20th Congress of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in brief. XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Send your good work in the knowledge base is simple. Use the form below

Students, graduate students, young scientists who use the knowledge base in their studies and work will be very grateful to you.

Posted on http://www.allbest.ru/

Municipal Autonomous Educational Institution

"Secondary School No. 152"

Test work by discipline: History

XX Congress of the CPSU

Performed:

Markova A.Yu.

Chelyabinsk

Introduction

1. The reasons and prerequisites for exposing the personality cult of Stalin

2. The alignment of political forces on the eve of the XX Congress of the CPSU

3. The main provisions of the report by NS Khrushchev "On the personality cult and its consequences" at the XX Congress of the CPSU

4. Creation and collapse of the "anti-party" group after the XX Congress of the CPSU

Conclusion

Bibliography

ideological diktat communist khrushchev

Introduction

Relevance of the research topic. The XX Congress was and remains the most important event in Russian history. Substantially and even chronologically, he divides its Soviet-Bolshevik era in half.

Of course, major historical events rarely take place in one or several days. The twentieth congress became the culmination point of a turning point that began on March 5, 1953, the day of the dictator's death, and continued for some time. Of the nearly three dozen congresses of the party, which ruled the country with absolute power for three quarters of a century, this congress stood out not with heated discussions, as was the case at the first congresses, and not with slightly new accents in some speeches in the midst of boring solemn word-making, which took almost two weeks.

The main one was Khrushchev's report at a closed session on February 25, 1956, when all the resolutions had already been adopted and the central bodies of the party were elected. Reading deeply into the forgotten text, although it became easily accessible after the publication of 1989, one can now appreciate what this report was, with its breakthroughs, exposures, interpretations and omissions, and to what frontiers the most "thaw" year 1956 brought our country.

And yet, the historical significance of the 20th Congress and what happened immediately after it can hardly be overestimated.

The process of liberation and rehabilitation acquired a sharp acceleration. Hundreds of thousands of people were released, and their good name was returned to millions. If this process, which had begun even before the congress, had proceeded, as Khrushchev's opponents insisted, dosed, had not been loudly announced, its influence on the moral improvement of society would have been much less.

The purpose of the research is to study the content, participants and consequences of the XX Congress of the CPSU of the USSR.

The object of research is the XX Congress of the CPSU.

The subject of research is the content and results of the XX Congress of the CPSU.

1. Causes and prerequisites pexposure of the personality cultStalin

The 20th Congress of the CPSU was undoubtedly a turning point in the history of the USSR. From that moment on, a new stage in the development of Russian statehood began, which ultimately led to radical transformations in society and the state, to a turn from a totalitarian regime to a normal, natural democratic development. After many years of silence, violence, fear, submission to a single ideology, society openly started talking about all the lawlessness and atrocities that had taken place, and, perhaps, one of the notable moments of this process was that the initiative came not only from representatives of the top party leadership, at that time during many interested in the "promotion" of a new ideology, or intelligentsia, which has historically been in opposition to totalitarianism, but also from the middle and lower strata of society, who for the overwhelming majority for many years perceived the situation as a natural necessity. Why did such drastic and largely unexpected changes take place? There are several reasons for this situation.

firstly, for the USSR, the main economic problems were solved, industrialization was fully completed in the thirties, the USSR came to the fifth place in the world in industrial production, exceeding the level of pre-revolutionary Russia, significant successes were achieved in agriculture and other sectors of the national economy;

secondly, Stalin managed to create a tough and strong system of personal control and suppression, which ultimately was embodied in the most severe repression, which was Stalin's support in suppressing all dissent, and in this sense, his authority was built, first of all, on the fear of the whole society and each person in front of the system; thirdly, the victory in the Great Patriotic War played a huge role in the rise of Stalin, since the USSR from a country that was in long-term political isolation turned into a state that dictated directions in world politics, which did not accept the rules of Western capitalist countries, but itself dictated these rules ; fourthly, one cannot but pay attention to the personal qualities of Stalin, who was an excellent leader and organizer, who knew how to manage people and subjugate them.

And yet, despite all this, a situation developed in the country when an outwardly unified system based on a regime of personal power could not fully govern the state, especially from a position of strength. The enthusiasm of the people, which practically put the country on its feet in the twenties and gradually faded after the war, various contradictions began to appear in society, a kind of protest grew. This protest was most vividly expressed in the early 50s in the spiritual sphere, literature and art.

In such a situation, since the end of the thirties, Stalin tried to maximize his position of power, covering almost all spheres of public life and using all possible methods to achieve his goals. Hence the massive repressions - a proven method in the struggle to retain power, and the ideological diktat that reached unprecedented proportions under Stalin, and the "iron curtain" policy designed to isolate the huge state from the world community, to protect it from possible influences and trends of the West, to build socialism in "A single country". Today, evaluating such measures, it becomes clear that they are inconsistent, utopian and impossible to implement, but Stalin needed to preserve the "moral and political unity of society", powerful power in his hands, and therefore he actively took such measures.

Most likely, this is also associated with sharp changes in the composition of the party leadership after the XIX Congress of the CPSU: Stalin expanded the number of the Presidium of the Central Committee to 25 people, and the number of candidates for members of the Presidium - to 11 (15 and 4, respectively, before the XIX Congress), and now the "old guards ”, true adherents of Stalin made up no more than a third of the Presidium of the Central Committee. At first glance, it seems that Stalin, taking such a step, is acting very illogically: being the opposite of collective leadership, he is expanding the composition of the Presidium so unheard of. It is impossible to explain such an act only by the fact that Stalin deliberately prepared the elimination of his closest associates as witnesses of his behind-the-scenes "deeds", since, firstly, there was no threat of exposure from this side, since these revelations would lead to the self-destruction of the entire Stalinist clan; and, secondly, the revelations least of all could have come from Molotov and Mikoyan, whom Stalin ostracized, and, on the contrary, left Malenkov and Beria in the closest retinue.

Probably the most correct explanation for the reshuffle in the leadership of the party is that Stalin was aware of the coming changes, that the cult of personality would die with him. Stalin did not see anyone who could replace him and continue the course of personal leadership, skillfully retaining the strength and power of one-man power; he assigns to his entourage the role of assistants who are incapable of taking big steps in his business, and therefore he saw an alternative to his power only in collective leadership. In pursuing this idea, Stalin simultaneously tried to prevent possible usurpatory claims to power by any of his comrades-in-arms.

However, there is one most important objective reason for the exposure of Stalin's personality cult, which played a decisive role in the changes that took place in the life of the USSR. This reason is the existing Soviet system of power. Phenomena like the 20th Congress were incorporated into the Soviet system as an internal condition for its renewal. The very existence of this system is a two-pronged process that combines "enlightenment" and exposure with the confrontation of the entire authoritarian system, which spread to the consciousness of the entire society, forming the notorious Soviet doublethink. It is not without reason that the processes of the 1930s were so enthusiastically perceived by the majority of the people as a completely fair exposure of the sabotage of the Leninist guard.

The Soviet system of power violated the foundations of human morality and consciousness, when a person does not understand that everything he does is a great crime and sabotage. Under such a system, even during his lifetime, a person becomes his own secret judge and executioner. And after all, the rules of such a game were set almost from the very beginning: back in the 30s, Stalin expressed them as a completely unthinkable paradox, stating that the real wrecker is not at all the one who works poorly, but the one who works well.

The Soviet system of power, constantly denying, exposing and bringing itself to the surface up to completely anti-Soviet positions, nevertheless successfully reproduces itself. The system catches criminals, successfully breeding them; the exposure of crimes for this system of power is an integral part of more and more of its crimes. After all, it was not for nothing that Stalin himself, having carried out collectivization, subsequently condemned its excesses, and after the repressions - the crimes of Yagoda and Yezhov.

One can argue for a long time about how the struggle for power would have developed in such a situation and further, but history ordered it in its own way, and after the death of J.V. Stalin on March 5, 1953, it sharply turned its course in a different direction, accelerating the course of events.

2. The alignment of political forces on the eve of the XX Congress of the CPSU

On March 6, 1953, a joint meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR took place. Taking advantage of the state of shock under the pretext of the prevailing extraordinary circumstances, the need for high efficiency, Stalin's closest associates attempted to restore their undivided domination in the leadership of the party and the country. In fact, at the meeting, the new composition of the Presidium of the Central Committee was approved, and the Bureau of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was liquidated.

The members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee included: G.M. Malenkov, L.P. Beria, V.M. Molotov, K.E. Voroshilov, N.S. Khrushchev, N.A. Bulgarin, L.M. Kaganovich, A.I. Mikoyan, M.Z. Saburov, M.G. Pervukhin. This composition reflects the hierarchy prevailing at that time and almost completely corresponds to the composition that existed before the 19th Party Congress. It is also noteworthy not the very fact of reducing the number of members of the Presidium by more than half, but above all the principle of this reduction: the Presidium of the Central Committee limited its membership to 10 because just so many, no more and no less, remained in power of "Stalin's comrades-in-arms", including Bulgarin, Pervukhin and Saburov, who had been part of the Stalinist apparatus for a considerable time. The new recruits were not given a single seat on the Presidium.

One of the main motives for revising the composition of the Presidium was precisely the inevitability of the question of the personality cult of I.V. Stalin, the regime of the Stalinist dictatorship. In the "reduced" composition, the Presidium of the Central Committee was able to determine the fate of the "personality cult" in its own interests, without fear of exposure by members who were not involved in lawlessness, which later actually happened. Thus, this was the first step towards exposing the personality cult of Stalin.

After Stalin's death, all leading posts in the party and the country remained with his closest associates. G.M. Malenkov became the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Molotov became the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Beria became the head of the new Ministry of Internal Affairs, Bulgarin was appointed the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Mikoyan - the Minister of Internal and Foreign Trade, Saburov - the Minister of Mechanical Engineering, Pervukhin - the Minister of Power Plants and Electrical Industry ... K.E. Voroshilov, and N.M. Shvernik was appointed Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. In addition, it was considered necessary that “Comrade NS Khrushchev focused on work in the Central Committee of the CPSU ", in connection with which he was relieved of his duties as first secretary of the Moscow Committee of the CPSU. Khrushchev formally remained in the rank of secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, but, being the only secretary (besides Malenkov), a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, naturally, he occupied the leading place among them. Khrushchev's position was further strengthened after the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU granted Malenkov's request to relieve him of his duties as secretary of the Central Committee due to the inexpediency of combining the functions of the Pre-Council of Ministers and Secretary of the Central Committee. Khrushchev was entrusted with the leadership of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and presiding over its meetings.

In the current situation of relative stability in the leadership, the possibility of usurpatory relapses remained. On the other hand, the question of the attitude to the regime of Stalin's personality cult acquired increasing political significance. The real danger in this direction came from L.P. Beria. He launched an active political activity, striving in every possible way to strengthen his position, in fact placing himself outside the control of the highest party and state bodies, since he led such a strong department as the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The despotic, adventurous figure of Beria concealed a serious threat to the new dictatorial regime. Having a "dossier" (up to the secret recording of telephone conversations) for each member of the leadership, he had every opportunity to eliminate any competitor. In addition, in his hands was a powerful apparatus for seizing power. In such a situation, the Presidium of the Central Committee, with the support of the military command, took decisive preventive measures and on June 26, 1953, at a meeting of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers, Beria was arrested. Officially, Beria's arrest was the result of his "criminal anti-party and anti-state actions", a report on which was made by G.M. Malenkov at the July 1953 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

For a certain period of time, the "Beria case" filled the vacuum of guilt and responsibility for repressive arbitrariness, violation of the law, and averted the threat of direct accusations against the rest of Stalin's associates. Nevertheless, the situation in the party and the country demanded the strengthening and stabilization of the party leadership. The Central Committee actually had two leaders and did not have an official elected leader. After the removal of Beria, Malenkov had a real opportunity to gain official leadership in the party, but as a mature and rather sober politician, he realized that the burden of crimes of the period of Stalin's personality cult would not allow him to gain the trust and support of the party and the people. N.S.'s candidacy looked different in this regard. Khrushchev, whom Stalin's associates considered their own, who was at the same time quite authoritative and did not fully identify with Stalin's inner circle. Considering all this, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in September 1953 establishes the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and unanimously elects N.S. Khrushchev to him. Thus, by the fall of 1953, the alignment of political forces in the USSR was completed. Stalin's companions retained strong positions in the party and managed to create a fairly harmonious system of top leadership, placing a new leader at the head of the party to ensure further achievement of the set goals.

3. The main provisions of the report by NSKhrushchev "On the personality cult and its consequences" at the XX Congress of the CPSU

Few of the delegates to the 20th Congress of the CPSU imagined what awaited them at the morning closed session on February 25, 1956. For the majority of those present in the hall, Khrushchev's report was a complete revelation, producing a truly shock effect.

Probably, it is not worth analyzing and presenting the report in full, mainly because today almost everything is known about the crimes of the Stalinist era, even more than Khrushchev himself knew at that time, and there is hardly anything new in it for our contemporaries. And, nevertheless, it is necessary to dwell on some of its most important provisions.

Before the report, the delegates of the congress were given a "Letter to the Congress" by V.I. Lenin. Many, of course, knew about its existence, but until that moment it had not been published. The specific consequences of the fact that the party at one time did not implement Lenin's recommendations, primarily in relation to Stalin, were carefully hidden and masked. In Khrushchev's report, these consequences were first made public and received a corresponding political assessment. The report, in particular, said: “Now we are talking about an issue of great importance both for the present and for the future of the party. and very serious perversions of party principles, party democracy, revolutionary legality. " In this regard, Khrushchev criticizes the Stalinist regime on the basis of Marxist-Leninist teachings, speaking of violations and deviation from the Leninist principles of party discipline and party leadership, which he sees as the reason for the development of Stalin's personality cult. The rationale for exposing the cult of personality by Leninist principles is the first distinguishing feature of N.S. Khrushchev's report.

The exposure of the Stalinist formula "enemies of the people" was of particular importance. This term, Khrushchev said, immediately freed the person or people with whom you are controversial from the need for strong evidence of the ideological wrongness of the person or people with whom you are conducting the polemic: it made it possible for anyone who disagreed with Stalin in some way, who was only suspected of hostile intentions, anyone who was only slandered, subjected to the most brutal repressions, in violation of all norms of revolutionary legality. This concept of "enemy of the people", in essence, already removed, excluded the possibility of any ideological struggle or expression of one's opinion.

Khrushchev openly raised before the delegates the question of the illegality and inadmissibility of repressive reprisals against ideological opponents, and, although the report contains mainly the old (according to the "Short Course") assessment of the ideological and political struggle in the party and Stalin's role in it, it was undoubtedly a bold step and the merit of Khrushchev. The report said: “It is noteworthy that even in the midst of a fierce ideological struggle against the Trotskyists, Zinovievites, Bukharinites and others, extremely repressive measures were not applied to them. The struggle was conducted on an ideological basis. But a few years later, when socialism was was already basically built in our country, when the exploiting classes were basically eliminated, when the social structure of Soviet society changed radically, the social base for hostile parties, political movements and groups was sharply reduced, when the ideological opponents of the party were politically defeated long ago, against them repression began.

As for responsibility for repression, Stalin's role in creating a regime of political terror is fully disclosed in the report. However, the direct participation of Stalin's associates in the political terror and the true scale of the repressions were not named. Khrushchev was not ready to confront the majority of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, especially since he himself belonged to this majority for a long time. Yes, this was not part of his task, the main thing was “to decisively, once and for all, debunk the cult of personality,” without which the political recovery of society was impossible.

It was decided not to open the debate on the report. At the suggestion of N.A. Bulgarin's congress adopted a resolution "On the personality cult and its consequences", published in the press. On March 1, 1956, the text of the report with Khrushchev's note and the necessary corrections was sent to the members and candidate members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. On March 5, the Presidium of the Central Committee adopted a resolution “on acquaintance with the report of Comrade Khrushcheva N.S. “On the personality cult and its consequences” at the XX Congress of the CPSU ”. It stated: “1. To propose to the regional committees, district committees and the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union republics to acquaint all communists and Komsomol members with Khrushchev's report, as well as non-party activists of workers, employees and collective farmers. 2. Send Khrushchev's report to party organizations with the stamp "not for publication", removing the stamp "top secret" from the brochure.

Thus, although the top party leadership of the USSR managed to carry out such a step as the nationwide exposure of the cult of the individual, in essence, by announcing the crimes of the authorities for almost two decades, giving the fight against the repressive regime the status of an official political phenomenon, nevertheless these measures were still rather weak and timid. This is evidenced by a number of facts, the main of which is the reaction to Khrushchev's report: the report itself was not published for almost 30 years, the "familiarization" was carried out at meetings of party and Komsomol organizations. In part, these facts can be explained by the fact that there was a serious danger of social tension, since there were still many people who remained loyal to the Stalinist principles, for whom his authority was unshakable, on the other hand, all this could lead to undermining the authority of the CPSU as a leader in the international communist and workers movement.

4. Creation and collapse of the "anti-party" group after the XX Congress of the CPSU

After the XX Congress of the CPSU, the former “elite” of the Stalinist entourage - Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, took a clearly antagonistic position in relation to Khrushchev, often entered into confrontation, jealous of the rapid growth and consolidation of his authority in the party and the people.

On the other hand, Khrushchev faced the inevitability of a break with the "Malenkov group", since he needed freedom of action relying on other, new forces in the party leadership, he had to dissociate himself from the continuity of the Stalinist leadership and thereby establish himself as the leader of a new, democratic course breaking with the personality cult regime. Khrushchev began his offensive even before the XX Congress: Malenkov was relieved of his post as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and in 1956 both Molotov and Kaganovich lost their ministerial portfolios. The situation for the "oldest associates of Stalin" was created threatening, and therefore they were the first to decide to take action. It must be said that from the very beginning Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich did not put forward any political platform, their conspiracy based on dissatisfaction with the "out of control" Khrushchev was formed under the pressure of circumstances, common destinies.

In the implementation of their plans, the "anti-party group" assigned an essential role to Bulgarin, since he held the post of the Presidential Council of Ministers, was power-hungry, close to pro-Stalinist sentiments. Over time Bulgarin actually became the center of the group. At the last moment, the group won over to its side Voroshilov, who, as a politician, was of little value, but his voice as a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee could play a significant role; moreover, no one doubted his inner commitment to Stalinism. As for Pervukhin and Saburov, their nomination and activity were also associated with Stalin's time, and in conditions when Khrushchev was already guided by the new cadres nominated by him, in Malenkov's group they hoped to retain themselves as prominent party and state leaders. With this composition, the "anti-party group" approached the moment of the most decisive action.

On the morning of June 18, 1956 Bulgarin appointed a meeting of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. Under the pretext of discussing the issue of a trip to the jubilee celebrations of the 250th anniversary of Leningrad, the "anti-party group" could gather on neutral territory and finally agree on their actions. Khrushchev, having learned about this, replied that there was no need for this, since all the issues related to this trip had already been resolved. Nevertheless, at the insistence of the majority of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, the meeting met.

From the very beginning, the meeting was attended by: members of the Presidium of the Central Committee - Khrushchev, Bulgarin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Molotov, Pervukhin; the candidates for the Presidium were Brezhnev, Furtsev, Shvernik, Shepilov, then Zhukov arrived. Malenkov proposed to remove Khrushchev from the chairmanship and recommended Bulgarin to replace him. The proposal was adopted by six votes to two. Then Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich made a statement and harshly criticized Khrushchev. The group had considerable political power to carry out its plans and had a majority of votes in the Presidium of the Central Committee. The main goal was to remove Khrushchev from the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and, entering the secretariat of the Central Committee, to take key positions in the leadership of the party, ensuring a calm future for himself. Given the instability of the numerical majority of the "anti-party group" in the Presidium, the question of removing Khrushchev had to be decided on the very first day. In this situation, Khrushchev and Mikoyan announced that they would leave the meeting if all the members and candidate members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, as well as the secretaries of the Central Committee, were not gathered.

At the meeting on June 19, the picture took on a completely opposite character. The full composition of the Presidium supported Khrushchev by Kirichenko, Mikoyan, Suslov, Brezhnev, Zhukov, Kozlov, Furtsev, Aristov, Belyaev, Pospelov. The balance of forces six against two at the meeting on July 18 was now seven (the absent Saburov was added) against four (Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Suslov, Kirichenko), but taking into account the candidates' votes - thirteen against six in favor of Khrushchev.

Taking into account the situation, Malenkov's group at the meeting on July 20 did not raise the issue of dismissing Khrushchev specifically, but spoke about the fact that in the interests of more complete collegiality, the post of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee should be abolished altogether. This proposal was introduced primarily with the aim of securing Bulgarin as the presidium chairman and, with his help, to confirm his influence in him, but this proposal did not receive a response from the majority of the participants in the meeting.

The members of the Central Committee learned about the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, and on July 21 they sent a letter to the Presidium. The letter contained a demand to urgently convene a Plenum of the Central Committee and submit to it the question of the leadership of the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Secretariat, since "it is impossible to hide from the members of the Plenum of the Central Committee such important questions for the entire party and country." A group of 20 people was instructed to present this letter to the Presidium of the Central Committee. After a short discussion and a congress in Moscow of the majority of the members of the Central Committee, it was decided to convene a Plenum for June 22.

Taking advantage of the moment, Khrushchev realized that it was necessary to prevent any decisions by the Presidium and to transfer all issues to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, since he could not personally strike a blow at Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich, without fear of no less weighty counter-accusations, but the Plenum of the Central Committee, the composition of which changed radically in the period of the XIX-XX congresses, he could openly raise the question of the personal responsibility of Malenkov's group.

The extraordinary Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU met in the afternoon of June 22. From the very beginning, after the speech by Suslov, who characterized the behavior of the group members as non-partisan, and Zhukov, who raised the question of the direct responsibility of Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov for the criminal repressions of the 30s and 40s, it became clear that the group's chances of implementing their plans are very small. Then Brezhnev and Aristov spoke at the Plenum, continuing the theme of responsibility and guilt of Malenkov's group. At the end of the meeting, when the political fate of the group was, in fact, a foregone conclusion, Khrushchev made accusations against it: for the first time, documents were presented about the true scale of the repressions and the involvement of specific individuals in them.

From that moment on, Malenkov's group took a defensive position, because the facts and documents clearly testify to their crimes. All the members of the group spoke at the plenum, stating that it was not about the removal of Khrushchev, but about strengthening the collective leadership of the leadership, eliminating shortcomings in the work of the Presidium and the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee. Under the weight of the accusations, the "united front" of the group disintegrated, each began to blame the other, as a result Saburov, Pervukhin, Voroshilov and Bulgarin tried with all their might to distance themselves from Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov.

In the end, the fact of collusion was recognized by all members of the group. The plenum unanimously condemned the group conspiracy and supported Khrushchev as First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The plenum on the same day adopted a resolution on the election of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, consisting of 15 members and 9 candidates. The following were elected as members of the Presidium:

Aristov, Belyaev, Brezhnev, Bulgarin, Voroshilov, Zhukov, Ignatov, Kirichenko, Kozlov, Kuusinen, Mikoyan, Suslov, Furtsev, Khrushchev, Shvernik; member candidates - Kalnberzin, Korotchenko, Kosygin, Mazurov, Mzhavanadze, Mukhitdinov, Pervukhin, Pospelov.

Conclusion

Thus, in the course of the research, the following main conclusions were drawn in the work, and the results were summed up.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU took place in 1956, on February 14-25. At this Congress, those assessments that had previously been given to Stalin's policy were revised. Also, the cult of Stalin's personality was condemned. One of the speakers was Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. The report “On the personality cult and its consequences” was presented on February 25 at a closed morning session. It criticized the political repression of the 1930s, as well as the 1950s, and all the blame for the events of those years was laid personally on Stalin.

The report "On the personality cult and its consequences" made a strong impression on the audience. The delegations of France and Italy, as well as the delegations of the communist states, were familiarized with it. It should be noted that the report was received ambiguously.

Citizens of the USSR were able to familiarize themselves with it only in 1989. But, due to the fact that rumors about the report made on the last day of the congress nevertheless leaked outside the Kremlin offices, a decree of June 30 "On overcoming the personality cult and its consequences" was issued. which explained the position of the Central Committee.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU and Khrushchev's report led to a split in public opinion. Some of the country's citizens perceived it as a symbol of the beginning of democratic changes. Another part reacted negatively. This could not but alarm the ruling elite and, as a result, led to the termination of discussion of the problem of Stalinist repressions.

Thus, all the necessary tasks were solved in the work, the set goals were achieved.

Bibliography

1. Zagladin N.V. History of Russia XX century. Grade 9. - M .: Infra-M, 2009 .-- 400 p.

2. Kuznetsov I.N. Domestic history: Textbook. - M .: Dashkov i K, 2012 .-- 816 p.

3. Orlov A.S., Georgiev V.A., Georgiev N.G. Russian history. Textbook. - M .: Prospect, 2015 .-- 528 p.

4. Spector A.A. Russian history. - M .: Infra-M, 2014 .-- 449 p.

5. Fedorov V.A., Moryakov V.I., Shchetinov Yu.A. History of Russia from ancient times to the present day. Textbook. - M .: Prospect, 2015 .-- 536 p.

Posted on Allbest.ru

...

"I made a proposal to try Stalin in a party court"

N 1. From the information of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU

From 12 to 15 March this year In the districts of Leningrad, meetings of party activists were held to discuss the results of the XX Congress of the CPSU. The meetings were held in an orderly manner and at a high ideological and political level.

At a meeting of the party activists of the Vasileostrovsky district, a researcher at the Institute of Russian Literature of the Academy of Sciences, I.A. Alekseev, a member of the CPSU since 1920, speaking, said:

Comrade Khrushchev made such a turn in our party life with his report that the party should support.

Comrade Khrushchev pointed out that Stalin's true tragedy was his real conviction that he was doing everything for the good of the people.

I believe that the true tragedy is the tragedy of the personality for all communists and the entire party, that under the conditions of our Soviet system such facts have emerged; the historical facts of autocracy for a long time are a real tragedy for us. The rank-and-file members of the party speak about it, the people speak about it.

It is not enough to say that Stalin's true tragedy is the inner conviction that he acted for the good of the people. Take any tyrant in Russian and world history. Was he acting against persuasion? No, he was convinced that he was acting either as an anointed of God or as a holy inquisitor. It is generally accepted in our country that the greatest disgrace in the history of nations was the Inquisition. But the Spanish Inquisition pales before what we had ...

What scale did we have? Our scale is much larger. And how can we, comrades, say calmly that this man deserves condescension for being an ideological communist. Yes, when he went to make a revolution, he was a fighter for the liberation of the people, for their liberation from the yoke of the capitalists, he then went along with Lenin, but until a certain time, he fought the Trotskyists, wanted to affirm Lenin's views, exposed the anti-Leninists, etc. etc. But this man was not who he should be. What can compare with the monstrous feudal exploitation that took place during the reign of Stalin, when his words were at odds with his deeds?

Yesterday I reviewed the decrees relating to 1937-1938. Comrades, everything is correct, the plenums of the Central Committee of the Party, congresses all passed decisions for the good of the people, so that the collective farms were Bolshevik. A quarter of a century has passed, and we see collective farms on the brink of poverty in many areas (not counting some of the leading collective farms).

Comrades, on March 9, I wrote a letter to Comrade Khrushchev after having heard a report about the personality cult. In this letter I made a proposal to put Stalin on a posthumous trial by the party court, to raise the question of Stalin specifically in all party organizations in such an aspect, whether he was a state criminal. I think that the majority of the party, at least the healthy part of it, all honest, not degenerated members of the party will come out and say: "Yes, he was a criminal against humanity, the ideological inspirer of the murders committed by Beria's gang and his predecessors in bloody terror."

During the discussion of the resolution comrade. Alekseev made a proposal to judge Stalin posthumously by the party court. This was opposed by a number of communists, who rejected this proposal as politically harmful and leading the party away from solving immediate tasks.

At the meeting of the party activists, questions were asked.

If many honest people have been posthumously rehabilitated, then why did the Central Committee of the CPSU and the 20th Party Congress not decide on the posthumous condemnation of Stalin, who caused so much harm to our Motherland?

The entire people from 1937 to 1952 lived in the grip of a military dictator - Stalin, and in their hearts everyone felt this and was indignant. Why comrade. Khrushchev, Molotov and others did not organize the salvation of the people, did not they sweep away one monster from the throne?

How to relate to the theoretical legacy of Stalin?

Why is the role of the commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the "Leningrad affair" headed by Comrade Malenkov 9 not disclosed?

The participants in the meetings of the district party assets unanimously approved the decisions of the XX Congress of the CPSU, adopted them for unswerving implementation and outlined measures for their implementation.

Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU Kozlov 10

RGASPI. F. 556. Op. 14.D. 45.L. 20-26.

signature - autograph of F.R. Kozlov.

"I met with the state security major who tortured me"

N 2. From the information of the Kalinin Regional Committee of the CPSU

[...] At a meeting of the activists of the Proletarsky District of the city of Kalinin, a member of the CPSU since 1925, Comrade Epstein said: “For 20 years the party has been waiting for an answer to a number of questions that worried us communists. The cult of personality has caused us great damage. In the city, too, many people were slandered. Comrade Khrushchev's report should be told not only to communists, but also to non-party people. "

Comrade Amdur, the chief engineer of the Kalinin artificial leather combine, said: “I, a communist since 1928, a native of the workers, a pupil of the Komsomol, was turned into an enemy of the people, a spy and a saboteur ... I am happy that I retained deep faith in the party. By faith I turned to the Central Committee of the CPSU when it became possible. The Central Committee of the CPSU sorted out this matter, took appropriate measures, and I was released. But when I returned in September 1955 happy and happy, my joy was overshadowed by what I met in Mr. Kalinin in the uniform of a major of state security Aleksandrov, who tortured me and knew my innocence better than me and pushed me to where I could get out only thanks to the attention of the Central Committee of the CPSU. I think that the work on checking the state security workers should be continued ... "

Many communists, in their speeches and in notes submitted to the speakers and to the presidium of the meetings, made proposals to take Stalin's body out of the Lenin Mausoleum, remove his portraits and not call him a comrade. Similar statements were made by non-party people. At some enterprises, collective farms, institutions and schools, they began to spontaneously shoot portraits of Stalin.

Proposals were also made to rename cities, industrial enterprises, collective farms, MTS and state farms, scientific institutions and educational institutions, which were given the name of Stalin, as well as to change the name of prizes in the field of science, technology, production and art. The communists of educational institutions spoke in favor of the abolition of exams on the foundations of Marxism-Leninism in higher educational institutions this year. In this regard, the following questions were asked. Should we continue to study the history of the USSR in schools using old textbooks? How to tell students about the dangers of the personality cult, are there any theoretical errors in the textbook of political economy and Stalin's work "Economic problems of socialism in the USSR"? What were the main issues of disagreement between Stalin and Tito? How to consider the conclusion of an agreement with Germany in 1939? Was it correctly concluded? Did we really buy time to strengthen the borders, and were they fortified in 1939-1941?

Whose initiative to stage a parade on Red Square on November 7, 1941? Where is Yezhov 11 now, and how to evaluate his work in the NKVD? Has the former secretary of the Kalinin regional party committee Mikhailov 12 been rehabilitated, or is he correctly accused?

Along with questions about Stalin's activities and his personal life, several notes were submitted with the following content: "How is Comrade Khrushchev's report on the personality cult in Georgia perceived?" "Are the rumors true that in Gori it almost comes to a strike?" 13

Secretary of the Kalinin Regional Committee of the CPSU
F. Goryachev 14
RGASPI. F. 556. Op. 14.D. 45.L. 36-39.
Script. Typewritten text,
signature - autograph of F.S. Goryacheva.

"I consider it wrong to accuse Stalin of despotism"

N 3. From the information of the Dagestan Regional Committee of the CPSU

Meetings of party activists and the overwhelming majority of speakers approve and acknowledge the correctness of the measures taken by the Central Committee to combat the theory of the personality cult, which is alien to Marxism-Leninism.

However, some communists misunderstand the essence of Comrade NS. Khrushchev at a closed meeting of the Congress. The chairman of the Lenin collective farm of the Dokuzparinsky district, Comrade Agabalaev (who previously worked as the head of the RO MGB) spoke at the district meeting of the party activists and said the following: "... I think it is wrong to accuse Stalin of despotism, whims, savagery, lost at the beginning of the war to the point that he did not direct military operations. Nobody approves of these accusations, the people are indignant ... We know Stalin as a party theorist who has been in exile, who wrote a number of works, defeated anti-Leninist groups, and will completely disgrace him wrong and unacceptable. "

Elements of misunderstanding of the report of Comrade. NS. Khrushchev's "On the personality cult and its consequences" are also manifested on the part of a small part of the students. So, when reading the report of the students of the Physics and Mathematics Faculty of the Pedagogical Institute, while reading the passage of the report, where the lines from the anthem are given: "Stalin raised us - he inspired us to be loyal to the people, to work and heroic deeds," some of the students applauded.

Secretary of the Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union A. Daniyalov 15
RGASPI. F. 556. Op. 14.D. 45.L. 86-88.
Script. Typewritten text,
signature - autograph of A.D. Daniyalova.

"Why were the members of the Politburo silent?"

N 4. From the list of questions asked at the meetings of the district party assets of the mountains. Molotov (supplement to the information of the Molotov City Committee of the CPSU).

1. Will the persons who suffered in 1937 be rehabilitated? How it will be organized, or it will be necessary to initiate a petition in respect of each. This question is of fundamental importance, it concerns many people, in particular, and me.

2. Where is Yezhov now?

3. Where does Shatalin work 16.

4. Is it true that Stalin's wife, Alliluyeva, expressed discontent against his despotic attitude towards the people and for this she died a violent death, like many others 17.

5. Were there representatives of fraternal communist parties at the closed session of the congress?

6. How to explain the statement of Comrade Khrushchev in a conversation with Tito that we will not give offense to Stalin.

7. How to view the speeches, speeches and works of Stalin.

8. Tell us about Malenkov's role in the creation of the "Leningrad affair".

9. Will Stalin's coffin be left in the Mausoleum, and whether this issue was resolved at the XX Congress.

10. After the death of Comrade Stalin, the government decided to build a pantheon in Moscow, where the sarcophagi of V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin. Is this building under construction now, and will Stalin's sarcophagus be placed 18.

11. What measures will be taken to those who planned, as usual work, arrests of honest party members and blindly carried out these arrests.

12. Where is Poskrebyshev at this time 19.

13. Isn't Kirov's death connected with the personality cult?

14. Were the enemies of the people Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Yagoda, Blucher, Gamarnik.

18. Is it possible to understand that Comrade Stalin was and remains the leader of the international proletariat, and should we use his works?

28. Is it correct to completely deny the progressive role of Stalin during the Civil and Patriotic War?

29. Is Stalin's pre-revolutionary activity described correctly in his biography?

30. Was Stalin in Berlin, as shown in the pictures.

31. When will the literature be examined and withdrawn, especially during the Great Patriotic War, where the personality cult of Stalin is highlighted.

32. Will portraits of Stalin be removed, and, if so, how to explain this to the workers.

33. Why, during Stalin's lifetime, the question of the wrong leadership of the state by Stalin was not discussed in the Central Committee of the CPSU, did the members of the Central Committee know about this, or what was the matter, apparently, criticism was squeezed.

34. Only half a year passed between the July Plenum and the Congress, in the transcript of the Plenum we read a positive assessment of Stalin given by Comrades. Khrushchev, Mikoyan and others. Why have there been dramatic changes in such a short period? Wasn't all this known then?

49. Why did none of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU raise the question of Comrade Stalin's mistakes at the 19th Party Congress? How could all this have happened, who and what contributed to this. Why were the members of the Politburo silent, and they themselves praised Comrade Stalin. It is wrong to accuse everyone of being blinded, because the cult of personality came from above. Maybe we need to explain the reasons more deeply, and not just talk about the effect.

50. Are the members of the Politburo cowards, and the party was powerless to put in Stalin's place?

RGASPI. F. 556. Op. 14.D. 45.L. 69-73.
Copy. Typewritten text.

"Why did I fight, starve, so that some small group could overeat?"

No. 5. From the information of the Tuva Regional Committee of the CPSU

At general meetings and conversations held in the districts, about I.V. Stalin had different interpretations. At a party meeting of the "Stalin's Way" collective farm in the Sut-Khol district, comrades Dondar, Urtun-Nazyn, O. Lopsan, Baldan and others in their speeches indignantly spoke about the atrocities committed by I.V. Stalin, and expressed a desire to remove him from the Mausoleum.

At the same meeting, the communist K. Monge said: "We know Stalin's merits, we must not hurry to remove his body from the Mausoleum. The work must be carried out gradually, because it can be used by capitalist countries." [...]

At individual meetings and in personal conversations, demagogic, incorrect judgments, and sometimes anti-Party and anti-Soviet statements took place. So, in a personal conversation with the secretary of the primary party organization of the food processing plant, comrade Peteneva non-partisan Ch. engineer Shubin, was in captivity and was convicted, made hostile, anti-Soviet statements of approximately the following content: "Why did they announce all this, they spat in the soul. Now you don't even know who you need to believe. For 20 years they sat there, were silent, but now they started talking. life had to be told to prevent this. So, they took care of their skin. And in general, as I remember, until 1928 they lived well, and then, as the five-year plans began, life went from bad to worse. " He went on to say that “I had to meet people who, under Hitler, did not live so badly. At night, I think, why did I fight, starve, so that some small group could overeat? The peasantry was brought to cattle.” To the answer of the secretary of the party organization that life would be even better, he replied: “So far it’s on paper,” apparently referring to the decisions of the 20th Party Congress. The secretary of the party organization, Comrade Peteneva, turned out to be weak and did not give him a decisive rebuff, and even belatedly reported to the city committee of the CPSU. T. Peteneva was summoned to the bureau of the city committee of the CPSU and received the appropriate suggestion for her soft-hearted approach to the sorties of hostile elements.

When familiarizing themselves with Comrade Khrushchev's report in the Party organization of the Department of Culture, Komsomol members Gorina and Shorshun asked the question: "Why have we been deceived for 25 years, where was the collective leadership, where was the unity of the party, where were the members of the Politburo?" Communists present, incl. Secretary of the Party organization, Comrade Stepanchuk, instead of giving a correct explanation, when reading Comrade Khrushchev's report, he gave "comments" in which he added the following moments: "When Kharkov was encircled, 75 Soviet divisions were defeated," 21 and about Ordzhonikidze he said: "After all the newspapers wrote that he died of illness, "22 and so on. And only when certain members of the Komsomol began to ask unhealthy questions, such as "why did they deceive us for 25 years," etc., Stepanchuk began to correct himself and give correct explanations. When comrade Stepanchuk was summoned to the city committee of the CPSU, he admitted that he had made a mistake and in the future he would not allow it.

Comrade Cherkashin, a non-partisan medical doctor of the regional health department, who came from a business trip, being in the store in line, was talking panicky about Moscow, that Moscow was allegedly very indignant that the Lenin-Stalin Mausoleum was closed, and from there, in his opinion, Stalin's sarcophagus should be removed. When he was summoned to the city committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and asked where he got all this, he calmly said: "It seemed to me so." He was also given a corresponding explanation.

Hurek, a fourth-year student at the teacher's college, said that: "I believe Stalin, he is really a genius, and many believe him."

Appropriate explanations were given for all these chic-making speeches.

The resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU of April 3, 1956, "On hostile forays at a meeting of the party organization of the heat engineering laboratory of the USSR Academy of Sciences following the results of the XX Congress of the CPSU" and the article of March 28 in Pravda "The Communist Party won and is winning by loyalty to Leninism" are discussed in the primary organizations. The Communists warmly approve of the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which exposes slanderous, malicious provocative statements revising the general line of our party.

Secretary of the Tuva Regional Committee of the CPSU
S. Toka 24
RGASPI. F. 556. Op. 14.D. 46.L. 173-179.
Script. Typewritten text,
signature - S. Toka's autograph.

Notes (edit)
1. See: Rehabilitation: how it was. T. II. M., 2003.S. 54.
2. Published: Ibid. P. 18.
3. About the personality cult and its consequences. Report of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU comrade Khrushcheva N.S. XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union // News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. N 3.P. 149, 160.
4. Transcript of I.S. Sharikov at a meeting at the Academy of Social Sciences under the Central Committee of the CPSU on March 23, 1956 and a note by D.T. Shepilov to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee on this matter on March 24, 1956, see: RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 171, D. 491, L. 49-66.
5. See: Rehabilitation ... T. II. S. 52-57.
6. Published: Ibid. S. 63-65. A set of documents on a closed party meeting in the Heat Engineering Laboratory of the USSR Academy of Sciences is kept in the RGASPI (F. 17. Op. 171. D. 490. L. 18-39).
7. Published: True. 1956.2 July.
8. The aforementioned letter from I.A. Alekseeva N.S. Khrushchev see: RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 171, D. 493, L. 30-31.
9. See: On the so-called "Leningrad affair" // News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 2.S. 126-137.
10. Kozlov Frol Romanovich (1908-1965) - in 1953-1957. First Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU, 1957-1964 member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee.
11. Ezhov N.I. (1895-1940) - in 1936-1938. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, in 1938-1939. People's Commissar of Water Transport of the USSR. In June 1939 he was arrested, in February 1940 he was shot by the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. Not rehabilitated.
12. Mikhailov (Katselenbogen) M.E. (1902-1938) - in 1928-1932. responsible instructor, deputy head, head of departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). In 1932-1935. Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee of the CPSU (b), in 1935-1937. first secretary of the Kalinin regional committee, in July-November 1937, the first secretary of the Voronezh regional committee of the CPSU (b). In October 1937 - January 1938 he was a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). In November 1937 he was arrested, in August 1938 he was shot. Rehabilitated by the decision of the CPC under the Central Committee of the CPSU of March 13, 1956.
13.March 5-10, 1956 in Georgia in defense of I.V. Stalin held mass meetings, demonstrations and strikes. The demonstrations in Tbilisi were suppressed by the troops. Documents about these events: see: Report by N.S. Khrushchev on the personality cult ... S. 257-265, 426-428.
14. Goryachev F.S. (1905-1996) - First Secretary of the Kalinin Regional Committee in 1955-1959.
15. Daniyalov A.D. (1908-1981) - First Secretary of the Dagestan Regional Committee of the CPSU in 1948-1967.
16. Shatalin N.N. (1904-1984) - in 1955-1956. First Secretary of the Primorsky Regional Committee of the CPSU, in 1956-1957. Deputy Minister of State Control of the USSR.
17. Alliluyeva N.S. (1901-1932) - wife of I.V. Stalin. Committed suicide in November 1932.
18. The decision to remove the coffin with the body of I.V. Stalin from the Mausoleum was adopted by the XXII Congress of the CPSU on October 30, 1961.
19. Poskrebyshev A.N. (1891-1965) - in 1929-1953 deputy head, head of the special sector of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the secret department and the special sector of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). In 1952-1953 Secretary of the Presidium and Bureau of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. Retired since 1953.
20. XIX Congress of the CPSU was held on October 5-14, 1952.
21. This refers to the Kharkov operation in May 1942.
22. Ordzhonikidze G.K. (Sergo) (1886-1937) - in 1926-1930. Chairman of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and People's Commissar of the RFKI of the USSR, at the same time deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and the STO of the USSR. In 1930-1937. member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). In 1930-1932. Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR, in 1932-1937. People's Commissar of Heavy Industry of the USSR. Committed suicide on February 18, 1937.
23. So in the document. The mentioned resolution was adopted on April 5, 1956.
24. Toka S.K. (1901-1973) - First Secretary of the Tuva Regional Committee of the CPSU in 1944-1973.

For a long time, the Khrushchev myth was promoted among the people that Stalin was not prepared for the war, that in the first days he was confused, closed in his dacha, and then ineptly led military operations ...
It turned out, however, that it was all a lie.
And it's not even a matter of the late investigations of historians, ours and foreign ones, who have found evidence refuting Khrushchev's lies.
The country's leadership and the commanding staff of the Red Army were well aware of the trends in the development of the situation in the West and adjusted their activities accordingly.
And evidence of this is found in the most unexpected source - the 1942 children's film "Timur's Oath", which takes place in June 1941.
The father of the young heroine of Gaidar's story, Zhenya Alexandrova, a colonel of the armored forces, sends his daughter a sound letter from the front, in which, in particular, he says (at 49 minutes):

I swear to you on the honor of an old and gray-haired commander that even then, when you were just a baby, we already knew this enemy, we were preparing for mortal combat with him, we promised to defeat him, and now we will fulfill our word ...

If we consider that Zhenya is 13 years old, then she was a baby in the early 30s. And it turns out that they already knew about the enemy at least since 1931. And they have been preparing since the same time.
And that's right, everything coincides in dates - Hitler's rise to power in Germany and the abrupt start of industrialization and collectivization in the USSR.

And under the cut is an interesting article by Igor Nevsky "Crooked speech of Nikita Khrushchev", exposing a number of Khrushchev's myths about Stalin, with quotes from ours and - what is especially significant - from foreign historians.

60 years ago, in February 1956, the 20th Congress of the CPSU took place, which ended in a closed meeting, which was not initially envisaged by the official agenda. According to eyewitnesses, after this meeting, the congress delegates dispersed silent and shocked.
.
At this meeting, the then General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Nikita Khrushchev exposed the cult of the recently deceased leader of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin, who for many years before had been the idol of millions of people not only in our country, but throughout the world.
.
In his speech, Khrushchev told the congress delegates that Stalin allegedly brought more harm than good to the party, state and people, that Stalin perverted Lenin's great communist teaching, that with Stalin we almost lost the Great Patriotic War. This debunking then, over the years, either faded away, then gained strength again ...
.
Recently, however, a lot of works by professional historians, including those living abroad, have appeared, who, on the basis of the facts they have discovered, have proved that most of the provisions of the famous speech of Khrushchev, expressed at the 20th Party Congress ... had no real basis.
.
That is, Nikita Sergeevich's speech was false from start to finish!
.
Here is what, for example, the famous American historian Grover Ferr, a prominent specialist in the history of Russia at the beginning of the 20th century, says:
.
“I managed to isolate 61 accusatory statements. Each of them has been examined by me in the light of historical evidence, and, as it became clear in the end, in the "closed" report Khrushchev did not say anything about Stalin and Beria that would turn out to be true. "Stalin's defense" has nothing to do with it: the burden of proof lies with the accusing party. And all the "revelatory" statements of the "closed" report as evidence are untenable. "
.
Take, for example, the main anti-Stalinist accusations made at the congress.
.
He was a dictator and did not consult with anyone.
.
Nikita Khrushchev said that there was allegedly no "personality cult" in the country before the appearance of Stalin. But, they say, with his coming to power in 1924, the cult began to flourish. Stalin imagines himself almost a tsar, who did not consult not only with his people, but even with the ruling communist party.
.
“Plenums of the Central Committee were almost never convened,” Khrushchev was indignant in his report. "Suffice it to say that for all the years of the Great Patriotic War, not a single Plenum of the Central Committee was actually held."
.
In fact, the cult of party leaders originated among the communists even before Stalin came to power - in the conditions of the dictatorship of a single political force, it simply could not be otherwise. Here is what the historian Igor Pykhalov wrote about this:
.
“In 1925 the city of Tsaritsyn became Stalingrad. And here Stalin was late, because Zinovievsk (formerly Elizavetgrad), Trotsk (formerly Gatchina) and Tukhachevsk (formerly Miass) already existed. In 1925, the secretary of the Central Committee, Alexei Ivanovich Rykov, during a trip to Leningrad, visited a factory named after him. The steamships Aleksey Rykov and Mikhail Tomsky sailed along the Volga. Etc. etc.".
.
I'm not even talking about the cult of Lenin, which arose literally immediately after the October Revolution and continued until the collapse of the USSR - our propaganda ranked Ilyich almost among the “saints”. However, this applied to almost all party leaders, without exception. People of the older generation remember well the personality cults of the same Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, and even the "perestroika" Gorbachev (at the beginning of his reign).
.
So Stalin was not particularly distinguished here ...
.
Khrushchev also lied about "violations of party democracy." Congresses and party plenums met regularly, literally on every important issue in the life of the state. Yes, during the war and the first years after it there was a break. But there were objective reasons for that. So, one of the plenums was planned for October 1941, even members of the Central Committee arrived in Moscow. However, the event had to be postponed due to, as it was said in a special decree, "the difficult situation created at the fronts and the inexpediency of diverting leading comrades from the fronts" - by that time the Germans had begun their offensive against Moscow. Again, I want to quote Pykhalov:
.
“In general, to listen to Khrushchev, holding congresses and plenums is a panacea for all ills. As it was said in one Soviet joke: “In the spring, regardless of any weather, we sow wheat, corn, oats, rye. - And what will we collect in the fall? - Plenum on Agriculture ". As if chatter at party forums can replace real work. "
.
As for the assertion that Stalin did not consult with anyone ... It is enough to read the memoirs of our prominent military men, engineers, scientists, designers, party workers of that time to be convinced of the falsity of this Khrushchev's postulate. Stalin not only consulted with smart people, but often argued with them (as they did with him). And it was the Stalinist point of view that did not always win. Let us recall at least how in 1944 Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky was able to prove to Stalin that the summer offensive of our troops should be launched in the center of Belarus, and not further south, as the leader himself believed.
.
The Marshal showed enviable tenacity, backing him up with convincing evidence. And Stalin eventually accepted Rokossovsky's point of view, not hesitating to publicly admit that he was wrong.
.
He killed Kirov and repressed the party.
.
Khrushchev directly accused Stalin that, by establishing his cult, he unleashed massive repressions against "honest communists" who were killed almost immediately after their arrests. The alleged reason for the repressions against these innocent people was the mysterious murder of the first secretary of the Leningrad regional party committee, Sergei Kirov. Khrushchev directly hinted in his report that it was Stalin who was involved in the death of Kirov ...
.
Firstly, as historical science has already established today, Stalin had nothing to do with the death of the leader of the Leningrad communists - Kirov, in a fit of jealousy, was shot by a petty party worker by the name of Nikolaev, whose wife was having a stormy love affair with Kirov.
.
Secondly, at the beginning of the 30s, there was a powerful anti-Stalinist opposition in the party, and there were many opponents of communism in the country, who survived from the revolution, who showed themselves during the Great Patriotic War.
.
At the same time, the internal party opposition was also going to fight the leader of the party and the state not by means of discussions. As follows from the recently declassified archival documents, the opposition intended to act in accordance with the tactics used in the bloody years of the revolution and civil war - to beat the enemy until he was completely destroyed. In particular, one of the leaders of the opposition, the major leader of the Comintern, Osip Pyatnitsky, in 1936 not only called on his comrades-in-arms to overthrow Stalin, but also to liquidate him altogether.
.
Now imagine a country that, before World War II, is literally torn apart by such internal contradictions, where since the revolution there has been a “fifth column”, where the ruling party is on the verge of a split ... We agree that Stalin, although very harshly, solved this problem - exactly in the spirit of their difficult and terrible time.
.
By the way, Khrushchev was wrong when he spoke of the "illegality" of Stalin's repressions. Here is what Alexey Kazannik, a convinced democrat and anti-Stalinist, who headed the General Prosecutor's Office of Russia from 1993 to 1994, wrote about this:
.
“At the Faculty of Law of Irkutsk University, we were given — there was a Khrushchev thaw — assignments to write a term paper based on the materials of those criminal cases that were investigated in the thirties and fifties. And to my horror, while still a student, I became convinced that even then the rule of law in the strict sense of the word was not violated, although there were draconian laws, but they were exactly executed. "
.
They won the war in spite of Stalin.
.
This is probably Khrushchev's most egregious lie. He colorfully described to the delegates of the congress how Stalin was at a loss in the first days of the Great Patriotic War, how ineptly led military operations, focusing not on topographic maps, but on ... a school globe (!), How his personality cult only prevented the country from fighting.
.
Immediately after the congress, our military leaders among themselves called these Khrushchev attacks "bullshit".
.
And indeed, what confusion of Stalin, who allegedly hid from everyone at his dacha outside Moscow in June 1941, can we talk about if today a diary of visits to Stalin's office in the Kremlin is published? And there it is clearly indicated that all the first days of the war, a continuous stream of people went to the leader - generals and admirals, people's commissars, state security officers, diplomats, factory directors ... worked hard.
.
And the reasoning about the leadership of military operations "according to the school globe" can only be attributed to the exuberant imagination of Nikita Sergeevich himself. The same can be said about Khrushchev's assessment of Stalin's role as a military leader. Marshals Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Vasilevsky and many other high-ranking officers considered Stalin an outstanding Commander-in-Chief. I will dwell only on the opinion of General Pyotr Grigorenko, who became a Soviet dissident in the 60s:
.
“Operational and strategic decisions, starting with the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, coordinating the efforts of the fronts, combat arms and aviation, are beyond serious criticism. That, of course, is not the merit of Stalin alone. But one cannot also say that this was done without him ... His competent participation is felt in the development of all operations ...
.
The brilliant offensive operations of the Soviet troops are examples of military art. Many generations of military men around the world will study these operations, and it would never occur to anyone to prove that they were prepared and carried out without Stalin's participation, or even more against his will. "
.
Preparing for the democratization of the country?
.
American researcher Grover Ferr called his work on Khrushchev's revelations at the 20th party congress "Anti-Stalin Vastness." In his opinion, Khrushchev took such a step because he sharply opposed Stalin's plans to ... democratize Soviet society ?! Yes Yes exactly. The historian writes that at the end of his reign, Stalin conceived cardinal transformations:
.
“Their essence boiled down to the fact that the role of the Communist Party in governing the state was narrowed to normal (as in other countries) limits, and the nomination of government officials would take place not according to party lists, but on the basis of legal, democratic procedures. That is, according to the real merits of certain people. "
.
This is what the representatives of the party nomenklatura could not allow! And as soon as Stalin died, his party successors, represented primarily by Khrushchev, tried to get rid of the Stalinist legacy, consolidating the party's position as the leading and guiding force of Soviet society. And Stalin was accused of all conceivable and inconceivable sins ...
.
As a result, these people killed not the personality cult of Stalin, but the entire Soviet country. For the collapse of the USSR and the entire Soviet society in reality began precisely after the 20th Congress, when together with Stalin, willy-nilly, our entire history after the October Revolution of 1917 was called into question.

The XX Congress is usually considered the moment that ended the Stalinist era and made the discussion of a number of public issues somewhat freer; it marked the weakening of ideological censorship in literature and art and the return of many previously forbidden names. However, in reality, criticism of Stalin was voiced only at a closed meeting of the Central Committee. At the congress, the reports of the central organs of the party and the main parameters of the 6-year plan were discussed. The congress condemned the practice of separating "ideological work from the practice of communist construction", "ideological dogmatism and pompousness."

The international situation was also discussed, the role of socialism as a world system and its struggle against imperialism, the disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism and the emergence of new developing countries. In this regard, the Leninist principle of the possibility of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems was confirmed.

The congress adopted a decision on the variety of forms of transition of states to socialism, pointed out that civil wars and violent upheavals are not a necessary stage on the path to a new social formation. The congress noted that "conditions can be created for the peaceful implementation of fundamental political and economic transformations."

Condemnation of the personality cult of Stalin

The main events that made the congress famous took place on the last day of work, February 25, at a closed morning session. On this day, N. S. Khrushchev made a closed report "On the cult of the individual and its consequences", which was devoted to the condemnation of the cult of I. V. Stalin. It voiced a new point of view on the country's recent past, listing numerous facts of crimes of the second half of the 1930s - early 1950s, for which Stalin was blamed. The report also raised the problem rehabilitation of party and military leaders who were repressed under Stalin.

Despite the conditional secrecy, the report was distributed to all party branches of the country, and at a number of enterprises, non-party people were also involved in its discussion; discussion of the report was also conducted in the cells of the Komsomol.

The "softened" version of the report was promulgated as a resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of June 30, 1956 entitled "On Overcoming the Cult of the Personality and Its Consequences", which set out the framework of acceptable criticism of Stalinism ... Decisions of the congress on transport.

At the congress, it was decided to start the massive introduction of diesel and electric locomotive traction on Soviet railways, as well as to stop the construction of steam locomotives. Instead, these plants switched to the production of diesel locomotives TE3

63. Foreign policy of the USSR in the first after the Stalinist decade.

By the mid-1950s. a rather tense situation existed in the international arena. The tough Cold War continued. There was a creation of military blocs aimed at curbing the influence of the "socialist camp" (CENTO, SEATO, ANZUS). After the signing in October 1954 of the Paris agreements between the United States, Britain, France, Germany and other Western countries, West Germany received the right to restore its armed forces and joined NATO. This upset the balance of power in Europe and affected the geopolitical interests of the USSR. Germany refused to recognize the post-war borders with Poland and Czechoslovakia. In the face of a real military threat, on May 14, 1955, the socialist countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia) signed the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. On the basis of this document, the Warsaw Pact Organization (OVD) was created to conduct a joint defense policy of the socialist countries. Within its framework, there was a unified military command and coordination of foreign policy activities. The presence of Soviet troops in Central and Southeastern Europe received a legal basis. The creation of military-political blocs heated up the international situation and contributed to the intensification of confrontation. In the United States, from the beginning of the 1950s, there was a law according to which countries receiving assistance from them were obliged to break off all trade relations with socialist countries. In turn, the socialist countries have limited their contacts with the capitalist world as much as possible. All their foreign trade activities took place within the CMEA framework.

The liberalization of domestic life after 1953 led to serious changes in the international policy of the Soviet state. The renewed Soviet leadership (in 1956 Minister of Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov was dismissed, and from February 1957 this post was held by A.A. Gromyko) the community is stumped. It renounces the unrealistic and dangerous Stalinist foreign policy. The suspension of the "cold war" was facilitated by the successful test in the USSR in August 1953 of a hydrogen bomb. It created a temporary military-strategic advantage for the Soviet Union and forced the Western powers to change their policy towards it. The search for new approaches to solving complex international problems that have accumulated over the first post-war decade begins. Among the most important tasks of Soviet diplomacy in the international arena are: reducing the military threat, ending the Cold War, expanding international relations and strengthening the influence of the USSR in the world as a whole.

Positive shifts in the international arena began already in 1953.

On June 27 this year, a ceasefire agreement was finally signed in Korea. The 1954 Geneva Conference ended with success, the decisions of which settled the situation in Indochina. France withdrew its troops and recognized the independence of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. On May 15, 1955, the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France signed an agreement on the restoration of an independent and democratic Austria, whose parliament adopted a decision on permanent neutrality.

The new leadership of the USSR also sees the way to defuse tensions in the settlement of bilateral ties with many countries. In 1955, diplomatic relations were restored with Austria and Yugoslavia. After Chancellor K. Adenauer's visit to Moscow in September 1955, diplomatic relations were established with the FRG. In October 1956, as a result of negotiations, relations with Japan were normalized. The USSR renounced reparation claims and supported Japan's request to join the UN. However, the peace treaty was never signed due to territorial differences. By the end of the 1950s, the Soviet Union had trade and diplomatic relations with more than 70 countries around the world. B 1954 - 1964 Soviet leaders visited dozens of capitals in Europe, Asia and America. Prominent politicians and businessmen from the USA, England, France, Italy and many other countries of the world paid visits to Moscow. The Soviet Union at that time proposed a new form of foreign policy activity - public diplomacy.

The influence of the USSR grows after its accession in 1954 to UNESCO - the organization for education, science and culture at the United Nations - and the International Labor Organization (ILO). In 1958. The Soviet Union renewed its membership in the World Health Organization (WHO).

The impetus for Khrushchev's foreign policy was given by the XX Congress of the CPSU in February 1956. It formulated a new foreign policy doctrine of the Soviet state, which proclaimed a return to the policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, the possibility of preventing wars in the modern era and recognized various forms of transition of countries to socialism. The proclaimed course was quite contradictory. On the one hand, they declared respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and on the other hand, they stressed the need to provide assistance to both the countries of the socialist camp and the world communist and national liberation movement, i.e. in fact, it was about interference in the internal affairs of capitalist and developing countries. The USSR did not give up its confrontation with the West. Peaceful coexistence was understood as a specific form of class struggle. The doctrine had a pronounced class orientation. It allowed the use of various methods of influencing class opponents in the international arena, from force pressure to peace initiatives.

As the main direction in ensuring peace on the planet, Khrushchev proposed to create a system of collective security in Europe, and then in Asia, as well as to begin immediate disarmament. Wishing to demonstrate the seriousness of these intentions, the Soviet government undertook a unilateral reduction of the Armed Forces. The reductions in the army, carried out in 1955-1960, made it possible to reduce it by almost 4 million people and bring the number of Soviet troops to 2.5 million. Other countries of the socialist camp also made significant reductions in their armies. Finally, in 1957, the USSR made proposals to the UN to suspend nuclear weapons tests and to accept commitments to renounce the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons, as well as to simultaneously reduce the armed forces of the USSR, the United States and China to 2.5 million, and then to 1 , 5 million people. In 1958, the Soviet government unilaterally declared a moratorium on nuclear tests and appealed to the parliaments of all countries to support this initiative. However, to break the vicious circle of the arms race in the 50s. never succeeded. Western countries were skeptical of the Soviet proposals and put forward unacceptable conditions. In the fall of 1959, N.S. Khrushchev was the first Soviet leader to visit the United States. His speech at the UN General Assembly on the problem of general disarmament caused a great resonance in the world. In his famous speech, he proposed to completely eliminate the national armies and navies and leave only the police forces to the states. This initiative sharply increased the authority and prestige of our country in the international arena and helped to ease tensions in Soviet-American relations.

However, the Soviet leadership was not sincere in its quest for peace. Apparently, it would be more correct to assume that it was trying to gain time in the arms race. Peaceful initiatives of the Soviet state were put forward against the background of the significant successes of Soviet scientists in improving weapons and missile technology. In August 1957, the USSR successfully tested the world's first intercontinental ballistic missile. For the first time, the territory of the United States turned out to be potentially vulnerable to a nuclear missile strike. At the same time, not only began large-scale missile armament of the air defense, air force and ground forces of the Soviet Army, but also the creation of a new type of Armed Forces - the Strategic Missile Forces (since 1962). In addition, the submarine fleet of the USSR Navy also received nuclear missiles. Pressure on the enemy "from a position of strength" remained the main instrument of Soviet foreign policy. As Khrushchev stated, "there can be no other policy, our opponents do not understand another language." It was thanks to the threat of Soviet "nuclear retaliation" in 1956 that it was possible to prevent the united aggression of the Western countries against Egypt during the Suez crisis. The USSR significantly strengthened and then gradually expanded the sphere of Soviet influence in the countries that had freed themselves from colonial dependence both in Asia and in Africa.

The expansion of multilateral relations with the socialist countries was one of the priority directions of the USSR's foreign policy. New in relations with the socialist countries was de-Stalinization - the exposure of the personality cult, the rejection of the theory and practice of Stalinism. Moscow called on the leaders of these countries to democratize their domestic and foreign policies along the lines of the USSR. This call prompted the growth of a democratic movement that united opponents of the Stalinist model of socialism. The weakening of censorship and the rehabilitation of political prisoners intensified criticism of the regimes and led to the radicalization of the population. In the summer of 1956, a general strike broke out in Poznan, Poland, followed by street riots. The performance was suppressed by army units. Only thanks to the flexible policy of the newly elected General Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party V. Gomulka was it possible to prevent a large-scale military "pacification" of Poland with the help of Soviet troops.

Under the influence of the Polish events, the situation in Hungary sharply deteriorated. In September - October 1956, in the wake of student and workers' demonstrations, the new government headed by Imre Nagy tried to get out of strict dependence on Moscow, break off allied relations with the USSR and other people's democracies, and achieve NATO membership. The Hungarian Party of Workers was ousted from power and in fact found itself outside the law. Total control over all aspects of the life of Hungarian society by the punitive authorities was terminated. At the request of the Nadem government, parts of the Soviet troops stationed in Budapest and other cities were withdrawn from the country. At the same time, the border with Austria was opened. The apogee of the Hungarian "October Revolution" was the events of October 23, 1956, when armed students and workers gathered at a rally in Budapest destroyed the Stalin monument. In response to these actions, the Soviet leadership decided to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of Hungary (relying on the formal appeal of the "temporary workers 'and peasants' government" J. Kadar). On the night of November 4, Budapest was occupied by Soviet troops. The popular uprising was suppressed. About 2.5 thousand insurgents were killed, tens of thousands of Hungarians were wounded, many emigrated from the country. The power of the Communist Party and the allied obligations of the Hungarian People's Republic in relation to the USSR and the ATS countries were restored.

After the events in Hungary, the trend of some liberalization was stopped, ideological pressure increased and control over the political situation in the countries of the socialist camp became more rigid. The unity in it now rested on the ATS troops.

The second half of the 1950s was marked by a sharp deterioration in relations with the PRC. Since 1957, the Chinese leadership began to express sharp criticism about the Soviet model of building socialism and the campaign unfolding in the USSR to expose the cult. Mao Zedong openly began to claim the role of the second leader in the socialist world and the world communist movement. China no longer wanted to put up with the role of "little brother" in the family of socialist peoples. Moscow's attempts to smooth over the Soviet-Chinese contradictions by holding meetings of communist and workers' parties in 1957 and 1960. had no success. Accusing the Soviet leadership of deviating from the principles of Marxism-Leninism and of revisionism, Beijing strongly advocated curtailing relations with the USSR: In 1960, China made claims to a number of border territories of the USSR and Mongolia. At the same time, problems arose in relations between the USSR and Albania, which supported Mao's policy in the international arena. In 1961, Albania refused to provide the USSR with naval bases and arrested Soviet submarines stationed in its ports. In 1962, Soviet-Albanian relations were actually severed, and in 1968 Albania withdrew from the Department of Internal Affairs. Since 1962, armed conflicts began on the Soviet-Chinese border. Romania also took a special position within the framework of the socialist camp. achieved the withdrawal of Soviet troops from its territory. To a large extent focused on China and the leaders of North Korea. Thus, during the years of the "thaw", the violation of the unity of the socialist countries begins.

The late 1950s and early 1960s saw the collapse of the colonial system. The USSR paid great attention to strengthening ties with the countries of the "third world" ("developing" countries) for two reasons. First, by attracting the liberated countries to his side, he tried to maintain the balance of power in the world arena. As soon as the aid of the Soviet Union weakened, the influence of the USA in them automatically grew. Secondly, the XX Congress of the CPSU ranked the national liberation movement, along with the communist and workers' movements, as integral parts of the world revolutionary process. Therefore, the expansion of cooperation with these countries was seen as a form of struggle against world imperialism. The "developing" countries received serious diplomatic support from the USSR, but most importantly, huge financial assistance. Particularly close contacts developed with India, Indonesia, Burma, Afghanistan and others. They were assisted in the construction of industrial enterprises and other facilities. With the help of Soviet specialists, the Pkhilai Metallurgical Combine was erected in India, and the Aswan Dam in Egypt. In total, during this time, with the financial and technical support of the USSR, about 6 thousand industrial facilities were built in different countries of the world.

The most important problem of the international situation in Europe during this period was the settlement of the German question, which now consisted in determining the status of West Berlin. According to the decisions of the Potsdam Peace Conference in 1945, the capital of Germany, like the entire territory of the country, was divided into occupation zones. The Soviet zone in 1949 became the GDR, and Berlin became the capital of socialist Germany. The territory of West Berlin was actually part of the FRG. In November 1958, the Soviet government asked Western countries to review the status of West Berlin, which was to become a free and demilitarized city. The aim was to liquidate the "outpost of imperialism on socialist German soil." The fundamental decision on the status of West Berlin was postponed (in accordance with the agreements between Khrushchev and Eisenhower) until May 1960, when a conference of the heads of government of the USSR, USA, France and England was to take place. But the meeting never took place: on May 1, 1960, an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down over Soviet territory (pilot F. Powers was detained at the landing site and gave testimony denouncing him as a spy).

East-West relations have sharply deteriorated. Meanwhile, the Berlin crisis deepened. The western sector of the city quickly recovered with the help of investments from the United States (Marshall Plan). The standard of living here was incomparably higher than in the eastern sector. In the spring and summer of 1961, a significant part of the population, mainly young people and students in large cities, openly advocated a change in the political system. In this regard, after preliminary agreement with Moscow on the initiative of the head of the GDRV. Ulbricht, a wall of concrete and barbed wire was erected around West Berlin on the night of 13 August 1961. This measure made it possible to prevent "voting with feet" against the socialist system. The Berlin crisis had a negative impact on the development of international relations in Europe. In September 1961, the USSR unilaterally abandoned the agreement with the United States on a moratorium on nuclear tests in the atmosphere and carried out a series of nuclear explosions. The East-West confrontation soon brought humanity to the brink of a world war, when the Cuban missile crisis broke out in October 1962. The reason for it was that the United States, trying to overthrow the Castro regime, in April 1961 organized an amphibious assault in the Playa Giron area. To protect against American expansion, F. Castro in the spring of 1962 obtained from the Soviet Union the deployment of medium-range missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba. Since Cuba proclaimed itself a socialist country, Khrushchev considered it his duty to defend the "island of freedom." It was also tempting to be able to locate a military base in close proximity to the United States. In the spring of 1962, the USSR began secretly transferring missiles. In October 1962, this became known to the Americans. President J. Kennedy announced a naval blockade of Cuba and demanded the immediate removal of Soviet missiles from the island. In full combat readiness were brought not only the troops of the United States and the USSR, but also NATO and the Department of Internal Affairs. The political ambitions of the leaders have put the world on the brink of nuclear disaster. Still, a saving compromise was found. During intensive negotiations on a direct wire between N.S. Khrushchev and D. Kennedy, the parties agreed that the USSR would remove the missiles from Cuba, and the USA - from Turkey and Italy. In addition, Kennedy guaranteed the safety of the Castro regime. With the resolution of the Caribbean crisis, a new effective form of interstate relations emerged - personal contacts between heads of state. They made it possible to achieve some relaxation of international tension. However, the murder of D. Kennedy in November 1963 and the resignation of N.S. Khrushchev in October 1964, this process was stopped. A new round of the arms race begins in the mid-1960s.

The emotions experienced in the days of the Cuban missile crisis clearly showed the world the need for a treaty on the limitation of nuclear weapons. In 1963, an agreement was signed in Moscow between the USSR, the USA, and England on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Soon more than a hundred states joined this treaty.

During the period of the "thaw", the USSR managed to reduce the intensity of the "cold war" and strengthen its position as one of the world powers

64. USSR in the period of stable development (65 - early 80s)

The period from the mid-60s to the mid-80s, when the political leadership of the country was headed by Leonid I. Brezhnev, is called the time of stagnation - time of wasted opportunities... Started with rather bold reforms in the field of economics, it ended with an increase in negative trends in all spheres of public life, stagnation in the economy, and a crisis of the socio-political system.

The October (1964) plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU marked the beginning of a new round in Soviet history.

At the October (1964) plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a change in the leadership of the party and the country took place. The first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU was Brezhnev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Kosygin.

Even under Khrushchev, prominent Soviet economists came up with proposals for a radical economic reform, the essence of which was the transition from an administrative, command economy to a market economy. This idea was supported by Khrushchev, and after his removal from power, Kosygin headed the development of a new economic reform. By the decisions of the March (1965) and September (1965) Plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU, this reform received formal approval and support from the party.

The essence of the 1965 reform can be roughly reduced to three major areas:

1) changes in the structure of management of the national economy - to liquidate the territorial councils of the national economy and make the transition to the sectoral principle of managing industrial enterprises. Union and Union-republican ministries were recreated.

2) correction of the planning system. Since the previous planning system was focused on achieving growth in production volumes by enterprises on the basis of gross output, it was supposed to focus plans on sold products.

3) improving economic incentives. It included: improving the pricing system, improving the wage system.

In line with these directions, it was envisaged:

1. to evaluate the results of economic activities of enterprises for the products sold, the profit received for the fulfillment of tasks;

2. to make wages dependent not only on the results of their individual labor, but also on the overall results of the work of enterprises;

3. to put the principle of mutual material responsibility in the basis of economic relations between enterprises. To develop direct links between manufacturing enterprises and consumers of products. Enhance the role of business contracts.

The XX Congress of the CPSU was held from 14 to 25 February 1956 in Moscow in the Grand Kremlin Palace with the participation of almost one and a half thousand delegates, as well as representatives of 55 communist and workers' parties of the world.

In accordance with the previously announced agenda, the congress was supposed to hear and discuss the reporting reports of the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission of the CPSU, a report on the directives for the sixth five-year plan for the development of the USSR national economy and hold elections for the central bodies of the party.

The main event of the congress took place on the last day of its work, February 25, 1956, at a closed morning session. On this day, the first secretary of the Central Committee (Central Committee) of the CPSU Nikita Khrushchev made a report exposing the personality cult of Stalin.

The revision of assessments of Stalin's policy began immediately after Stalin's death in 1953 in connection with the beginning of the process of rehabilitation of victims of repression. On December 31, 1955, on the eve of the XX Party Congress, a commission was created to study materials on the mass repressions of the pre-war period. The conclusions of this commission, presented at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on February 9, 1956, forced the leadership of the party to decide on the need to condemn the policy of Stalinist repression at the congress. It was decided to make a report on this issue at the final, closed (without foreign guests) session of the congress in order to avoid widespread publicity of the facts that had been discovered that presented the party as a whole and its individual leaders in an unfavorable light.

The secretaries of the Central Committee, Peter Pospelov and Averky Aristov, who headed the commission, prepared the first version of the text, which, after serious revisions by Khrushchev and the secretary of the Central Committee for ideology, Dmitry Shepilov, introduced all members of the Presidium of the Central Committee. Stalin's harsh assessments were opposed by his former close associates - Lazar Kaganovich, Kliment Voroshilov and Vyacheslav Molotov. But the majority of the Presidium of the Central Committee supported Khrushchev.

The report on the personality cult acknowledged the numerous lawlessness of the previous years and the scale of the repressions. Khrushchev spoke about Stalin's complete disregard for the principles of collective leadership, about his personal involvement in the repressions. The names of those who were illegally convicted and shot on the eve of the war, including Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, were announced. However, the names of political oppositionists (Trotsky, Bukharin, Rykov, Kamenev) were not mentioned.

The reasons for the emergence of mass repressions in the report were explained exclusively by Stalin's personality (i.e., subjective reasons), emphasizing that in the USSR there could be no objective prerequisites for lawlessness, and the political course since 1917 was absolutely correct. Moreover, the party itself suffered from the repressions first of all. Khrushchev also blamed Stalin for the unpreparedness for war, the cruel defeats of 1941 and 1942.

On June 30, 1956, the CPSU Central Committee issued a decree "On Overcoming the Personality Cult and Its Consequences", in which the assessment of Stalin was somewhat less harsh than in the report. It was admitted that he "actively fought for the implementation of Lenin's behests."

The historical significance of the XX Congress of the CPSU lies in the condemnation of Stalinism. A direct consequence of the decisions of the congress was a certain liberalization of the country's socio-political life (the so-called thaw).

The material was prepared on the basis of information from RIA Novosti and open sources