port of Odessa.

Arriving reinforcements from the Headquarters reserve and the defense forces of the Primorsky Army strengthened positions in the Southern sector of the OOR, which made it possible to begin preparing a counterattack in the Eastern sector in order to rid the city and the port with the fairways leading to it from artillery shelling from the northeast. As a result of the operation of the air and sea landing of the Grigorievsky landing force in the eastern sector of defense and the liberation of Chabanka, Staraya and Novaya Dofinovka, the situation at the front stabilized from September 24th. The shelling of the port and water area was stopped. The headquarters of the Odessa Defense Region began to develop a plan for preparing troops for long-term defense in connection with the approach of winter. But for strategic reasons, on September 30, a directive was received from Headquarters: “The soldiers and commanders of the OOR, who bravely and honestly completed their task, evacuate the troops of the Odessa Defense Region to the Crimean Peninsula as soon as possible”.

In pursuance of the directive, on October 16, the landing and loading of troops and equipment onto ships was completed: 35,000 people with weapons and military equipment headed for Sevastopol under the cover of a convoy of ships. An operation was carried out to withdraw the defending troops in direct contact with the enemy, hidden from the enemy.

Summing up the defense of Odessa, the newspaper Pravda wrote:

Composition of the defenders

On August 19, 1941, by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the Odessa Defense Region (ODR) was created. The commander of the Odessa naval base, Rear Admiral G.V. Zhukov, was appointed commander of the OOR. The OOR included the Separate Primorsky Army under the command of Lieutenant General Georgy Pavlovich Sofronov from October 5 - Major General Ivan Petrov), the Odessa Naval Base and the Black Sea Fleet (commander - Vice Admiral Philip Oktyabrsky) with the active participation of the city population.

The fate of the Primorsky Army

The Primorsky Army was transferred to Sevastopol and took part in the defense of Sevastopol. In heavy battles in June 1942, army units were almost completely destroyed. The army commander, General I.E. Petrov, was taken out of the besieged city by submarine and subsequently held high command positions in the Soviet army.

Medal "For the Defense of Odessa"

By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of December 22, 1942, the medal “For the Defense of Odessa” was established. It was awarded to all participants in the defense of Odessa - military personnel of the Red Army, Navy and NKVD troops, as well as civilians who took a direct part in the defense. The period of defense of Odessa is considered to be August 10 - October 16, 1941.

Data

• At the very beginning of the battles, three times Hero of the Soviet Union Alexander Pokryshkin shot down a plane near Odessa (by an unfortunate coincidence, it turned out to be a Soviet Su-2 bomber).
• During the siege of Odessa, homemade “NI” (“Na Puzug”) tanks (at least 50 pieces) were manufactured - ordinary tractors were lined with boiler steel and armed with machine guns and/or small-caliber cannons.
• Odessa was one of the first to receive the title of Hero City.

Defense of Odessa. 73 days of heroic defense of the city Savchenko Viktor Anatolyevich

Chapter 15 BATTLE FOR ODESSA. RESULTS

BATTLE FOR ODESSA. RESULTS

There are different assessments of the results of the battle for Odessa. Recently, a number of studies on this topic have appeared in Romanian historiography, which provide a detailed overview of the combat operations of the Romanian units and an assessment (albeit quite biased) of the actions of the Romanian command. On the Soviet side, the first assessment of the defense of Odessa was made during the war. An example is A. Borisov’s brochure “Defense of Odessa. A brief operational-tactical outline”, which was published in 1943.

In subsequent publications, much less attention was paid to the analysis of the actual actions of the Romanian and Soviet commands during the hostilities. The only exceptions are works devoted to Soviet naval art during the Great Patriotic War, where only certain aspects of city defense were considered. Without in any way questioning the decisive role played by the courage of Soviet soldiers, it should be noted that no less important in the Romanian “embarrassment” were the mistakes of the Romanian command and the insufficient level of training and armament of the Romanian troops.

In the period from June 22, 1941 to January 1, 1942, according to statistics from the General Staff, Romania mobilized and used on the Eastern Front: 418,760 people in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, 426,440 in Transnistria and Odessa, 78,240 in Crimea, 75 040 near the Sea of ​​Azov, 64 120 in Kharkov. To participate in the battle for Odessa, the Germans sent 7 batteries of heavy artillery (of which four were coastal artillery), 2 assault battalions, and 1 bomber squadron.

In the battles for Odessa, the Romanian army lost 875 officers, 308 non-commissioned officers, 16,708 soldiers killed, 2,470 officers, 1,035 non-commissioned officers, 59,775 soldiers wounded, 90 officers, 42 non-commissioned officers, 8,717 soldiers missing (28.50 % of all officers, 14.6% of sergeants and warrant officers, 26.76% of soldiers); Thus, near Odessa, the Romanian army lost 3,435 officers, 1,385 non-commissioned officers, 85,200 soldiers (killed, wounded, missing). A total of about 100 thousand people (excluding Wehrmacht losses near Odessa, which amount to several thousand people).

Soviet casualties totaled 41,268 (16,578 killed and missing and 24,690 wounded). The ratio of combat losses between the defending Soviet and advancing Romanian forces was 1:2.3. In addition, Romanian sources say that between July 2 and October 6, the Romanians captured 60 thousand prisoners and another 6 thousand people on October 15–16. According to Romanian data, near Odessa, Soviet troops destroyed 58 aircraft, 19 combat vehicles, 90 cannons, 115 mortars, 956 machine guns, 336 machine guns, 10,250 rifles.

Soviet sources cite more significant figures. For example, the number of Romanian losses is estimated at 160 thousand people. There is an equally big difference in the assessments of downed aircraft and damaged tanks. In the essay by A. Borisov, the figure is 99 aircraft, in the book “73 Heroic Days” there are already 167 of them, in some Soviet articles the figure already appears as more than 200.

Romanian sources give generally fantastic figures for the losses of Soviet aircraft. The report of the chief of the aviation defense section of the General Staff of the Romanian Royal Navy, Major Paunescu, provides the following data: for the period from August 1 to October 16, 1941, the Romanian aviation, which took part in the battle for Odessa, consisted of 650 aircraft, grouped into squadrons in accordance with their specialization : 17 fighter squadrons (12–14 aircraft each), 14 bomber squadrons (8–10 aircraft each), 13 observer and seaplane squadrons (10 aircraft each), 3 reconnaissance squadrons (8 aircraft each), 8 transport and ambulance squadrons (10–15 aircraft each).

Anti-aircraft artillery consisted of 52 batteries, of which 20 batteries of 75-mm cannons, 22 batteries of 37-mm cannons, 6 batteries of 13.2-mm machine guns, 3 searchlight batteries.

The number of Soviet aircraft that took part in the battles near Odessa is estimated by the Romanians at 1 thousand units, and the anti-aircraft artillery numbered no less than 150 batteries, armed with 900–1000 guns. Truly, fear has big eyes.

The data on Romanian losses looks just as surprising. The cited document provides the following data: 58 aircraft were destroyed, of which 20 fighters, 12 bombers, 5 reconnaissance aircraft, 10 observers, 1 seaplane, 9 support aircraft, 1 transport aircraft. The Romanians estimated Soviet losses at 397 (!) aircraft, of which 249 were fighters and 45 bombers. Accordingly, the ratio of Romanian and Soviet losses was estimated as 1:6.84.

Losses in Romanian aviation personnel amounted to 59 killed (21 officers, 15 non-commissioned officers, 23 privates), 81 wounded (22 officers, 30 non-commissioned officers, 29 privates), 32 missing (15 officers, 10 non-commissioned officers, 7 privates). A total of 172 people. Soviet personnel losses, according to Major Paunescu's estimates, were seven times (!) higher than the Romanian ones.

From June 22 to October 16, Romanian aviation completed 30 thousand flight hours, 18 thousand missions, using 3 million bombs and 630 thousand artillery shells, destroying 600 ground targets and the already mentioned 397 air targets. German bombers operating in the 5th Army Corps sector throughout September 1941 damaged 18 Soviet ships. The following were also captured: 4 fighters, 50 fighters in disassembled condition, 70 aircraft engines, 1214 aircraft shells, 49 anti-aircraft guns of 76.5, 85 and 12.7 mm caliber, 6 searchlights with a diameter of 120 mm, 16 thousand artillery shells, 582,896 machine gun cartridges of 12.7 mm caliber.

There are detailed data on the participation of Black Sea Fleet aviation (without the 69th IAP). During the battle for Odessa, the Black Sea pilots made 4,641 sorties (624 of them at night), scattered up to 10 infantry regiments, destroyed 168 tanks, 135 vehicles, 14 armored vehicles, 25 tanks with fuel and lubricants, 7 guns and up to 2,000 soldiers and officers. In air battles and at enemy airfields, Black Sea Fleet aviation destroyed 80 enemy aircraft, while the Black Sea troops themselves lost 47 aircraft.

Apparently, as usual, the sides quite accurately name their own losses, but significantly increase the enemy’s losses. In this case, the Soviet data on enemy losses is closer to the truth, since not only Romanian aviation fought against the Soviet troops (the figure of 58 lost Romanian aircraft fits well here), but also German aviation.

The figures about destroyed Romanian tanks raise equally strong doubts - the figure is 168 tanks, which were allegedly shot down only by Black Sea Fleet aviation pilots! A. Borisov's essay indicates that 55 tanks were knocked out by artillerymen and tank destroyers. Taken together, it turns out that together with aviation and ground forces, all Romanian armored forces were completely destroyed, with the exception of the FT-17 platoon located in the rear. But a knocked out and destroyed tank is not the same thing. A destroyed tank is a tank that cannot be restored, while a tank that has been knocked out after a battle may well be restored. It is very likely that the Romanian side, when citing the figure of 19 combat vehicles, meant irretrievable losses in tanks. But these figures also seem to be underestimated.

Soviet sources say practically nothing about the losses of Soviet tanks near Odessa. Nevertheless, G. Penezhko’s memoirs mention at least the irretrievable loss of 6 BT-7 tanks: 3 tanks sank in the lake during an operation near the village of Yaski, three more were lost in the area of ​​​​operations of the 25th Infantry Division near Kagarlyk in the 20s days of August, 1 - during the liberation of the Lamzin battalion, which was surrounded, and 2 - during the offensive on October 2. Romanian sources indicate that during the general Romanian offensive, 5 Soviet tanks were knocked out, and during the Soviet offensive on October 2, another 12 tanks. In general, Soviet losses of combat vehicles over the entire period of fighting can be estimated at 10–15 units.

In addition, during the evacuation in Odessa, all the “Yanvarets” - “NI” armored tractors were left behind, which were subsequently used by the Romanians as training vehicles, and three operating armored trains and two inoperative ones were also rendered unusable.

With the end of the Battle of Odessa, the command of the Romanian Army was disbanded: on November 1, 1941, the 4th Army was returned to Romania (Iasi) and reorganized.

On November 4, 1941, the 3rd Army received orders to secure the territory between the Dniester and the Dnieper. For this purpose, in the territory between the Dniester and the Bug, the 2nd and 6th Army Corps, consisting of six infantry divisions, one engineering brigade and two cavalry divisions, were allocated from the 3rd Army.

The success of the defense of Odessa was largely ensured by the fact that the enemy failed to achieve air superiority. Initially, in the first days of the war, Soviet aviation, based in the Odessa Military District, suffered much fewer losses than in other areas. The wider possibilities of using Soviet aviation in the defense of Odessa, especially before the abandonment of Ochakov and Nikolaev by Soviet troops, were explained by the fact that there were 11 land and 4 naval airfields near Odessa and Tavria.

The relative proximity of airfields, where Soviet bombers and attack aircraft could be based, in the initial period of the defense of Odessa favored their use in the interests of the defending troops. After the abandonment of Nikolaev and Ochakov, difficulties in using strike aircraft increased. The separate basing of bomber aviation (at the airfields of the Crimean hub) and the fighters covering it made it difficult to organize tactical interaction and caused tension in the small number of fighters located in Odessa.

In the battles near Odessa, Soviet I-16 fighters, which made up the main aviation fleet of the Primorsky Army, had to face not only the Romanian PZL P-24E aircraft, which were similar in combat qualities, but also the Me-109, which was superior to them. The success of Soviet fighter aviation in battles with enemy fighters was facilitated by the development of new tactics by the commander of the 69th Fighter Aviation Regiment, L. Shestakov. In battles with Me-109, the group's battle formation was located in several tiers in height. The upper tier was where the Me-109 usually finished climbing after an attack and dived again from a combat turn onto the I-16. The upper tier aircraft, taking advantage of their superior speed during descent, could pursue enemy fighters, just like the middle tier aircraft. The lower I-16s at low altitude were forced to rely only on their superior horizontal maneuverability relative to the enemy. In fights with the more maneuverable Romanian PZL P-24 fighters, the German style of combat was used - the faster I-16s attacked them from above and immediately went back up.

Given the shortage of attack aircraft, a number of I-16s were converted to carry light bombs and rockets, allowing them to be used for attacks on ground troops.

In addition to supporting ground units, Romanian and German aviation, given the weakness of the Romanian fleet, was assigned a much more important task - to impede military and cargo transportation to Odessa. However, neither Romanian nor German aviation could cope with this task, despite the fact that there were extremely favorable conditions for its implementation: an insufficient number of Soviet fighters, the absence, at first, of reliable cover for transports going from Sevastopol to Odessa.

As the authors of the book “Soviet Naval Art during the Great Patriotic War” note, the reasons for this “lie in the habitual attempt of the German aviation command to simultaneously solve several tasks with forces that seemed to be sufficient to complete only one of them. German aviation almost always operated against the convoys in small, sequentially attacking groups of aircraft. In a number of cases, these groups struck again after reloading. Only occasionally were attacks carried out by larger groups.”

From the second half of August 1941, German bombers and torpedo bombers transferred from the Mediterranean naval theater began operating on communications connecting Odessa with other Soviet naval bases. The intensification of German aviation forced the Black Sea Fleet to strengthen its marching guards, which played mainly the role of anti-aircraft cover.

In total, during the entire period of defense of Odessa on the Sevastopol - Odessa - Sevastopol route, 12 ships were killed by aviation, including 2 ships (17%) from mines laid by it, 7 ships (38%) from aerial bombs, 3 from torpedoes vessel (25%). Of these ships, only three were escorted, and two of them were guarded by one patrol boat each. These ships did not have air cover.

German and Romanian air forces acted not only against convoys at sea, but also against the port of Odessa, trying to disrupt loading and unloading operations. When attacking a port, strike groups usually consisted of 5–12 bombers covered by fighters. However, strengthening the Soviet air defense system both at the crossings and in the port required both the massive use of strike aircraft and a more specific choice of target from Romanian and German aviation: either convoys at sea or a port.

Raids by Romanian aviation on the Odessa port created additional stress for Soviet fighter aircraft, which also ensured the entry and exit of convoys and single transports, and covered them when moving during daylight hours. This task was solved by patrolling in the air with one or two pairs of fighters. In the latter case, the first pair patrolled at an altitude of 500–600 m, the second at an altitude of 1000–1500 m. This number of fighters was clearly not enough even to support medium-sized convoys. In this situation, fighter pilots were ordered not to get carried away in pursuit of retreating enemy aircraft, which could deliberately distract Soviet fighters. The pressure on Soviet fighters especially increased after the enemy began using Me-109 fighters as bombers in September 1941.

Along with aviation, Romanian long-range artillery was also used against the port of Odessa. To reduce the damage from artillery fire and bombing, the defenders of Odessa took retaliatory measures: the organization of parking and the approach of ships and vessels to Odessa was rebuilt, and the port was filled with smoke. The actions of Romanian and German bomber aircraft were constrained by the actions of the Soviet air defense forces (73rd anti-aircraft artillery regiment, 16th and 53rd anti-aircraft divisions, machine gun and searchlight battalions).

The Romanian military assessed the operation of the Soviet air defense system as follows: “The air defense of Odessa was well organized and equipped with a large amount of anti-aircraft artillery, as a result of which the sky of Odessa was not accessible to either our or German aviation, except at high altitude.”

Attempts to blockade Odessa harbor with the help of German aircraft were equally unsuccessful. The delay of the Luftwaffe in accumulating a sufficient supply of proximity mines also had an impact. As a result, the attempt by German aircraft to mine the Odessa port was unsuccessful. In general, the unsuccessful actions of Romanian and German aviation contributed to the successful defense of Odessa.

Based on archival documents, Romanian historians have identified the main reasons that led to the “incomplete” military success near Odessa. First of all, the factor that played a role was that the Romanian General Staff in its analyzes underestimated the Red Army as a worthy enemy, well armed and trained, with professional commanders and with an exceptional desire to fight.

On November 4, 1941, shortly after the capture of Odessa, the 2nd (intelligence) department of the 4th Romanian Army prepared a certificate entitled “Data on the actions of Soviet troops opposing the 4th Army in Bessarabia and Transnistria during the conduct of hostilities 22 June - October 16, 1941", intended for studying and taking into account the further experience of conducting combat operations with the Soviet army. In the section “The work of commanders and staffs of units and formations of Soviet troops” it is noted:

"1. The commanders of the Soviet troops at all levels showed unyielding determination, energy and perseverance to complete their assigned tasks.

The high command of the Soviet troops was well aware of the composition of the grouping of our troops and the tasks assigned to our troops (which is confirmed by operations on the Prut River in the sector of the village of Epureni - the village of Tsyganka and during operations in the Odessa region).

It should also be noted that the commanders and staffs of smaller units, up to and including the battalion level, are well trained. In this case, the battle of the 2nd battalion of the 161st rifle regiment in the Bolshaya Dalnitskaya - Novy Dalnik sector in September 1941 is indicative, when Soviet troops showed exceptional skill in defense and counterattacks.

2. The commanders’ combat orders were brief and included the following main points:

– information about the enemy;

– tasks of units and subunits;

– ways to accomplish assigned tasks.

All orders were approved by the commander of the appropriate level, and also signed by the chief of staff and the political commissar, who reviewed all staff documents. At the same time, despite the inspection of headquarters documents, political commissars and political instructors canceled only a small part of the documents, and to an even lesser extent this concerned combat orders.

3. The organization of the transmission of orders to lower units and subdivisions, during which overlapping means of wire communication, radio transmissions, and communication delegates were used, was carried out quickly and efficiently.

4. During the conduct of hostilities, the Soviet command showed the ability to act even in situations of clear superiority in manpower and equipment of the Romanian troops.”

There were certain shortcomings in the organization of the defense of Soviet troops near Odessa. Thus, the joints of the units were not always ensured, which was repeatedly used by the advancing Romanian units, which, having found them, wedged themselves between the units.

The Soviet infantry received and skillfully used a wide range of weapons: semi-automatic rifles, submachine guns, mortars. True, at the initial stage of the defense of Odessa, there was a catastrophic shortage of weapons, as a result of which individual units went into battle armed only with grenades. The battalions were supported by mortar units of caliber from 50 to 80 mm, and the regiments were supported by one or two 76.2 mm artillery batteries.

The mortars advanced to the first line and, as a result of the shelling, led to heavy losses and demoralization of the Romanian troops. Tactical aircraft, heavy artillery and armored vehicles actively supported the infantry. The troops constantly launched counterattacks, used military cunning and fought as well both during the day and at night.

Soviet rifle units skillfully used the terrain to deploy fire weapons and organize a fire system, which facilitated the opening of unexpected dagger fire from short distances, when our infantry approached at a distance of 200–300 m, and sometimes less. Flanking fire was also widely used.

During combat operations, both standard and improvised means of camouflage were widely used to camouflage weapons. One of the important factors contributing to the success of the Soviet defense was the well-organized work of the intelligence service, which was noted by the Romanian staff officers.

As stated in the already quoted note from the 2nd Department:

“Soviet rifle units, often operating as part of military personnel from different units in an encircled environment, offer stubborn resistance, leading to hand-to-hand combat, which is explained by their devotion to the political leadership and the youth of ordinary soldiers.

The enemy infantry showed the ability to operate in night conditions, infiltrate through the front edge of our troops, and also take advantage of gaps in the joints of our units and subunits. It should be noted that the enemy snipers are well trained, who, using weapons with optical sights, strive to hit, first of all, the command staff of our troops.

At the same time, during offensive combat operations, the Soviet infantry acts without much initiative or ingenuity.

Frontal counterattacks by Soviet rifle units and subunits, even supported by a large number of artillery and attack aircraft, mortars and machine-gun fire, were unsuccessful and were always repulsed with the help of our artillery.”

The Romanian infantry did not fully master 60 and 80 mm mortars, did not always receive air support and was not fully supported by its artillery on more than one occasion.

The Romanian army was affected by the lack of experience in using tank units. Having more than 100 tanks in the Odessa direction, the Romanian troops used them mainly in small groups, although there were cases of using up to 70 tanks simultaneously on a narrow section of the front, as was the case in the battle of Karpov. The interaction between tanks and infantry was not properly adjusted, which led to the fact that tanks were often left without infantry cover. On the other hand, the lack of anti-tank artillery was one of the reasons for the successful operations of insignificant Soviet armored forces, including the Yanvarets-NI armored tractors.

At the initial stage, the Soviet army used a few repaired tanks (from 3 to 10 units) in the most dangerous sectors of the front, moving them from place to place. At the initial stage of the battle for Odessa, Soviet tanks rather played the role of a mobile reserve. In some cases, as in the battles near Kagarlyk in the 20th of August, this led to losses. In this battle, the tank platoon commander did not lead his unit; as a result, the tanks, each acting alone, were knocked out. Subsequently, with an increase in the number of repaired tanks and the arrival of the 157th Infantry Division, tanks began to be used en masse as a breakthrough strike force.

The shortage of tanks on the Soviet side was partially compensated by the use of armored trains. The three active armored trains were used primarily as a mobile reserve providing artillery support. However, the small caliber of their guns (76 and 45 mm) does not allow us to speak of them as a significant firepower. In addition, their attachment to the railway limited the possibility of their use and made them vulnerable to enemy aircraft. At the initial stage, successful raids of armored trains across the front line were carried out twice. It should be noted that the Romanian army did not have armored trains.

Speaking about other mobile units, it is worth mentioning the cavalry, which by that time was already an archaic branch of the military. Nevertheless, cavalry units were used on both the Soviet and Romanian sides. At the beginning of the battles near Odessa, the Soviet command retained cavalry units as a mobile reserve. The cavalry was then dismounted and fought alongside the infantry. The Romanian command tried to introduce its cavalry into battle in certain sectors of the front, using the junctions of Soviet units, as, for example, in Shitzli. But all attempts by Romanian equestrian breakthroughs ended in failure. The Romanian cavalry suffered huge losses.

The command staff of the Romanian troops caused serious criticism. The number of regular officers in the Romanian army was insufficient (50% of officers were called up from the reserve). At the end of the Battle of Odessa, some regiments had only 20 career officers left out of 43, of whom only five had seen combat since the beginning of the war. The number of career non-commissioned officers was also insufficient; many of them were replaced by contract sergeants who had no experience in commanding units.

As the authors of the book “Romania in the Second World War 1941–1945” write, a large number of changes in the structure of units and unsatisfactory organization and support of units had a negative impact: in particular, the lack of a general command of artillery brigades designed to coordinate and direct the fire of artillery units, lack of their own vehicles, which created an obstacle to the rapid movement of troops, in accordance with the requirements of the development of the battle, insufficient provision of communications and trained personnel for supply, lack of anti-aircraft weapons, as well as machine gun companies and heavy mortar companies in the infantry regiments.

Another factor hindering the development of military operations was the poor training of the Romanian troops, due to the shortening of the training period, the time required to master modern types of weapons, which appeared shortly before Romania entered the war. In many cases, skills were acquired in battle. Therefore, it is not surprising that there was a “fear of combat vehicles,” “inability to use mortars,” “limited use of hand grenades,” and “poor use of the terrain.”

Erich von Manstein gave the following characteristics of the Romanian army and the Romanian soldier: “The Romanian soldier, most of whom come from peasant backgrounds, is unpretentious, hardy and brave (by the way, the same qualities of the Romanian soldier were noted by Russian generals in the First World War, they They also gave a negative characterization to the officer corps of the Romanian army of that time. Auto.). However, the low level of general education, and only to a very limited extent, did not allow him to be trained as an initiative single fighter, not to mention a junior commander... Outdated procedures, such as the presence of corporal punishment, also could not contribute to increasing the combat effectiveness of troops...

The decisive shortcoming that determined the fragility of the internal structure of the Romanian troops was the absence of a non-commissioned officer corps in our understanding of the word... Of no small importance, further, was the fact that a significant part of the officers, especially the highest and middle ranks, did not meet the requirements. First of all, there was no close connection between officer and soldier, which we took for granted. As for the care of officers for soldiers, the “Prussian school” was clearly lacking. Due to the lack of experience in warfare, combat training did not meet the requirements of modern warfare. This led to unjustifiably high losses, which, in turn, negatively affected the morale of the troops. Troop control, which had been under French influence since 1918, remained at the level of the ideas of the First World War.”

The social stratification between Romanian officers and soldiers also affected the quality of supplies for the troops. As Manstein writes, “although the supplies of the Romanian troops were provided by us (that is, by the Germans, we are talking about battles in the Crimea. - Auto.), it was still difficult to exert a permanent influence on food distribution. The Romanian officer took the view that the Romanian soldier - a peasant by origin - was accustomed to the coarsest food, so the officer could easily increase his ration at his expense. First of all, this applied to goods sold for cash, primarily tobacco products and chocolate, the supply of which was carried out in accordance with the number of people on allowance. The officers argued that the soldiers were unable to purchase these goods anyway, so they were all stuck in the officers' messes. Even my protest to Marshal Antonescu led nowhere.” Manstein notes another point that limited the possibility of using Romanian troops in the war in the East - “the great respect that the Romanians had for the Russians. In a difficult situation, this posed the danger of panic.”

According to modern Romanian historians, the military-political leadership of Romania took a superficial view of the real state of affairs at the front near Odessa, the balance of forces between the 4th Army and the Soviet group, and neglected to receive military assistance from the allies. I. Antonescu admitted: “We were not sufficiently prudent. It is true that the relatively weak resistance we encountered between the Prut and the Dniester misled us.”

At the direction of the marshal, who received from Hitler the right to make independent decisions on the Black Sea coast between the Dniester and the Dnieper, the 4th Army received the order to “take Odessa on the move.” Later, despite the fact that the city was encircled by land, a classic siege or “land blockade” was not undertaken, due to the fact that Soviet troops had an advantage at sea. The version of Romanian historians about the superiority of Soviet troops in the air must be set aside, since at the very beginning of the battle only the 69th Fighter Aviation Regiment provided cover, and only later did the residents of Odessa receive active support from part of the naval aviation based in the Crimea. Obviously, it should be recognized that we should not be talking about the superiority of Soviet aviation, but about the fact that Romanian aviation failed to achieve dominance in the skies, which significantly complicated the task assigned to it.

The conduct of the offensive of the Romanian troops according to a certain pattern also had an effect. Initially, before the artillery barrage, the Romanian artillery fired several sighting shots. A similar tactic was figured out by the Soviet command. After the shooting began, the commanders took the soldiers into the second trench, leaving behind observers. After the end of the artillery preparation, the Soviet units returned to the first trench and were ready to repel the attack. Soviet commanders noted the inability of Romanian soldiers to adequately respond to flank attacks.

The centralization of artillery command, which previously was partly subordinate to the Black Sea Fleet and partly to the ground command, played a positive role in the defense of Odessa. As the chief of artillery of the Primorsky Army N. Ryzhi notes in his memoirs, “to our regret, in peacetime this issue (that is, coordination of artillery actions. - Auto.) were not engaged, since according to the erroneous views of our military strategy, the very possibility of an enemy attack on Odessa from land was completely excluded. In this regard, the coastal defense artillery was intended exclusively for combating the naval enemy.”

For example, in the “Manual for combat at a mine-artillery position” of the Odessa naval base it was stated that “the task of the base’s forces and assets is a concentrated attack and independent strikes by torpedo boats, air forces and coastal batteries to prevent shelling of the coast of the Odessa naval base.” naval base by enemy ships, laying active minefields off the coast of the base, breaking through into the base by enemy light forces and attacking ships stationed in the internal roadstead. All coastal batteries were subordinate exclusively to the commander of the Odessa naval base. He was entrusted with artillery control during the battle, including the distribution of targets between artillery divisions and individual batteries."

Centralization of fire control in the hands of the OOP artillery commander allowed for greater efficiency in the use of available assets. The commander controlled the naval artillery through the base's flag gunner, the coastal artillery through the commanders of the coastal defense artillery battalions, and the land artillery through the artillery chiefs of the defense sectors. Naval and especially coastal artillery were used in the defense of Odessa as long-range artillery.

The success of the OOP coastal artillery fire was facilitated by well-organized observation and adjustment. In addition to permanent correction posts, each battery had a movable correction post, which was moved out if necessary in one direction or another. The vast majority of shooting was carried out with adjustments based on the observation of signs of explosions.

Subsequently, the arc-shaped front and the concentration of combat formations closer to the center, especially in the last days of the city’s defense, the creation of infantry support groups and long-range groups made it possible to maneuver fire and create a greater density of fire in threatening areas. The long range and accuracy of fire made it possible to widely use naval artillery for counter-battery warfare. Thus, coastal artillery conducted about 35% of its firing at enemy artillery batteries, and of the total number of naval artillery firings, 15% were in counter-battery combat. Artillery support from ships and batteries of the Black Sea Fleet forced the enemy to increase the number of long-range guns on the front near Odessa to thirty-eight.

Actions along the internal operational lines of the Odessa defensive region made it possible for the Soviet command, if necessary, to transfer artillery reserves to any point on the front within one night, while the Romanian command needed three to four days for this purpose.

“Soviet artillery generally did not use fire from long-term positions, preferring frequent movements to new firing positions, which was facilitated by its good equipment with automobile and tracked transport.

The technical condition of the artillery and the training of personnel is good, and therefore almost all artillery raids were carried out on time and on target.

The interaction of artillery, infantry and aviation is organized effectively.

At the same time, Soviet artillery is often used not assembled together, but spread out along the front. Batteries, and sometimes individual guns, are located at a great distance from each other, which significantly reduces the effectiveness of firing.

Firing positions of both light and heavy artillery are located at a great distance from the positions of rifle units, sometimes quite greater than is necessary in defense. Soviet-made artillery ammunition functions normally without many failures. In some cases, the use of shrapnel shells by Soviet troops was noted."

The Romanian command clearly overestimated its own strength and underestimated or did not even know the strength of the Soviet troops. The General Staff, even by the beginning of September 1941, did not know the number of defense lines and confused the front line of defense of the “Soviets” with the main line of defense. The removal from office of the commander of the 4th Army, General N. Chuperke, did not lead to a change in the situation, and his successor was forced to continue working according to the strategic plans proposed by N. Chuperke.

At the beginning of August 1941, the German allies noted that the only correct solution to the operation was to occupy positions northeast of Odessa, from where they could launch attacks on airfields and the city’s port. The General Staff, on the contrary, concentrated its main forces west of the city in open areas and, exhausting the troops in grueling general offensives, did not achieve decisive results.

In his response dated October 11, 1941 to Hitler’s letter (dated October 5), I. Antonescu defends the position of why the troops did not advance from the northern side of Odessa: “The need for the offensive to be developed from the northeastern side of Odessa was obvious to us from the very beginning of hostilities... But we were unable to implement this plan due to the fact that the enemy had superiority at sea... Our attacks from west to east were aimed at gaining the opportunity to strike at the southern coast of the city and presented us with an operational initiative.” . The 4th Army was forced to advance on two main axes, north and west of the target, against a well-fortified enemy with air and sea superiority.

Speaking in general about the strategy of the Romanian command, it should be noted that it was the desire to “take Odessa on the move” that determined the fact that at the initial stage preference was given to a frontal attack on the Razdelnaya-Odessa railway line, which led to unjustified losses and exhaustion of the advancing troops. As A. Borisov noted in his essay, the direction along the Razdelnaya – Odessa railway line “was the shortest and led out troops advancing directly to the city. The terrain in this direction contributed to the widespread use of tanks. However, it was still frontal and therefore was used by the enemy only as the direction of an auxiliary attack.”

Some success began to accompany the Romanian army only after it switched to flank attacks in the South-Western direction (in the sector between the Kuyalnitsky and Bolshoi Adzhalytsky estuaries) and in the South-Eastern direction (along the Dniester estuary). Despite the fact that both general offensives, on August 28 and September 12, did not lead to the capture of the city, the Romanian units managed to create a critical situation for the city’s defenders and organize shelling of the port with long-range artillery from two directions, which could significantly affect the delivery of reinforcements and ammunition to Odessa .

As for the dispute between the Romanian generals Ciuperca and Ionitsu regarding whether it is worth carrying out a concentrated attack on one sector or launching dispersed attacks on various sectors of the front, the success of the Soviet offensives on September 22 and October 2 rather proves I. Antonescu and the General Staff were right.

The position of the command of the 4th Romanian Army was influenced by several factors: the concept of the General Staff and the Supreme High Command (“taking Odessa on the move”, “general offensives”); strategic position at the front (open terrain, without any shelter, fragmentation of the theater of operations due to estuaries and closed “castling lines”); powerful defensive fortifications and combat capability of the Soviet troops (three lines of defense, superiority at sea). Romanian sources note that the freedom of action in decision-making by the command of the 4th Romanian Army was severely limited by the General Staff and the High Command.

After the defeat of the 5th Army Corps as a result of the Grigoriev landing, the 4th Army went on the defensive. I. Antonescu denounced: “One army corps was put in a shameful position, was thrown back 10 km, because one regiment was out of order... One enemy regiment made this shameful catastrophe possible.”

The Odessa operation was the first large-scale operation carried out by the Romanian army against such a serious enemy as the Red Army. Romanian troops were just learning to attack using modern methods and modern weapons.

The command of the Odessa defensive region was able to correctly use the advantages of the terrain and organize defense. Although initially there was a misunderstanding and lack of interaction between the naval and army commands. There was also no experience in defending naval bases from land.

The presence of mobile reserves in the Primorsky Army, first in the form of a cavalry division, and then motorized infantry, tanks and armored trains, ensured speed of maneuver. The army command took care of the reserves, and in the event of the introduction of a reserve into battle, a new, at least small, reserve was always created by allocating part of the forces from the attacked sectors of the front.

Yu. Perechnev noted: “Before the Great Patriotic War, our operational documents underestimated the importance of defensive actions in the Primorsky direction. The Field Manual of the Red Army (projects of 1939–1940) spoke only about the defense of the coastal flanks of the ground forces and outlined the main problems of joint actions of the army and navy in repelling an enemy amphibious landing. The issues of organizing and conducting the defense of the sea coast, naval bases and large coastal cities from land were not considered.

In the “Combat Manual of the Red Army Naval Forces - 1937,” a special section emphasized the special danger of capturing naval bases from land. Therefore, it was recommended to have a land front capable of both repelling a surprise attack and withstanding a long siege. It was to consist of a defensive strip equipped along the entire land front with long-term fortifications with a security strip prepared in front of it in accordance with the requirements of the Red Army regulations, special maneuverable groups of ground units intended for combat in a given fortified area, self-defense of coastal batteries from air and sea landings and equipping threatened areas of the coast with means of anti-landing defense, self-defense of ships in ice conditions, command posts of the land front with all means of combat control. BUMS-37 emphasized that the defense plan for the base's ground front should include the use of artillery fire from coastal batteries and ships for land operations. For this purpose, coastal batteries should be provided with communications equipment and a network of remote posts for adjusting fire on the most important lines and sections of the land front that had been targeted in advance.

These generally correct recommendations lacked the most important provisions: the organization of command of the base forces when defending it from land, the remoteness of the defense lines and the nature of their engineering equipment, issues of interaction between the army and navy, etc. Responsibility for the defense of naval bases from land lay with military districts, but there were no documents regulating the joint actions of the army and navy.”

The joint exercises of the coastal districts and the Black Sea Fleet conducted in the pre-war years, as well as special exercises on air defense and anti-landing defense of bases, showed the insufficient preparedness of their defense from the air and land. But for some reason the results of these exercises did not stimulate the development of specific measures that would ensure the organization of interaction between the ground forces and the navy in the defense of bases.

The military-political leadership of Romania, after the abandonment of Odessa by the Soviet units, experienced conflicting feelings: on the one hand, the “victory” near Odessa, even if incomplete, proved that the Romanian army is a serious rival on the Eastern Front; but, on the other hand, Marshal I. Antonescu did not miss the opportunity to openly express his dissatisfaction with the way the fighting was being conducted, mainly due to the heavy losses.

“The results of mistakes made over two decades can only be described as catastrophic. Untrained officers caused untrained soldiers and non-commissioned officers. It all starts with leadership. State and, as a consequence, political leadership could not help but become the cause of what it is: a disaster. But now the question arises: what should we do? Take note of this and grit your teeth? We must start over and work hard.

1. A new atmosphere of energetic, conscious, intense, coordinating, professional, well-led activity must reign in the General Staff.

2. The command of large units, army corps and divisions should be entrusted only to commanders who not only have brains, but also enthusiasm and vitality, diligent and fair, who can not only serve as an example, but also inspire and stimulate others to carry out reasonable , well organized, well prepared and enthusiastic work.

3. The training of non-commissioned officers and officers should be carried out in such a way as to develop their impetuosity, strengthen their skills, as well as the conscientiousness that they had at the beginning of their careers and which they have lost due to lack of system, bad examples, injustice, because the worst were not punished, problems that were discovered in units at the very beginning of their careers.

4. Finally, we need to improve the training of soldiers and ensure that units are fully staffed. Without this, the weapons could not be used, no matter how much effort they made - and they did - on the battlefield to avoid the disasters that peacetime mistakes entail.

5. And above all, we need continuity in our organization, leadership, preparation, measures, actions, etc...."

The headquarters and intelligence department of the 4th Romanian Army learned the following lessons from the Battle of Odessa, which are reflected in the corresponding note:

“- massive artillery fire directed against enemy infantry is the most effective method of destroying it;

– the use of terrain properties in combination with the skillful use of weapons and equipment is the main key to success;

– training in fire training, camouflage on the ground, supplying troops with communications equipment must be carried out without any considerations of economy;

– work on area engineering equipment is one of the main means of preserving manpower and equipment;

It must be remembered that in battle the main strength of the Romanian army is only man.

– in modern warfare, attacking infantry, without which even heavy artillery will not be successful, decides the outcome of the battle;

– mortars are an effective means of defeating the enemy due to the ability to hit the enemy at short distances and behind cover, which is impossible when using conventional artillery, moreover, they are light in weight and can be used by infantry in any terrain conditions;

– artillery of 75 mm and 76.2 mm caliber does not meet the requirements of modern combat as assault guns; to conduct assault operations, guns of 100 mm or 105 mm caliber are required;