Solipsism in simple words. Ancient dialogue as a form of philosophizing

the position or teaching of a person who has turned away from the smallpox of the world and reduces all validity to the reality of his individual "I". Solipsism is the state of the one who doubts everything. The first moment of Descartes' Reflections, when the philosopher questions all generally accepted truths, is the moment of solipsism. The term is tantamount to skepticism.

Excellent definition

Incomplete definition ↓

SOLIPSISM

(from Lat. solus - one, only + ipse - oneself, oneself) - Philosophy. teaching, acc. to-rum really there is only one subject (subjective "I"), and any reality outside his consciousness yavl. illusory. According to Schopenhauer, the doctrine of which is often cited as an example of philosophy. S., representatives of this philosophy. ideas in their purest form can only be found in the insane asylum. However, the history of philosophy knows many examples of "moderate S.", which is presented in three versions: 1) In addition to a single subjective "I", the existence of a transcendental subject is recognized, which is a real source of the content of consciousness "I" and, ultimately, immanent to the personal " I "(Uddalaki brahmanism, Shankara's advaita vedanta, Chinese and Japanese Chan / Zen Buddhism, Schopenhauer's voluntarism); 2) The existence of a transcendental subject is recognized, potentially identified with the subjective "I" as a result of the latter's self-development (the subjective idealism of Berkeley, Hume and Fichte); 3) There is a “methodol. S. ", considering the cognition of reality as a process starting from the extreme S. and continuing in the direction of movement from int. content of "I" to the images generated by its activity externally. reality (Descartes, Kant, Husserl). By the formula of philosophy. S. often makes the statement of Berkeley: "Esse est percipi" ("To exist is to be perceived"). E.V. Gutov

Excellent definition

Incomplete definition ↓

Intelligent tricks. Criticism of modern philosophy of postmodernism [with an afterword by D. Kralechkin] Bricmont Jean

Solipsism and skepticism

When my brain produces in my soul the sensation of a tree or a house, I hastily say that a tree or a house really exists outside of me, and I even know their location, size, and other qualities. Therefore, there is no man or animal who would doubt this truth. If any peasant wanted to doubt her, if he, for example, said that he does not believe that his bailly exists, although he would be in front of him, he would be mistaken for a madman and with good reason; but when such judgments are put forward by a philosopher, he wants everyone to admire his reason and enlightenment, infinitely superior to the reason and enlightenment of the people.

Leonard Euler (1911, p. 220)

Start over. How can we hope to achieve an objective (even approximate and partial) knowledge of the world? We never have direct access to it; only our sensations are directly familiar to us. How do we know that there is something outside of them?

The answer is that we have no proof that anything exists outside of our senses; it is simply an eminently reasonable hypothesis. The most natural way to explain the persistence of our sensations (especially unpleasant ones) is to assume that they are generated by causes external to our consciousness. Almost always, we can dispose of, as we ourselves want, the sensations that are products of our imagination, but no one with a simple effort of thought will stop the war, will not make the lion disappear and will not fix the broken car. Obviously, and it must be emphasized, this argument does not refute solipsism. If someone persists in asserting that he is "a harpsichord that plays by itself" (Diderot), there is no way to convince him that he is mistaken. Nevertheless, we have never met sincere solipsists and we doubt that they exist at all 45. This illustrates an important principle that we will use many times: the fact that a certain opinion cannot be refuted does not in any way imply that there is any reason to believe it to be true.

In place of solipsism, radical skepticism is often encountered. Of course, they say in this case, there is a world external to my consciousness, but I have no way of getting reliable knowledge about it. And again the same argument: directly I have access only to my sensations; How should I know, correspond are they real? To do this, I would have to resort to the argument a priori, such as the proof of the benevolence of the deity in Descartes, and such proofs in modern philosophy have become (for quite reasonable reasons, which we will not consider) very dubious.

This problem, like many others, was beautifully formulated by Hume:

Whether sensory perceptions are produced by external objects that resemble them is a matter of fact, but how could it be resolved? Naturally, through experience, like all questions of a similar nature. But experience in this case is silent and cannot act otherwise. Only perceptions are always presented to the mind, and there is no way for it to achieve any experience of their connection with objects. Thus, the assumption of such a connection has no reasonable basis. (David Hume, A Study of Human Cognition, 1982, p. 160)

What position to take in relation to radical skepticism? In short, the answer is that Hume's skepticism applies to to all our knowledge: not only the existence of atoms, electrons or genes, but also the fact that blood flows through the veins, that the Earth is (approximately) round, that at birth we came out of our mother's belly. Indeed, even the most trivial knowledge of everyday life - like the fact that there is a glass in front of me - depends entirely on the hypothesis that our perceptions systematically we are not deceived into thinking that they are produced by external objects that resemble them in some way 46. The universality of Hume's skepticism is at the same time its weakness. It is, of course, irrefutable. But since no one is skeptical (when at least he or she is sincere) about ordinary knowledge, one has to ask oneself, why skepticism is rejected in this area and why it nevertheless turns out to be significant in relation to something else, for example, scientific knowledge. The motive according to which we reject systematic skepticism in everyday life is more or less obvious and it rests on approximately the same reasoning that leads us to reject solipsism. The best way to explain the coherence of our experience is to assume that the external world at least roughly corresponds to its image, which is presented to us by the senses.

From the book Am I an Atheist or an Agnostic? by Russell Bertrand

Skepticism The likelihood and possibility of the existence of a Christian god is the same as that of the Homeric gods. I cannot prove that the Christian god or Homeric gods do not exist, but I do not think that the likelihood of their existence is

From the book Philosophical Dictionary of Mind, Matter, Morality [fragments] by Russell Bertrand

4. Skepticism Skepticism in the form in which I advocate it means only the following: 1) if the experts agree, the opposite opinion cannot be considered true; 2) if they do not agree, non-experts should not take any opinion as correct; 3) when all

From the book of the Word of the Pygmy the author Akutagawa Ryunosuke

84. Solipsism Thus, I confine myself to what is called "solipsism", that is, the theory that there is only one I exist. This point of view is difficult to refute, but it is even more difficult to believe in it. I once received a letter from a philosopher who stated that he

From the book Philosopher at the Edge of the Universe. SF-Philosophy, or Hollywood Comes to the Rescue: Philosophical Problems in Sci-Fi Films by Rowlands Mark

From the book History of Philosophy the author Skirbekk Gunnar

Skepticism Descartes's thought, his ideas about the dream and the evil spirit were directed in a certain direction - towards skepticism, the doctrine of knowledge, the main position of which is that a person cannot have knowledge. Therefore, we cannot claim to know anything. Myself

From the book Ancient Philosophy the author Asmus Valentin Ferdinandovich

54. Skepticism The point of view according to which objective knowledge of reality is impossible. So, a skeptical view of the world around us suggests that a person cannot know whether he is dealing with objective reality or with his own idea of it.

From the book Phenomenology of Spirit the author

Skepticism Ancient skeptics (eg Pyrrho, Pyrrho, c. 360-270 BC, Carneades, Carneades c. 213-128 BC, Sextus Empiricus, Sextus Empiricus, c. 200 AD) mainly interested in epistemological issues. On the whole, they doubted the possibility of giving definite answers to them.

From the book Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Book two the author Hegel Georg Wilhelm Friedrich

Vi. Skepticism Antique skepticism was one of the first such movements. Like any significant phenomenon of philosophical life and thought, skepticism did not arise from scratch: it was formed on the basis of ideas that were developed by the development of philosophy that preceded it. Already

From the book Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Book three the author Hegel Georg Wilhelm Friedrich

2. Skepticism Skepticism is the realization of what stoicism is only a concept, and a real experience of what freedom of thought is; it is negative in itself and must manifest itself in this way. With the reflection of self-awareness into a simple thought about oneself, in spite of

From the book Human cognition of its scope and boundaries by Russell Bertrand

D. Skepticism Skepticism completed the point of view of the subjectivity of all knowledge by the fact that in general, in the place of being, speaking of knowledge, he put the expression "seeming". This skepticism comes out as something extremely impressive, which we must treat with great respect.

From the book The Concept of Consciousness by Ryle Gilbert

A. Idealism and Skepticism Thinking is generally a simple universal equality to itself, but as a negative movement, thanks to which the definite is removed. This movement of being-for-itself now turns out to be an essential (370) moment of thought itself, while hitherto

From the book Epistemology Classical and Non-Classical the author Lektorsky Vladislav Alexandrovich

CHAPTER 2 SOLIPSISM The teaching called "solipsism" is usually defined as the belief that there is only one I exist. But if it is not true, then it is no longer a teaching. If true, it is a statement that I, Bertrand Russell, exist only one. But if it's false and if I

From the book Philosophical Dictionary the author Comte Sponville André

(10) Solipsism Modern philosophers are concerned with the problem of our knowledge of the consciousness of other people. Having bound themselves with the dogma of the spirit in the machine, they found that it was impossible to find any logically satisfactory evidence to justify a person's belief in existence.

From the author's book

Skepticism (Scepticisme) In the technical sense of the word - something opposite to dogmatism. To be a skeptic is to believe that every thought is doubtful and that we cannot have absolute certainty about anything. It is easy to see that in order to preserve itself, skepticism, questioning everything,

From the author's book

Solipsism (Solipsisme) The belief that in the whole world there is only me (ipse) alone (solus). According to the solipsist, the existence of the rest of the world (insofar as it is given to us in sensations) remains doubtful, in contrast to the "I" (insofar as the "I" is given to us in

Today, many people consider their opinion to be the only correct one and not subject to any doubt. The existence of another reality, which is somewhat different from their own, such individuals reject and treat it critically. Philosophers have paid enough attention to this phenomenon. Investigating this self-awareness, they came to certain conclusions. This article focuses on solipsism as a manifestation with a subjective centric attitude.

General concepts

The philosophical term "solipsism" comes from the Latin solus-ipse ("one, oneself"). In other words, a solipsist is a person with a point of view that perceives without doubt only one reality: his own consciousness. The entire external world, outside one's own consciousness, and other animate beings are subject to doubt.

The philosophical position of such a person, undoubtedly, asserts only his own subjective experience, information processed by individual consciousness. Everything that exists independently of it, including the body, is only a part of subjective experience. It can be argued that a solipsist is a person with a point of view that expresses the logic of the subjective and centrist attitude that was adopted in Western classical philosophy of modern times (after Descartes).

The duality of theory

Nevertheless, many philosophers found it difficult to express their point of view in a spirit of solipsism. This is due to the contradiction arising in connection with the postulates and facts of scientific consciousness.

Descartes said: "I think - it means I exist." With this statement, with the help of ontological proof, he spoke about the existence of God. According to Descartes, God is not a deceiver and, therefore, He guarantees the reality of other people and the entire external world.

So, a solipsist is a person for whom only he himself is a reality. And, as mentioned above, a person is real, first of all, not as a material body, but exclusively in the form of a set of acts of consciousness.

The meaning of solipsism can be understood in two ways:

Consciousness as a real personal experience of its own as the only possible entails the assertion of the "I" as the owner of this experience. The theses of Descartes and Berkeley are close to this understanding.
Even with the existence of the only undoubted personal experience, there is no “I” to which that very experience belongs. “I” is just a collection of elements of the same experience.

It turns out that a solipsist is a paradoxical person. The duality of solipsism was best expressed by L. Wittgenstein in his "Logical-Philosophical Treatise". Modern philosophy is more and more inclined to such a point of view that the inner world of "I" and individual consciousness is not possible without communication of the subject in the real material world with other people.

Tight framework

Modern philosophers-solipsists abandon the framework of classical philosophy regarding the subjective centrist attitude. Already in his later works, Wittgenstein wrote about the inconsistency of such positions of solipsism and the impossibility of purely internal experience. Since 1920, the opinion has begun to assert that people fundamentally cannot agree with solipsism offered on behalf of another person. If a person considers himself separately from others, then solipsism will look convincing about self-experience, but it is the attitude towards another person that is a statement of a real experience.

What position was expressed by famous solipsists of the past and present?

Berkeley identified physical things with the totality of sensations. He believed that no one perceives the continuity of the existence of things, the impossibility of their disappearance is ensured by the perception of God. And this happens all the time.

D. Hume believed that from an exclusively theoretical point of view it is impossible to prove the existence of other people together with the outside world. A person needs to believe in their reality. Without this faith, knowledge and practical life are impossible.

Schopenhauer noted that an extreme solipsist is a person who can be mistaken for insane, since he recognizes the reality of the exclusive "I". More realistic may be a moderate solipsist who recognizes the super-individual "I" in a certain form as a carrier of consciousness.

Kant considers his own experience to be the construction of his “I”: not empirical, but transcendental, in which the differences between others and his own personality are erased. With regard to the empirical "I", we can say that his inner awareness of his own states presupposes external experience and consciousness of independent material objects and objective events.

Psychology and solipsism

Such modern ones as Fodor J., believe that the main strategy of research in this area of science should be methodological solipsism. a position different from the classical understanding of philosophers, according to which it is necessary to study psychological processes by conducting an analysis outside the relationship to the external world and its events together with other people. This position does not deny the existence of the external world, but the facts of consciousness and mental processes are associated with the activity of the brain as a material formation in space and time. However, many psychologists and philosophers consider this position to be a dead end.

Radical views

I wonder what extreme conclusion logically comes to a solipsist who can be considered radical?

Although this position is sometimes more logical, it is at the same time implausible. If we start only from the observance of logical correctness, to which solipsism seeks, then a person should limit himself only to mental states that he is now directly aware of. For example, Buddha contented himself with reflecting on the growling of tigers around him. If he were a solipsist and thought logically consistently, then, in his opinion, the tigers would stop roaring when he stopped noticing them.

An extreme form of solipsism says that the universe consists only of what can be perceived at a given moment. A radical solipsist must argue that if for some time his gaze absent-mindedly dwelt on something or someone, then nothing happened in him as a result.

AGNOSTICISM (from the Greek. Agnostic ideas became widespread in the 19th century. among English naturalists.

SOLIPSISM

(from Lat. solus - one, only and ipse - itself) - a kind of idealism, which asserts that only the thinking subject is an undoubted reality, and all other individuals and objects exist only in his mind.

George Berkeley - English philosopher, bishop (1685-1753).

“Everything that exists is singular,” he says in his treatise On the Principles of Human Knowledge. The general exists only as a generalized visual image of the singular.

An abstracted, abstract understanding is impossible because the qualities of objects are inseparably united in an object.

The concept of representative thinking. According to this concept, there can be no abstract general ideas, but there can be particular ideas that are similar ideas of a given kind. So, any particular triangle that replaces or represents all right-angled triangles can be called general, but a triangle is absolutely impossible at all.

Berkeley regarded the idea of matter or corporeal substance as "the most abstract and incomprehensible of all ideas". “Denying her does not bring any harm to the rest of the human race, which will never notice her absence. The atheist really needs this ghost of an empty name to justify his godlessness, and philosophers will find, perhaps, that they have lost a strong reason for idle talk. "

Berkeley's doctrine is subjective idealism. "To exist is to be perceived." The immediate objects of our cognition are not external objects, but only our sensations and representations; in the process of cognition, we are not able to perceive anything except our own sensations.

Materialistic epistemology, recognizing that our sensations are direct objects of cognition, assumes that sensations still give us knowledge of the external world, which generates these sensations by its influence on our sense organs. Berkeley, while defending subjective-idealistic attitudes, asserts that the cognizing subject deals only with his own sensations, which not only do not reflect external objects, but actually constitute these objects. In A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley comes to two conclusions. First, we know nothing but our sensations. Secondly, the totality of sensations or "collection of ideas" is what is objectively called things. Things or single products are nothing more than a modification of our consciousness.

Solipsism is a teaching that makes the existence of the objective world dependent on its perception in the consciousness of the individual "I".

Such a point of view, if adhered to to the end, leads to the transformation of the world into an illusion of the perceiving subject. D. Berkeley understood the vulnerability of such a position and tried to overcome the extremes of subjectivity. For this purpose, he was forced to admit the existence of "thinking things" or "spirits", the perception of which determines the continuity of the existence of "inconceivable things." For example, when I close my eyes, or leave the room, then the things that I saw there may exist, but only in the perception of another person. But in this case, the question naturally arises, what to do with existence before a person arose. Indeed, even according to the teachings of Christianity, of which Bishop Berkeley was an adherent, the real world arose before man. And Berkeley was forced to retreat from his subjectivism and, in fact, to take the position of objective idealism. According to Berkeley, God is the creator of the entire surrounding world and the guarantor of its existence in the consciousness of the subject.

Traditional theology, according to Berkeley, argues as follows: "God exists, therefore he perceives things." One should reason like this: “Sensual things really exist, and if they really exist, they are necessarily perceived by an infinite spirit, therefore an infinite spirit or God exists”.

7. Skepticism of D. Hume

English philosopher David Hume (1711-1766), author of "A Treatise on Human Nature", "Studies on Human Cognition", in his creative activity paid attention to many problems of history, ethics, economics, philosophy, religion. But the central place in his research was occupied by questions of the theory of knowledge.

Hume reduces the task of philosophy to the study of the subjective world of man, his images, perception, the definition of those relations that develop in the course of time in human consciousness.

The main elements of experience are perceptions (perceptions), which consist of two forms of cognition: perceptions and ideas. The distinction between perceptions and ideas is established by the degree of vivacity and brightness with which they strike our minds. Impressions are such perceptions that enter consciousness with the greatest strength and irrepressibility and embrace all our sensations, affects and emotions at their first manifestation in the soul. Ideas mean "faint images of these impressions in thinking and reasoning."

The reason for the appearance of impressions and sensations, according to Hume, is unknown. It should be identified not by philosophers, but by anatomists and physiologists. They are the ones who can and should determine which of the sense organs give a person the greatest and most reliable information about the world. Philosophy is interested in the impressions of reflection. According to Hume, they arise as a result of the action on the mind of some ideas of sensations (i.e. copies of impressions, sensations). The order of the sequence of ideas preserves memory, and the imagination moves them freely. However, the activity of the mind, according to Hume, does not add anything new to the source material. All the creative power of the mind, he said, comes down only to the ability to combine, mix, increase or decrease the material delivered to us by external feelings and experience.

Since Hume divorces the content of consciousness from the external world, the question of the connection between ideas and things for him disappears. An essential issue for further research of the cognitive process becomes for him the question of the relationship between various ideas.

Three types of idea associations are found:

The first type is similarity association. By this type of association, we cognize the similar as if we saw a portrait of a person, then we immediately revive the image of this person in our memory.

The second type is associations by contiguity in space and time. Hume believes that if you are not far from home, then the thought of loved ones is much brighter and more vivid than if you were at a considerable distance from home.

The third type is associations of causality. The relationship between space and time, as well as causality for Hume, is not an objectively existing reality, but only the result of a causal connection of perception.

Hume extends skepticism to spiritual, including divine, substance. In his opinion, with the help of experience it is impossible to discover a special perception of spiritual substance. Individual impressions are themselves substances and do not need support from anything else. If there was a spiritual substance, it would be permanent. But no impression is permanent.

Hume's skepticism, associated with his refusal to reduce perception, on the one hand, to the external world, and on the other, to the spiritual substance of God, is one of the forms of agnosticism.

SOLIPSISM

(from Lat. solus - one, only and ipse -) - a kind of idealism, asserting that only the thinking person is the undoubted reality, and all other individuals and objects exist only in his mind. A. Schopenhauer noted that only the insane can be an extreme solipsist who recognizes only his own I. More realistic is the moderate S. who recognizes in some form a super-individual I, which is the bearer of consciousness. Thus, J. Berkeley argued that all things exist as “ideas” in the divine mind, which brings sensations to a person. I.G. Fichte ultimately identified the I not with individual consciousness, but with the self-consciousness of all mankind.
Epistemologically, S. means a doctrine that considers the individual I and its only possible or only correct starting point for constructing a theory of knowledge.
In an ethical sense, S. sometimes means extreme, egocentrism.

Philosophy: Encyclopedic Dictionary. - M .: Gardariki. Edited by A.A. Ivina. 2004 .

SOLIPSISM

(from lat. solus is one, only and ipse is itself), the extreme of subjective idealism, in which only the thinking subject is recognized as an undoubted reality, and everything else is declared to exist only in the consciousness of the individual. S. is in contradiction with all life experience, with the data of science and practical. activities. In follow. S.'s form is extremely rare, in some thinkers (for example, the French philosopher and physician 17 in. K. Brunet).

The adherents of this trend strive, how, to avoid consistent S. by synthesizing subjective and objective idealism, thereby testifying to the inconsistency of their foundations. Thus, the idealist Berkeley, trying to evade the accusation of S., declared that all things exist as "ideas" in deities. the mind that "implants" into the consciousness of people; he, T. O., moved to the position of objective idealism of the Platonist type. Fichte also led to S., although he himself emphasized that the absolute "I", which is the basis of his scientific teaching, is not an individual "I", but ultimately coincides with the self-consciousness of all mankind. It was clearly manifested to S. in the philosophy of Machism. (empirio-criticism) (cm. V. I. Lenin, "Materialism and", in book: PSS, T. 18, with. 92-96) ... Even more clearly than in empirio-criticism, S. led (Schuppe, R. Schubert-Soldern).

The term "S." sometimes used in eth. sense as extreme egoism, egocentrism (t. n. practical S., in the terminology of the existentialist Marcel)... A striking representative of this form S. was Stirner. , Russian religion philosopher, poet, publicist and critic. Son of S. M. Solovyov. After a speech against the death penalty in March 1881 (in connection with the murder of Alexander II by the Narodnaya Volya) S. was forced to leave teaching. work. In the 80s biennium performed preim. as a publicist, preaching the unification of the "East" and "West" through the reunification of churches, fighting for freedom of conscience, against national religions. discrimination. In the 90s biennium was engaged Philos. and lit. work; translated Plato, led Philos. department in the encyclopedic. Dictionary of Brockhaus and Efron.

In his philosophy, which rejects the revolutionary-democratic. , S. took the most meaning. in history Russian idealism attempt to unite in the "great synthesis" christ. platonism, German classic (ch. arr. Schelling) and scientific. empiricism. This obviously contradictory metaphysical. , undergoing continuous restructuring, was supposed to serve the mind. "Justification" of vital morals. searches and mythopoetic. S.'s dreams. Believing that "the moral element ... not only can, but must be taken as the basis of theoretical philosophy" (Collected. Op., T. 9, SPB, 1913 , with. 97) S. tied Philos. creativity with a positive resolution of the life question "to be or not to be truth on earth", understanding the truth as a realization christ. ideal (for the socialist teachings S. recognized only the relative socio-historical truth)... IN end 70s and 80s biennium in an atmosphere of searching for ways to transform Russia, S. as a counterweight to both the radical democratic and late Slavophil and official-protective tendencies came out from social positions close to liberal populism. Moderate reformist polit. his views were combined with the mystical-maximalist preaching of "theurgic work" designed to "rid" the material world of destroys. the impact of time and space, transforming it into "imperishable" beauty, and with the historiosophical theory christ."Divine-human process" as the total salvation of mankind ("Readings on God-manhood", 1877-81)... Looking for a practical ways to solve this "universal" problem, S. later comes to theocratic. utopia, polit. the consequence of which is the union between the pope and Russian tsar as a legal guarantee of the "divine-human cause" (cm., ex., "The history and future of theocracy", 1887)... The collapse of this utopia is captured in Philos. S.'s confessions "The Life Drama of Plato" (1898) and in "Three Conversations ..." (1900). The end of S.'s life was marked by a tide of catastrophic forebodings and a departure from previous Philos. designs towards Christian eschatology.

Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary. 2010 .

SOLIPSISM

(from Latin solus - the only one and ipse - itself) is an extreme form of subjective idealism, in which only the thinking subject is recognized as an undoubted reality, and everything else is declared to exist only in the consciousness of the individual. S. is in conflict with life experience and everyday human. activities. In follow. S.'s form is extremely rare, at dep. thinkers (for example, the philosopher and physician of the 17th century K. Brunet). According to Schopenhauer, complete solipsists can only be found among the inhabitants of the insane asylum.

Supporters of this trend tend, as a rule, to avoid explicit S. by synthesizing subjective and objective idealism, thereby testifying to the inconsistency of their foundations. So, Berkeley, trying to get away from the accusation of S., declared that all things exist as "ideas" in deities. mind, to-ry "introduces" sensation into the consciousness of people, and so on. passed to the position of idealism of the Platonist type. Fichte's subjective idealism also led to S., although he himself emphasized that the absolute I, which is the basis of his scientific teaching, is not an individual I, but ultimately coincides with the self-consciousness of all mankind. The tendency towards S. was clearly manifested in the philosophy of empirio-criticism (see V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism). Even more clearly than in empirio-criticism, the immanent led to S. Schubert-Soldern, for example, declared in the spirit of Fichte that the "theoretical-cognitive" S. is irrefutable (see R. von Schubert-Soldern, Grundlagen einer Erkenntnißtheorie, Lpz., 1884). With gnoseological. S. Schuppe was also justified (W. Schuppe, Der Solipsismus, in the journal "Zeitschrift für immanente Philosophie", 1898, Η. 3). The tendency towards S. is manifested in various forms of subjectivism.

The term "S." also used in eth. sense, as extreme egoism, egocentrism (the so-called practical. S., in the terminology of the existentialist Marcel). A striking representative of this form S. was Stirner. To "practical. S." gravitate and many others. representatives of modern. bourgeois. "egotism".

B. Meerovsky. Moscow.

Philosophical Encyclopedia. In 5 volumes - M .: Soviet encyclopedia. Edited by F. V. Konstantinov. 1960-1970 .

SOLIPSISM

SOLIPSISM (from Latin solus - the only one and ipse - itself) - philosophical, according to which undoubtedly the data is only one's own subjective, data of individual consciousness, and everything that is considered to exist independently of it (including the world external to the consciousness of physical things, other people) , in reality - only part of this experience. The point of view of solipsism expresses the logic of the subjective-centric attitude that was adopted in the classical Western philosophy of modern times after Descartes (see Subjective ^ Theory of knowledge

niya, I). At the same time, the contradiction of the position with the facts of ordinary common sense and the postulates of scientific knowledge did not allow the majority of philosophers who adhered to the subject-centric attitude to draw conclusions in the spirit of solipsism. So, Descartes, who put forward that the only self-evident truth is “I think, therefore I am,” with the help of ontological proof, asserted God, who cannot be a deceiver and therefore guarantees the reality of the external world and other people. Berkeley, who identifies physical things with a set of sensations, believed that the existence of things, that is, their disappearance when they are not perceived by anyone, is provided by their constant perception by God. From the point of view of Hume, although purely theoretically it is impossible to prove the existence of the external world and other people, it is necessary to believe in their reality, for without such faith, practical and knowledge is impossible. According to Kant, experience is a construction of I. But it is not an empirical I, but an I. in which, in essence, it is erased between myself and others. As for the I of an empirical individual, his internal experience (states of his own consciousness) presupposes an external experience (consciousness of physical objects and objective events independent of the individual I).

There are two ways to understand the meaning of solipsism. According to the first, the affirmation as the only real my personal experience entails also the affirmation of the I, to whom this experience belongs. This is consistent with the theses of Descartes and Berkeley. According to another understanding, although the only certainty is my personal experience; there is no I to which this experience refers, for I am nothing but a combination of elements of the same experience. The paradox of such an understanding of solipsism was well expressed by L. Wittgenstein in his "Logical-Philosophical Treatise", linking this understanding, however, not with the undoubted givenness of my sensory experience in the form of sensations (as was the case with Hume and Mach), with the givenness of my language and the facts described by this language. On the one hand, Wittgenstein emphasizes, I am my world, on the other hand, “the subject does not belong to the world, but represents a certain border of the world” (L. Wittgenstein Philosophical Works, part l. M., 1994, p. 56). “What solipsism implies is absolutely correct,” he believes, “only it cannot be said, but reveals itself” (ibid.). Therefore, “... strictly carried out solipsism coincides with pure realism. The “I” of solipsism shrinks to a non-extended point, while the reality correlated with it remains ”(ibid., P. 57). In fact, consistently carried out solipsism, identifying with the real only that which is directly given in my experience, does not allow even the past facts of my consciousness to be considered real, that is, it also makes it impossible for the continuity of my consciousness (see Russell B. Human cognition. M. , 1957, pp. 208-214).

Some representatives of modern cognitive psychology (J. Fodor and others) believe; what so n. methodological solipsism should be the main research strategy in this science. This refers to the point of view according to which the study of psychological processes presupposes them outside of relation to the events of the external world and other people. This, of course, is not solipsism in its classical philosophical understanding, for the existence of the external world is not denied, but mental processes, facts of consciousness are associated with the activity of the brain, which exists as a formation in space and time. Many philosophers and psychologists (for example, H. Putnam, D. Dennett and others) believe that the point of view of methodological solipsism is a dead end, since it is impossible to understand consciousness and psyche outside the relationship to the external world and the world of interhuman interactions.

In modern philosophy, the point of view is increasingly being adopted, according to which individual consciousness, including the I, is possible only as a result of the subject's communications with other people in the real physical world. The position of solipsism could seem logically possible only within the framework of the subject-centered attitude of classical philosophy, which modern philosophy rejects. L. Wittgenstein wrote about the impossibility of purely internal experience and the inconsistency of the position of solipsism in his later works. M.M.Bakhtin since the 1920s. showed that if he considers himself outside the relationship to others, then from the point of view of self-experience, solipsism may seem convincing, but we fundamentally cannot agree with the same solipsism proposed on behalf of another person. It is to the other that the real I constitutes, and not the one from which the philosophical one proceeded. See Art. Consciousness, Self-awareness, I to lit. to them.

V. A. Lektorsky

SOLIPSISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. In the Indian religious and philosophical, two teachings came close to the ideas of solipsism, in which the concept of "pure consciousness" plays a special role: among the unorthodox teachings - the Buddhist vijnana-vada, among the orthodox - the advaita-Vedanta. According to vijnana-vada, of all the skandhas, or elements of the universe, only vnjnana (consciousness) is real, while all the others are derived from it. Since it itself produces not only representations and ideas, but also sensory data, we can assume that the world is generated by the activity of consciousness. Nevertheless, the vijnana-vada restrains itself from extreme solipsist conclusions due to the postulation of a certain common "receptacle of consciousness" (alatyajayana). In other words, from the point of view of Buddhist Vijnanavadins, this is not my own, subjective consciousness, but the general dream of the Alayavijnana, to which the consciousness is only able to connect from time to time. According to the notions of Advaita Vedanta, only the highest Brahman is real, which is understood as pure consciousness (jinna), or pure (cit, upalabdhi). The whole world owes its existence to the temporary obscurity of this perception (therefore, it is essentially defined as either ignorance), or, what is the same, the deployment of a "cosmic illusion" (beckoning). In some directions of advaita-Vedanta, the existence of the empirical world is directly reduced to its perceptibility (such is the drishti-srishti-vada, or the teaching of a vision, equivalent to creation, by the advaitist Prakasananda (16th - early 17th centuries). However, even before the formation of this teaching, in the compendium , attributed to the advaitist Shankara, expounds the concept of "eka-jiva-vada", a kind of